LAND REFORM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN RURAL IRAN

BY

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ABSTRACT

Prior to land reform in Iran, there existed the articulation of capitalist and feudal modes of production. The relations of production of each mode reproduced/reinforced the relations of production of both. Thus, the relationship among the agents of production (producers and non-producers) were semi-feudal-semi-capitalist. The peasants, being subjected to feudal exploitation, made attempts in two different periods to end this feudal relationship, but failed.

The fully-fledged development of capitalism was blocked by the articulated combination of the capitalist and feudal modes of production. The failure of the peasants to remove feudal ties, made it clear that the peasantry on its own was unable to open the way for the development of capitalism (the "American" path). However, the economic and political crisis of 1959-1961 broke the alliance of the feudal landlords on the one hand and comprador bourgeoisie on the other. Thus the latter by mobilizing the peasantry, managed to launch a land reform programme.

This programme removed the set of feudal relations of production and therefore prepared the ground for the development of capitalism. Some peasants received land while the rest became part of the landless and urban proletariat. Some of the landlords began to employ machinery and wage-labour and thus became capitalist farmers. The "American" and "Prussian" paths of development of capitalism went on side by side. The articulation of these two paths of development has become the characteristic feature of rural Iran after the implementation of land reform.


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Sources/Quellen/Források: Various press reports

CONTENTS

Abbreviations:

A.D.B.I.	:	Agricultural Development Bank of Iran
C.B.I.	:	The Central Bank of Iran
C.O.R.C.	:	Central Organization for Rural Cooperation
G.O.P.F.	:	Guerrilla Organization of the People's Fadaee
K.W.P.A.	:	Khuzistan Water and Power Authority
L-R	:	Land Reform
N.B.I.	:	National Bank of Iran
N.I.O.C.	:	National Iranian Oil Company
R.G.	:	Research Group of Faculty of Economics, University of Tehran
T.E.	:	Tahqiqat-e Eqtesadi (Quarterly Journal of Economic Research)

INTRODUCTION

In 1962 a nation-wide land reform programme was launched by the central Government. This study is concerned to attempt to discover how the programme affected rural Iran. Thus this thesis sets out to analyse relations of production in rural Iran before and after the implementation of land reform, to examine the nature of this programme, and in so doing to establish the relationship between the land reform programme and the development of capitalism in rural Iran. In the first part of this study, we shall argue that prior to land reform, rural Iran was characterized by an articulated combination of feudal and capitalist modes of production. Our argument in the second part will reveal that the nation-wide land reform programme had a transitional function. And finally, in the third part we shall set out to explain that after land reform the two processes of development of capitalism, i.e. the "American" and "Prussian" ways, have gone on side by side.

Before outlining the structure of the thesis, we should briefly state our understanding of the major concepts of feudal and capitalist modes of production, and their articulation as these terms have been used throughout this study. The 'feudal mode of production' is understood as a mode of production in which the direct-producer owns or may own all means of production (e.g. oxen and tools) but land. He is assigned to a plot of land by the landlord. The latter is able to exploit the former (in different forms) because of his political dominance. The render of surplus takes place outside the labour-process, and therefore the political dominance provides the conditions of existence of exploitative relations of production within the structure of this mode of production. By the capitalist mode of production, we mean a mode of production in which the direct producer is completely separated from the objective conditions of production, so he has to sell his labour-power to the owner of means of production. The capitalist, in this mode of production, organizes and conducts the

labour-process. It is within this process that the direct-producer renders surplus-value. That is, the exploitation takes place through an economic mechanism.

Any social formation contains more than one mode of production. These modes of production are articulated in the sense that the elements of the modes of production are joined together in a structure in such a way that the whole is itself defined by relationships obtaining between the elements. Thus an articulated combination of capitalist and feudal modes of production refers to the existence within the relationships between agents of production (direct-producer and non-producer) of capitalist and feudal elements. Ambiguities of delineating feudal and capitalist relations in the transitional period clearly cause problems of identifying which elements are feudal and which capitalist. What is apparently a feudal economic relationship (e.g. share-cropping) may hide the emergence of underlying capitalist relations. However, such a mode of production may still be labelled 'feudal' because of the continued, though less enforced, existence of non-economic coercion outside the labour process (e.g. the obligations of labour service or dues in kind). These ambiguities of definition will be more clear by the concrete analysis of rural Iran.

It is very fluidity of the articulation process which leads to the conclusion that rural Iran should be categorized as a semi-feudal - semi-capitalist social formation. By this we mean a social formation which is dominated neither by capitalism not by feudalism, and as such is in a transitional period. The transition from feudalism to capitalism may, following Kautsky and Lenin, be categorized as entailing two main processes, the "American" and the "Prussian". The former refers to a process by which capitalist relationships develop among the peasants, polarizing into a class of landowners and landless labourers. By the "Prussian" way is meant the process by which the feudal landlords become capitalist farmers, therefore employing the peasants as wage-labourers and produce for the

market.

In the first part of this study, we deal with the relations of production during the period of 1940-1960. We shall distinguish two sets of relations of production in the Iranian rural social formation: one embracing the relationship between landlord and peasant, and the other encompassing the relationship between the peasants. Thus in the first six chapters, we examine different aspects of the relationships between landlord and peasants while in chapter seven we study the relationships between the peasants,

In the first chapter, we examine the property relations in the Iranian rural social formation. There were five elements of production, i.e. land, water, oxen, seeds and labour. Our examination of the property relations shows that land and water in almost all cases belonged to the landlords; whereas oxen and seed in most cases belonged to the peasantry. However, the peasants, as direct-producers, were assigned to the position of possession of land/water by landlords for reasons of economic calculation. Yet the landlords had the power to dismiss their subjects from this position, though they were faced with some restrictions. Our examples in this chapter reveal the struggle between landlords and peasants over the ownership/possession of land/water.

Having studied the property relations and the subordination of peasants to landlords, we move in the second and third chapters to examine the different forms of the extraction of surplus. Thus in the second chapter, we show that the share-cropping system was the dominant form of rent payment in almost all parts of Iran but the Caspian sea littoral. The analysis of this form of rent payment reveals that it is neither a capitalist rent nor a feudal rent. In fact, the share-cropping system has the elements of both capitalist and feudal systems. However, we have distinguished two types of share-cropping, one is for the winter crops and the other for summer crops. The former type includes rent for land and water (irrigated cultivation), rent for land (unirrigated cultivation) and

rent for water. In terms of the relations of production, the latter type of share cropping is very different from the former type. That is, our analysis of the share-cropping of the summer crops reveals that it is a type of capitalist rent payment. Another form of rent payment was the fixed rent system. In this system the direct-producers had to pay a certain amount of produce and/or money to their landlords. This form of rent payment was the dominant form in the Caspian sea littoral; whereas to a limited extent it was practised in the other parts of the country. In addition to these two types of rents, in some cases, the peasants paid the rent partially as fixed rent and partially as a portion of the produce. In this chapter, we also discuss the question of the form of payment (in cash or in kind) in relation to the mode of production in order to find out whether or not it is scientific to identify a mode of production only on the basis of forms of payment.

In addition to the types of rents cited above, the Iranian peasants were subjected to other forms of rent, in particular labour service and dues. However, these latter were supplementary to the above mentioned rents. In chapter three, we examine labour-service and dues in detail. We shall explain how the peasants had to perform labour service with no return. As we shall argue in this chapter, labour service and dues are forms of direct exploitation characteristic of the feudal mode of production.

Having concluded that the peasants were subordinated to their landlords and had to pay them rent in different forms, in the fourth chapter we shall examine whether or not the former were tied to the land. Thus we shall examine factors which prevented the peasants from migration as well as factors which were *exogenous* to the rural social formation and could indirectly affect the relationship between producer and non-producer in the rural areas.

Having analysed the property relations and forms of exploitation in the first four chapters, we shall go on to examine the peasant's revolts

during 1940s and 1950s. We shall argue that during these two decades, there were two types of peasants' struggles. In some cases, the struggles of the peasants were restricted to the economic domain for example to demand a reduction of rents and dues. But in other cases, the peasants rose against the landlords and occupied the land on which they worked, thus making an attempt to overthrow the feudal system. However, all these revolts were suppressed by the State.

In order to impose their power upon the peasantry (for the extraction of surplus), the landed classes, which owned around 83% of all cultivable lands, had to either rent its lands to other agents or assign bailiffs to run its estates. As we shall show, this created a hierarchy on the top of the peasantry. In chapter six, we shall examine the different categories of landowners as well as the way in which each category ran its estates.

Thus far, we shall have treated the peasantry as a homogeneous social category. However, in chapter seven, we shall consider the relations of production among the peasantry. This includes property and labour relations as well as the relation of the direct producers to the produce. First, we set out to analyse the property relations of the peasantry. This includes the ownership/possession of land/water and also ownership of other means of production such as seeds and oxen. As we shall show in this chapter, some peasants owned/possessed means of production. This uneven ownership/possession of the means of production reflected the complex set of relationships existing among the peasantry. Our analysis of the lending/borrowing of oxen, the labour process and also the division the produce among the peasants reveals different aspects of these relationships. In effect, our main concern in this chapter is to establish the extent of differentiation among the Iranian peasantry before the implementation of land reform.

Our argument in chapter eight on the social classes in rural Iran is based on the analysis, in the previous chapter, of the relations of production. Thus with regard to the peasant owner/possessors we shall

distinguish three classes of peasantry: rich, middle and poor peasants. We shall show the different positions which the peasants of different classes occupied within the relations of production, as well as positions of social groups without land, for example the agricultural wage-labourers, artisans and shopkeepers.

In the second part of the thesis, we deal with the activities pertinent to land reform in Iran during 1940-1970. In order to study the land reform movement we consider the different definitions of land reform. However, we shall give a definition of land reform, thus enabling us to analyse land reform in Iran.

Before the implementation of nation-wide land reform in 1962, different governments and local authorities had made partial attempts during 1940s and 1950s to change landed property in Iran. Thus we shall set out to explain the land distribution by the democrats in Azarbaijan and Qavam and Mossadeq's bills in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In addition, we shall deal with the distribution of Public Domain and Crown lands which took place in the 1950s. However, none of these attempts brought about any major change in landed property in the Iranian rural social formation.

In order to find out the causes of the implementation of such an important programme, in the third section of chapter nine, we shall set out to study the economic and political situation in Iran after 1953, i.e. when the coup government came to power and suppressed all types of partial movement. We also explain the opposition of different groups to the implementation of the L-R programme.

Finally, in the fourth section of this chapter, we shall examine the land reform laws. We shall classify the land reform laws into two sets: one technical and the other related to landed property. We shall not discuss the former laws, because they have been explained in detail elsewhere, and shall therefore concentrate on the second set in order to discuss the nature and aims of the nation-wide L-R of 1962, as well as

the detrimental effects of this programme on landed property.

In chapter ten, we shall set out to analyse rural Iran after the implementation of land reform. In the first section, we shall deal with the different aspects of the relations of production among the peasantry. First we shall examine the property relations and try to show the changes which took place due to the L-R programme in this aspect of the relations of production. We shall also examine the ownership of other means of production. We shall then analyse the relationship of the peasantry to the market for capital goods and thus the lending/borrowing of tractors and combines, the consumption of chemical fertilizers and also the use of motor-pumps. The second aspect of the relations of production is labour relations. We shall show how some two million proletarians and semi-proletarians sell their labour power in the rural as well as urban labour markets. We shall also try to discover the reasons for an increase in the number of these two rural classes after the implementation of L-R. The relation of the peasantry to the commodity market is the third aspect which is analysed in this chapter. Thus we shall examine the sale of produce by the different strata of the peasantry in the commodity market. However, in order to sell their produce on the market, the majority of the peasants, as we shall show, are connected to the money market. Thus we shall describe how the majority of the peasants borrow from moneylenders as well as from the cooperatives and banks.

In the second section of chapter ten, we briefly study the economics of capitalist farming. Thus we examine farmers' land ownership and also their investment in machinery and fertilizers. We also analyse their employment of wage-labourers for a period of the year. We shall argue that these capitalist farmers usually have monopsony power in the village labour market, that the vendors of labour power have the opportunity to find jobs outside the village boundaries, and that this weakens the monopsony power of the capitalist farmers in the village labour market. Furthermore, we examine the relation of the capitalist farmers to the

commodity and money markets.

The development of the CMP through the "American" and "Prussian" ways have gone on side by side. Both these forms of development of the CMP are, in effect, articulated. The process of development, however, has always been accompanied by the process of pauperization of the peasantry. This is examined in the third section of the tenth chapter. Thus we briefly explain different forms of the pauperization of the peasantry during the period of 1962-1976.

In the late 1960s, the State initiated two projects to "develop" the agricultural sector of Iran. They are corporation and agro-business projects. We shall therefore briefly examine these in the last chapter.

The first section of chapter eleven presents an argument formation of corporations and the election of board of directors and the manager. We shall show how the peasants could become share-holders and how they are supposed to control the corporations. Generally speaking, we shall concentrate on two questions: First the aims of the formation of corporations and whether or not these aims are achieved; secondly, the changes in the positions of peasant owner/possessors in relation to the means of production. In effect, our main concern is to find out whether or not this project has accelerated the process of proletarianization of the peasantry. As our argument will show, the land reform programme increased the number of proletarians and semi-proletarians; hence by the early 1970s there were around two million of them seeking casual work in the urban and rural labour markets.

In the second section of this chapter, we shall examine the foundation of agro-business units, and in particular the role of the State in the formation of these units of Iran. We shall mainly concentrate on the impact of this project on the relations of production in the villages affected by the formation of these units and the State provision of various facilities in different forms for the agro-business companies.

Our analysis of rural Iran before land reform, the land reform

programme and the process of the development of capitalism after land reform can be contrasted with earlier studies.[1] Previous studies by Denman, Shams-Zanjani and Lambton have considered pre-land reform rural Iran as a feudal social formation. Our analysis shows that rural Iran during 1940s and 1950s was a semi-feudal - semi-capitalist social formation. Russian writers on the subject, for example, Ivanov, Badi and Demin, have considered rural Iran as a semi-feudal - semi-capitalist social formation. For them this is because of the existence of the share-cropping system as the dominant form of extraction of surplus. But we shall argue that this is to oversimplify the complexity of what was in effect the articulation of capitalist and feudal modes of production. Secondly, the land reform programme was a bourgeois reform programme which began to release the forces for the development of capitalism. Some studies (e.g. the G.O.P.F. and Mo'meni) have attributed the reason for the implementation of land reform to the contradiction between the capitalist mode of production (supported by the imperialist powers) and the moribund feudal mode of production. Other studies have attributed the reform to the personal desire of the Shah and other political leaders (see e.g. Lambton, Denman). In our analysis we shall argue against both of these positions and try to show that the implementation of this programme was the result of the struggles between the different social classes particularly, the struggle between landlords and peasants. We shall also show that the economic and political crisis in the late 1950s in Iran played a decisive role in the initiation of the land reform programme. Finally we place emphasis on the role played by the land reform programme in removing the last vestiges of feudalism from rural Iran, and allowing the more rapid development of capitalism through the "American" and "Prussian" ways. However, these two processes should not be considered as alternative and exclusive paths of development. In effect, they are articulated and only by taking into consideration this articulation, can the development of capitalism in rural Iran be analysed.

With regard to most definitions of 'development'[2] we may generally note that these writers have not taken into account the mode of production for which "*development*" is defined, in spite of the fact that by development they imply the development of the CMP. Phillips is right therefore when she writes: 'the first development analysts had been attacked for their uncritical acceptance of the term "development" as synonymous with "the development of capitalist social relations". *They had assumed that the term was non-problematic, and failed to acknowledge that it inevitably referred to development under specific historical conditions.*'[3] In addition to this point, disregarding modes of production in a definition of "development" may imply that a process of social and economic development is something *natural and a-social* which has an existence independent of any specific mode of production. This will enable us to distinguish between those UDCs which are approaching capitalist mode of production on the one hand and those which are approaching "socialism" on the other.

In order to avoid the above cited errors, we may therefore define "development" of a certain mode of production as *the expansion/reinforcement of social relationships pertinent to that mode of production at all levels, i.e. economic, political as well as ideological.* Obviously, with regard to the economic development of any specific mode of production, only the economic level is taken into consideration; and therefore we may define it as *the expansion/reinforcement of relations/forces of production* of that specific mode of production.[4] In conjunction with our definition the following points should be made:

First, in an articulation combination of two modes of production, development is pertinent to one of the modes of production *vis-a-vis* the other one. And when neither of these modes is in the absolute dominant position, we have a social formation in the transitional stage, i.e. transition from the dominance of one mode to that of the other. Secondly, with regard to the CMP in our model, there is no place for "underdevelopment" in the Frankian sense of the word, considering the point that we are concerned

with a single country and not the world capitalist system. Instead we have "uneven development" within a capitalist country. That is to say, in a capitalist social formation (and also those which are approaching this mode) the expansion/reinforcement of capitalist relations/forces of production does not take place evenly in sectors and subsectors of the economy. The typical example of such an unevenness is the development of capitalism in agriculture and in industry.

The major sources for the discussion in the first part of this thesis are the surveys which were carried out by the research group of the Faculty of Economics (University of Tehran) in 1963-64 and the Ford Foundation's reports in 1953, we have also relied to some extent on the major studies by Lambton (1953) and English (1966). For assessments at the national level, the *Agricultural National Census 1960* provided a mass of data and was an invaluable source. Various issues of journals, magazines and daily papers (in English and Persian) laid the basis for the analysis of the economic and political events in the 1950s. Two monographs incorporately work carried out by the G.O.P.F., some reports to the Cabinet (during 1973-75), four monographs containing the researched results of the scholars at the Institute of Social Research and Studies (university of Tehran) provided the basis for much of the analysis in the third part of the thesis. A short field trip in particular to three villages in the Tarom area in the summer of 1977 enabled me to check on some of the source material and interview villagers affected by the land reform programme. A more systematic field trip was rendered impossible by the increasingly unstable political situation ruling in Iran at that time, already showing the strains which led to the Revolution of February, 1979.

Finally we would like to draw attention to the following three points: First, we have considered only the economic relationships among the agents of production in rural Iran, because the study of the non-economic elements is out of the scope of this thesis. Secondly, we have not

considered the economic system of tribes which exist in different parts of Iran. Thirdly, we have assumed that the land reform programme affected all villages, though the events in 1978-79 have revealed that in some villages affected by land reform, the pre-capitalist relations of production continue to exist; while in some areas (e.g. in some parts of Kurdistan) land reform did not affect landed property at all, because of political considerations.

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

1. See Lambton 1969, Warriner 1969, Mclachan 1968.
2. See for example Todaro, 1977, p.87; Meier, 1976, p.6; Dorner 1972, p.15; and Long, 1977, p.10.
3. Phillips, 1977, p.10, italics added.
4. Bradby, on the basis of Rey's model, defines "development" as the widening capitalist relations of production and increasing the labour-base from which surplus-value can be extracted. See Bradby, 1975, p.142.

CHAPTER I

Property Relations in Rural Iran

The relations of production of any social formation embrace three dimensions, i.e. property relations, labour relations and the relation between agent of production and product. In the first chapter of this study, we shall examine property relations in the Iranian rural social formation before the implementation of L-R. We shall distinguish between two different sets of means of production: land and water on the one hand and implements and machinery on the other. We shall concentrate on the ownership and possession of land and water and the relationship which the agents of production established through these two elements of production.

As conceptualized by Marx, the feudal mode of production (FMP) has the direct producer in effective possession of all means of production but land, i.e. this factor of production 'confronts him as an alien property, independent of him and personified by the landlord.'[1] Included in the category of 'means of production' in a semi-arid country like Iran are land, water, seeds, implements and draught animals. The immediate producer combines these factors with his labour and organizes the production process.

The Ownership and Possession of Land and Water: During the period under study, the peasants owned seeds, draught animals and labour-power; while the non-producers owned land and water. In most cases, the ownership of land and water was vested in one person, but there were some variations which will be explained below. Land and water, therefore, 'confronted' the direct producers as alien and were personified in the landlord. The possession of water was important because of the semi-arid climatic conditions of most regions of Iran.

Conceptually possession can be defined as the ability to set into operation and govern the means of production.[2] As regards ownership (in

fact property) as an economic relation, Bettleheim states that 'it is constituted by the "power to appropriate" the objects on which it acts for uses that are given, particularly the 'means of production' and the power to dispose of the products obtained with the help of these means of production'.[3] But one may pose the question as to the nature of the relationship between ownership and possession of the means of production. Here Bettleheim states that *the power to appropriate cannot be effective unless it be articulated on the basis of possession*: 'either the agents of property also being the agents of possession, or the agents of possession being subordinated to the agents of property'.[4]

Following Bettleheim, we are now able to study, briefly, the structure of land/water ownership in Iran before L-R.[5] Gharachedaghi, studying the land distribution in Varamin, states that in the late 1930s, i.e. just before the WW II, peasants held only 18% of the cultivable lands, the rest being owned by landlords of different categories, including Shah Reza, the State, religious institutions as well as private landlords.[6] Seidov quotes a report in 1952 that 60% of peasant households had no land at all, 23% owned less than one hectare, 10% owned between one to three hectares and 6% owned between three to twenty hectares of land. 99% of peasant households owned only 17% of the total cultivable lands, whereas 1% of the landlord families had the control of 70-75% of the total cultivable lands of the country.[7] Finally a Ministry of Agriculture estimate, in January 1962, revealed that out of 49,000 villages about 10,000 belonged to the landlords who owned more than 7 villages each, and over 5000 villages belonged to those who had ownership of 5 to 6 villages each. Before the implementation of L-R, 400 to 450 large landlords owned 57% of the total villages in Iran.[8]

The Ownership of Water: Broadly speaking, apart from the Caspian Sea littoral which gets sufficient yearly rain, in the other regions of Iran, especially in the areas around the central deserts, the yearly amount of precipitation is very low. This fact makes water a scarce resource and

therefore an important factor in agricultural production. Hence it is quite conceivable that the monopoly ownership of water would play a crucial role in the social relationship between the agents of production. A Persian agronomist, for example, states that due to the great length of the *ganats*[9] and the heavy expenses involved in their digging, water is of foremost significance and has tipped the balance in favour of the owner or the holder.[10] As we will see in the section below on the share-cropping, water resources were monopolized by the owners of over 80% of the total cultivable lands, i.e. landlords.

In almost all cases, the owners of land in any village were also owners of water.[11] But the ownership of the couple land/water was not an absolute rule throughout the country, although it was dominant. Exceptions to the rule occurred in Istahbanat in Fars province, in some areas in Yazd and also in Maymeh and some districts of Ardistan, where the ownership of land and water was separated, i.e. while the ownership of the latter was monopolized by the landlords, the former belonged to the immediate producers.[12] For example, the *qanat* of Dohesaran, in Khorasan province, is owned jointly by the landlord (non-producers) and immediate producers, and consisted of 144 water shares in the *qanat* as follows:

a) Non-producers: 6.5 shares belonged to a religious endowment
14 shares belonged to the children of a landlord
4 shares belonged to the Sarayan school
50.5 shares belonged to the absentee landlord

b) Immediate producers: 69 shares belonged to 20 peasant households[13]

There are also cases landlords owning water and selling it to those landlords who did not possess this resource.[14]

Possession of Land and Water: As already stated in the FMP, the direct producer is in the position of possession of land and water. But why and how does he come to this position? In order that land ownership may become effective, i.e. enabling the owner to appropriate the products obtained

from the use of his property, the landlord will articulate his ownership of land/water on the basis of possession. That is to say, in this mode of production the direct producer is provided land/water by the landlord, in return for a portion of the produce and/or labour, i.e. feudal rent.

The assignment of the direct-producer to the position of the possession of land/water gives him, in fact, the right of use of the land. In Persian, this right is called *nasaq*, and the one who owns this right is called *sahib-nasaq* or *nasaq-dar*. For present purposes, in discussing the relationship between landlord and direct producer, we shall assume the latter to be a *nasaq* holder. The category of peasants without *nasaq* included agricultural labourers, peasant landowners and those who were involved in non-agricultural activity.

However, while the direct producer has possession, i.e. by virtue of being a *nasaq* holder, the landlord has the power by virtue of ownership to appropriate a portion of the produce. The *nasaq* holder, on the other hand, is able to reproduce himself at the same time. But the security of this position, generally speaking, did not exist for most of the *nasaq* holders, although traditions and customs, to some extent, supported them. This insecurity could occur in different forms, but these forms can be classified into three types: i.e. eviction from this position, redistribution and competition on the part of non-*nasaq* holders.

In Mahan and Jupar in Kirman province, for instance, in order to fix the share-cropping contract, the landlord visited the village twice a year: once in the mid-summer to reaffirm the contract, and the second time in autumn to collect his share of the harvest.[15] In this province, the *nasaq* holder could be turned out either in March (the beginning of spring) or in September/October. If he was turned out of the land in March, he was entitled to one-third of the harvest which have been given to him, if he had not been evicted.[16] The landlords ('urbanites'), by retaining control of the elements of production and then leasing them to the *nasaq* holders,

kept themselves in a dominant position as the main decision makers: i.e. they could decide what were to be used as inputs and what were to be cultivated.[17] However, eviction from the land was not always accompanied by compensation. The following two examples show how the landlords, politically, socially and economically dominated their subjects: they evicted the *nasaq* holders from the possession of land/water by force. Two cases serve to illustrate this pressure. In Abdol-Tapeh, a village near Qazvin, the landlord, subjected the *nasaq* holders to various pressures and managed to dismiss the *nasaq* of 18 *juft gav*. Some of the *nasaq* holders left the village, and a few resisted and stayed in the village, while they lost their connection with cultivation.[18] The second example shows how the landlord of Hossein-Abad, in Qazvin region, by force managed to get rid of *nasaq* holders in 1961: '...the owner demolished the villagers' houses with a bulldozer and turned the village fortress into a garden for himself.'[19]

Despite the full power of the landlords on the ownership and the use of land, their power was restricted by tradition. But it seems that as long as the feudal landlords were prepared, within the framework of the FMP, to make their properties, land and water, effective, they were bound to raise the direct producers to the position of possession of land/water. In effect, this economic calculation on the part of the landlords required them to give to the direct producers some sort of security in their possession of land/water. This 'security' appeared in different forms, including selling and buying the *nasaq* and maintaining it through inheritance. English states that *nasaqs* were handed down from father to son for generations in Mahan and Jupar in Kirman province.[19] In the case of any disagreement, the landlord might redistribute *nasaqs* at will.[20] Not only were *nasaq* holders insecure, because of the landlords, but also the shortage of water loosened their ties to certain plots of land. In Kuhi Jupar share-croppers did not work the same village or field from year to year, they worked a

village or region within one valley, as the fortunes of each village rose or fell depending upon water rains and the condition of the *ganat*, peasants migrated from place to place to maintain an equilibrium between population and water supply.[22]

The *nasaq* holders were allowed to transfer their right either by inheritance and/or by selling. The buyer could be a fellow villager or outsider and/or the landlord himself. In Kurdistan, except in *Agili*, peasants did not have any security. In Aqili in the late 1940s the land was divided and distributed among the peasants. Thereafter, the peasants maintained the right to transfer the land by *inheritance but not by sale.*[23] Landlords could acquire *nasaq* by paying cash to its holder. The price for it was set either by mutual agreement, or on the basis of compensation of implements.[24] In 1964, before the implementation of L-R in Bangin, a village in Azarbaijan, the landlords had bought the farmers' *nasaq* in 91 hectares of land and gave it to farmers known as *nesfehkars* who share crops and/or fruits equally with the landlords.[24] There were two reasons for doing this: first to obtain an income in the landlords' share and secondly and more important by buying the right of *nasaq* holders, the landlords just by-passed the L-R.[25]

Although the landlord, in the FMP, is in a position to deprive the direct-producers of the land, he does not necessarily do it to maintain his dominant economic and political position. Redistribution of land among the peasantry was one way in which the landlord could maintain his dominant position at the economic and political level. The exploitation of *nasaq* holders in the estates in which the periodical redistribution of allotments was carried out, was visibly higher than the exploitation of those who lived on the land with permanent fixed possession.[26] A *nasaq* holder might have retained his *nasaq* (possession) in a certain village during his whole lifetime, but the land which he cultivated varied from time to time. Technically, the basis of this redistribution varied from place to

place: in some areas redistribution was based on the rotation of water-supply/or the number of shares into which the water was divided, whereas in other areas it was based on the basis of plough-shares.[27] But from the social point of view, there were two obvious reasons for the periodical redistribution, including increasing the rate of exploitation and reinforcing and maintaining the ownership of land/water. Any sort of periodical redistribution of land meant to the *nasaq* holders a kind of insecurity in the form of either eviction or competition from fellow villagers who did not have possession of land. Considering the point that the landlords were not concerned with the fragmentation of the land, but rather with an increase in their share, any redistribution could have been accompanied, although not necessarily, by an increase in the number of *nasaq* holders in a particular village. For example, the ex-landlord of Koleh-Jub Olya (a village in West Shahabad in Kirmanshah) raised a few peasant families to the position of *nasaq* holding against the payment of 400 rials per family. This resulted in an increase in the number of *nasaq* holders.[28]

That the periodical redistribution of land prevailed throughout the country is supported by the following. In areas of Sistan owned by landlords, every six direct-producers were grouped together in a work-team under the leadership of one called *salar*. These *salars* tended to be permanent, but the area they cultivated, changed from year to year.[29] According to Bahrami, in the State land of the same province, peasants in this region in addition to their absolute poverty, were subject to redistribution and/or eviction at the will of lessees.[30]

In Khorasan, in the villages owned by landlords, the land in each village was divided into a number of areas of land, worked by a varying number of oxen, *sahra*. This sahra was run by a few peasants headed by one called *sar-salar*. Redistribution in this province took the form of redistribution of land among sahras yearly and it was undertaken by the *sar-salar*.[31]

In many places, redistribution took place annually. Fars, Nayriz, Darab and Bihbahan are mentioned as examples. In Kirman and Kurdistan redistribution of land entirely depended on the landlord's will. In the latter province, it varied from 5 to 15 years. For example, the land of Hassan-Abad in the neighbourhood of Sanandaj was redistributed in 1948 after 5 years; whereas this period for Divan Dareh was 10 to 15 years.[32]

The third phenomenon which seriously weakened the position of a *nasaq* holder was the competition on the part of the *non-nasaq-holders* of the village, for we shall see, not all agricultural producers had possession of land. Such producers were to be found in almost all villages, and obviously any struggle on the part of these producers in a certain village could have weakened the position of *nasaq* holders *vis-a-vis* the landlord. It is true that the landlords employed this competition for two different aims: a) to make the *nasaq* holders feel insecure and therefore weakened against the non-producers; and hence b) to increase the amount of surplus in different ways, including increasing the rent (taken from the *nasaq* holders), and accepting presents from the *nasaq-holders* as well as *non-nasaq-holders* in the hope of granting them the right to use the land in the succeeding year. Thus in Farak, a village near Kashmar in Khorasan province, every year the *nasaq* holders had to go to the landlord at harvest time and donate gifts for the opportunity to cultivate his land for the next year. However, non-*nasaq* holders competed by saving what they could from their earning during the year to buy some presents for the landlord in the hope that they, instead of some other *nasaq* holders, would . get the chance to cultivate.[33]

There were three ways in which *nasaq* holders could reduce the level of insecurity. First by invoking customary rights[34]; secondly by the opposition of the villagers[35] itself provoked by the actions of landlords; thirdly by transferring their rights to other peasants by inheritance and or by sale.[36] For example in the village of Shirang-Sofla (in Gorgan) the

peasants possessed an unqualified perpetual right of use of the land they worked. The land could be sold or mortgaged: 'The one instance of sale the perpetual tenancy right recorded in the village for the year 1963 indicates a transaction value of some 20,000 rials/hectare (...). In the case of irrigated land, the sale price of the *haqq-bumi* (i.e. nasaq) runs as high as 50,000 rials, almost on *a par* with the value of the land itself.'[37] In addition, in almost all parts of the country, the possession of land by *nasaq* holders was not affected in the case of changes of ownership involving all or part of a village.

The struggle between landlords and direct-producers was carried out entirely within the framework of feudal relations of production: the struggle of *nasaq* holders was an attempt to secure their possession of land/water; while the object of the landlords was some sort of subordination of their subjects. However, in spite of the domination of feudal relations, this overview of the relationship between landlords and peasants in rural Iran has shown that there were considerable variations in the degree of security of land tenure which the peasant-producers had. In the next two chapters we shall explain the forms of rent payment.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. Marx, 1971, p.794
2. Carchedi, 1975, p.363; and Bett heim, 1976, p.69
3. Bettleheim, 1976, p.69 .
4. Ibid, p.69
5. However, in doing so, we have been forced to rely on fragmented studies. This is due to the fact that, there has, so far, been only one national agricultural census, carried out in 1960. But in this Census, the categories 'ownership' and 'possession' are combined under the heading of 'holdings'. We are therefore unable to use this national census in our present discussion.
6. Gharachedaghi, 1967, pp.31-2
7. Seidov, 1963, p.51
8. U.S. Army Area Handbook for Iran, pp.398-99
9. The low level of yearly rainfall in Iran has led groundwater to be the main source of irrigation:'Throughout much of the country this water (ground water) is utilized by means of an unusual engineering construction known as a qanat. This consists of a gently sloping tunnel which conducts water from an infiltration section beneath the water table to the ground surface by gravity flow. In the initial construction of a qanat a shaft or a well is sunk to prove the presence of groundwater at depth. An outlet point for the tunnel is selected and then the tunnel is dug back into the hillside to link up with the original shaft or mother well. To aid in construction a series of vertical shafts are sunk along the line of the tunnel. These permit the extraction of soil and provide a measure of air circulation to the workers below. Eventually the tunnel will intersect the water table.' Beaumont, 1974, p.421
10. Atai, 1967, p.116
11. For example, the R.G. reported in July 5, 1964 from Bangin, a village in the East Azarbaijan, that large parts of the village and the sole water resource of the village(a qanat) remained in the landlord's hands after the implementation of the first stage of L-R. (See T.E., Jan. 1968, p.166) Again, according to a report from Shokatabad, a village in Khorasan province, in 1965, the landlord provided the share croppers with land, seeds, means of ploughing and water. (See T.E., Nov. 1969, p.187)
12. Lambton, 1953, pp.219-20
13. T.E., Nov. 1969, p.161
14. Ivanov, 1948, p.65
15. English, 1966, p.69
16. Lambton, 1953, p.295
17. English, 1966, p.66
18. T.E., Nos. 15 & 16, Vol. VI, p.218
19. Ibid, p.219
20. English, 1966, p.81
21. Ibid, p.90
22. Ibid
23. Lambton, 1953, p.297
24. T.E., Jan. 1968, p.170
25. Ibid, p.175
26. Demin, 1967, pp.56-7
27. Lambton 1953, p.298

28. T.E., Winter 1970, p.85
29. Lambton, 1953, p.298
30. Bahrami, 1954, p.380
31. Lambton, 1953, p.299
32. Ibid, p.301. But Bahrami has asserted that the period of redistribution in this province was 2 to 3 years. That is why, according to him, the Kurdish peasants did not have any interest in the land. See Bahrami, 1954, p.517.
33. T.E., Nov. 1969, p.197
34. Vreeland, 1957, p.192
35. Demin, 1967, p.55
36. Ibid, p.192; also see Jones, 1967, p.65.
37. Okazaki, 1969, p.268

CHAPTER II

Forms of Rent in the 1940s and 1950s

In this and the following chapters we shall set out to analyse the mechanism of extraction of surplus from the peasant producers by the landlords. This will entail an explanation of the different forms of rent existing in the Iranian rural social formation during the two decades.

We shall distinguish between the following forms of rent in rural Iran:

1) Share-cropping:
   - Winter crops:
     - a) rent for land/water (irrigated)
     - b) rent for land (unirrigated)
     - c) rent for water
   - Summer crops:
     - d) *nesfeh-kari*
2) Fixed Rent
3) Fixed and share-cropping combined
4) Labour-service
5) Dues and tributes

1) Share-cropping System: Winter crops

The dominant form of rent in rural Iran was the share-cropping system. 54% of all cultivated land was based on the share-cropping system. It was widespread mainly in eastern and western Azarbai-jan and Kurdistan.[1] In this traditional form of rent, the immediate producer supplies his labour plus a portion of the working capital necessary for production while on the other hand, the landowner supplies land (and water in our case study) and another portion of the working capital. In effect, in this form, rent is not in its classical feudal form, but is situated somewhere in between capitalist ground rent and feudal rent. This is because: 'The landlord claims a portion of the product not exclusively as the owner of

land, but also as the lender of capital; and the farmer claims another portion of the product not as the possessor of labour, but as possessor of a portion of the means of production.'[2]

In order to develop an explanation for the role of rent in the share-cropping system, we shall compare the labour processes of the classical feudal and capitalist modes of production with that of the share-cropping system.

The labour-process, in its simple and abstract elements, is a purposeful activity aimed at the production of use-value.[3] In this sense, it is, therefore, a process of interaction between man and nature. There are three elements involved in the labour-process which are common to all modes of production. They include: purposeful activity, the object on which that activity (work) is performed and finally the instruments of the work.[4] The most essential factor in this process is the producer (his work) and in order to produce use-value (i.e. being purposeful) he consumes the objects and instruments of production. Consequently the labour process is the process of the appropriation of what exists in nature for the requirements of men.

The labour-process in the CMP, generally speaking, can be characterised by the following phenomena: 'First, the worker works under the control of the capitalist to whom his labour belongs; the capitalist takes good care that the work is done in a proper manner, and the means of production are applied directly to the purpose so that the raw material is not wasted, and the instruments of labour are spared.

Secondly, the product is the property of the capitalist and not that of the worker, its immediate producer.'[5] It follows from the above statement that: first, the labour-process, in the CMP, is an operation between things which the capitalist has purchased; and secondly, during this process the capitalist's control is required, because the individual labourer does not set to work the means of production.[6]

But, the labour-process in the FMP is very different from the labour-process in the CMP, although it involves the same three basic elements, i.e. purposeful activity (work), the object of work, and the instruments of work. In the FMP the direct-producer controls the labour process and therefore, he, and not the landlord, is concerned with the way of using the objects and instruments of work and has the resulting produce at his disposal.

There is no doubt that the basic elements involved in the labour processes of the CMP and FMP exist in the share-cropping system too. But the ownership of these elements is slightly different from that in the FMP. That is, as is shown in Table I, in some cases, the non-producer has instruments (oxen) or objects (seeds) in his disposal. In the extreme case, he may own all objective conditions of production, including land, water, oxen and seeds. Consequently, not only land, but also some other factors, such as water, seeds and oxen, may confront the direct-producer as alien properties. So, in the sense of the ownership of the means of production, the share-cropping system is closer to the CMP than the FMP. Yet contrary to the CMP, in the share-cropping system, it is the direct-producer who conducts the labour-process. In addition the labour-power of the share-cropper (i.e. direct-producer) has not yet become a commodity i.e. the non-producer does not have it in his disposal during the labour-process. This holds good, even in the extreme case of share-cropping, i.e. when the direct-producer has nothing to supply but his labour-power. It follows, therefore, that, *the non-producer* (landlord) has nothing to do with the labour-process. It is entirely the responsibility of the direct-producer (share-cropper) to take care of this process. However, one should note that, in the share-cropping system, the non-producer has a stake in the production. That is to say, it is he, who basically decides what is to be produced; despite the fact that the direct producer has the possibility to protest against/or counteract the decision of the landlord.

Finally, the produce, before its division, is not the sole property of any one of the parties. In other words, the produce is neither the property of the non-producer, nor is it at the disposal of the direct-producer: but both parties take away their shares of produce when it is harvested, threshed and ready for division. Thus, in this sense, the share-cropping system differs from both the CMP and FMP.

Furthermore, there is a similarity between the FMP and share cropping system. That is, the rent may be paid in cash or in kind and/or both. However, the form of payment of the rent does not change the nature of the rent, which in all cases remains in its transitional stage. Thus, although the share-cropping system has so many similarities with the feudal mode of production, the rent paid in this system is moved away from its classic form. We are now in a position to explain the system of share-cropping in the Iranian rural social formation.

There were five elements of production in rural Iran to be taken into consideration for fixing the share of the non-producer on the one hand and that of direct-producer on the other. They include *land, water, seeds, draught animals and lastly labour.* Almost in all cases, the landlords were in the position of the ownership of the land and water. While these two elements had always belonged to the landlords and the last element, labour, to the *nasaq*-holders, the other two elements were under dispute. Thus as Table I shows, while in some cases the landlords had furnished seeds or oxen and/or both, in other cases these elements were supplied by the *nasaq* holders. For example, in Fasa, Darab, etc., landlords supplied land, water, seeds and oxen; whereas in Torbat-e Jam and Hashtrud, *nasaq* holders supplied seeds and oxen as well as labour.

However, as one can see from Table I, there is not a strict correlation between the supply of the elements of production and the relative share of each party. For example, in Azarbaijan although in all cases given in Table I, the *nasaq* holders supplied in addition to labour, seeds and oxen,

TABLE I

Division of Wheat and Barley between Landlord and Peasant : Irrigated Cultivation

Place	Share of Landlord	Share of Producer	Supplier of Seeds and Oxen	Note
Azarbaijan:				
Harshtrood, Qarache Daq, Urjan, Abbas, Mehranrood	1/5 - 1/3	4/5 - 2/3	Seeds and Oxen by Producer	-
Sarkham, Khorramdash, Maraqeh	1/4	3/4	Seeds and Oxen by Producer	-
Khoy, Rezaieh	1/3	2/3	Seeds and Oxen by Producer	-
Almes, Inja, Qaraje Booloq	2/9	7/9	Seeds and Oxen by Producer	-
Kurdistan:				
Mahabad	1/2	1/2	Seeds and Oxen by Producer	
Sanandaj	1/2	1/2	Seeds and Oxen by Producer	Straw divided in same proportion but Korocce & grass belonged to the producer
In most other places:	1/5 - 1/3	2/3 - 4/5	Seeds and Oxen by Producer	-
Sistan:				
In most places	2/3 - 3/5	1/3 - 2/3	Seeds by L/lrd Oxen by Prdcr	-

TABLE I (continued)

Place	Share of Landlord	Share of Producer	Supplier of Seeds and Oxen	Note
In some places	1/2	1/2	Half of seeds by landlord Oxen & half of seeds by prdcr	-
Khorasan:				
Torok) Khiaban) Shadegan) Abkook)	1/2	1/2	Seeds by Mediator Oxen by Producer	-
Vakilabad	1/2	1/2	Seeds by L/lrd Oxen by Prdcer	-
Torbate-Haidarieh	3/5	2/5	Seeds by L/lrd Oxen by Prdcer	L/lrd also took half of straw
Torbate-Jam	1/2	1/2	Seeds & Oxen by Producer	
Fars:				
Mamasani) Noorabad)	1/4	3/4	Seeds & Oxen by producer	
Fasa	4/5	1/5	Seeds & Oxen by Landlord	
Darab	3/4	1/4	Seeds & Oxen by Landlord	
Darab	1/3	2/3	Seeds & Oxen by peasant	
Jahram) Dobaram)	1/2	1/2	Seeds by Landlord Oxen by peasant	Landlord took the straw
Qara-boolaq) Neiriz)	1/10	9/10	Seeds & Oxen by Producer	
Qora-boolaq) Estahbannat)	3/4	1/4	Seeds & Oxen by Landlord	
Kiraman:	1/2	1/2	Seeds & Oxen by Producer	
Rafsanjan	3/4	1/4	Seeds & Oxen by Landlord	

TABLE I (continued)

	Share of Landlord	Share of Peasant	Supplier of Seeds and Oxen	Note
Akbarabad) Mohammad-abad)	7/10	3/10	Seeds & Oxen by Peasant	-
Isfahan Region:				
Bara'an)	3/4	1/4	Seeds & Oxen	-
)	2/3	1/3	by Producer	-
Bidrood)	2/3	1/3	Seeds by L/lrd Oxen by Prdcr.	-
)	1/2	1/2	Seeds & Oxen by Producer	
Baloochistan:				
Bampoor	2/5	3/5	Oxen by peasant Seeds by L/lord	-
Khash	3/5	2/5	Seeds by L/lrd, Oxen rented from Landlord	-
Arak:				
In most villages:	1/3	2/3	Seeds & Oxen by Producer	-

Source: Seidov 1963, pp. 68-81.

they collected different shares in different places. This is due to the fact that the division of produce was affected by the permanent struggle between the landlords and their agents on the one hand and *nasaq* holders on the other, as we shall see in Chapter Five.

More or less, the same variability of relative shares existed for unirrigated cultivation of barley and wheat, the main winter crops. Generally speaking, the direct-producers collected a higher share than they had in irrigated cultivation. It is not an absolute rule, since in some cases, e.g. in Hashtrood, Urjan ... landlords obtained the same portion of the produce. Table II shows the division of wheat and barley (the main winter crops) between landlords and direct-producers on unirrigated land. The unirrigated cultivation of winter crops, from the point of view of social relations did not differ very much from the previous case, and in fact this sort of cultivation took place exactly within the same framework of social relations of production.

Ownership/Separation from the means of production other than land and water:

The FMP presupposes the non-separation of the direct-producer from the means of production. That is to say, the direct-producer being in a position of ownership of at least some means of production and in possession of land, is able to organize production and the reproduction of the means and conditions of production.

Almost in all of rural Iran, the peasants ploughed the land with a very simple plough: equipped with an ironclad, wooden tongue. It was drawn by animal, mainly by oxen and sometimes by donkeys and camels. Scythes and sickles were used for reaping and threshing was carried out by a wooden threshing device with circular knives or pieces of stone in its undercarriage. Tossing the grain into the air by a wooden pitchfork was the dominant method of winnowing.[7] Tables I and II give an idea of the degree of separation of the peasantry from the means of production. As can be seen, in almost all cases, given in the tables, the direct-producers

TABLE II

Division of Wheat and Barley between Landlord and Peasant : Unirrigated

Place	Share of Landlord	Share of Producer	Supplier of Seeds and Oxen	Note
Azarbaijan:				
Hashtrood, Urjan, Abad, Mehranrood, Qare-che daq	1/5 - 1/3	4/5 - 2/3	Seeds and Oxen by Producer	In addition to rents landlord took an additional amount of grains around 2/9ths of total production
Tabriz	1/4	3/4	Seeds and Oxen by Producer	
Tabriz	1/2	1/2	Seeds by L/lrd Oxen by Prdcer.	
Khoy, Arasbaran	2/3	1/3	Seeds and Oxen by Producer	
Kurdistan:				
In most areas	1/5	4/5	Seeds and Oxen by Producer	
Khorasan:				
Torok	1/10	9/10	Seeds and Oxen by Producer	In ordinary years
Torok	1/5	4/5	Seeds and Oxen by Producer	In rainy years field watered once
Torok	3/10	7/10	Seeds and Oxen by Producer	In rainy years field watered twice
Torbate-Heidarieh, Shadegan, Vakiabad	1/10	9/10	Seeds and Oxen by Producer	
Abkook	1/2	1/2	Seeds by L/lrd Oxen by Peasant	

TABLE II (continued)

Place	Share of Landlord	Share of Producer	Supplier of Seeds and Oxen	Note
Fars:				
Mamasani, Noorabad, Kazeroon	1/5	4/5	Seeds and Oxen by Peasant	
Fasa, Dobaran, Darab	1/10	9/10	Seeds and Oxen by Peasant	
Jahrum	1/10-1/5	9/10-1/5	Seeds and Oxen by Peasant	
Kkwzistan:				
Bavi	1/2	1/2	Seeds by L/lrd Oxen by Peasant	
Bavi	3/4	1/4	Both elements by Landlord	
Isfahan:				
Shakrekurd	1/4	3/4	Seeds and Oxen by Landlord	
Faridan	1/5	4/5		
Arak:				
In most villages	1/5	4/5		

Source: Seidov, 1963, pp. 68-81.

were the suppliers of seeds and oxen; in fact there are few cases in which the landlords supplied both seeds and oxen (e.g. Qara-boolaq, Estahbanat). The latter case may be considered as the last stage before the complete separation of peasant producers from the objective conditions of production.

c) Rent for water

In some arid areas, rent was collected on the basis of the ownership of the water supply, rather than of the ownership of land, which was left to the direct producers. In essence this sort of share-cropping system is not different from the 'original' form examined above. We shall therefore confine our examination of this form of share-cropping to the empirical level.

This variety of share-cropping seems to be bound to take place in arid areas such as Yazd.[8]

Thus peasants owned land in most areas of the neighbourhood of Yazd The rent, therefore, which peasants paid, represented a payment for water rather than for land. Owing to the great length of the *qanats* and expense involved in their building, water became of foremost significance and shifted the balance in favour of the owner of the source.[10] The amount of rent paid for water, like that paid for land/water together, varied from place to place, as well as with different *qanats*. In Maybud, the amount of rent was computed according to the water used: a peasant paid, in 1945, one *manni* tabriza (= 6½ lb) of wheat and one manni tabriz of cotton per jur'eh (8½ minutes) of water; in Nain for per taq of water (i.e. 12 hours water), the producer had to pay 120 manni tabriz (approx. 6 cwt., 103 lb) wheat or cotton;[11] and again, in Jinabad, in 1949, for per taq (12 hours) of water, the direct-producer had to pay 75 manni tabriz wheat, 35 manni tabriz barley and straw.[12] The rent could be paid in cash as well as in kind. For example, in some villages near Yazd (i.e. Aliabad, Husainabad and Hassanabad), the average rent in 1945, which was around 7-10 manni tabriz (approx. 45-65lb) of wheat or barley per sabu (10 minutes water)

was usually converted into and paid in cash.[13] In Zatach in the township of Yazd, where the farmers owned land and the landlord owned water, the farmer paid the latter an annual sum of 700 rails per "*jur'eh*" of water (equal to 10 minutes and 55 seconds per day).[14] Table IV illustrates both cases: in some areas the rent was paid in cash, whereas in others it was paid in kind.

TABLE IV

Rent Paid for the Use of Water

Area	Rent in Kind	Rent in Cash s. d.	Unit of Water
Maybud	6½ lb wheat / 6½ lb cotton	-	8½ minutes
Na'in	6 cwt, 103 lb wheat/cotton	-	12 hours
Pushti-Kuh:			
Jinabad:	4 cwt, 43 lb. wheat / 2 cwt, 5 lb. barley / 2 cwt, 5 lb. straw	-	12 hours
Yazd:			
Aliabad	46-65 lb. grain	-	10 minutes
Dihabad	(for winter crop	2 . 4	
	(for summer crop	2 . . 4	
Hassanabad / Husaiabad	46-65 lb. grain	-	10 minutes
Sadrabad	46 lb. grain	5 .10	11 minutes

Source: Lambton 1953, p. 322.

From a technical point of view, the actual amount of rent was fixed by a valuer, who visited the villages. He estimated the amount of production of the land, and on the basis of this estimation, fixed the amount which the direct-producer had to pay for the use of water.[15]

It can be said that these three varieties of share-cropping were all similar to each other, in the sense of the relations of production, including ownership/possession of land (and water), ownership of the means of production, and exploitation by non-economic coercion. We shall now go on to examine another variety of the share-cropping system which is very similar to the cases explained above, but has a fundamental difference: i.e. the direct-producer does not have *nasaq* i.e. he is not in 'permanent' possession of land (and water), and therefore he is, to a lesser extent, subordinated to the landlord.

Share-cropping of the Summer Crops

In this form of share-cropping the direct producers were not at the same time holders of *nasaq*, but were assigned to the position of possession of land/water according to a written contract between them and the landlord, and only for a specific period, usually six months. When the time of contract expired, the direct producers could not claim possession of land/water. This is the main reason why many landlords tried to turn their estates to this sort of share-cropping, before and during the implementation of L-R, because these producers were not covered by the L-R laws.[16]

The contracts for the production of summer crops were carried out mainly around the cities and towns where there was a vast market for the summer crops (including vegetables, beans, peas, melons, water melons and the like). The production of these products needed experience and know-how that is why, in many cases the producers were not local people. In some villages of Khuzistan, for example, the producers of summer crops were Yazdies and Isfahanies, some of whom were in permanent residence in that province. Also in the villages of the south and west of Tehran, producers

from Qum are recognized as experts in this business. Safinezhad explains that direct-producers (experts in cultivating vegetables) from Qum used to meet the landlords somewhere in the south of Tehran to make contracts with them. According to the contract, the landlord supplied land, water (during the summer and spring) and some money as credit, while the producers (or their representatives) agreed to supply labour and seed and to undertake the other expenses. The cost of marketing and other expenses were undertaken jointly.[17] The basis of the division of crops is the same as explained for the winter crops, but the form of payment is cash. The procedure was as follows: first the produce was sold in the market, the expenses such as ploughing, marketing, etc. deducted from the total income; then the net income was divided into two equal portions, a portion going to both parties.

Under this form of share-cropping system, the direct-producers were not subordinated to the landlord through non-economic coercion. There was no question of eviction by force; if a landlord wanted to break the contract, he would have been obliged to pay all expenses. The amount of land and water and the type of products (to be cultivated) were already determined by mutual agreement of landlord and producers. After the contract and giving some money as credit to the producers the landlord did not interfere with the labour-process. And the direct producers, after being raised to the possession of land (and water), were themselves responsible for the running of the business. In Abdol-Tapeh (near Gazvin) one could see an example of this sort of share-cropping agreement: 'The landlord has rented the entire village to specialists in the raising of summer crops from Qum. He supplies water, land and half of the cost of seeds, ploughing and pest control. The tenants in turn bring in labour to grow the summer crops for six months of the year, pay their wages undertake responsibility for working the lands and provide half the cost of seeds, ploughing and pest control. The income earned from farming is divided equally between the landlord and tenants.'[18]

TABLE V

Sharing Summer Crops

Area	Share of Landlord	Share of Producer	Supplier of Elements of Production	Notes
Khuzistan:				
Dizful	1/2 - 1/3	1/2 - 1/3		
Ramhormoz	1/3	2/3		
Bihbahan	1/4	3/4		
Kirman:				
Kirman	4/5	1/5	All costs undertaken by landlord	
Rahmatabad	3/4 - 3/5	1/4 - 2/5	All costs undertaken by landlord	
Babek	1/2	1/2	All costs undertaken by landlord	
Other Villages	3/4	1/4	All costs undertaken by landlord	
Isfahan:				
Isfahan	1/2	1/2		
Borhar)	1/2	1/2	All costs undertaken by producer	Peasant realizes the produce and pays rent in cas
)	2/7	5/7	All costs undertaken by producer	
)				
)				
Kohab	1/2	1/2	All costs undertaken by producer	
Kerarej	1/2	1/2	All costs undertaken by producer	
Rugesht	1/3	2/3		
Shahreza	3/4	1/4		
Sharkord	1/3	2/3		
Marbin	1/2	1/2	All costs undertaken by producer	
Jei	1/2	1/2	All costs undertaken by producer	
Najafabad	1/3	2/3	Seeds undertaken by Landlord, rest by Producer	

TABLE V (continued)

Area	Share of Landlord	Share of Producer	Supplier of Elements of Production	Notes
Kurdistan:				
Sanandaj	1/3 1/3	2/3	All costs undertaken by producer	
Khorasan:				
Torok, Abkuh, Shadegan, Vakilabad	1/5 - 1/3	4/5 - 2/3		
Kashmar	3/4	1/4		
Fars:				
Kazeroon	1/5 - 1/3	4/5 - 2/3		
Mamasani, Fediskan, Jahrom, Firozabad	1/2	1/2		
Ij, Estahbanat	2/3	1/3		
Neiriz	3/4	1/4		
Darab	1/2 - 3/4	1/2 - 1/4		
Qora-bulaq, Neiriz	1/10	9/10	All costs for cultivation of land undertaken by direct-producer	Water supplied from well

Source: Seidov 1963, pp. 68-81

2) Fixed Rent as the Second Dominant Form of Feudal Rent

The second form of feudal rent which used to be paid to the non-producers previous to L-R was *fixed rent*. By fixed rent, here, we understand the fixed amount of produce (or its equivalent value in cash) which the direct producer is compelled, by non-economic coercion, to pay to the owner of the land each year. It may be paid in kind, in cash, or both. This form of rent is very similar to *capitalist absolute ground rent*. The explanation of this form of ground rent and its comparison with fixed rent would, therefore, help to explain two points: the nature of this form of rent, and secondly, the degree to which it has approached capitalist ground rent.

Capitalist ground rent: Marxists distinguish two forms of ground rent: differential and absolute. We are not, here, concerned with the former but briefly we can describe it as a form of capitalist ground rent which arises from the difference in the productivity of various investments of capital, i.e. 'it is due to the greater relative fruitfulness of specific separate capitals invested in a certain production sphere, as compared with investments of capital which are excluded from these exceptional and natural conditions favouring productiveness.'[19] It does not determine the production cost of commodities, but is bound to it.[20] According to Lenin, this form of ground rent is an inherent feature of every form of capitalist agriculture; whereas absolute ground rent arises from the monopoly private ownership of land.[21] The mere legal ownership of land does not bring about any ground rent for the owner. 'But it does, indeed, give him the power to withdraw his land from exploitation until economic conditions permit him to utilize it in such a manner as to yield him a surplus, ...'[22] In other words, monopoly ownership of land establishes a barrier to the investment of capital in land; and this power of blocking the free investment of capital, in effect, enables landed property to charge capital some money as rent. Absolute ground rent, therefore, presupposes the existence of landed property, and in fact, the former is

the economic realization of the latter. In order for capital to be invested in land, it is bound to pay rent to the landed property; i.e. the latter '... acts as an absolute barrier only to the extent that the landlord exacts a tribute for making land at all accessible to the capitalist.'[23] '*Landed property itself creates rent*'[24].

This landed property i.e. the monopoly of landed property, hinders free competition and therefore hinders the formation of average profit in agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises. In addition, there are two other assumptions on which the formation of absolute rent is based, this is the tendency of commodities to exchange at their values, and the presence of low organic composition of capital, in those branches yielding absolute rent.[25] In fact, it is the combination of these three phenomena which creates absolute rent. Only so long as the condition of the lower organic composition of capital in agriculture holds good, is there an absolute rent. But any tendency to level the organic composition of capital in agricultural and non-agricultural branches on the part of capital (due to attempts to make an average rate of profit) is faced with a barrier, i.e. *landed property*.[26]

Capitalist ground rent, contrary to feudal rent, does not embrace the whole of the surplus-value produced in agriculture. Considering the fact that capital possesses the whole surplus-value produced by the immediate producer capitalist ground rent is a portion of this surplus which landed property manages to transfer to itself. *It is the monopoly power of the landed property in confrontation with capital's investments in land, which can be considered as economic coercion.*

To end this discussion, we should note that there are some limitations on the imposition of absolute rent on the worst soil. They include: 1) additional investment in the old plots, 2) imports, 3) competition among the landlords, and 4) needs of consumers and their ability to pay the price of the agricultural goods.[27]

Can fixed rent be considered as a capitalist ground rent? This is the question which we shall try to answer. However, in order to do this, we should first examine this form of rent in Iran.

In this form the direct-producer was assigned a plot of land in lieu of fixed amount of produce or its equivalent value in cash. The contract between landlord and direct-producer *was merely a verbal one* and 'when a written contract is entered into some stipulation is usually made safeguarding the peasant in the event of natural calamity such as drought or pest.'[28] The amount of rent varied from place to place, but from a technical point of view, generally speaking, it was a function of the size of the land (and/or the amount of water). The following examples throw light on the amount of fixed rent in Gilan and Mazandaran, the main regions in which this form of rent was dominant. In Ghaleh-garden (near Shahsavar) the amount and rate of rent for different crops were as follows:

for rice: 330 kg. per hectare;
for tea: 2500 rials per hectare;
for citrus: 7000 rials per hectare[29]

The rate of rent per hectare in Gigasar (in Gilan) for rice was about 30% of the gross produce and for tobacco was 1000 rials out of 18000.[30] In Langarud, the fixed rent ranged from 150 to 225 kg. per 2000 kg. per 2000 square metres.[31]

In Gilan the amount of fixed rent for a paddy field was about 660 kg. of threshed rice per ha., this was equal to one third of the total output of one hectare. Exceptions to this were villages in the neighbourhood of Talish and some villages in Siahkal in which this amount was increased to 740 to 1000 kg. per ha.[32]

Table VI sets out the amount of fixed rent paid by the producers in the 40s. As one can see, it has examples of many regions but does not include Gilan, i.e. the region in which fixed rent was the dominant form of rent. However, it is useful in the sense that it gives an idea about

the amount of surplus that was taken away from the direct producer.

TABLE VI

Fixed Rent per Acre

Area	Rent in Kind		Rent in Cash £ s. d.	£ s. d.
Barzuk	5 cwt, 98 lb.)) 11 cwt, 84 lb.)	grain		-
Havizeh	1 cwt, 71 lb.	grain		-
Isfahan	-		19 0 0	28 0 0
Jangand	11 cwt. 10 lb.	grain		-
Khwurmiz	2 cwt. 39 lb.	grain		-
Mazandaran	(5 cwt. 110lb. (	grain		-
	(8 cwt. 109lb.	rice		-
Mihriz	1 cwt. 46 lb.	grain	7 2 8	
Natanz	4 cwt. 78 lb.	grain		-

Source: Lambton 1953, p. 323.

Under the fixed-rent system, the contract between direct-producer and non-producer was often merely a verbal one.[33] The period of contract was one year or more. In Talish for instance peasants had rented certain areas for a period of one to five years, though in some cases, the contract lasted as long as 10 years.[34] In Gigasar (in Gilan) before L-R, the contract between producer and landowner was *an official agreement for a period of three years.* The fixed amount of rent (usually in kind) was specified in the contract. In practice, however, the contract was not renewed and direct-producers carried on paying the same amount of rent mentioned in their contracts after the expiry of the three years.[35] Furthermore, according to Okazaki, the actual contract between landlord and

producer in Shirang-Sofla, a village in Gorgan, was *negotiated by word of mouth.*[36] Commenting on the verbal/written contract between two partners, one may say that the landlords tried to have written and official contract with the producers mainly for two reasons: to secure their ownership (of land) and to secure the payment of rent by producers. On the other hand, the producers were sufficiently subordinated to the landlords that the latter did not really need to keep renewing the contract and/or to decline to make any verbal contract with the former at all. However, the direct producer was free in the sense of being able to decide which crops he would cultivate and by which method. According to Okazaki, the possession of land by the direct producers was an unqualified perpetual right. They could sell and/or mortgage it. In addition, their plots were not subject to redistribution and/or to confiscation at the will of the landlord.[37]

On the other hand, the landlord did not provide the producer with any working capital such as draught animals and the like, he just leased out his land in lieu of which he received a certain amount of rent in kind or in cash or both. This is precisely the role which a landlord plays in the CMP. That is, in this mode of production, 'the landlord is reduced from the manager and master of the process of production and of the entire process of social life to the position of mere lessor of land, usurer in land and mere collector of rent ...'.[37]

To conclude, fixed rent (in the Caspian Sea littoral) can be considered as 'capitalist' ground rent, despite the fact that there was, to some extent, some sort of non-economic subordination of the producers to the landlords. This 'capitalist' ground rent might also have been coupled with labour service and some other dues and these will be discussed in the next chapter.

Rent in Kind/Cash

Can the form of payment of rent be the criterion for distinguishing rent as feudal or capitalist rent? This question arises from a consideration of a recent research on the forms of rent in the Iranian rural

social formation before L-R.[38] Five forms of rent are distinguished: 'the first and the least capitalistic, is payment in kind, usually constituting a portion of the crop, ... The second, and diametrically opposed to the first, is capitalist ground rent-free land, rented for a term of years, with cash payment.'[39] There are three other forms, according to Khamsi, between these two opposed forms. The share-cropping system is the third form.' In this instance the farmer divides the crop ..... on the basis of share cropping (*muzare'e*), and pays the landlord either a share of his income in kind, or a fixed sum in cash, the lease always being for a term of years.' The fourth form appears when a customary tenant becomes a free holder. That is, 'the fourth form to be the renting or purchasing of land by customary tenants. Here, two types of rent exist side by side. Strictly speaking, we should not couple purchased land with rented land, but because purchasing of land by customary tenants is a departure from the norms, and portends the weakening of customary tenure, its inclusion may be permissible. Lastly, the fifth form is the fixed rent paid in kind.'[40]

As one can see, Khamsi's argument is based on only one main criterion, i.e. the form in which the rent is paid. Thus if it is paid in cash it is capitalist ground rent; and if it is paid in kind, it is feudal rent. This ignores entirely the social relationship between the landlord and tenant. What is important is to see the way in which the rent is exacted from the direct-producer. In order to distinguish a type of rent (capitalist or feudal) the set of relationships established between the direct-producer and the non-producer through the means of production must be examined. If it is exacted by non-economic coercion, it is in fact, feudal rent no matter in what form it is paid. The forms of payment only show the forms of appropriation of the surplus. Hence, feudal rent is directly comparable to surplus-value in the CMP rather than capitalist ground rent. (We should note that feudal rent paid in cash presupposes a commodity production

sector and the sale of a proportion of the produce as a commodity by the direct-producer.) 'By money-rent as distinct from industrial and commercial ground-rent based upon the capitalist mode of production, which is but an excess over average profit - we here mean the ground rent which arises from a mere change in form of rent in kind, ... The direct producer here turns over instead of the product, its price to the landlord(...).'[41] On the other hand, a rent can be a capitalist ground rent and be paid in kind. That is, the capitalist farmer/producer may pay to the landlord a certain proportion of the produce instead of its price, without being subsumed to the latter by non-economic coercion. An example of this, though not a perfect one, is the rent paid in kind in Gilan and Mazandaran provinces. This rent-in-kind (unfixed and fixed) which is considered by Khamsi as the least capitalistic and between the opposed forms of rent respectively, *could be feudal as well as capitalist ground rent* depending on the economic form in which it is alienated from the direct-producer in that particular rural social formation.

The share-cropping system is considered as a form of rent situated between capitalist and feudal rent. However, Khamsi never states the reasons why share-cropping is considered as a transitional form of rent. The interesting point is that, he totally forgets his main criterion, i.e. the form of payment, when he places share-cropping in the transitional stage between the FMP and CMP. We have already discussed the share-cropping system and its position as a transitional form, so there is no point in repeating it here.

Furthermore, Khamsi considers a situation in which a *nasaq*-holder has already bought a plot of land. This is a departure from the norm and approaches the weakening of customary tenure. Although purchasing a plot of land on the part of a *nasaq*-holder, is in fact a departure from the (feudal) norm, this movement does not necessarily raise him to the position of ownership of a sufficient amount of land nor does his position as an

owner/possessor necessarily correspond to the form of rent which he pays. That is to say, as owner/possessor, he might be subject to feudal exploitation and/or be a commodity-producer who pays capitalist ground rent to the landlord. Hence, he should be classified into different categories according to his social relationship with the owner of land.

Lastly, Khamsi has not considered two other points pertinent to the question of rent, i.e. mixed-rent and labour-service. Both of these will be discussed below.

Share-cropping as the dominant form of payment of rent

So far we have referred to share-cropping as the dominant form of the payment of rent and fixed rent as secondary, without giving any data at the national level. However, at this stage, we are in a position to substantiate our statement by the data given in Table VII. As can be seen from the table, there were six types of operation of holdings in rural Iran: three origins and three combinations. Leaving aside the combined forms, since they are due to be discussed in the next section, one can see that the share-cropping system was the dominant form of rent payment in almost half of the provinces. The highest percentage of share-cropping belonged to East and West Azarbaijan (the third and fourth provinces) and Kurdistan, i.e. 70, 73 and 78 percentages of the holdings respectively. Next come the fifth and sixth provinces and then Tehran province. The high percentage of the share cropping type of operation vis-a-vis other forms in Azarbaijan (East and West) and Kurdistan, indicates one general point: the dominance of the so-called semi-feudal relationship between *nasaq* holders and landlords.

Classifying the provinces according to the type of holdings, we can distinguish a group of provinces in which a high percentage of the producers owned land, though the percentage of those who were share-croppers was not relatively low. This group includes: Shiraz (7th province), Kirman (8th province) Sistan and Baluchestan, Khorasan (9th

province and finally Isfahan (10th province). The percentage of leaseholders, i.e. those who paid fixed rent in this group, except in Isfahan and Fars, was very low.

Thus the relatively high percentage of producers who owned land indicates one main point, that is, that all other conditions being equal, the semi-feudal relations of production embraced a majority of the direct producers in these provinces. As far as the degree of feudal exploitation was concerned, we have in these provinces a different situation from that in Azarbaijan. That is to say, although in these provinces a minority of the direct producers were subject to semi-feudal exploitation, they were subject to a higher degree of exploitation than in Azarbaijan (compare Table VII with Table I).

Consequently, we see two opposite situations in these two groups of provinces; i.e. in one group (Azarbaijan) the semi-feudal relations of production embraced a high percentage of the direct-producers, but the degree of the exploitation was relatively low; whereas, in the other group (including 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th provinces and Sistan and Baluchestan) the semi-feudal relations of production covered a minority of the direct-producers, but this minority was subject to a high degree of exploitation.

In Kurdistan, the direct-producers were in a worse condition than those in the two above groups. That is to say, not only were a high percentage of the producers subordinated to semi-feudal exploitation (i.e. 77.9%), but also the degree of feudal exploitation was high, i.e. although they furnished oxen and seeds in addition to labour, they had to hand over half of the produce to the landlords (see Table I).

The third distinct group includes provinces in which the fixed-rent system was dominant; i.e. the first and second provinces (Gilan and Mazandaran). In both provinces, as is shown in Table VII, fixed rent was the dominant form of rent payment. But the data for both provinces are misleading, since each one of these provinces, at the time of survey

TABLE VII

Types of Holdings by Province (percentage)

Type of Operation	% of Share Cropping	% of Owner Operator	% of Fixed Rent	% of 1 + 2 Combined	% of 1 + 3 Combined	% of 2 + 3 Combined	Total %	Total No.
Province	(1)	(2)	(3)					
Tehran	50.8	30.7	2.5	10.3	2.8	1.6	100	139,829
1st Province (Gilan)	28.2	17.3	41.4	2.4	6.5	4.2	100	212,144
2nd Province (Mazadaran)	26.6	27.7	33.7	2.2	4.3	5.4	100	210,324
3rd Province	70.0	18.1	3.2	2.7	5.8	0.2	100	220,141
4th Province	73.0	23.6	0.9	2.2	0.3	0.0	100	55,456
Kurdistan	77.9	10.8	2.4	3.0	5.9	0.0	100	55,559
5th Province	60.4	17.0	5.0	1.5	15.9	0.2	100	138,374
6th Province	51.7	33.8	9.5	3.5	1.2	0.3	100	165,689
Bakhtiari and Chaharmahalat	42.7	47.6	1.7	2.5	4.6	0.9	100	53,276
7th Province	43.2	33.4	11.7	5.0	5.2	1.5	100	149,982
8th Province	34.3	55.0	1.5	5.9	2.3	1.0	100	71,569
Sistan and Balnehestan	24.6	68.7	4.1	2.0	0.6	-	100	46,988
9th Province	25.3	67.8	1.8	3.1	-	2.0	100	216,772
10th Province	29.8	38.6	11.9	7.3	0.1	12.3	100	141,198
								1,877,299

Source: 1960 Census, Vol. 15, Table 103.

(1960) comprised two or more heterogeneous agricultural regions. Here as an example, we shall try to sort out the forms of landholding in Gilan.

At the time of the survey (1959-60) Gilan, comprised three different agricultural regions. They included Gilan, Arak and Zanjan. From a social and agricultural point of view, the latter two regions are very different from the former one. That is to say, while in Arak and Zanjan the share-cropping system was dominant, in Gilan region fixed rent was the prevalent form of rent payment.

Table VIII illustrates the type of land operation for the regions of the first province, i.e. Arak and Zanjan on the one hand and Gilan on the other. Since there is nothing particular to say about the first two regions, Arak and Zanjan, where the share-cropping system was the dominant form of land operation, we leave them aside and concentrate on the Gilan region.

In Gilan region, the fixed-rent system covered the highest percentage of holdings (i.e. 61.3%) followed by owner/operator holdings (21.8%). This means that only around 10% (columns 1, 3 and 4) of the total producers were subject to semi-feudal exploitation. In addition, about 21.8% of the producers were not attached to the land, which is equal to saying that they were not exploited through the share-cropping system. The majority i.e. 67.2% (columns 3 and 6) operated the holdings without any intervention and subjugation on the part of the landlords. These operators (i.e. so-called capitalist farmers and/or commodity producers) had only to pay a portion of their produce, i.e. around one-third, as rent to the landlords. The table below, clearly, indicates the dominance of the so-called capitalist relationship between landlords and producers.

3) Mixed Rents

So far, we have explained the main forms of rent, i.e. fixed rent (in cash and in kind) and share-cropping (in cash and in kind). However, in some cases, throughout the country, the direct-producers were subject

TABLE VIII

Types of Land Operation in the First Province

No. of Holdings / Area	Share-cropping (1)	Owner/ Operator (2)	Fixed Rent (3)	1 + 2 Combined	1 + 3 Combined	2 + 3 Combined	Total
Arak and Zanjan	49,705	6,696	3,743	1,952	11,850	900	74,846
%	66.4	9.0	5.0	2.6	15.8	1.2	100
Gilan	9,900	29,898	84,000	3,300	1,800	8,100	137,298
%	7.3	21.8	61.3	2.4	1.3	5.9	100

Source: 1960 Census Vol. II, Tables 101(1) and 101(2).

to a combination of these rents. Moreover, in some cases, where the system was a combination of fixed rent and share-cropping, the latter was paid in cash. This can be seen as an attempt on the part of the landowner to transfer the rental system from share-cropping to fixed rent,[42] indicating a transitional stage from semi-feudal relationship (i.e. share-cropping) to a 'capitalist' relationship (fixed rent). However, fixed-rent had some advantages which the landowner at a certain point might prefer. From the economic point of view, these advantages were as follows: on the part of the landlord, he saw no need to keep a full-time overseer (himself or a bailiff) to check on the amount of produce; and on the part of the direct-producer, he knew that if he produced more (by working harder) the landlord would not receive more than the agreed amount of produce, in cash or in kind. Table VII shows that the mixed form of rent existed in almost all provinces except 9. However, these holdings with the mixed form of rent constituted a low percentage of the total.

Generally speaking, the mixed rent form was a combination of fixed rent and share-cropping. But as far as the form of payment was concerned, rent was paid, in some cases, partially in kind and partially in cash. For example, in some villages of Astara (the south western of Caspian Sea) the system of *sehkoot* was applied i.e. the landlord collected one-third of the produce. In addition, peasants had to submit 5 to 6 koots (= 800-960 kgs.) of rice for each sown ha. of land.[43] In some villages of Hamadan, before the division of the crop between landlord and producers, the former collected 150 to 300 kgs. of the crop per *juft*. In some other villages of the same region, the landlord collected one fourth of the wheat, and in addition the producers had to submit 30 to 60 kgs. per juft of wheat to him.[44]

Apparently, payment of mixed rent in cash and kind was more common than payment in kind only. In Garmaseh, in the Isfahan township, for instance, the farmers had to pay 120 kg. of wheat, 240 kg. of oats, 240 kg. of paddy, 180 kg. of millet, 240 kg. of giant beans, 3600 kg. of onions, *plus 4750 rials for the cultivation of melons and 3800 rials for cultivation of cucumbers*, to the landlord as the rent of one habbeh of land (= 2.4 has.). In the Borzavan plantation in the above village, the farmer submitted annually 60 kg. of wheat, 60 kg. of paddy, 240 kg. of onions, plus *250 rials cash for melon and cucumber cultivation* to the landlord for the rent of one habbeh (= 0.3 ha.).[45] In Hamadan township, for the cultivation of clover, the direct producers had to pay a given amount of money as the rent of $3600m^2$ of land. If the cultivation exceeded more than this size, one third of the clover, produced in the extra lands, was taken by the landlord.[46] In Bileh Savar, a village in Moghan plane, the land was measured by *shoot* (equal to 300,000 square metres). The direct-producers gave one tenth of the produce plus 80 rials cash for the rent of one *shoot* of land.[47] Furthermore, according to the daily paper *Keyhan*, July 7, 1945, in Jamalabad, a village in Kurdistan,

the landlord furnished land and water to 65 peasant households, for which he obtained from each peasant household one third of the produce *plus 120 rials in cash.*[48] Finally, the R.G. gives an example which strongly supports Seidov's idea mentioned above, i.e. mixed rent signified an attempt, on the part of the landlords for a transition from the share-cropping system to fixed rent: *Nasaq*-holders in Bangin, in East Azarbaijan, paid the landlords a share to farm wheat, barley alfalfa and cotton (if they planted it). Landlords had no share in the vegetable or, almond crop. Until 1954 the landlord's share was one-third of the winter crops, then for whatever reasons they reduced it to one-fifth of the produce, but in return they collected a lump sum of an account of supplying water to the producers.[49]

Thus in this chapter we explained various forms of rent payment in rural Iran. That is, we examined different varieties of the share-cropping system, and concluded that this system has similarities with the FMP, but the rent paid in this system is moved away from its classic form. We also examined the fixed rent system in the Caspian Sea littoral. However, in the next chapter, we shall set out to analyse labour-service and dues in rural Iran.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. Demin, 1967, pp.221-22
2. Marx, 1971, p.803
3. Marx, 1976, p.290
4. Ibid, p.283
5. Ibid, pp.291-92
6. Balibar, 1972, p.214
7. Vreeland, 1957, p.187
8. Table III shows the rainfall in the neighbourhood of Yazd during the 1940s and 1950s.

Table III
Rainfall Statistics in Millimetres for the Township of Yazd

Year	1941	1942	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Total Amount	257	134	53	119	41	71	81	24	107	43

Source: Atai, 1965, Table 5

9. See Lambton, 1953, and Atai, 1965.
10. Atai, 1967, p.116
11. Lambton, 1953, p.320
12. Ibid, p.319
13. Ibid
14. Atai, 1965, p.116
15. Lambton, 1953, p.319
16. See for example Bangin, a village in Azarbaijan, already quoted above and also Abdol Tapeh, a village near Qazvin, in which the landlords preferred to lease their lands to these share croppers. (T.E., Vol. VI, Nos. 15 & 16, Nov. 1969, p.221)
17. Safinejad, 1974, p.157
18. T.E., Nov. 1969, p.217
19. Marx, 1971, p.646
20. Ibid, 646
21. Lenin, Vol. 13, p.298
22. Marx, 1971, p.757
23. Ibid, p.764
24. Ibid, p.755
25. Murray, 1977, p.109
26. See Marx, 1971, pp.771-71
27. Ibid, p.758
28. Lambton, 1953, p.319
29. T.E., Jan.1967, pp.180-81
30. Ibid, pp.170-71
31. Lambton, 1953, p.321
32. T.E., Nos. 5 & 6, Khordad 1342 (in Persian)
33. Lambton, 1953, p.319
34. Ibid, p.321
35. T.E., Jan. 1967, p.169
36. Okazaki, 1969, p.268
37. Marx, 1971, p.883
38. See Khamsi, 1968.
39. Ibid, p.54
40. Ibid, pp.54-57
41. Marx, 1971, pp.796-97

42. Seidov, 1963, p.94
43. Ibid
44. Bahrami, 1954,
45. Atai, 1965, p.117
46. Bahrami, 1954, p.532
47. Ibid, p.213
48. Quoted in Seidov, 1963, p.94
49. T.E., Jan. 1968, p.170

CHAPTER III

Labour-Service and Dues

Labour service is one form of the extraction of surplus in pre-CMPs. The payment of this surplus-labour, or rent, is in the form of direct labour. It is in effect unpaid surplus-labour for the owner of the means of production. In this form of rent, the direct producer, using instruments of his own, cultivates a plot of land actually owned by him for a few days of the week and works during the remaining days upon the estates of the feudal lord. Labour-rent presupposes a direct separation of necessary and surplus labour: the direct-producer reproduces his own labour-power by working on his own land and produces a surplus-product by cultivating on the landlord's land. Marx explains the situation in which a peasant is forced to undertake labour service as follows: 'He (the peasant) works on his own land with his own means of production for, say, three days a week. The other three days are devoted to forced labour on the lord's domain. He constantly reproduces his own labour-fund, which never, in his case, takes the form of a money payment for his labour, advanced by another person. But in return his unpaid and forced labour for the lord never acquires the character of voluntary and paid labour.'[1] Comparing labour service with surplus-labour in the CMP, Marx states that the value of the wage which represents the paid portion of the working day in the CMP, appears as the value of whole working day, i.e. paid as well as unpaid portions. Hence, the wage form, contrary to labour-rent, conceals every trace of the division of the working day into necessary labour and surplus-labour.[2]

What determines the amount of labour rent? In order to answer this question, one should take into account some other factors including the degree of the dominance of the FMP in a particular social formation, the level of development of productive forces and also the payment of other

forms of rent on the part of the producers. But labour-rent, all other conditions remaining the same, '... will depend wholly upon the relative amount of surplus-labour, or enforced labour, to what extent the direct producer shall be enabled to impose his own conditions to acquire wealth to produce an excess over and above his indispensable means of subsistence, ...'[3] As far as the Iranian rural social formation is concerned, an attempt will be made here to show that the amount of labour-rent depended upon a number of factors, including the degrees to which the direct producers were subordinated to the landlords and also on the amount of the other forms of rent paid by the direct-producers.

Labour service, as a form of rent, existed in rural Iran, but it was not the main form of exploitation of the direct producers. In effect, it was usually supplementary to the other forms of rent and therefore it did not directly affect the sphere of production of the main crops. For these reasons, Demin states that labour service never played an important part in Iranian agriculture.[4] However, despite its minor role in Iranian agriculture, it occurred throughout the country.

In rural Iran, labour service was mainly used for non-agricultural work rather than for the cultivation of the landlord's crops as in the classical feudal system. This was because the FMP was to a considerable extent articulated with the CMP (which will be discussed below) which is why by the 1950s labour service was no longer demanded in all parts of the country.[5] And again, due to this articulation of these two modes of production, labour service was imposed, to a lesser extent, on the direct producers living in the villages near the towns and cities. Hence, the landlord's estates could not have been run on the basis of labour service.

Light is thrown on the subordination of the direct producers to the landlords by the following: Peasants in Varamin in addition to agricultural work, just like landlord's servants, were obliged to take care of the landlord's farmstead, construction works, transport of wheat and other

crops. In the case of any protest on the part of the peasants, they would have been expelled from the village. In Koleh-jub'Olya, a village in west Shahabad, up to the first stage of L-R (Feb. 1961) the direct producers were obliged to undertake labour service. But the implementation of L-R, which was followed by weakening of the position of the feudal landlords *vis-a-vis* the peasants, made the landlord unable to impose labour-service any more. The R.G. reported that in this village '... the farmers were most dissatisfied because the landowner had managed to avoid the first stage of Land Reform, by purchasing the village in the name of his small children. The previous year he had collected his ownership share by force, and the villagers told us (R.G.) that this year they would refuse to hand it over whatever the consequences and that the landlord, too afraid to come himself, would send his brother. *Nevertheless, despite the disappointment of the villagers, Land Reform has had some effect in Koleh-jab in that the landlord has been compelled to abolish personal taxes and labour-service.*'[6]

Generally speaking, direct-producers were obliged to do the following without any reward from the landlords: . transport, participation in building of roads and buildings, construction, cleansing and repairing the irrigation systems, chopping wood , collecting firewood , and other agricultural work (working in the landlord's lands). Here an attempt will be made to explain these varieties of labour-service.

One of the most common forms of labour-service throughout the country was the transportation of the landlord's grain from the field to the granary and market. The producers were required to carry the landlord's share, after the harvest, to the store room and/or market, using their own animals. 'Thus in Azarbaijan the transport both of the landlord's share from the fields to his granaries and of the grain which the landlord delivers to the state granaries by way of taxation was commonly a charge upon the peasant. This was also the case in Kurdistan, Kirman, and in vicinity of Kashmar.'[7] But the interesting point is that, in some cases,

e.g. Aderan in the neighbourhood of Tehran, this form of labour service, transportation, was levied on the producers in the form of cash. In Azarbaijan, this amount was about 500 rials for each *juft* of land. In Hamadan, also each peasant had to pay 70 rials and the landlord, in addition, collected 150 rials per ton of harvest.[8] In Hamadan, the grain used to be carried to the nearby town by the peasants, but later the landlords changed the form of levy, i.e. they preferred to charge the producers a certain amount of money per 300 kg. of grain, depending on the distance of the village to the nearby town.[9]

Participation in the construction of roads died out since the central government took over these public works. But other forms of construction services survived until the implementation of L-R. In Kirman, labour-service took the form of *corvee* levied for the performance of projects which the landlord wished to undertake.[10] However, the main form of labour-service included in this category, was the construction and repair of the *qanats*. These were the principle duties of the producers in the central and arid areas, where, *qanats* were the most important source of water supply. In these areas, despite the fact that the *qanats* belonged to the landlords and they collected rent for water (as we saw above) the direct-producers were obliged to perform digging, cleaning and repairing of the wells and canals of the *qanats*. Thus according to Ono, whenever the landlord of Ibrahimabad, in the neighbourhood of Nishaboor in Khorasan province, needed labour-service for repairing his *qanat*, the *nasaq holders* had to undertake the job.[11] In the Yazd area, also the peasants had a duty to look after the irrigation systems of the villages.[12] The peasants in Sistan had exactly the same duties which were imposed on them by the central government, the owner of most of the lands in this province.[13] The obligation to look after the irrigation system, in many places, was regarded as integral part of the villagers' economic life, and consequently, one might expect that they were not reluctant to perform

it. Indeed, as most unpaid labour was said to be for the common good of the public, the *nasaq holders* themselves did not seem to mind it very much.[14]

Labour-service in the form of agricultural works existed throughout the country during these two decades. However, many scholars believe that all other varieties of labour service, including agricultural duty, had less significance than transportation duty. Agricultural duties might have covered either the whole process of cultivation, including ploughing, sowing, winnowing, reaping, harvesting and threshing; or any one of these stages. Thus in certain areas of Khuzistan '... it is the practice for the holder of a plough-land to be required also to plant, reap, and thresh a certain amount of grain free in the land which the landowner reserved for himself,...' In Nurabad (in Fars Province) the *nasaq*-holder was required to sow and reap for the landlord without any rewards.[15] In the Saqqiz area, if a landlord wanted his land ploughed, or the harvest reaped, or any other agricultural work performed, *nasaq*-holders were obliged to furnish the labour required.[16] In Hamadan region, the direct producers, among other things, had to undertake the following agricultural works: threshing the landlord's grain (2 days), hay making (one day) and collecting grain (one day).[17] According to a study, carried out by the Institute of Social Research and Studies, an average of 46% of the sampled households were subject to labour service. The study covered seven townships and the relevant percentages of direct-producers who were obliged to undertake labour service were as follows: Sanandaj (in Kurdistan) 95.1%, Qasreh-Shirin 60.4%, Birjand (in Khorasan) 43.4%, Hamadan 35.5%, Sari (in Caspian Sea littoral) 33.8%, Garmsar (near Tehran) 30.7%, and in Golpaigan 25%. The study clearly shows the signficance of agricultural works *vis-a-vis* other works which were carried out by corvee in these areas, i.e. 45.9% of the households had to carry out their labour service in the field.[18]

There were some other varieties of labour service which had less significance than those explained above. They included: chopping firewood ,

collecting grasses, spinning cotton and wool, removing snow from the roof of the landlord's house, taking out landlords' sheep and cows,[19] acting as the landlords' personal servants, and providing fuel.

Having reviewed all these forms of labour service, one may pose the question of whether or not there was any basis on which labour service was being imposed and by whom was it undertaken? If we were to compare this with the Russian case, Lenin for instance argued in *the Development of Capitalism in Russia* that labour service requires the middle-peasant, that is a peasant who is not affluent, but is not proletarian either. Labour service is not suitable for the well-to-do peasants, because 'it is dire need that compels the peasant to undertake the worst-paid jobs ...'[20] On the other hand, poor peasants are not suitable for labour service, because 'having no farm of his own, or possessing a miserable patch of land, the rural proletarian is not tied down to it to the extent that the "middle" peasant is, and, as a consequence, it is far easier for him to go elsewhere and hire himself out on "free" terms, i.e. for higher pay and without bondage at all.'[21]

At first sight it appears, looking at the pertinent studies, that labour service was levied on the peasants without considering their social status. But some evidence exists which suggests that there was some sort of discrimination: i.e. the levying of labour service on all social strata of the peasantry was not an absolute rule. For example in Ibrahimabad, a village in the township of Nishabour in Khorasan, the landlord required labour service for repairing the *qanat*. The Labour service then was levied on the ordinary peasants, members of *sahras* (work-teams)[22]. Lambton is more precise on this point. In Turbati Haydari however a township in the same province, labour service was levied on all share-cropping peasants (*nasaq* holders) and landless peasants, but not on the *salar*, the peasant in charge of the work-team.[23] There were three types of work-team (*Pa-gavi*) cultivating the land: the first type called *Pa-gavi*

Kalkin, belonged to the poor peasants. These peasants were allowed to cultivate small pieces of land surrounding the village farms. These (poor) peasants were not obliged to undertake any labour service. The second stratum of peasants, who occupied 64% of farming lands in Sistan, consisted of share-croppers who collected one-third or two-thirds of the harvest, depending on who supplied the seeds. These share-croppers were in the middle stratum and were obliged to carry out labour service. The third group included peasants (called *tuyal kars*) who supplied only half of the required seeds, and the rest was supplied by the landlord. This group of peasant share-croppers were better off than the others and collected half of the harvest, after deduction of all costs. These share-croppers were not bound to perform labour service.[24]

Lenin considered labour service as the worst-paid job in rural Russia.[25] There were some economic reasons for which peasants, middle peasants in particular, undertook labour service. 'Sometimes peasants undertake (labour service) for a money payment to cultivate with their own implements the field of landowner .... Sometimes the peasant borrows grain or money, undertaking to work off either the entire loan or the interest on it ... In some cases the peasants work "for trespass" (...), or work simply "out of respect" (...), i.e. gratis, or just for a drink,... Lastly, labour service in return for land is very widespread in the shape of either of half-cropping or directly of work for land rented, for grounds used, etc.'[26] However, this statement by no means can be considered as a situation in which the peasants had the option to undertake and/or not to undertake labour service. They were bound to perform it. According to Lenin, peasants were obliged, by economic as well as non-economic coercion , to undertake labour service. That is to say, 'the peasants' farms were not entirely separated from those of the landlords, for the latter retained possession of very essential parts of the peasants' allotments: the "cut off" lands, the woods, meadows, watering places, pastures, etc. Without these lands (...) the peasants

were absolutely unable to carry on independent farming, so that the landlords were able to continue the old system of economy in the form of labour-service. The possibility of exercising "extra-economic pressure" also remained in the shape of the peasants' temporarily-bound status, collective responsibility, corporal punishment, forced labour on public works, etc.'[27] Comparing this form of labour service with the form which existed in rural Iran during 40s and 50s, we should, first of all, say that, labour-service was by no means '*the worst paid job*' but was, in effect, an unpaid job which *nasaq* holders, and in some cases landless peasants, were bound to undertake. Consequently, the dire economic needs on the part of the poor *nasaq*-holders did not direct them to perform labour service. It holds good for the well-to-do *nasaq* holders, but in a different way. That is to say, they were driven off the performance of labour service, due to their prosperity. However, assuming that all strata of the peasantry had to undertake labour-service, the performance of this obligation could have originated from the following 'coercions':

In some cases, there were village-level public works which peasants had to undertake, e.g. the cleaning and repairing of *qanats* in places where it was the sole source of water. On the one hand, the peasant had to perform this unpaid job, despite the fact that the *qanat* belonged to the landlord. He was, therefore, subject to the exercise of "extra economic pressure", which forced him to take this work without any reward. But on the other hand, his reproduction was almost impossible without being supplied with water by *qanat*. He was, therefore, under *an economic pressure* as well to construct, repair and clean the *qanat*. Thus it was this double pressure, which directed him to perform the job in the form of labour service. Although the *qanat* belonged to the landlord, since the supply of water was vital for all of the producers, in certain villages, affairs pertinent to the *qanat* were for the common good. That is why *nasaq holders* accepted the obligation of cleaning and repairing the *qanat*.[28]

In some other cases, labour service was linked to being raised to the position of possession of land, i.e. *nasaq*, (see the cases below, according to which peasants were obliged to undertake labour service according to their ploughed land). We have already explained the conditions of security and insecurity surrounding the direct-producers. It was further stated that the peasants (direct-producers) had all means of production other than land (and water). It follows that, these producers were unable to reproduce themselves without obtaining land. This dire economic need put them into a position of subordination to the owners of land. This subordination, which stemmed from economic needs, plus subordination at the level of the political and ideological (existing in all feudal social formations) obliged the direct producers, not only to pay rent, but also to perform labour service. Labour service, in this case, had different forms such as carrying out the landlords personal affairs and transporting the landlords grain by his (producers) ass. Since these jobs would by no means be seen as being for the common good, the producers could directly feel the pressure on themselves and therefore, were more reluctant than in the former case to perform labour service.

Labour service was levied by household, male and/or female population, ploughed land, house, share of water, animals (asses and cows) and also on the granting of *nasaq* for the next year. In Farsinj, a village in Hamadan region, peasants had to undertake *begari* (labour service) for the landlord in the form of five days work for him per person per year (*Rahbar*,Oct. 25, 1946). In Kurdistan, peasants were obliged to perform one to four days work per person per year (*Navideh Ayandeh*, June 4, 1952 and *Dezh*, August 12, 1952). Peasants in Mazan, in Kirman province, were bound to work during the summer for the landlords without any charge (*Dezh*, August,1, 1952). Lastly, the peasants of Torbat-e Heydarieh, in Khorasan province, had to choose a person among themselves and send him to the landlord to work as a servant, while they had the responsibility of feeding

him.[29] Sometimes labour service was heavier than in the above cases. In the village Sonqor-Kolai and Matar, peasants had to work 30 to 60 days a year for the landlords.[30]

Apparently, the most common criterion for levying labour service was *juft* (plough-land). In Hassanabad, near Sanandaj in Kurdistan, the levy was made per *juft* and amounted to seven days' free labour of a peasant and four days' free labour of an ass per year. In the Saqqiz area, in the same region, each *juft* had to provide the landlord with several free days' labour in men and asses. In Varzaqan, in Azarbaijan province, each (plough-land) was bound to provide the landlord with four days' free labour in men and asses. In Nurabad, in Fars province, a member of each plough-land had to sow and reap for the landlord a small quantity of rice with no reward. Lastly, in some parts of Azarbaijan each holder of plough-lands had to provide a certain number of loads of firewood, or camel-thorn.[31]

All the above include the cases in which the levy was made on animals and asses in particular. We should mention here that in these cases, asses were used for the transport of the landlords' produce from the fields to the nearby town and/or for carrying building materials for example.

In some cases, in arid areas, labour service was levied on the users of water, based on their relative shares. For example, most of the land in Sistan, belonged to the State, and therefore labour service was levied by government officials for performance of various kinds of work, including irrigation works and road-building. Thus 'men have to be provided for this labour service by those who have the right to a share of the water, in proportion to the number of their shares, whenever called upon to do so by the officials of the government.'[32]

Finally, in some cases, labour service was undertaken by the *nasaq* holders to obtain *nasaq* for the next year. Peasants in some areas of Khuzistan, for instance, might have been required to work all over the

summer on rice production without any reward, except that of obtaining *nasaq* during the balance of the year on favourable conditions.[33]

Dues other than labour service

So far, we have explained the forms of rent and labour service which were imposed on the direct producers during these two decades. However, they were subject to some other forms of direct exploitation which can generally be called *dues*. The direct subordination and servitude of the producers to the landlords not only had enabled the latter to exact surplus in the form of rent, but also had given the landlord the possibility of imposing one of the medieval types of levy on producers in the form of the presentation of different products such as chicken, eggs, butter, milk, and even in some cases cash. These dues were levied on the producers throughout the country during the period under study and during the early forties in particular. But due to the peasant revolts in the forties and early fifties, they disappeared and were almost all abolished on the eve of the implementation of L-R. They were effectively compulsory presents to be given to the landlords.

In certain areas, some dues were levied per ploughed land; for example in Distgird and Sulaymanabad, near Hamadan, the due comprised of two loads of lucerne and some money per year. The peasants of Asadabad, near Hamadan, had to pay 50-100 rials plus 32-39 lb. of clarified butter per annum, while in the Pushti Kuh area of Kangavar, the dues comprised of 6 lb of clarified butter, three hens and 200 rials.[34]

In Hamadan region, the landlords collected the following dues yearly: a certain amount of cash per head of sheep, a certain amount of money per household as rent, 2 to 4 hens per peasant (*nasaq* holder or landless), 10 to 25 eggs per household, a certain amount of wood and manure in some areas, 1.5 kg. clarified butter in some villages and in some others (remote areas) 4.5 kg. per pair of draught animals.[35] A number of dues, including clarified butter, hens, eggs, lambs, kids and money, were levied per plough

land, or per share of water in Azarbaijan. In Hashtrood, dues were levied on *nasaq*-holders as well as landless peasants, but the latter had to hand over more per head of livestock than the farmer.[36] In Azarbaijan (east and west) peasants were obliged to give 12 *kaseh* (vessel) grain for the crop, 3 *kaseh* for the harvest and one *kaseh* for the fields and some more for other things to the landlords. As a whole, landlords collected around 280 kg. of grain, five toomans cash (10 rials = 1 tooman) per head of livestock, one hen or cock, from each peasant household. In the cases in which the peasant did not have any one of these items, it could be substituted for grain. These dues had to be paid by the producers of almost all areas of Azarbaijan including Arasbaran, Tabriz, Garmrood, Reza'ieh, Hashtrood, Dehargan, Maragheh, Ardebil, Maku, Marand, Sarab, Khalkhal and Salmas.[37]

The Kurdish peasants were apparently subject to the heaviest rent as well as the heaviest dues. E.g. in Hasanabad, near Sanandaj, they had to hand over to the landlords 3-4 hens, over 3 lb. clarified butter and 100 rials per plough-land; while in another village, i.e. Dabbagh, these dues comprised of 5 hens, 5 lb. clarified butter and 100 rials.[38]

Kurdish peasants, in the neighbourhood of Marand, were subject to the following dues per annum: 30-100 rials cash, one mann clarified butter, some eggs, 4 to 10 hens. In Matar, a village in this province, the peasants who owned draught animals, in addition to the labour service, had to hand over 150 rials cash, ¾ kg. clarified butter and some fodder, to the landlords; while some other peasants were subject to another set of dues, including: one head of sheep, 3 hens (or cocks), 25 eggs, 16 kg. kerosene and five days' yield of sheep's milk.[39]

In Gilan province, in addition to the fixed amount of rent, which was around one-third of the produce, landlords also collected every year 6 to 12 chickens, one egg for every 33 kg. of rice plus some other products such as garlic, onions, grapes, walnuts, cooking oil, honey and some fruits.

These dues died out in this province around 1945.[40]

The collection of dues, just like that of rents, was undertaken by someone other than the landlord himself. As a matter of fact, although there was a direct relationship between landlord and peasant, this relationship was, in most places, mediated by an agent of the landlord, i.e. village headman (*kadkhoda*) or bailiff. Thus 'collection is made on behalf of the landowner by the kadkhoda or by a collector (*zabit*). On a given day a crier is sent out to announce that the holders of plough-lands should bring their clarified butter on such and such a day.'[41]

There is one further point in relation to dues to be mentioned here. In almost all cases mentioned above, at least one item of dues was paid in cash. This meant that the peasants had connections with the market: i.e. there existed a commodity economy alongside the feudal economy.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. Marx, 1976, p.713
2. Ibid, p.680
3. Marx, 1971, p.793
4. Demin, 1967, p.221
5. Lambton, 1953, p.331
6. The first example from Seidov, 1963, p.97; and the second one from T.E., Winter 1970, p.86, italics added.
7. Lambton, 1953, p.330
8. The examples are quoted in Badi, 1959, pp.62-3
9. Bahrami, 1954, p.533
10. Lambton, 1953, p.332
11. Ono, 1966, p.457
12. Besooyeh Ayandeh, March 5, 1952, quoted in Seidov, 1963, p.98
13. Lambton, 1953, p.333
14. Ono, 1966, p.457
15. Lambton, 1953, p.332
16. Ibid, p.331
17. Badi, 1959, p.75
18. Institute of Social Research and Studies, Project No. 1804, pp.56-7
19. Rahbar, June 5, 1946, quoted in Badi, 1959, p.73
20. Lenin, CW3, p.203
21. Ibid, p.208
22. Ono, 1966, p.457
23. Lambton, 1953, p.332
24. Bahrami, 1954, pp.371-72
25. Lenin, CW3, p.207
26. Ibid, p.198
27. Ibid, p.194
28. Ono, 1966, p.457
29. All cases are quoted in Badi, 1959, p.72
30. Seidov, 1963, p.98
31. All examples from Lambton, 1953, pp.331-33
32. Ibid, p.333
33. Kristjanson, 1960, p.3; note that this case is very similar to the last case which is mentioned by Lenin, i.e. labour service in return for land; see above.
34. Lambton, 1953, p.333
35. Bahrami, 1954, p.533
36. Lambton, 1953, p.334
37. Seidov, 1963, pp.100-01
38. Lambton, 1953, p.334
39. Seidov, 1963, p.100
40. T.E., nos. 5&6. pp.125-26 (in Persian)
41. Lambton, 1953, p.333

CHAPTER IV

Were the Peasants Tied to Land?

The social relationship between landlord and peasant has already been discussed. In short, we saw how the peasantry was exploited by the land-owning class, and how the farmer had to hand over a great portion of surplus to the latter in different ways. There is no doubt that, this intensive feudal exploitation caused the peasantry to live in absolute poverty. Then, why did they remain in the land? Were they tied to it? Here we will try to answer this question.

The Iranian peasant was not tied to the land in the same way as a serf under 'classical' feudalism. He could move from one village to another or to the towns. He was not subsumed to the landlord to the extent that he was unable to move away from the land. However, he was subject to some other pressures which, as a matter of fact, forced him to stay on the land. He was immobilized by the lack of alternative employment, an extremely low standard of living, and also limited energy and initiative due to poor health and illiteracy.[1] However, it seems that migration to the urban centres for whatever reasons accelerated in the late 50s. Khamsi writes: 'The high level of rural unemployment was already causing peasants to migrate to the cities in large numbers, as is evident from the fact that while rural population increased 18% between 1956 and 1966, urban population increased 80%.'[2]

However, considering this situation, i.e. the existence of exploitation and oppression accompanied by absolute poverty in rural Iran, one may pose the question of which factors caused peasants to remain and which to move away from the rural areas. Without getting deeply involved in the migration question during 1940-60, an attempt will be made to answer the above questions.

In order to answer these question, we will classify all the contributing factors into two categories: i.e. *disincentive factors* and *incentive factors*. By the former, it is understood, all factors which, in one way or another, discouraged the villagers to move away from rural areas. By the latter, incentive factors, is meant the factors which encouraged them to move away from the rural social formation. The elements of both categories, in relation to the rural social formation, are either external or internal. We explain therefore, the elements of both categories one by one according to their relevance to rural Iran.

a) Disincentive factors

Frightened by the flight of the peasant due to super-exploitation, the landlord had, during 1940-60, already taken some initiatives to induce the peasant to attach himself more to the land. These initiatives included giving him *nasaq*, encouraging him to get involved in gardening, giving him a house with its surrounding area, and finally keeping him permanently in debt.

We have already explained how the landlord raised the direct-producer to the position of possession of land, i.e. *nasaq*-holding. Although the latter could have been suspended from this position, the obtaining of *nasaq* was a strong factor which tied peasants to a particular village and discouraged migration.

The rights of gardening and also of possessing a house, were the privileges which the peasantry enjoyed during this period. The landlord usually owned all the land of a village, and it was not uncommon that a villager was given a house or a piece of land for building one. This 'privilege' existed in almost all parts. However, the landlord, in the case of dismissal of the peasant from the village, was able to take the house away from him, even though the latter had built it. But in some cases, this foothold had become so strong that the peasants even had permission to register the houses in their names subject to the condition

that they did not sell them to outsiders.[3]

Generally speaking as far as the ownership of houses is concerned, there existed different practices in different places. Hence, in Aliabad, a village in southern part of Tehran, 90% of the houses belonged to the landlord.[4] Also the houses in Sayyid Khalaf, near Ahvaz, were owned by the landlord. On the other hand, 'in various areas in Fars the peasants own their houses. This is so in Qara Belagh and Istahbanat, ... Most of the houses in Dizful formerly belonged to the landowner. In many cases these have been transferred to the peasants.... In Vays, Bandi Qir, Agili, Ram Hurmuz, Khalafabad, and for the most parts in the Bihbahan area the houses belong to the peasants'.[5]

One of the most common initiatives, taken by the landlords, was to encourage the peasants to get involved in gardening. In this case, the lands owned by the landlord, was given to the direct-producer to plant trees, fruit-trees, vines, etc. The legal term for the ownership of that which is on the land, such as trees, fruit-trees, vines and houses, etc., is called *a'yani*; whereas, the legal term for the ownership of the land called *arseh*. The ownership of land (*arseh*) and *a'yani* of a garden might have been vested in two different persons. That is, the land was owned by the landlord, while the *a'yani* belonged to the peasant. In Nikpay, a village in Zanjan, for instance, the *arseh* of the 16 has. of tree-nurseries belonged to the landlords and the *a'yani* to the peasants.[6] The separation of the ownership of *arseh* and that of *a'yani* was common, but it was not an absolute rule: e.g. in some places, the ownership of *arseh* and *a'yani* was vested in the landlord, such as in Sareh and Sahneh.[7]

This inducement was not provided by all landlords. Some landlords were frightened of any sort of peasant prosperity. They, therefore, tried to prevent the latter from getting involved in *gardening* which could have made them prosperous.[8] There is no doubt that the landlord, in this case, did not like to give an opportunity to the direct-producer to

have any permanent stake in the land. Having a permanent stake in the land, could be meant as an approach towards effective possession of the land, and therefore autonomy on the part of the direct-producer. That is why, in some places, the landlords did not encourage their subjects to be engaged in gardening.

However, the ownership of a tiny plot of land (as a garden or farm) was widespread in rural Iran: i.e. over 46% of these smallholdings belonged to the direct-producers (see Table XII). The reason why we consider the ownership of small plots of land, i.e. up to 2 has., as an inducement to attachment of the direct-producers to land, is due to the fact that, in most parts of Iran a plot of less than two has. is insufficient to feed a peasant family of six.[9]

In some areas, where there was a shortage of labour, the landlords were forced, in one way or another, to counteract any sort of flight on the part of the direct-producers by allowing peasants to engage in gardening. Thus 'in Jahrum (in Fars province) neighbourhood there is a shortage of peasants and they are encouraged to plant gardens so that they may become attached to the soil.'[10] In many villages of Arak, an area in which there was a shortage of labour[11], the producers had gardens for which they had to pay rent.[12] In some parts, this inducement took place in a different way. In Birjand and Qa'inat, for example, when the peasant lost his draught animal, it was frequently replaced by the landlord.[13]

However, one should notice that not always was there a correlation between the sparsity of population and the tendency of the landlords to give such concessions to the direct-producers. Thus in the sparsely populated areas, i.e. central Persia on the borders of the central desert stretching from Qum through Kashan to Yazd, there was no uniform practice concerning the ownership of gardens: in some cases the gardens belonged to the peasants, whereas in other cases they were owned by the landlords.[14]

As a concluding remark concerning the ownership of gardens on the part of the direct-producers, one may say that it was highly dependent on the degree to which the direct-producers were subordinated to the landlords by

other than economic mechanisms. Thus in places where the producers were highly subordinated to the landlords, the latter could see no reason for resorting to this policy to attach their subjects to the land; and *vice versa*, in places where the former were loosely subordinated to the latter, the landlords, in some cases, had to give some concessions to the direct-producers to tie them to the land.

The absolute poverty of the peasantry had brought about, among other things, permanent indebtedness. Lambton states that : 'it is not surprising that debt should be one of the curses of Persian rural life ... (the peasant's) reserves are almost always exhausted before the winter is over and he has to borrow merely to feed himself and his family.'[15] He had the following sources available to borrow from: the State institutions; brokers; moneylenders and other peasants; and lastly landlords. We shall be concerned here with the impact of these loans, granted to the peasantry, by different private sources, on the social relationship between landlord and direct-producer.

Table IX illustrates the contribution of private sources to the total loans granted to holding by size of holding in 1960. We shall assume that only the producers in the second category, i.e. holdings from under 0.5 hectare to under 20 hectares were subject to this set of social relations of production. The other categories were either holdings without land (landless peasants, owners of cattle and sheep) or capitalist farmers, that is lessees who rented the holdings from the landlords.

As Table IX shows, a quite high percentage of the producers of the holdings from under 0.5 to under 20 has. borrowed money from different sources. The public sources (or in fact organized money market) had a negligible contribution, while the rest of the producers borrowed from the landlords and/or other sources including money-lenders, shop-keepers, brokers. The main characteristic feature of the loans from private sources was that *they were raised on the security of the next year's harvest.*

TABLE IX

Percentage of Holdings Borrowed Money from Private Sources During the 1960 Agricultural Year

	Total No. of Holdings	% of Holdings borrowing from any source	% of Holdings borrowing from landlord	% of Holdings borrowing from other private sources
Holdings without land	507,600	25.3	2.8	22.2
Holdings from under 0.5 to 20has.	1,787,046	43.5	4.5	37.8
Holdings from 20 to 50	77,714	45.3	8.3	36.3
Holdings from 50 to 100	8,446	43.0	1.0	35.1
Holdings from 100 to 500	3,770	39.2	8.5	19.0
Holdings of 500 and over	316	48.4	-	46.8
Total	2,384,899	-	-	

Source: Table 202 of 1960 Census.

This form of security of loans and the indebtedness of over 42% of the *direct producers to private sources, obviously reinforced the peasants' ties to the land.* Thus Keddie states: 'in many cases the peasant borrows from his own landlord. This had led to the loss of the little remaining peasant land due to inability to repay, and to perpetual indebtedness which ties the peasant to a single area. Thus tenants are often in a state of peonage.'[16] However, one can consider debt as a binding tie, only when one takes into consideration some other social phenomena, including those explained above and the lack of opportunity of getting jobs in other places, lack of skills, poverty of the peasantry, and their ignorance.

We conclude this discussion with a quotation from Djamalzadeh's account written in the mid-thirties, at a time when feudal relations of production were more dominant and widespread than in the 50s. He states: 'The peasant usually cannot avoid becoming, sooner or later, in the debt of his master, who is often the landowner himself. It is in the interest of the latter to induce the peasant attached to his land to ask for a loan. Having contracted such a loan, *the peasant can no longer think of abandoning the ground which he is cultivating, his labour becoming, in fact, a sort of surity for the debts which he has contracted to his master.*'[17]

b) Incentive factors

By these factors we mean, the factors which are *exogenous* to the rural social formation. These factors could affect the relationship between direct producer/non-producer in the rural area indirectly, i.e. by opening opportunities of some other jobs to the direct-producer and therefore loosening his ties to the land. During these two decades, a low percentage of the labour-force was involved in the services and industry sectors and also the growth of these two sectors were very slow. This 'stagnation' in these two sectors meant, to the direct-producers in the rural areas, a lack of opportunity to find jobs in the urban centres. However one should notice

that, this lack of opportunity was accompanied by a lack of skills on the part of the (agricultural) direct-producers. Thus '.. peasants generally remained in the villages because finding alternative employment was difficult... Because of the lack of opportunity elsewhere for his unskilled service, the agricultural labourer was tied to the villages where he worked by the day for a tiny cash wage or part of the harvest.'[18]

The conditions of life of the peasantry will be analysed below, however, some scholars refer to the low standard of living and absolute poverty of the Iranian peasantry in the 1940s and 1950s, as one of the factors which had impelled peasants to migrate in search of employment in the urban centres. It is quite right to argue in this way, but one should note that only in some extreme cases did absolute poverty force the peasants to abandon their villages. Thus in Shahi (in Mazandaran province) they suffered crop failure due to severe drought for three consecutive years, i.e. 1947-49, losing three-quarters of their produce. They had to sell even their draught animals to feed themselves and their families. This disaster, later resulted in the reduction of the population of this area by 50%.[19] In Isfahan, the peasant's share (of the harvest) was so low and grain prices were so high that the peasants in crop failure years either died or moved out from their villages.[20] Lambton noted that in Qarajeh Dagh and other areas of Azerbaijan in 1949 the peasants, who had no reserves to tide them over bad times were being forced by poverty to sell up their belongings, including their draught animals. Already it would appear that poverty has forced many to abandon their villages.'[21]

Price estimated the number of these Azarbaijani peasants to be several thousands. According to him, many of these peasants worked on the project of the completion of the railway in the North to Tabriz.[22]

Generally speaking, different factors had different effects on the relationship between the direct-producers and the landlord. However, on the basis of their impact on the feudal social relationship, these factors

can be classified into two groups: i.e. those which reinforced the reproduction of the semi-feudal relationship between the two agents of production, and secondly, those which loosened this social relationship.

The first group is mainly comprised of the right of *'a'yani'*, loans and also the degree of development of the CMP in the urban centres. The impact of the latter factor is straightforward, and is already explained. But the impact of the former two factors is interesting in the sense that, while they are categories at the level of capitalist relations of production, they reinforced the semi-feudal relations of production. This is explained by English as follows: 'in debt is not viewed as a totally negative condition by the share-cropper in Kirman. Some measure of security is derived from the fact that the landlord will lend him grain, and it is clearly understood that the landlord will not take so much of the next harvest that the share-cropper cannot feed his family. *But debt keeps the share-cropper at the subsistence level; he works his way from harvest to harvest with little prospect of bettering his condition.*'[23]

The second group, which is diametrically opposed to the first, affected extremely poor peasants, due to feudal exploitation. In some cases shown above, we saw that, the peasants left their villages, because of absolute poverty. In these cases, capitalist relations developed out of feudal relations through separating the direct producers from their conditions of production. As a result of the super-exploitation of the feudal landlord, the direct-producer was no longer able to reproduce himself within the feudal relations of production. He had to sell his means of production to feed his family and himself. In this specific conjuncture, therefore, the feudal relations of production forced the direct-producer to be divorced from his objective conditions of production. Thereafter, he owned nothing but his labour-power; hence he became a labourer, separated from all the means of production. He moved out of the village social formation. This

was because there was no demand for his commodity, labour-power, in that 'feudal' social formation. Hence, he had to find a demand for his commodity in another social formation with different relations of production, i.e. a capitalist social formation (e.g. urban centres). Consequently the feudal relations of production, at one point, partially stopped reproducing themselves and by separation of the direct-producer from the conditions of production, in effect, reinforced the reproduction of capitalist relations of production within or outside the village social formation.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. Hadary, 1951, p.187
2. Khamsi, 1969,
3. Lambton, 1953, p.303
4. Hayden, 1949, p.145
5. Lambton, 1953, p.303
6. T.E., nos. 5&6, p.225 (in Persian)
7. See Lambton, 1953, pp.302-03
8. Ibid, 302
9. Okazaki, 1969, p.272
10. Lambton, 1953, p.325
11. Ibid, p.304
12. Ibid, p.323
13. Ibid, p. 312
14. Ibid, p.325
15. Ibid, p.380
16. Keddie, 1960, pp.15-16
17. Djamalzadeh, 1935, pp.341-42, italics added
18. US Army Area Handbook for Iran, p.405
19. Bahrami, 1954, pp.259-60
20. Badi, 1959, p.81
21. Lambton, 1953, p.383
22. Price, 1950
23. English, 1966, p.90

CHAPTER V

Peasant Revolts in Rural Iran

So far, we have analysed the relations of production in rural Iran. Relations of production in the sense of the specific economic form in which surplus was pumped out of the direct-producers, i.e. *share-cropping, fixed rent, and labour service as well as dues.* It has been asserted that these forms of appropriation/expropriation of surplus presuppose a specific form of subordination: the direct-producer is subject to *other than economic pressure* to hand over a portion of his produce to the non-producer.

However, what we are concerned with here, is the struggle between landlords and peasants during these two decades. First we shall give some examples of the peasant struggles and secondly, we shall try to present a theoretical explanation for the causes, purposes and direction of all these struggles.

After the Second World War, parallel with the anti-imperialist movements in the urban centres, anti-feudal (landlords) movements were formed by the peasantry throughout the country. In almost all provinces, including Azarbaijan, Kurdistan, Hamadan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Isfahan, Kirman, Fars, there were peasant revolts. However, there were two peaks in these revolts: 1945-46 and 1952. Generally speaking, the peasants' demands included, an *increase in their share of the total produce, new arrangements in the relationship between themselves and the landlords and also the abolition of all obligations.* Below we shall try to give a general view of the features of these movements together with specific examples. In addition, we shall examine the attitude of the landlords and that of the central government towards these movements.

The greatest agrarian revolts developed (in 1945-46) in Azarbaijan, where survivals of the feudal mode of production were combined with national suppression. Although all peasants in Azarbaijan are of Turkish origin,

most of the landlords of this region were Persian and those of the latter who were of Turkish origin were persianized and had lost their own national culture and traditions. The Iranian ruling class not only ruthlessly exploited the peasants of this region, but also denied their national feelings, did not recognize their mother tongue, customs, traditions and refused them education in their own language. National suppression coupled with feudal exploitation, resulted in the peasants' participation in the democratic movement which emerged in Azarbaijan in 1945.[1] Indeed 56,000 out of 75,000 members of the Democratic party were peasants.[2] The Democratic government of Azarbaijan took some measures against the landlords, including increases in the share of the direct-producers and abolition of all forms of obligations. However, the peasants, who were looking for effective possession of land, demanded fundamental changes in their relationship with the landlords. In many places the peasants refused to hand over the landlords' share and distributed some lands among themselves, which, according to the law of the democratic government, should not have been distributed.[3]

But this state of affairs did not last very long. The Democratic government of Azarbaijan collapsed and the Army of the central government occupied this province. Douglas states that 'when the Persian Army returned to Azarbaijan it came with a roar. Soldiers ran riot, looting and plundering, taking what they wanted... The Persian Army - the army of emancipation was an army of occupation. It left a brutal mark on the people. The beards of peasants were burned, their wives and daughters raped. Houses were plundered; livestock was stolen... On the heels of the Army came the absentee landlords.'[4] The landlords, who were strongly supported by the central government this time, once again managed to re-establish the rules: they not only reimposed obligations and rents but also laid claim to the rent which had not been paid while the Democrats were in power.[5]

The suppression of the Democrats of Azarbaijan brought political as

well as economic setbacks for the peasantry of this region. After the suppression, the peasants once again lost the effective possession of land and the minimized rates of rent. At the political level, this suppression so demoralized the peasantry that it was unable later on to raise itself against feudal exploitation even during 1952 when the peasantry of almost all areas revolted against the feudal landlords.

Apart from Azarbaijan, in the first half of 1946 the scale of the peasants' revolts reach an unprecedented level. In almost all provinces peasants revolted against the landlords. They mainly demanded the following: reconsideration of the division of the crop, an increase in the share of peasants at the cost of the landlords and the abolition of all dues. Having been frightened by such upheavals, the government deemed it necessary to manoeuvre and show that it wanted to take some measures on behalf of the peasants, in order to make their conditions of life better. In the spring of 1946, the general-governors were ordered by decree to establish commissions, comprised of the representatives of the State, landlords and peasants, to reconsider the division of the harvest between landlords and peasants.[6] At the same time, the government ordered a 15% increase in the peasants'share.

However, the reaction of the landlords to the new orders of the central government was different in different places. In some areas the landlords refused to carry out their agreements with the peasants, as well as the government's order for an increase in the producers' share. Yet, according to Ivanov, in many other places, the landlords, frightened by the uprisings, agreed to reduce their share. Thus in the spring of 1946, in Gilan, the representatives of landlords and peasants arrived at an agreement, which foresaw a decrease in the landlords' share by 25% and the abolition of dues. In Rafsanjan (province of Kirman) in May 1946, the representatives of the peasants and landlords arrived at an agreement to raise the peasants' share from 25% to 35% of the produce. In Gevard (province of Isfahan) the land and water belonged to the landlord. In

addition, in some cases he furnished seeds and draught animals. He collected an average two-thirds and the peasants one-third of the harvest. Due to the protest on the part of the peasants in this area against the order of division of the harvest, the landlord was obliged to arrive at an agreement in the beginning of June 1946. According to this agreement, the share of the peasants increased to two-thirds and that of the landlord was reduced to one-third. However, the peasants, who were trying to become independent producers and to have a secure position, went further than that, i.e. after the agreement they refused to submit even the reduced share to the landlord.[7]

The peasants in many other places rose up against the landlords and refused to pay rent to them. That is why groups of soldiers and policemen, ready to support the landlord, were sent to the rural areas to force the peasants to pay feudal rent at the previous rate. In the majority of regions, a state of war existed: soldiers and policemen destroyed peasants' unions, beat up, arrested and killed activists in these revolts.[8] Once again at the end of 1946, the medieval form of relationship between the landlords and peasants was restored. Therefore the landlords had managed to subordinate the peasants, separate them from land and water, and consequently keep them from controlling the conditions of their own reproduction. In short, due to the democratic movement during 1945-46, the central government was bound to give some concessions to the peasantry, e.g. increase their share out of the total produce. However after the suppression of this movement in December 1946 (in Azarbaijan), these concessions no longer existed.

The suppression of the peasants did not last very long. That is to say, a few years later, i.e. 1952, parallel with the anti-imperialist movement throughout the country, once again the peasants revolted against subordination by the landlords. Generally speaking, they demanded the execution of the law of 1946, an increase in their shares, and the abolition of dues and other obligations.

The anti-landlord riots on the part of the peasants took place in almost all rural areas: in Takistan (in Qazvin region) peasants took over the control of lands. (*Besooyeh Aiandeh*, May 12, 1952); in the same region the peasants revolted against the landlords (*Akharin Nabard*, May 29, 1952); the cultivators of Foomenat (in Gilan) demonstrated and took '*bast*' (the traditional taking of sanctuary in a holy place) and sent a telegram to the centre (*Asreh Now*, June 30, 1952); the peasants of Salehabad and some other villages of Hamadan region revolted against the landlords and ousted the police (*Besooyeh Aiandeh*, January 1, 1953); peasants' struggle in Bihbahan (*Besooyeh Aiandeh*, May 15, 1952); peasants of Kirman were reported as determined to fight for their legal rights (*Dezh*, August 1, 1952); peasants of Gorgan continued to fight to rescue themselves from their unbearable life (*Asreh Now*, June 16, 1952); peasants of the township of Mashhad struggled to rescue themselves from the yoke of big feudals ... (*Asreh Now*, June 18, 1952); and finally, 'peasants of Isfahan rose to fight for land' (*Akharin Nabard*, June 1, 1952).[9]

The above examples show how widespread the peasant movements were. However, in order to understand the direction, aims and other features of these upheavals, they should be reviewed in more detail. The examples below, will help us to understand the main features of the peasants upheavals in 1952.

Thus at the end of April 1952, the peasants of Takistan occupied the fields and started working on them. They declared that as long as their demands were not considered and arbitrary rule did not cease, they would not release the harvest (*Besooyeh Aiandeh*, May 12, 1952). They revolted against the landlords and proposed the following demands: 1) returning to the peasants, gardens appropriated by the landlords; 2) reviving the *qanat*; 3) reducing rent by one-third in irrigated land and one-fifth in irrigated fields; 4) giving to the peasants 15% increase in the share of the harvest which was their legal right (*Akharin Nabard*, May 29, 1952).

In Gilan a unified uprising took place against a state monopoly: the tobacco cultivators of Foomenat sent a statement to the tobacco administration (a state monopoly) according to which they demanded an increase in the price of the produce of one ha. from 6500 rials to 10,000 rials. They took '*bast*', sent a telegram to the centre and demonstrated by chanting slogans: "Tobacco Administration has to agree with tobacco cultivators and increase the price 1, 2 and 3 times", "Tobacco Administration is bound to increase the price from 6500 to 10,000 rials for one hectare".[10]

The peasant riots took place mainly in the western part of Iran, where the power of the feudal landlords was greatest. Thus, skirmishes occurred in many villages of Hamadan region between peasants on the one hand and landlords and police on the other. In some cases, peasants ousted landlords and the police; while in some other cases police arrested representatives of the peasants. However, the peasants were struggling for land and a minimal rent. Thus in Salehabad, they independently abolished obligations and did not hand over the landlord's share until they collected their own legal shares (legal share refers to the law of 1946). In another village, they forced the landlord to supply them with water without any change thereafter.[11]

But the struggle in Kurdistan, where the peasants, more than anywhere else, were subject to feudal exploitation, was harsher. The cases below, not only show the skirmishes between landlords and peasants, but also reveal how the State through the army and police supported the dominant classes in this province. Thus, the peasants of *Gorooman* (near Sanandag) refused to pay the landlord's share. The peasants occupied the village. As a result of a collision between the rival groups i.e. peasants on the one side and landlords and police on the other side, the landlord and one policeman was wounded while two peasants were killed. The peasants of Zavieh in the Zarand region of Kurdistan, demonstrated in front of the landlord's house. In order to intimidate them, the landlord (Colonel Mirgoli) fired a few shots in the air. Despite this, peasants continued

to insist on their demands and did not go away. Then Colonel Mirgoli opened fire on the peasants and killed three of them. However, later on, as a result of collisions between the rival groups, two brothers of the colonel and one peasant got killed. The fight ended with the arrest of the majority of the village inhabitants by some policemen who had come from the nearby police station.[12] Finally the commander of a division of the army in Mahabad (provincial capital of Kurdistan) collected 80,000 tomans from the landlords to arm them. The armed landlords, their men and some policemen invaded the villages in the neighbourhood of Mahabad township and committed an outrage against the peasants and confiscated their belongings.[13]

Here, in passing, we should state that the above cases among other things, clearly reveal the role that the nationalist government played against the peasants in their struggle against the landlords. However, due to the pressure on the part of the peasants, the government was forced in August 13th, 1953, to issue a decree: 'ordering landlords to turn over an additional 20% of the return from their agricultural lands. This amount would be divided equally between a rural development and cooperative organization created by the decree and the individual peasants working on the lands... The Prime Minister Mosaddeq also issued a decree which would abolish feudal dues and forced labour.'[14]

Seidov states the enforcement of this decree caused more conflicts between landlords and peasants. This was because the latter, after the decree, were insisting more and more on their legal rights; while the former were resisting and did not want to give any concessions to the peasants. Thus, for example, Khans, landlords of Songor-Koliai region (in Kurdistan), refused to carry out the new law which announced an increase in the share of the peasants of the total harvest. Police and officials helped them in this business preventing the harvest from being collected, and stated that anyone who wanted to get a share, had to walk out of the peasants' union, and secondly to submit a receipt showing that he

had received 20% increase in his share as well.[15]

The peasant revolts did not carry on at this level in the years after 1953. This was mainly due to the fact that, in that year, the nationalist government was overthrown by a coup and the 'democratic' atmosphere faded away from the country. The succeeding government, which was strongly supported by the comparador bourgeoisie and landlords, succeeded in suppressing all movements including that of the peasants. There is no doubt that after the coup, the feudal landlords managed to reimpose, to some extent, feudal rents and other obligations. However, on the eve of the L-R (1962) many obligations, for one reason or another, were already abolished.

After 1953, the Coup Government enabled the landlords to suppress and subordinate the peasantry to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the revolts on the part of the peasants became more widespread from the late 1950s up to the first stage of L-R.[16] By May 1961, the Iranian prime minister addressed the landlords and stated that: "You are bound to agree with the distribution of your estates, otherwise you would lose both your estates and your lives."[17] This statement indicates one point, that is, the pressure on the part of the peasantry (from the bottom) had reached the extent that the Iranian politicians could clearly feel the danger threatening the dominant classes. And as a matter of fact, it was one of the main reasons why they resorted to L-R.

Having surveyed the peasant movement between 1940 and 1960, we shall try to relate the main features of these movements to the dominant relations of production, and examine the purposes and limitations of these upheavals. Thus, the following questions need to be answered: What was the purpose of those struggles, were they anti-feudal movements, and were the peasants conscious of themselves as a class?

In the classical FMP, the direct-producer owns all means of production but land (and water). The latter belong to the non-producer. The non-producer, while he makes no contribution to the process of production, raises the direct producer to the position of possession of land (and

water) but appropriates a portion of produce produced by the producer. By the same token this makes it possible for the direct-producer to reproduce himself. This conjuncture brings about, for the direct producer, a specific form of subordination to the owner of land (and water). Thus, the direct producer is subordinated, because he is unable to reproduce himself on his own; and the non-producer subordinates, because this is the only way of giving his property the power to appropriate surplus.

According to Hindess and Hirst, the basic form of the economic class struggle in the FMP is the struggle for and against subsumption.[18] The direct-producer struggles against subsumption, but this struggle is not necessarily an attempt to overthrow feudal relations of production. However, his objectives are: autonomy as a producer, to hand over no or a limited amount of surplus (in different forms) to the non-producer and consequently to take control of his own reproduction. In order to realize these objectives and in fact to get rid of subordination, the direct-producer is forced to obtain (in the sense of ownership) those means of production which do not belong to him i.e. land (and water). He, therefore struggles for effective possession of land (and water). Thus if we saw that in the majority of cases cited above, the producers ousted the landlords by force, and took control of the fields, it was an attempt on their part to eliminate their subsumption to the landlords, i.e. to become independent producers. But on the other hand, the only way in which a non-producer can keep a producer in the state of subsumption, is by keeping him away from effective possession of land (and water). That is why, in our examples, the landlords maintained their ownership by force: through their own men or police and army. This holds good especially for the period 1946-52, and 1953 onwards, i.e. the periods in which the central government strongly supported the landlords. In effect, the landlords knew that this was the only way of subordinating and therefore exploiting the direct producers.

The other subject of dispute between landlords and peasants, was the

amount of rent to be paid to the former. The producers were trying to hand over a limited amount of surplus (in any form) to the non-producers. That is why, they mainly demanded the elimination of labour-service and some other dues on the one hand, and a decrease in the amount of ownership shown on the other. They were mainly insisting on paying the rent on the basis of new rates fixed by the central government (both in 1946 and 1952); whereas, the landlords aimed at an increase in the amount of rents. They, therefore, imposed heavy obligations on the producers and in the cases in which they were faced with an uprising on the part of the producers, the use of force was the only way to challenge the latter. This can be seen in almost all the cases. As a matter of fact, force and also the State's support played a very important role for the landowning class. The mass arrests of peasant demonstrators, fighting on the side of the landlords and also attempts to arm them, clearly show the significance of the role played by the State. In Gigasar (a village in Gilan) during 1954-64, the producers and landlords *had had frequent disagreement over the amount of the ownership share, which resulted in the imprisonment of several peasants. However in the year 1964 (prior to L-R) the landlord hoped to collect the entire ownership share with the help of government agencies.*[19]

In all examples cited so far, the conflict between the landlord and peasants was crystalized in the form of armed fighting. However, the contradiction between these could not have been always as antagonistic as in the above cases. It is reasonable to say that, in a conjuncture in which the direct producer is suppressed strongly and is therefore unable to stand against his landlord openly (as in the above cases), he may resort to other ways in which to struggle against him. There is obviously a certain limited aim, i.e. an attempt to obtain some more out of the total harvest. It seems that rural Iran during 1953-60 (the period in which all movements including the peasant movement, were ruthlessly suppressed) witnessed many varieties of this type of struggle on the part of the peasants. Thus Safinjad, who has explained the landlord-peasant relationship of some

villages in the south of Tehran, reveals some of the techniques used by the peasants to increase their share. In Hosseinabad, peasants used to dig tiny holes in the floor of the field which was the place where the wheat was threshed. At the time of the division of wheat between landlord and peasants, therefore some wheat had already collected in the holes, which would later on be emptied by the peasants. In Firoozabad, a state-owned village, the peasants used to resort to another stratagem: Every year the amount of produce on the threshing floor was estimated by an agent of the State and on the basis of this estimation the share of the landlord (State) was taken away from the producers. But the peasants in the process of cultivation watered most part of the field properly, but watered the remainder insufficiently. Consequently, wheat of the latter part was underdeveloped, i.e. the wheat seeds were poorer and smaller than ordinary ones. Then to mislead the valuer, they put good seeds first and covered them by poor seeds in the threshing floor. This gave to the valuer the impression, at the time of estimation, that this year the produce was not good, which resulted in under-estimation of the amount of produce.[20]

Gharachedaghi gives us an example (which happened before 1949) which clearly shows how the producers resisted the landlord who forced them to shift from the cultivation of wheat to that of sugar beet. He writes: 'Kurdian landlords in the region of Mianduab, who had to cultivate and deliver sugar beets to the Government-owned sugar factory and who had obtained advance payments for this cultivation, ordered their share croppers to cultivate sugar-beets instead of wheat which had been customary so far.

Although normally loyal to their landlords, the Kurdian peasants secretly boiled the sugar beet seeds and sowed the seeds without germinating capacity, in order to convince their landlords that sugar beets would not grow on the fields. Landlords gave in, when the two years' attempt failed.' Peasants did so because: ' a) according to the tenancy regulations in Azarbaijan and Kurdistan, the share of peasants would have

decreased from four-fifths to two-thirds of the harvest by shifting from the "winter crop" (wheat) to the "summer crop" (sugar beets), b) ... peasants would have had to share their portion with the pump-owner, ... c) peasants did not benefit from the advance payments of the factory made to landlords.'[21] These examples clearly indicate that the producers were quite aware of their own interests and since they were not able to stand against their landlords, they had to resort to trickery to obtain some more of the harvest.

There is no doubt that the purpose of the struggle, for land (and water) and minimization of rent, on the part of the producer, is for the producer to take control of his own reproduction. On the other hand, the landlord knows that if he enables his subject to take the control of his (producer's) reproduction, he would be unable to subordinate and therefore exploit him (producer) any more. That is, he will lose his position as an exploiter. Both sides, therefore, fight for effective possession of land (and water). This state of affairs was very obvious in all cases in 1945-46 and 1952. Thus the peasants were quite aware of their own class-interests. They expressed their hatred for the exploiting class (landlords) by fighting, ousting and occasionally killing the landlords. Their demands for land (and water), minimized rent and also for the elimination of obligations, show that they had a sufficient level of class-consciousness.

However, in some cases, the peasants went far beyond the feudal structure: in some villages of Azarbaijan (in 1945-46), the peasants distributed land among themselves and claimed that they would not pay rent anymore. It was an attempt to curtail feudal property and feudal relations of production. That is why their struggle was directed against the varied forms of feudal exploitation. Here, the peasantry was looking for its urgent demand, borne from the suffering and hatred of long years of oppression: i.e. a demand for the survival, strengthening, consolidation

and expansion of small farming.[22] The peasantry in these cases, possessed a class-conscious and full understanding of the system exploiting them. This is the reason why the peasantry made an attempt to end the feudal relations of production and replace them with a social formation of free proprietor-commodity producers enjoying equal rights.[23]

In some other cases, the peasantry did not oppose feudal relations or try to destroy them. Instead, the peasants tried to reduce the rent and abolish some other obligations. Examples are the peasants of Takistan and those in the villages in the neighbourhood of Hamadan during 1952, and peasants of Gilan and Rafsanjan (in 1946) whose representatives in meetings with the landlords, fixed the amount of rent to be paid by the peasants. It can be stated that the peasantry of these regions possessed a class-consciousness in the sense of defending their own interests *vis-a-vis* the landlords within the framework of feudal relations of production. But one should notice that the peasants did not possess a sufficiently developed class-consciousness to have a full understanding of the feudal social formation. This is the main reason why, they did not go further and attack the property relations of their social formations: they did not demand the strengthening, consolidation and expansion of small-farming.

However, in conclusion, it seems that the struggles during these two decades brought about positive as well as negative consequences for the peasantry. In other words, the possible outcome of the peasant revolts varied from place to place and there is some evidence of changes in the relationship between landlord and peasant. Thus, Black wrote in 1948 (two years after 1945-46 revolts) that the peasant., in addition to his farming, was bound to perform some work for the landlord (i.e. labour-service). 'He may be paid wages for those tasks (building and the like) or the work may be considered merely as a part of the whole village economic organization and not entitled to additional wages. In recent years more landlords have begun to pay for these extra services, primarily because there has been a tendency for peasants to leave the villages for the urban centres.'[24]

Lambton wrote in 1953 'in Azarbaijan a number of dues were, and to a lesser extent still are, levied per plough-land or per share of water ...' and 'A poll tax was formerly levied in most areas. It has now largely died out, but is still found in Azarbaijan.'[25] All these obligations were abolished due to the peasant uprisings. However after the suppression of the democratic movement in this region, many of these obligations were reimposed once again.

The same author gives an example which shows clearly how the revolt on the part of the peasantry forced the landlord to reduce the rent. Thus 'formerly in the neighbourhood of Rafsanjan the division (of crop) was 75% to the landowner, except for straw, which was *nisfi* i.e. half going to either party. About the year 1946, when agitation by the Tudeh Party was active the landowner's share in many villages was reduced to 70%'.[26]

Finally, in Kurdistan, which as shown above, witnessed many peasant revolts during 1952, peasants had demanded, among other things, the abolition of labour service. However the peasants of Doshan (near Sanandaj) had no success: i.e. tributes and labour service were in effect up to 1964, to be removed only in the first stage of L-R.[27]

There are many other examples of the negative or positive effects of the peasant revolts on the relationship between landlords and peasants. In general, the pressure on the part of the democratic movement and the development of capitalist forms of production in rural Iran resulted in the disappearance of a great many duties and requirements, and those which remained diminished remarkably throughout the country.[28]

Thus in this chapter we surveyed the peasant movements during 1940-1960, In some cases, the peasants opposed the feudal landlords within the dominant social relationships and therefore did not try to curtail the feudal relations of production. But in some other cases, the peasants opposed their landlords and tried to remove the dominant forms of exploitation. However, all these movements were suppressed, though in some cases the peasants managed to reduce the amount of rent and obligations.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. Ivanov, 1948, pp.72-73
2. Ivanov, 1977, p.108
3. Ibid, pp.109-10
4. Douglas, 1951, p.45
5. See Lambton, 1953, p.334
6. Ivanov, 1948, p.76
7. All examples from Ivanov, 1948, pp.75-76 .
8. Ibid, pp.76-77
9. The examples from Seidov, 1963, p.148.
10. The examples from Seidov, 1963, pp149-51.
11. Ibid, p.179
12. Ibid, pp. 147-48
13. Ibid, p.180
14. The Middle East Journal, vol.6, no.4, 1952, p.459
15. Seidov, 1963, pp.177-78
16. See Ivanov, 1977, pp.209-10
17. Ibid, p.215
18. Hindess and Hirst, 1975, p.248
19. T.E., Jan. 1967, p.174
20. Safinejad, 1974, pp.56-57
21. Gharachedaghi, 1967, p.85
22. See Lenin, vol. 13, p.295
23. Lublinskaya, 1973, p.357
24. Black, 1948, p.426
25. Lambton, 1953, p.334
26. Ibid, p.312
27. T.E., Spring 1970, p.110
28. Demin, 1967, p.158

CHAPTER VI

The Landowning Class

Having discussed the relations of production and the forms of exploitation, in this section we will analyse the class of non-producers, to which the direct-producers were subordinated. First, we shall try to distinguish different groups of non-producers, and then examine the forms of social connection between the producers and non-producers. By the latter we mean the forms of administering the production process and as we shall see, there was in fact a hierarchy of non-producers above the direct-producers.

As stated earlier, around 83% of the cultivated lands belonged to the big landowners including the State, Royal family, holy shrines and absentee landlords. Many of these lands were run either by bailiffs (*mubashir*) or by sub-renting. Thus the majority of peasants, in rural Iran, were subsumed to the owners of land (and water) through the mediation of agents of the latter. In order to explain this relationship, we classify the landowning class into three different groups, i.e. State (and Royal family), religious institutions and private landlords, starting with sub-renting of the State lands. However, before explaining these forms of mediated renting systems, one should notice that any form of mediation by a third party does not make any difference to the nature of the feudal or semi-feudal exploitative relationship between the peasants and landowning classes.

1) The State Lands

According to the 1956 Census, the State owned around 10% of the total lands of the country.[1] These lands were run in different regions in various ways, according to the local land tenure system. There were three forms of practice in the public domain.[2] The first form was to rent out

the land to a middleman for a period of three to five years. This form of sub-renting had a ruinous effect on the village economy, because, the leaseholder did not have any interest in the development of the village economy, and tried to exhaust the peasants during this period of time. The second form was some sort of one-year rent i.e. the middleman, or leaseholder obtained permission to collect the State's share. But in the third form, the State had direct participation, i.e. one of the officials collected the rent on behalf of the government.[3] It appears that the first form was dominant.

As far as the management of the State lands was concerned, these lands were poorly managed relatively to the lands which belonged to the landlords.[4] No one knew how much land belonged to the State, who was occupying it, what, if anything, was being paid for its use or how it was being used. Considerable rent was collected from the peasants, but in some cases little or none was paid to the State.[5]

The most important concentration of public domains was to be found in Sistan. For whatever historical reasons, most of the lands in this region belonged to the State.[6] The lands in this region were mainly rented out to local influential people, including *Khans*, *Sardars* and *Kadkhodas* (village headman). Around 172 villages existed, in this province, which were rented by 120 persons. The majority of these leaseholders had no business other than renting State lands, and this they had been doing generation after generation.[7] The social condition of producers who worked the Public Domain lands was very bad; 'their relations of production are those of landlord and peasant, and they are compelled to turn over two-fifths of their produce to the Public Domain Administration. Although, ... , they used to migrate to find work, because of the possibility that their land will soon be ceded to them, they are unable to make the journey and must remain in the village waiting.'[8]

The second most important province that the Public Domain lands were

situated in was Khuzistan. State ownership originated mainly in the confiscations of the previous general-governor of this province in the 1920s. However, during the 1940s and 1950s, the relationship between the State and peasantry was mediated by the heads of local tribes, *Sheikhs* and *Khans*. In fact, they were the main beneficiaries of State lands in this province.

Why did heads of tribes perform this mediating role? As in many other pre-capitalist formation, the direct-producers in this province were subordinated to the local *khans* and *sheikhs* other than by economic mechanisms. In effect, this form of subordination had enabled the latter to obtain a portion of the produce of the direct-producers. However, the local *sheikhs* and *khans* in 1949 took one step farther and in some villages such as Wayce, they obtained permission from the State by initiating irrigation companies, to instal water-pumps over the Karun river.[9] These companies had two forms of farming: share-cropping and employing agricultural workers and machinery. In the latter cases, we are faced with a form of capitalist farming, i.e. some companies (as capitalist farmers) which have rented land from the landlord (the State), employ wage-labour. Here, a portion of surplus-value goes to the State, as landlord, which has the monopoly ownership of lands while another portion goes to the companies in return for their investment. E.g. the irrigation company directly cultivated 3200 has. of the irrigated lands in Wayce.[10] But in the former case, the share-croppers were of two types (in Wayce, one of the villages studied by the R.G.): those who rented land and water from the companies and paid one-third of the winter crop and one-half of the summer crop as share to the companies; and secondly, those who obtained ploughs and seeds as well as land and water from the companies and paid one-half of the winter crop to them.[11] Here, the mediator (the company) claims a portion of the produce, partially for its investment (water pump as well as ploughs and seeds) and partially for its (share holders') dominance over the direct-producers. There is no need to say

anything about the companies' claim to a portion of the produce as far as it concerned their investment. However, the following throws some light on the non-economic subordination of the direct-producers to the local *sheikhs* and *khans* (i.e. the share holders of companies): These influential men 'either rent the farmlands directly from the Public Domains Dept. and put them at the disposal of *their people from whom they collect shares as landlords do, or they get a share from those who have obtained lands from the Public Domains Dept. for cultivation.*'[12]

2. Vaqf Lands

These lands, bequeathed to such bodies as the religious groups, mosques, shrines and religious schools by religious believers were called *Vaqf* lands. The largest concentration was to be found in Khorasan, where numerous villages and other properties were endowed to the *shrine of Imam Reza*. However, in almost all other parts of the country *vaqf* lands existed. According to an official estimate, there were around 6000 villages endowed to the holy shrines.[13] The office of administration of some of the most important *vaqf* properties, such as the properties of *Imam Reza* in Khorasan, *Sipahsalar* and the *Shah Cheraq* mosques in Tehran, were vested in the reigning monarch. These properties were exempted from tax, because the income of the monarch was not taxable. The other *vaqf* lands paid tax in the same way as other landed properties do.[14] The administration of all *vaqf* properties was undertaken by the Ministry of Education which collected revenues through its provincial departments. These revenues were divided by law as follows: 25% for repair of land and irrigation works, 10% to the manager, 5% reserve fund, 9% to the Education office for administrative costs, and 46% for the declared purpose of the trust.[15]

Generally speaking, there are two types of endowments:

a) Private endowments, whose revenues are collected to be used by certain

individuals such as sons or daughters, or other relatives. These properties refer to the lands endowed, therefore, for the personal benefit of the benefactor's successors.

b) Public endowments, whose revenues are collected for public charities rather than for particular individuals. They, therefore, refer to the properties endowed for the public charities.

According to the Islamic Law each *vaqf* must have an administrator. In the case of having no administrator, in Iran, the judge appoints someone as administrator. This administrator (*mutavalli*) could be anyone including the donor himself, the tenant and or a third party. According to article 75 of Civil Code, 'the settlor can designate himself during his lifetime or for a stipulated period as the *mutavalli*, or we can appoint another person as *mutavalli* to act as administrator jointly with himself, or appoint a person or persons to act as administrators severally or jointly. He can stipulate that he himself or the *mutavalli*, whom he has designated shall appoint the (succeeding) *mutavalli* or make any other conditions, which he considers fit.'[16]

On the other hand, *vaqf* lands in most cases are rented out to some other person, rather than being administered by the government and/or by the organization pertinent to *vaqf* properties. The lessee, in this case, pays a fixed sum to the State or the foundation and pockets the rest. The latter person could be anyone including wealthy landlords, *mutavalli* (administrator) and/or the donor. This state of affairs has enabled the donor, in the case of private endowments, to become the *mutavalli*/tenant of the property endowed by him; whereas in the case of public endowments, the landlords as well as *mutavalli* have been enabled to lease those properties in lieu of the payment of fixed sums to the *vaqf* organization. As far as it concerned the latter case the land leased to wealthy individuals might have been subleased to tenants or directly cultivated by themselves.[17] However, 'the general tendency is for *vaqf* property to be let on terms advantageous to the lessee; this is especially the case

when the lessee is the *mutavalli* himself. There are many instances of lessees of *vaqp* property who have succeeded in making large profits.'[18]

This form of administration of *vaqf* lands i.e. leasing and sub-renting, especially in cases where they were leased for a short term, resulted in disaster for some of the properties, because the lessee had no interest in the long term improvement of the property. For example, Lambton records a visit to a village in the south of Tehran in 1945: 'the garden of which had been allowed to fall into complete disorder, though it had formally been in production. The reason alleged for this was that the lease had come to an end: the Dept. of *Ouqaf* wanted to raise the rent, but the lessee was not prepared to accept the new figure and, being uncertain of this tenure, had allowed the garden to fall into decay.'[19] That is why *vaqf* lands were managed worse than other forms of landholdings, i.e. those of State and private landlords.[20]

The above discussion reveals the distribution of surplus exacted from the direct-producers in *vaqf* lands, between the non-producers including *vaqf* administration as the landlords and the mediator (*mutavalli* /sub-lessee). As far as relations between non-producers and peasants were concerned, the share-cropping system was the dominant form of exactraction of surplus in the *vaqf* estates throughout the country. Subordination of the direct-producers to the non-producers was further reinforced by religious belief.

3) Subrenting the Private Lands and the Social Relationship Between the Landlords and Peasants

According to 1956 Census, private landholdings constituted around 76% of the total lands.[21] This includes the small landowners as well as absentee landlords. However, the latter had absolute dominance in the ownership of land. Thus the "power of appropriation" of the produce of 57% of the total villages was vested in 400 to 450 landlord families. This high concentration of landownership in the hands of a few landlords

raises the following questions:Who were these absentee landlords? and how did these landlords administer their villages?

The absentee landlords were mainly in important government and military posts, parliament and to a lesser extent private commercial jobs. These landlords often supervised their estates *in absentia* through bailiffs and village headmen (*kadkhoda*), meanwhile spending most of the time in Tehran or abroad.[22] As regards relations between the direct-producers and big landlords, there was a wide gulf between landlords and direct-producers, and no co-operation or feeling of being engaged in a mutual enterprise existed.[23] An absentee landlord might have a residence that he occupied part of the time in his village. However, he had a residence in one of the larger cities where he spent most of his time. In some cases the landlords never visited their own villages in their life-time, whereas in some other cases, they actually visited their villages once or twice a year.[24]

In some extreme, but not rare cases, the landlords did not have any idea about their subjects: 'In Khuzistan when a landlord was asked how many farmers were cultivating his land, his answer was invariably in terms of the middle-men to whom he contracted parts of his hectarage. The landowner or operator, and this includes operators of government lands, knew his "labour contractors" but had no idea how many families each contractor had placed on the land, nor did he know what the wages or living conditions of these families were.'[25] On the other hand, the direct-producer in some cases had never seen their landlords: 'Time after time during the course of this survey when the subject of ownership was approached in absentee landlord-owned villages, one or more of the villagers would say: "I've lived here all my life (or so many years) and I've never seen our landlord. He doesn't know we exist." At the village of Mamadel, seven kilometers north of Miandoab, we again heard the same story. "We have never seen our landlord", the people said. "His son came here the year after a flood when one of the *qanats* was ruined

and stayed about an hour, but we have never heard whether the *qanat* will be repaired."'[26]

This absence of landlords in the vast majority of villages obviously directed them to administer their land through some other agents, i.e. bailiffs, village-headmen and/or lessees. Any two of these functions might have been vested in one person, e.g. a bailiff could have been lessee or village headman. So, the relationship between an absentee landlord and a direct-producer was interposed by a third party. Obviously, the function which this agent could have performed depended upon the social conditions of the landlords. For example, in some cases the landlords preferred to free themselves from the trouble of administering their villages and only collected their dues. They therefore rented their estates out to a third party. In some other cases, the landlord had preferred to keep control over their properties, and therefore they employed bailiffs. According to the 1960 Census, the latter case was the dominant form of administration of the estates, whereas subleasing was the least favoured way of administration. Direct contact with the producers, i.e. the case of non-existence of any interposed agent, had a place somewhere in between the above cases. Table X illustrates this point.

This social relationship might have been interposed by more than one agent. That is, in the cases in which a landlord owned many villages in a given area, he appointed an agent as a bailiff for all of these villages, who in turn appointed some others (such as village headman) at the village level to run affairs.

As far as peasants were concerned, the hierarchy of non-producers made their conditions of life worse: 'where the landowner is an absentee his affairs are entrusted to a bailiff who often practices extortion on the peasants. The reasons for this are many. On the one hand, the bailiff is tempted to feather his own nest. That he is often able to do so is shown by the frequency with which bailiffs become themselves petty

TABLE X

Administration of Private Estates

Size of Estate	Direct Control	Through Agent	Sub-Leasing	Total %	
Estates each of which is a village	22.2	65.9	11.9	100	185
Estates each of which is ½ and under 1 village	23.6	63.3	13.1	100	414
Estates each of which is 1/12 and under ½ village	35.1	53.3	11.6	100	2315

Source: 1960 Census

landowners,.. On the other hand, where the bailiff watches closely over the interests of his masters, there is a tendency to consider him, ..., a hard task master. Clearly, moreover, since in such a case his main concern is to raise the income of his master and thereby render his services the more valuable, he is reluctant to make concessions which the owner of the land himself might make. Nor has he the same permanent interest in the land as the owner.'[27]

Thus in this chapter, we explained that the owners of land and water included the State, the *Vaqf* Organization, the Royal family and private landlords. They ran their estates through bailiffs/village headmen, though sub-renting the estates was not uncommon. This created a hierarchy of non-producers which extracted surplus from the peasants. However, the latter established very complicated relationships among themselves which will be analysed in the next chapter.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. Ajami, 1975, p.120
2. Badi, 1959, p.31
3. Ibid
4. Black, 1948, p.429
5. Ibid, p.427
6. For the historical events, see Lambton, 1953, pp.244-52
7. Bahrami, 1954, p.378
8. T.E., nos. 19&20, p.193
9. T.E., August 1965, pp.202-03
10. Ibid, p.209
11. Ibid, p.204
12. Ibid, p.169, italics added
13. US Army Area Handbook for Iran, p.399
14. Lambton, 1953, p.234
15. English, 1966, p.144
16. Lambton, 1953, p.231
17. Hadary, 1951, p.186
18. Lambton, 1953, p.234; see also the case of religious endowments cited by English, 1966, p.144
19. Lambton, 1953, p.234
20. Black, 1948, p.429
21. Ajami, 1975, p.120
22. Hadary, 1951, p.187
23. Lambton, 1953, p.263
24. Black, 1948, p.425; according to English, the landlord, in Mahan-Jupar (in Kirman province) visited the village twice a year : once in August to affirm the contract, and again at harvest time to collect his share of the produce. See English, 1966, p.69
25. T.E., Winter 1970, p.125
26. T.E., Jan. 1968, p.230
27. Lambton, 1953, p.271

CHAPTER VII

Relations of Production Among the Peasantry

The first set of relations of production i.e. the relationship between the peasants and feudal landlords, has been examined in the first five chapters. In this chapter, we are concerned with relations of production among the peasants.

It has already been stated that relations of production encompass three aspects, *property relations, labour relations and distribution relations*. In this section, an attempt is to be made to study these three aspects of the peasant-peasant relationship.

The Property Relations of the Peasantry

As we have already argued, in the FMP, the direct-producer owns all conditions of production but land (and water). He is raised to the position of possession of land by the landlord in order to enable the latter to dispose a portion of produce produced by the direct-producer.

In the first section for the sake of simplicity, we assumed that first, all direct-producers were in a position of possession of land (and water), i.e. they were *nasaq*-holders; and secondly that they owned means of production. We assumed these two conditions because we wanted to show the semi-feudal relationship between the feudal-landlord and direct-producer . However, here an attempt is to be made to show that, a) all direct-producers were not necessarily *nasaq*-holders at the same time; and b) some of them had already been separated from all other means of production.

In order to discuss possession/ownership on the part of the direct-producers, one may make a distinction between those means of production (land and water) which were owned by the landlord but possessed by the direct-producer, and those means of production which virtually belonged to

the direct-producers. On the basis of this classification, we shall review the relations of direct-producers to both of these groups of means of production. At the same time, these means of production will be described. This description will give an idea of the level of development of the relations and forces of production in rural Iran during these two decades.

Possession of Land: the question of nasaq-holding

In the first section, we mentioned the direct producer and/or *nasaq*--holder. By doing this, we firstly did not take into account other agents of production which were not involved in agricultural production (e.g. blacksmiths); secondly we assumed that all agricultural direct-producers were in the position of possession of land; and finally we ignored the differences between different agents who had *nasaq*. However, an attempt is to be made in this section to make a distinction between different agents of production in relation to land and then to the other means of production. Thus, as far as the agents of production in relation to the land are concerned, we distinguish only two groups of agents, those who were involved in agricultural production as the main source of their income; and those who were indirectly connected with agricultural production.

Table XI illustrates the population in rural Iran according to their ages and occupations. It also shows the percentage of the economically active population in 1960. As one can see, around half of the population were active. Table XI shows the occupations which these active agents of production had by age. It is evident from the table that a high percentage of the active rural population in different categories were only engaged in agriculture, a minority in non-agricultural activity and a tiny percentage in agricultural and non-agricultural occupations.

TABLE XI

Occupation of the Active Population, 10 Years and Over by Age (Percentage)

Age	Total Economically Active Population	Engaged in Agriculture only	Mainly Engaged in Agricultural Work	Engaged in Non-Agricultural Work	Engaged in Non-Agricultural Work only
Total of 10 years and Over	100	68.1	3.5	6.0	22.4
10 to 14 Years	100	76.7	0.4	0.2	22.7
15 to 19 Years	100	73.4	1.4	1.3	23.9
20 to 29 Years	100	67.7	3.1	4.0	25.2
30 to 39 Years	100	64.4	4.4	7.7	23.5
40 to 49 Years	100	63.6	4.3	8.0	24.1
50 to 59 Years	100	67.8	4.5	8.6	19.1
60 Years and Over	100	72.8	3.5	8.2	18.5
Age not Reported	100	28.2	7.0	-	-

Source: 1960 Census.

With regard to the agricultural producers, 68% of the total active population, how they were related to the land? Did they all have the right in use of land? And finally, did they possess equal sizes of plots of land? It seems that there were three alternative ways in which direct producers could be related to the land in the process of production in the Iranian rural social formation. They included: being in the position of ownership of the land, being in the position of possession of land, and finally working on the land as a wage-labourer (not necessarily mutually exclusive, as we shall show). The existence of these alternatives, in effect, stems from the fact that, in the Iranian rural social formation there existed an articulated combination of at least three different modes of production, i.e. FMP, CMP, and also simple commodity production. We have already explained this point in the previous section. However, here one can see the effect of this articulation on the structure of landholding in rural Iran. Table XII shows the structure of land holding (possession/ ownership) on the eve of the implementation of L-R. There were, in fact, four forms of operating the holdings, i.e. share-cropping (possession), fixed-rent (so-called capitalist ground rent), owner-operator, and finally a mixture of any two or three of these forms. The latter category constituted 10.6% of total holdings (and 11.1% of total area). In this sense it had less significance than the other categories. But on the other hand, this category is interesting in the sense that the agents of production were related to the means of production and therefore other agents of production, by more than one set of relations of production. For example, an agent, who owned a plot of land and at the same time was a share-cropper in another plot, was related to the land as an owner and possessor simultaneously, and so on. In this category, in short, we have an articulation of different modes of production. Apart from this category which had the least share of the total holdings, the shares of the other categories, i.e. possession, fixed-rent and ownership, in the total holdings

TABLE XII

Number and Area of Holdings by Types of Operating

Size of Holding	Total		Share-Cropping		Owner-Operator		Fixed Rent		A Mixture of Two or More of These Types	
	No.*	Area†	No.*	Area†	No.*	Area†	No.*	Area†	No.*	Area†
Holdings under 0.5 ha.	313	69	60	15	179	36	52	12	22	6
Holdings 0.5 ha. and under 1	179	130	43	32	79	57	34	24	23	66
Holdings 1 ha. and under 2	256	372	83	122	89	128	55	79	29	43
Holdings 2 ha. and under 3	209	512	87	216	66	161	35	84	21	51
Holdings 3 ha. and under 4	144	501	72	251	40	139	14	46	18	65
Holdings 4 ha. and under 5	122	541	61	275	32	141	14	62	15	63
Holdings 5 ha. and under 10	340	2,413	202	1,447	77	541	17	115	44	310
Holdings 10 ha. and under 20	224	3,054	148	2,037	41	561	10	129	25	317
Holdings 20 ha. and under 50	78	2,209	51	1,428	16	479	3	71	8	331
Holdings 50 ha. and under 100	8	564	5	310	2	166	0.4	29	0.6	59
Holdings 100 ha. and under 500	4	684	0.6	87	2	386	11	185	1.4	26
Holdings 500 ha. and over	0.3	307	.003	1.0	0.2	179	-	1	-	126

* Thousand † Thousand hectares

Source: 1960 Census.

were 43.3 (54.7% of total area), 12.5% (7.5% of total area) and 33.2% (26.2% of total area) respectively. The table, therefore, verifies the relative significance of each one of these categories at the national level.

In order to analyse the differentiation of the peasantry in rural Iran, for the time being, we will consider only land holding. Since the relationship between land and the agents of production, as a relation of production, took three different forms, we will, therefore, study differentiation of the peasantry within each one of the forms of this relation of production.

According to the 1960 Census (Table 323), 776700 out of the total of 3218460 households (i.e. 24.1%) were considered as landless households. But due to the fact that the category of landless embraces different agents of production (including non-agricultural producers other than cattle breeders) this group cannot be considered as the rural proletariat. The holdings possessed by the *nasaq*-holders varied greatly from under 0.5 ha. to over 500 has. (see Table XII). Table XII shows the number and the area of the plots by size of the holding. In order to make the position of each class of holdings more clear on the basis of Table XII, we have computed Table XIII. The latter shows the share of each class of holdings as a percentage of the total holdings of the same category. As can be seen in this table over 12% of the *nasaq*-holders possessed only 0.7% of the total area under the share-cropping system. The next set of holders were slightly better off in terms of possession. That is, 29.8% of those who possessed plots varying from 1 to 4 has., held 9.5% of the total area under share cropping system. However, another set of *nasaq*-holders, i.e. those who possessed plots between 5 and 50 has., were much better off than the other groups. These *nasaq*-holders who constituted almost 50% of the plots, occupied nearly 80% of the area under the share-cropping system.

With regard to the direct-producers who were under the fixed-rent system, the differentiation was more or less the same. The second column

of Table XIII illustrates this point. At the bottom there existed the poor peasants. They constituted around 27% of the total holdings and occupied only 13.7% of the area under this rental system. They can be considered the poorest stratum of the peasantry, due to the fact that their farms never yielded enough for subsistence,. Hence, all other conditions remaining the same, the peasants in this group were bound to seek some other sources of income, including lending their draught animals, and selling their labour power (this is a factor to be analysed when we take into account the ownership of some other means of production). The next stratum of the peasantry in this category seems to be better off than the previous group. This stratum of peasants, who rented plots between 2 to 5 has., constituted around 26% of the total holdings and occupied 22.3% of the area under the fixed rent system. With regard to the direct-producers of this stratum in the Caspian sea littoral, the main centre of the fixed-rent system, one can say that they were more or less able to obtain their livelihood from agriculture. This is because in this region, a 2 has. plot of land can provide the livelihood for a family of six. So, all other conditions remaining the same, one may say that the peasants in this stratum did not need to seek some other job.

The direct-producers/leaseholders who held holdings between 5 to 20 has. were much better off than the previous strata. They constituted 11.4% of the total leaseholders and occupied 28.9% of the area in this rental system. Finally, this stratum embraced the capitalist farmers. They leased 34.4% of the total area, while in terms of the number of holdings they possessed a tiny percentage of the total holdings, i.e. 1.9%. There are three reasons why this stratum of leaseholders can be considered as capitalist farmers, First, as has already been explained, the leaseholders in the fixed-rent system were not, in the real sense, subject to feudal subordination; secondly, the produce of a plot of 20-500 has. is much more than the livelihood of a family, hence the produce was

TABLE XIII

Number and Area of Holdings (percentage)

	Possession		Fixed Rent		Ownership		Average No. of Parcels
	No.	Area	No.	Area	No.	Area	
Holdings under 0.5 ha.	7.4	0.2	22.3	1.4	28.8	1.2	2.5
Holdings 0.5 and under 1 ha.	5.3	0.5	1.4	2.9	12.6	1.9	3.7
Holdings 1 and under 2 has.	10.2	1.9	3.5	9.4	14.3	4.3	4.2
Holdings 2 and under 3 has.	10.7	3.5	15.0	10.0	10.6	5.5	4.6
Holdings 3 and under 4 has.	8.9	4.1	5.8	5.5	7.3	4.7	5.6
Holdings 4 and under 5 has.	7.6	4.5	5.9	7.3	5.1	4.8	6.2
Holdings 5 and under 10 has.	24.7	23.2	7.2	13.6	12.3	18.2	7.8
Holdings 10 and under 20 has.	18.3	32.8	4.2	15.3	6.6	18.9	10.8
Holdings 20 and under 50 has.	6.2	22.9	1.3	9.1	2.5	16.1	13.3
Holdings 50 and under 100 has.	0.5	5.0	0.2	3.4	0.4	5.6	15.9
Holdings 100 and under 500 has.	0.07	1.4	0.4	21.9	0.3	13.0	24.3
Holdings 500 and over	-	-	-	0.4	-	6.0	26.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	6.0

Source: Table XII

for the market; and thirdly, a farm of this size cannot be exploited without employing wage-labourers at least for part of the year.

The differentiation of the owners of land was greater than in the other two categories (see column 3 of Table XIII). At the bottom, there existed a high percentage of owner/producers who owned plots under 3 has. That is, over 66% of the owners owned less than 13% of the total lands owned by all owner/operators. There is no doubt that the owner/operators in this stratum were unable to obtain their livelihood from the land that belonged to them. This argument holds good especially in the central areas of the country, where there exists a shortage of water and the land must be left fallow regularly. The next stratum of the owners comprised those who owned 5 to 50 has. of land. Although they constituted around 20% of the owner/operators, they owned over 53% of the total land owned by this category. These can be considered as capitalist farmers who controlled the process of production directly. Finally the last stratum of owners comprised those owner/operators whose holdings were over 50 hectares. They constituted less than one percent of the total holdings and owned over 24% of the lands operated by the owners.

The above argument and tables provide us with an illustration of the differentiation of the peasantry in rural Iran before L-R. However, the foregoing does not show the relations of production among the peasants. With regard to the small landholders (owner/operators as well as possessors), one may only state that the high percentage of small landholders indicates the existence of semi-proletarian peasants in this social formation. Such landholders were unable to obtain a livelihood from agriculture alone, they had to work for wages as well. On the other hand, with regard to the large landholdings (owners and leaseholders in the fixed-rent category), one may also state that, they were capitalist farmers who employed wage-labourers to produce cash crops for the market. We shall consider other factors such as the ownership of other means of production and the labour process in order to establish more about relations of production and

differentiation of the peasantry.

The means of production in rural Iran were composed of primitive tools including different varieties of spades, simple plough, harrows, scythes (or sickles) and wooden threshing devices. Tractors were introduced to a limited extent. The main sources of power, therefore, were animals and human beings. Ploughing, harrowing, threshing and pounding the grain were mainly performed with the help of animals. The draught animal was the most important and valuable element of the means of production. That is why its owner always collected a portion of the produce for his ownership; whereas the ownership of other means of production such as scythes, harrows and so on did not have such an influence on the distribution of produce. Hence we shall only consider the ownership of draught animals.

Draught animals were mainly employed as sources of power. However, there were two other sources of power, human power and tractors both of which were less important than draught animals. Table XIV shows the share of each one of these sources by size of holding. As Table XIV indicates, human power was the main source of power in small holdings, especially holdings under 0.5 hectare. This was because it was not really economical to use any other source. For example, Atai states that, in all sample villages in Isfahan province, when the farmers were asked why they used their own labour as the source of power, the answer was generally the same: 'With the limited area of land we have at our disposal, it does not pay to keep oxen. Besides, it is extremely difficult to plough a small piece of land with oxen, what money we have we use on ourselves instead of using oxen.'[1] In other cases, it may have been impossible, from a technical point of view, to use any other source of power. For example, cultivation of some luxury vegetables which involves intensive care in a small piece of land, renders the use of any tools other than simple ones activated by the farmer's labour power impossible.

In the majority of holdings, i.e. holdings over 0.5 ha. up to 100 has., animal power was the main source of power. The use of this source

increases with the increase in the size of holdings i.e. it increases from 66.3% in the holdings between 0.5 and 1 ha. and reaches to 88.3% in holdings between 5 and 10 has. However, after this point the share of animal power decreases as the size of holdings increases. Thus only 19% of power was supplied by animals in the largest holdings, 500 has. and over. On the other hand the main source of power in the latter holdings was machinery. As Table XIV indicates mechanical power was used in almost all holdings of different sizes, but only in the largest farms was it the main source of power.

Table XIV indicates the significant role which draught animals played in the labour process in rural Iran. Oxen, donkeys, horses, mules and also camels were mainly used for agricultural production. In some areas, donkeys and mules, and also horses and camels were used for ploughing and not for transport. For example, Lambton states, 'In the dry-farming belt round Ahvaz and Bandi Qir in Khuzistan, the Arabs use a donkey, mule, horse or mare for ploughing. In Bandi Qir donkeys are most commonly used... In certain parts of Fars mules are used as draught animals, but mainly on unirrigated land. Buffaloes are also used in various areas including the northern littoral of the Persian Gulf, Miandoab in Azarbaijan, and Mahabad in Kurdistan... In some areas in Baluchistan the camel is used as a draught animal.'[2] But these animals were mainly used for transportation, despite the fact that in later years they were replaced by trucks for long distances: 'Farmers, weavers and labourers use them (donkeys) for short distance hauling and transportation. Larger transport animals (camels, horses and mules) have to a great extent been replaced by trucks. Donkeys carry fertilizers, tools, and seed to the fields in the sowing season and haul grain and straw back to the village at harvest time. Donkeys are important to maintain dwellers, because no roads exist in that region; they haul brush, charcoal, wool, and produce to the plains and carry tea, sugar, cloth and other essentials back.'[3] However, generally speaking, in the functions pertinent to the labour-process oxen played a

TABLE XIV

Use and Sources of Power on Agricultural Holdings by Size of Holding (Percentage)

Size of Holdings	No. of Holdings	No. of Holdings Reporting Use of:			
		Animal Power only	Mechanical Power only	Mechanical & Animal Power	Human Power only
All Holdings	100	74.9	3.7	5.9	15.5
Holdings under 0.5 ha.	100	38.7	0.5	0.5	60.3
Holdings 0.5 & under 1 ha.	100	66.3	3.7	2.0	28.0
Holdings 1 & under 2 has.	100	77.7	5.9	3.7	12.7
Holdings 2 & under 3 has.	100	85.7	4.7	6.0	3.6
Holdings 3 & under 4 has.	100	85.8	4.2	6.8	3.2
Holdings 4 & under 5 has.	100	86.0	5.0	7.0	2.0
Holdings 5 & under 10 has.	100	88.3	2.9	8.0	0.8
Holdings 10 & under 20 has.	100	86.1	4.3	8.9	0.7
Holdings 20 & under 50 has.	100	75.1	5.6	19.0	0.3
Holdings 50 & under 100 has.	100	71.6	4.2	24.2	-
Holdings 100 & under 500 has.	100	36.7	33.7	29.6	-
Holdings 500 and over	100	19.0	43.0	38.0	

Source: 1960 Census, Table 129.

more important role than all other animals: i.e. out of 2166515 animals, 1860618 were oxen (see Table XV).

Table XV verifies the ownership of draught animals by size of holding in 1960. The first point to be noticed in this table is the high percentage of the owner/possessors (i.e. on average 48%) who owned no draught animals. However, the percentages of non-owners varies by size of holding: and as the table illustrates, the percentage of non-owners increases as the size of holdings decreases. That is to say, only 2.2% of households with no land, 18.8% of direct-producers holding under 0.5 ha., and 40.3% of direct-producers holding between 0.5 and 1 ha. owned any draught animals. On the other hand, 82.8% of direct-producers holding 4 to 5 has., 87.8% of those holding 5 to 10 has., and 92% of those holding 10 to 20 has., owned draught animals. The high percentage of owner/possessors with no animals indicates the following two points: a vast market for the hiring of draught animals, and the differentiation of the peasantry in relation to the ownership of draught animals and the possession of land.

Secondly, with regard to the owners of draught animals, Table XV does not illustrate the differences existing in the ownership of these animals for different groups of holdings. In order to make this point clear, we have computed the average ownership of different draught animals for each holding in the different groups. Table XVI illustrates the average ownership of different draught animals by size of holding. As one can see, the average ownership of draught animals differs in different size categories of holding. To analyse this point, we take into account only the ownership of oxen, since oxen constituted around 86% of the total number of draught animals in Iran in 1960. As Table XVI verifies, the trend of the amount of ownership of oxen is surprisingly even in all holdings; as the size of holdings increases the average number of oxen owned by the owner/possessors also increases. However, there are two

TABLE XV

Number of Draught Animals by Size of Holding (Thousands)

Size of Holding	No. of Holdings	No. of Oxen	No. of Buffaloes	No. of Asses	Others
Holdings without land	508	13	0.2	0.4	-
Holdings under 0.5 ha	313	56	0.2	9.1	0.1
Holdings 0.5 ha. and under 1	179	76	-	12.9	0.6
Holdings 1 ha. and under 2	256	174	1.0	22.7	3.3
Holdings 2 ha. and under 3	208	175	1.2	26.6	4.9
Holdings 3 ha. and under 4	144	152	2.1	21.2	4.4
Holdings 4 ha. and under 5	122	135	3.1	20.7	5.1
Holdings 5 ha. and under 10	340	145	13.2	42.0	11.7
Holdings 10 ha. and under 20	224	402	16.3	32.8	13.4
Holdings 20 ha. and under 50	78	170	4.2	13.3	7.3
Holdings 50 ha. and under 100	8	31	4.8	3.7	2.9
Holdings 100 ha. and under 500	9	17	0.7	0.9	0.8
Holdings 500 ha. and over	0.3	3	0.7	-	0.2

Source: 1960 Census, Table 125.

TABLE XVI

Average Ownership and Percentage of Borrowing of Draught Animals 1960

	Oxen	Buffaloes	Asses	Other Animals	Percentage Borrowing	% of Holdings Owned Draught Animals
Holdings without land	0.02	-	-	-	-	2.2
Holdings under 0.5 ha.	0.17	-	0.29	-	29.9	18.8
Holdings 0.5 ha. to 1 ha.	0.42	-	0.07	-	47.7	40.3
Holdings 1 ha. to 2 ha.	0.67	-	0.09	0.01	51.0	57.7
Holdings 2 ha. to 3 ha.	0.84	-	0.13	0.02	52.4	70.7
Holdings 3 ha. to 4 ha.	1.06	0.01	0.14	0.03	49.1	80.1
Holdings 4 ha. to 5 ha.	1.11	0.02	0.17	0.04	44.7	82.8
Holdings 5 ha. to 10 ha.	1.31	0.04	0.12	0.03	36.3	87.9
Holdings 10 ha. to 20 ha.	1.79	0.07	0.15	0.06	21.0	92.1
Holdings 20 ha. to 50 ha.	2.31	0.04	0.17	0.09	23.3	88.5
Holdings 50 ha. to 100 ha.	3.73	0.15	0.44	0.35	29.5	88.9
Holdings 100 ha. to 500 ha.	4.52	0.20	0.24	0.23	14.8	58.7
Holdings 500 ha and over	8.59	2.37	-	0.83	21.5	47.5

Source: 1960 Census Table 125.

points to be made on the first and last categories. With regard to holdings of over 500 hectares, the high average ownership by the capitalist farmers[4] was due to the fact that they were engaged in farming as well as cattle breeding. In other words, their cattle were not raised to be used mainly in the labour-process of farming. This is because animals supplied only 19% of the power required by these holdings, whereas machinery supplied 43.0% (see Table XIV).

With regard to holders without land, one should notice that this category comprised piggeries, poultry batteries, city dairies with livestock kept by nomadic tribes, and apiaries. According to the 1960 Census, only 2% of these holdings kept oxen, and on average each one of them owned 0.02 oxen (see Table XVI). The main business of these oxen owners was to rent out their animals in lieu of a portion of produce. For example, in Kirman province 'cattle renters are found in the larger centres (e.g. Mahan and Jupar), who rent out animals at lower rates than an ordinary farmer would. These men own cattle of various ages and strengths and constantly buy and sell, and exchange animals for profit.'[5] 'In Sistan oxen are let out by the cattle breeders for ploughing, a payment being made at harvest time at the rate of one mann per manni zabol of seed sown, one pair of oxen sowing 4-7 manni-zabol per day.'[6]

Thus, despite the fact that Table XVI has combined ownership with possession of land, it illustrates clearly the differentiation of the peasantry. That is to say, those who owned/possessed small plots of land, owned fewer draught animals than those who owned/possessed larger plots of land. However, what reinforced this differentiation, was the renting out of draught animals by rich peasants and cattle breeders, to the poor peasants. It was one of the commonest aspects of the relationship existing among the peasantry of all provinces of Iran (see Table XVI).

This aspect of relations of production has two dimensions: one is the formal aspect, while the other is the nature of this relation of production.

By the latter dimension, we mean whether or not that aspect of relationship is exploitative, and if exploitative, at the level of which mode of production? We shall deal with these questions below in a study of the labour-process. Here we concentrate on the first dimension of this relation of production, i.e. the formal aspect of borrowing/lending draught animals in relation to the size of holdings.

Only 29.9% of the owner/possessors of less than 0.5% ha. borrowed draught animals in spite of the fact that their average ownership of draught animals was the lowest of all the categories holding land (Table XVI). The reason for this is to be found in the fact that, the direct-producers in this category used mainly their own energy as a source of power, and only 38% of them employed draught animals (see Table XIV). The reason for using human energy as the main source of power was simply explained by the direct-producer in all sample villages in Isfahan province as follows: 'With the limited area of land we have at our disposal, it does not pay to keep oxen. Besides, it is extremely difficult to plough a small piece of land with oxen, what money we have we use on ourselves instead of buying oxen.'[7] There is one further point related to this worth noting. That is, the low percentage of borrowing plus the relatively low percentage of animal power-use (Table XIV) parallel with a low average ownership of oxen (Table XVI) are indicators of an uneven distribution of oxen between the members of this category. Hence, one may state that in this category there were some producers who did not own any draught animals and therefore borrowed them, while others let out their animals to other producers in lieu of money or a portion of the produce.

Looking at those owner/possessors holding from 0.5 to 5 hectares, the main source of power for this group was draught animals (see Table XIV). The average amount of ownership of oxen by different categories of this stratum ranged, from 0.42 to 1.11 oxen per holding. The last column of

Table XVI shows the percentage of holdings owning any draught animals in each category. As the size of allotment increases, the distribution of draught animals becomes more even. However, a high percentage of ownership accompanied by a relatively high percentage of borrowing by the owner/possessors of each category in this stratum, indicates that a good deal of them owned insufficient draught animals to plough their allotments. It follows also that the owner/possessors of these categories were highly integrated within and between each category.

The next group comprised owner/possessors holding between 5 to 100 hectares. The condition of this group is remarkably different from the two previous groups. The production in these holdings relied heavily on draught animals as a source of power (see Table XIV). However, the oxen were mainly supplied by the owner/possessors themselves, due to the following facts: a) the average ownership of oxen by the categories in this group is quite high; b) the percentage of holdings owning draught animals in this group is much higher than that of all other categories. This directed the producers to borrow to a lesser extent than the previous mentioned groups (see Table XVI). By a comparison between the ownership of oxen and the percentage of borrowing by this group, one may state that *the owner/possessors of this group, generally speaking, were the lenders rather than borrowers of draught animals.* This is one of the main differences between this group and the previous ones.

Finally, the situation for the last two categories, i.e. owners holding 100 hectares and over, is quite different from all other categories. The percentage of borrowing by these owners reaches the lowest of all the groups. This is for two reasons. First, the average amount of ownership of oxen (and also other draught animals) was much higher than the previous groups (see Table XVI), and secondly, in any case, these farms were highly mechanized. Thus these owners were largely lenders of draught animals. However, because of their ownership of the agricultural machinery, the

owners in these two groups had some connection with the others. Table XVII shows the situation of ownership/renting of tractors. As one can see, around 80% of the total tractors belonged to the owner/(possessors) of the holdings of 10 has. and over. On the other hand, these owner/(possessors) were the main lenders of tractors to almost all holdings of various sizes. In short, over 94% of the holdings, which used tractors, borrowed tractors from the owner/(possessors) of large holdings 10 has. and over.

In conclusion, the direct producers were related to land in three different respects, i.e. as possessors, as leaseholders and finally as owner/operators. Within each one of these forms, the agents of production were differentiated by the size of holdings at their disposal: some of these agents were landless peasants, the majority of direct-producers possessed/owned small plots of land, while a minority had large holdings at its disposal. On the other hand, with regard to the ownership of draught animals and tractors, the trend was more or less the same. That is to say, the owner/possessors of larger plots owned more draught animals/tractors than those who had smaller plots at their disposal and due to this fact, the former managed to lend their oxen/tractors, to a considerable extent, to the latter. However, this so-called differentiation does not express the nature of the relations of production existing among the peasantry. To discover this set of relations of production, it is necessary to review the labour-process in the Iranian rural social formation.

The Labour-Process: A Review

In the first section, we explained the labour-processes of the CMP, FMP and then that of the share-cropping system at the theoretical level. The explanation of the labour-process in the share-cropping system showed why the expropriation of surplus in this system can be considered as a transitional form of rent. However, our argument was carried out at the

TABLE XVII

Number of Holdings Using Tractors According to the Ownership

Size of Holding	Owned by Holder	Owned by the Government	Owned by the Cooperative	Owned by the Landlord or Others
Holding under 0.5 ha.	-	-	-	3,375
Holding 0.5 ha. and under 1	-	1,350	-	8,025
Holding 1 ha. and under 2	-	150	-	24,806
Holding 2 ha. and under 3	450	300	-	21,704
Holding 3 ha. and under 4	-	-	-	15,936
Holding 4 ha. and under 5	-	300	150	14,237
Holding 5 ha. and under 10	685	-	450	36,091
Holding 10 ha. and under 20	1,366	1,200	150	26,805
Holding 20 ha. and under 50	1,276	-	600	17,254
Holding 50 ha. and under 100	240	-	-	2,157
Holding 100 ha. and under 500	1,371	-	-	1,014
Holding 500 and over	256	-	-	-

Source: 1960 Census, Table 127.

abstract level for the following reasons: a) means of production and also the process of expropriation of nature were not considered; b) the direct-producers were taken as a homogeneous social class. Here, therefore, an attempt will be made to consider these two phenomena in the labour-process of the share-cropping system.

Like any other feudal social formation, the means of production and also the method of cultivation were very primitive in Iran. Draught animals were the main source of power, tools were very primitive and the use of fertilizer was rare. Ploughing in most areas was carried out by a traditional iron or wooden nail-plough drawn by an ox: 'the plough-share merely scratches the soil and does not invert the furrow slice. In the dry-farming belt around Ahvaz and Bandi Qir in Khuzistan the Arabs use a donkey, mule, horse or mare for ploughing... The speed at which a mare or mule ploughs is considerably greater than that of an ox or donkey. In certain parts of Fars mules are used as draught animals... Buffaloes are also used in various areas including the northern littoral of the Persian Gulf, Miandoab in Azabaijan and Mahabad in Kurdistan... In some areas in Baluchestan the camel is used as a draught animal.'[8] Although the animal-drawn plough was generally used in rural Iran, digging by spade was not uncommon even in large orchards and in vegetable cultivation. Thus the same author states that in some villages in Isfahan and Yazd districts the land was being dug by spade. 'It is customary for several men to dig together. A long-handled spade is used; above the blade is a wooden cross-piece upon which the man who wields it places his foot, and drives the space into the earth with a jump or lunge forward, three or more men usually working together in unison side by side.'[9]

Manure was not widely used. Animal manure was mainly used as fuel, however, sheep and goats were often allowed to graze on stubble in order to fertilize the land by their droppings. Wulff states that for fruits and vegetable growing, manure was widely used: 'Since orchards and market gardens are always near villages and towns, sufficient animal dung and

human faeces are available... Towers to obtain pigeon manure are a peculiar feature of an area of about 100 miles around Isfahan, ...'[10]

Reaping, threshing and also winnowing were done by hand. Reaping was done by a scythe or in some areas by a sickle. 'The grain and straw are gathered together and carried in loose bundles to temporary threshing floors, where the bundles are piled into large round heaps...' [11] Then the grain was threshed by a wooden threshing machine: 'Drawn by an ox, donkey, or mule, the *chun* (threshing machine) is driven round and round the heap, the unthreshed grain being strewn in the path of the threshing machine which gradually cuts it up into small pieces. When the grain was separated from the straw, the winnowing could begin. It was mainly carried out by tossing the grain in the wind with a wooden fork. Wulff states that there was usually a fair wind in the early morning and especially in the late afternoon. The direct-producers threw the threshed material about six feet high into the air with winnowing forks so that the wind carried the chaff and husks away while the grains dropped down.[12]

Finally, the process of grinding the grains was as primitive as the previous processes. Thus the same author points out that the mill for the grinding of wheat barley, millet, maize, pulse and the like was essentially the same whether it was hand operated, animal-driven, and/or worked by a power source such as wind and water.[13]

The direct-producers in almost all parts of the country had to leave a portion of their plots fallow and/or to cultivate different grains in alternating years. According to the 1960 Census, on the average, between 30 to 40% of cultivable land was left fallow every year. From a technical point of view, there were two main reasons for this. First, the amount of land under cultivation was a function of the water availability and since there was a shortage of water in almost all regions, the direct-producers, with the limited amount of water at their disposal, were not able to cultivate all their plot. Secondly, permanent

cultivation of a piece of land without using fertilizer sufficiently, sooner or later would exhaust the productivity of the land. The direct-producers, therefore, had to leave part of their plots fallow.

There is no doubt that this factor potentially reduced the amount of land at the disposal of the direct-producers. Thus, with regard to Table XII which shows the size of holdings in 1960, one should notice that the actual amount of land available to the owner/possessors was on the average 30 to 40% less than that shown in the table. Note that this statement concerns mainly the lands under the cultivation of grains, including wheat barley, rice, and maize. In addition to this (technical) factor, there was a *social factor* which strongly counteracted the development of productive forces in rural Iran, namely division of lands into small pieces, Table XIII clearly shows that the majority of holdings comprised small holdings under 5 has., i.e. around 65% of the holders possessed/owned plots smaller than 5 hectares. However, the factor which made this situation even worse, was the fact that each holding, although very small, was divided into fragmented pieces. As the same table illustrates, the number of parcels in each class of holdings is much more than the number of holdings: on the average, each holding was comprised of around six parcels of land. The last column of the table shows the average size of each parcel. As can be seen, even holdings up to 20 hectares were extremely fragmented. This fragmented form of landholding brought about two important consequences for the rural social formation. First, *with regard to the possessors, this form of landholding made them (possessors) vulnerable to partially lose or gain land.* Secondly, the fragmented landholding, as a specific form of property relation, strongly counteracted any sort of development of productive forces in rural Iran.

The above argument considered the labour-process from a technical point of view. However, in order to understand the relation/forces of production, one should study the relationships established among the agents of production through the means of production in the labour-process. With

regard to the fact that there were three modes of production, i.e. share-cropping, fixed-rent and owner/operators, we shall discuss the labour-process in relation to each one of these modes.

The Labour-Process of Share-Cropping System

Broadly speaking, the share-croppers either worked individually or jointly in work teams. In some areas, the landlords directly assigned each *nasaq*-holder to a plot of land. In this case, the *nasaq*-holder with his family worked on the land and shared the produce with the landlord. In the peak seasons an extra labourer was employed by the *nasaq*-holder. The employed labourer was paid either in cash or in kind. Moreover, the *nasaq*-holders who did not have draught animals borrowed them from other *nasaq*-holders and/or cattle breeders. Apparently, Arak was the only area in which this form of individual operation was dominant. Thus, Lambton states that in this area a plough land is usually run as a family concern; 'the amount of grain (wheat and barley) harvested averages 10 *kharvar* (approx. 58 cwt.) of which the peasant keeps on irrigated land two-thirds, less various small deductions. This, unless supplemented in various other ways, as for example by gardening produce, the produce of flocks or weaving, is not enough to support the holder and his family. The capital required by the holder of a plough-land in 1945 was some 30,000 rs. (approx. £176). Among the items making up this total were the following: a pair of oxen... A minimum of 1 donkey... 2-3 spades. 1 threshing machine. 2 ploughs. 1 ox-shaft. 1 ox-yoke. 1 harrow.'[14]

Hence, with regard to the other agents of production, a *nasaq*-holder in this form of operation was involved in two sets of relationships: i.e. employing wage-labourers and borrowing oxen. Employing wage-labourers can be considered as a form of relationship at the level of the CMP. This is because, the objective conditions of production were possessed/owned by the *nasaq*-holder, and also it was he who conducted the labour-

process; whereas, the labourer was employed for a certain period of time in lieu of some money or a portion of the produce. Here, the *nasaq*-holder appeared as "capitalist" exploiter, who exploited other agents by an economic mechanism in the process of production. On the other hand, if our *nasaq*-holder borrowed oxen (according to the 1960 Census, 31.7% of the *nasaq*-holders borrowed draught animals in Arak and Zanjan areas), it cannot be considered as an exploitative relationship. This is due to the fact that, while he conducted the labour-process, he only partially owned/possessed the objective conditions of production and borrowed the rest in return for a portion of produce and/or cash. However, borrowing draught animals exhausted the *nasaq*-holder's capacity for accumulating capital. Thus, with regard to the *nasaq*-holders who worked individually, on the one hand, they were subject to semi-feudal subordination, while on the other hand, they had established relationships with other agents of production at the level of the CMP: i.e. employed wage-labourers and borrowed means of production from others.

However, the dominant form of expropriation of nature was working in plough-teams comprising two to eight *nasaq*-holders. The work-teams had different names in different areas, e.g. *Haraseh* in Kirman, *Sahra* in Khorasan, *Pagav* in Sistan, *Juft* in Kirman, and *Boneh* around Tehran. For the sake of simplicity, we use *boneh* to symbolise a work-team. Evidently, from a technical point of view, working in *boneh* increases productivity. Hence Gharachedaghi states that 'by founding *boneh*, tilling the soil and irrigating the field together, the peasants of the villages had always aimed at deriving the utmost advantage from the available water supply.'[15]

But the foundation of *boneh* had brought about the reinforcement in one way or another of the differentiation of the peasantry. The land of each village was divided into a number of plots, each of which was cultivated by a group of *nasaq*-holders under a leader. The work-team or *boneh* was comprised, therefore, of these *nasaq*-holders, a pair of oxen, a

plot of land plus some other necessary means of production. Here, one may pose the question as to the nature of the property relation in *boneh*. As a matter of fact this is the core of the relations of production among the peasantry. In order to answer the above question, we shall distinguish two sets of means of production i.e. land and water on the one hand and oxen on the other. First, we shall examine the possession relationship established between the members of *boneh* and the land and (water); and secondly the ownership of oxen.

In the first section of this part, concerning the ownership/possession of land, we assumed that the direct-producers were assigned to position of possession of land by the feudal landlords, thus leaving aside the issue of peasant differentiation. Here, we revise the relationship between direct-producers and feudal landlords with reference to the different strata of the peasantry. In the FMP, the direct-producers are subordinated to and also are raised to the position of possession of land by the feudal landlord. But in rural Iran, despite the fact that almost all direct-producers (share-croppers) were subordinated to the landlord and/or his agent, *not all these share-croppers were raised to the position of possession of land directly by the feudal landlord/or his agent*. In other words, the feudal landlords did not have a direct relationship with all of the share-croppers.

The labour-force of each *boneh* comprised two or more *nasaq*-holders. The number of members varied from place to place. However, the group had one leader who had different names in different areas, e.g. *Sar-Salar* in Kirman, *Salar* in Sistan and Torbat-i Heydarieh, *Sar-Za'im* in Kirman, and also *gavband* in the neighbourhood of Tehran. In almost all areas the leader of the work-team was assigned to a plot of land directly by the feudal landlord/or his agent. In each village, therefore, the landlord was in direct contact with the heads of *bonehs*, while all other producers were subsumed to him. By doing this, the landlords managed to control their subjects easily. Thus, 'the control of landlords and their agents

over the villages is reinforced by the existence of a relatively privileged stratum of tenants in almost every village which has a stake in the status quo. There are so-called *gavband* heads who typically control a work-team of two to four men and two oxen... Landlords encourage in each village the existence of a group which has a stake in the present tenure system and which has the power to grant or withhold favours from the poorer tenants and labourers, thus keeping the latter under control.'[16]

The head of the *boneh* (hereafter, we shall use *gavband* to refer to the head of *boneh*) conducted the labour-process of the work-team. Thus the *gavband* was in charge of: furnishing seeds and oxen, organizing the ordinary members for production arrangements of an extra-labour force in the peak seasons, making contracts with the landlord and *boneh*, provision of extra water if required and so forth. In many cases, like the ordinary direct-producer, the *gavband* worked in addition to his duties as the head of the team. In some other cases, he had only managerial duties. Dr. Hayden for example states that in Aliabad, in the neighbourhood of Tehran, 'most of the oxen are in the possession of a few prosperous villagers who "hire out" their oxen and ploughs to the working farmers. Such individuals are called *gavband*, "ox-owners" and this title signifies their higher prestige in social rank. *When a villager becomes a gavband he wears hat, coat, carries a cane and quits work.*'[17] Furthermore, Gharachedaghi explains the contribution of *gavbands* to the labour-process in villages around Varamin. According to him, *gavbands* put the necessary means of production, such as draught animals, tools, seeds, and a portion of fertilizer, at the disposal of ordinary direct-producers. The latter received one fourth of the produce from the gavbands.[18]

What was the relationship between the *gavband* and other ordinary members of the *boneh*? The above argument did not tell us anything about the nature of this relationship. It only revealed the relationship between the *gavbands* and feudal landlords. In order to answer the above question, one should consider the ownership (as a property relation) of

oxen by the members of *boneh*.

As already explained, there were some peasants who owned draught animals (as the main means of production owned by *nasaq*-holders), and the rest had either to borrow and/or to work without draught animals. In order to study the property relation (pertinent to oxen), therefore, we classify work-teams according to the supplier of oxen. Thus we can distinguish the following types of work-teams: those which were supplied with oxen by a member of the *boneh*, those which were supplied with oxen by all members of *boneh*, work-teams which were supplied oxen by a third person other than landlord, and finally those work-teams which were supplied with oxen (and seeds) by the landlords.

a) Work Teams Supplied by Gavband

In these work-teams, the *gavband* (head of the team), in addition to duties at the managerial level, supplied his men with oxen and sometimes seeds. In effect, he was appointed as the head of *boneh* mainly because he owned oxen. He was richer than ordinary members and therefore, had a stake in the status quo. As the examples below show, the *gavbands* supplied the work-teams with oxen (and seeds) in return for a portion of the produce:

'In the Mamasani (in Fars province) there are two men attached to a plough-land, the owner of the oxen (the *gavband*) and a peasant known as the *bazyar*. *In some areas the latter receives one quarter of wheat remains after the landowner's share of one-fifth on daym crops, one-fourth on abi, and one-half on sayfi has been deducted.*

In Jahrum (in Fars province) the division between the men attached to the plough-land is as follows: 'if they are two each owns one of the oxen the share is equally divided bwtween them. *If, on the other hand, one man owns both oxen and is helped by two men, the share of the oxen, ..., is half, and the remaining half is divided between the other two men.*'[19]

The following example shows that the situation was more or less the

same in some areas of Khorasan province. According to the Ford Foundation, in 1954, in Farak, a village in the neighbourhood of Kashmar, for the full employment the work-team should have had a maximum of two members and four oxen. It had four men and two oxen. The share within the work-team was divided into six parts, 9405 rials per share. One share, or 9405 rials, went to each of four men, two shares went to the owner of oxen. Thus three men received 9405 rials each and the *gavband* who owned the oxen received 18810 rials.[20] Lambton points out that in the State's lands of Bampur, in Baluchestan, the work-team was comprised of three men, one of whom owned an ox. The seed was supplied by both landlord and producers jointly. After the deduction of the share of the landlord, blacksmith, carpenter and ..., one-fifth of the rest went to the owner of the oxen. Then the rest of grain was divided equally between the owner of the ox and the other two *nasaq*-holders.[21] Contrary to the State lands in the estates which belonged to private landlords, in this region, the oxen were supplied by agents other than the cultivators. Generally speaking, in this form of *boneh*, the owner of an ox collected one share for his animal in addition to his own share as a member of the work-team. Put it in a simple way, the grain after all deductions (the shares of landlord, blacksmith, ...) was divided by the number of members plus the number of oxen. Each share was collected by one member, and the shares of oxen were collected by their owners.

With regard to the above variety of *boneh*, what was the relationship between the members of the *boneh*? Can this form of relationship, which is mediated by oxen, be considered as an exploitative relation of capitalist type? It was indeed some sort of capitalist exploitative relationship from its very early period. This is because, one member of the *boneh* conducted the labour-process and he himself either did not work at all, or undertook lighter productive work. In addition, he owned an objective condition of production, oxen, which was used in the labour-process in lieu of a portion of the produce. That is to say, he collected a portion

of produce produced by other members of *boneh* for the use of his oxen; hence the oxen were not just an absolute form of means of production, rather they expressed a specific social relationship between the owner on the one hand and the direct-producers on the other. *That is, these means of production, oxen, tended to become capital.*

But why cannot these relations be considered as fully capitalist, but merely exhibiting tendencies towards capitalist relations? There are three reasons for this statement. First, the direct-producer, who conducted the labour-process, was not in the position of effective possession of all objective conditions of production, he only owned oxen (and in some cases seeds). Rather, he was, like all other members, subject to feudal subordination. Secondly, and more important, 'capital presupposes wage-labourer, wage-labourer presupposes capital. They reciprocally condition each other's existence; they reciprocally bring forth each other.'[22] In other words, the existence of the free labourer is the prerequisite for the existence of capital. However, in our specific conjuncture, we had two distinguished groups of direct-producers: *nasaq*-holders and free labourers. The former, *nasaq*-holders, could not be considered as free labourers, because they were not completely separated from the objective conditions of production. That is, they had the possession of an objective condition of production at their disposal, i.e. land. However, the second group of direct-producers were, in the real sense of the word, free labourers, because they had nothing at their disposal to contribute to the labour process, but their labour-power. Although, they got paid in kind, one can consider them as a prerequisite condition for the existence of capitalist relations of production. Thus the process of production was not entirely based on the wage-labour system. The third reason why we did not consider the production by *boneh* as fully capitalist production is the fact that the production did not take place mainly for the market. But one should notice that, some direct-producers, including many of the rich oxen-owner peasants, sold at least a portion of

their share of grain in the market.

There is one further point to be made in relation to the borrowing of draught animals. We have already shown how widespread the lending/borrowing of draught animals was throughout the country. Neither officials nor the scholars have so far explained the variety of forms of borrowing draught animals. We do not, therefore, know whether or not the ordinary *nasaq*-holders, in the above case, were considered as borrowers of draught animals. However, our discussion shows that the relationship between the members of *boneh* with regard to the draught animals cannot be considered as a simple lending/borrowing relationship.

Thus in the *bonehs* in which draught animals were supplied by a member (usually the leader), we see an articulated combination of two sets of feudal and capitalist relations of production. On the one hand all members were subject to feudal subordination, and there was some sort of collaboration between all members of the work-team. Moreover shares and wages were paid mainly in kind and the production was not mainly for the market. But on the other hand, a member of the *boneh*, who conducted the labour-process, owned oxen which were used in this process. He collected a portion of produce for his oxen. The *boneh* also employed wage-labourers in the peak seasons.

b) Boneh Oxen Supplied by all Members of the Work-team

In some rare cases, each one of the members of the *boneh* owned an ox, and there was no difference between them in terms of ownership of the means of production. The direct consequence of this equal ownership of means of production was equal distribution of produce between the members of the *boneh* after deducting the owner's share. Furthermore, the *boneh* in the peak seasons employed wage-labourers and wages were paid either in cash or in kind. Two cases illustrates this. In Zeidanlu, a village in the neighbourhood of Guchan (in Khorasan province) there were, in 1954, sixty work units each of which comprised of two or more families. The

boneh is made up of two family heads, each of whom own oxen, so the production is divided equally between these two families, i.e. 13877 rials per family unless labour outside these two families is hired, in which case one man is hired for forty days during the ploughing season at 1500 rials. If labour is needed for the spring barley and the summer crop, the labour receive one fifth of the crop. Village boys are hired for the harvest at 600 rials. The cost of labour is not deducted from the family income, as the elders of the village asserted that most of the two family *joft* (work unit) were sufficient within themselves as to labour.[23]

The above report does not make it clear, if there were any privileges for any one of the member of the *boneh* in this village. However, it seems that the relationship between the two members were some sort of collaboration rather than any form of hierarchy. On the other hand, member families employed labourers, which is a sign of the extraction of surplus by economic mechanisms. Safinejad asserts that in the villages in the neighbourhood of Torbat-a Jam (in Khoresan), the *sahra* (i.e. *boneh*) usually comprised of men and six oxen. The members owned all objective conditions of production other than land and water which belonged to the landlord. According to him, the ownership of an ox was the necessary condition for becoming a member of the *sahra*. This equal ownership of means of production, oxen in particular, naturally led to the equal distribution of the grain between the *sahra* members. But in effect, there was some sort of hierarchy within the *sahra* which resulted in a differentiation of the members.

The labour-process in the *sahra* was conducted by a leader called *sar-salar*. In addition to his managerial job, he occasionally helped other members in light work. As a whole, all the productive work was undertaken by the ordinary members of the *sahra*. Furthermore, *sar-salar* enjoyed another distinguished privilege, that is, a separate piece of land was granted (in the sense of possession) to him, *which was exploited by the*

labour and means of production of the sahra. He also enjoyed some other privileges granted by the landlord, which did not have anything to do with the relationship between the members. We shall, therefore, ignore them.[24]

In the first of these two cases the relationship between the two agents of production (*boneh* members) was based on co-operation and collaboration. In so far as the direct-producers in Zeidanlu village owned their own lands, one can consider them as capitalist farmers or commodity producers who jointly cultivated their plots, first, because employing hired-labourers was quite common; and secondly, some of their products (e.g. grapes and poppy) were produced for the market.

However, the second case is different. On the one hand, all members of the *boneh* were subject to feudal subordination while on the other hand, the labour-process had a so-called capitalist character. That is to say, although all members possessed/owned the objective conditions of production and the employment of wage-labourers was uncommon, the labour-process was conducted by a leader, *sar-salar*, and the productive work was undertaken by the ordinary members. In addition, *sar-salar* possessed a piece of land which was cultivated by the members with the *sahra's* means of production. In short, one may say that the extraction of surplus which took place in the labour-process was transferred to the head of the work-team.

c) Oxen Supplied by a Third Party

In the third type of work-team (*boneh*) the property relation had a peculiar character which distinguishes it from all other types. Here the oxen (and in some cases seeds and tools) were supplied neither by the direct-producers (*nasaq*-holders) nor by the landlords, but by a third person who in some areas called *gavband*. These lenders of oxen can be classified into two groups, first, cattle breeders who were not concerned with the labour-process and had no connection with the landlords; and secondly, those who acted, in effect, as mediators between landlords and

nasaq-holders.

Cattle Breeders as Suppliers of Draught Animals

There were, in some areas, groups of people who were engaged in cattle breeding. The poverty of the *nasaq*-holders, in these areas, had provided the opportunity for the cattle breeders to rent out their oxen to the direct-producers in lieu of a portion of the produce and or some money. For example the *nasaq*-holders of Nukjub, a village in the neighbourhood of Bampur in Baluchestan, were divided into 12 *pa-gav* (work-team). Of these work-teams, eight had one head and eight members each, and the other four had one head and nine members each. 'The division of the *jofts* (plough-lands) between the farmers is uneven and the *nasaq*-holders told us (the R.G.) that only forty-five of them own oxen. Thus the majority (63 families) have to rent animals from the *gavbands* against a payment of one-tenth of their product.'[25] Generally speaking, all surveys carried out by the R.G. on the villages in this region show more or less the same state of affairs. Nevertheless, in none of these surveys does the R.G. go further to reveal the nature of this dimension of relations of production. However, Safinejad specifies that these cattle breeders performed ploughing as well as threshing by their own buffaloes.[26] This means that these cattle breeders not only provided an objective condition of production, oxen, but also performed some productive work in the labour-process.

The cattle breeders live around Hamoon Lake, and not only sell all products of the cattle, but also undertake ploughing and threshing. The cattle breeders perform this work in return for a portion of the produce, hence one can see that the payment for ploughing and threshing and the like was another heavy burden on the shoulders of the owner/possessors of this province.[27] According to the 1960 Census, around 46% of the owner/possessors in this province borrowed draught animals. On the other hand, out of 3750 heads of buffaloes, 2850 (i.e. 76%) belonged to a group

of 19650 households which owned/possessed no land. The rest belonged to the owner/possessors of plots over five hectares.[28]

To sum up this argument, one may state that, as far as the labour-process is concerned, the cattle breeders did not conduct it, but only contributed to this process by provision of buffaloes and performance of some productive work. On the other hand, they were under no contract (verbal or written) to the landlords of this province. It follows, therefore, that the relationship between cattle breeders and agricultural direct-producers cannot be considered as an exploitative relationship.

Gavband as a Supplier of Oxen and Other Means of Production

There was a specific form of property relations, in the neighbourhood of Tehran, which was very different from the previous case in spite of the fact that, the oxen (and occasionally other conditions of production) were supplied by a third party. In this region, like many other regions, the relationship between the direct-producer and the landlord was interposed by a third person called *gavband*. But unlike the other regions, the *gavband* was not necessarily a prosperous *nasaq*-holder working as a direct-producer. As a matter of fact, he might have been engaged in many other businesses, such as cattle breeding, local trade, transport activities, running the village shop, and money lending. In any case, he had a stake in the labour-process.

In any village in this area, few *gavbands* held a direct lease agreement with the landlord and/or his lessee. The contract between these two was a kind of share-cropping agreement, i.e. the *gavbands* had to hand over around 50% of the produce to the landlord as the ownership share. As a result of this agreement, each *gavband* was in a position of possession of a piece of land and a certain amount of water. According to Gharachedaghi, the *gavbands* around Varamin cultivated the land in two different ways: 'either by utilizing family labour or daily paid workers and farm hand, or

they had one or more share croppers without means (...) to work the land.'[29] However, he points out that the latter form of cultivation, i.e. share-cropping, was dominant.[30]

In the latter case, a group of *nasaq*-holders, working in a work-team (*boneh*), assumed full responsibility for production on the apportioned land. These *nasaq*-holders had nothing to contribute to the labour-process but labour-power. Instead, the *gavband*, as the leader of the *boneh*, undertook the following responsibilities: furnishing seeds and draught animals provision of an extra-labour, granting loans to the *boneh* members, making contracts with the blacksmith, carpenter and the like, marketing the summer and winter produce, supervising the division of produce between the *boneh* and the landlord and so on. In other words, the boneh was organized by the *gavband* ; while the *nasaq*-holders had to cultivate the land. That is, 'after having reached an oral agreement of at most one year's duration with the individual *gavbands* who leased the land from the Amlak Administration (the Administration in charge of Crown lands), raiyyats (ordinary *nasaq*-holders) assumed full responsibility of the apportioned land. They disposed of the right to decide how and when the land should be tilled, sowed, irrigated and harvested.'[31]

Before explaining the division of produce according to the ownership/possession of the objective conditions of production, there is one point to be stated briefly about the social relationships in the villages run by *gavbands*. That is, not only were the direct-producers in the position of possession of land (i.e. *nasaq*-holding), but also the *gavbands* enjoyed a special right called *the right of gavbandi*. The *gavbands* were allowed to buy and sell their right on the one hand; while on the other, it was not so easy for a landlord to dismiss a *gavband*.

As a result of the specific form of property relations that existed in the *bonehs* around Tehran, the produce was divided at two different levels: first, between the landlords on the one hand and *bonehs* on the other; and then between the *gavbands* and other members of the *bonehs*.

The division of produce between landlord and boneh (producers) has already been discussed in the second chapter of this part. However, that explanation could not illustrate the real share of the direct-producers, due to the subdivision of produce within the *boneh*. The following quotation clearly shows how meagre the share of an individual *nasaq*-holder was: 'In Khwar and Varamin the land which he (the *gavband*) manages consists of four plough lands known as *baneh*, each worked by four peasants and an ox; the grain harvest of such a unit comes to some 100 kharvar (approx. 584 cwt.) on an average. From this 2 kharvar (approx. 12 cwt.) or 50 manni tabriz (approx. 3 cwt.) per *boneh* are deducted from the total harvest for the religious classes. The payment of the *dashtban* amounting to 3 kharvar (approx. 17½ cwt.) per *gavband* or 25-30 manni tabriz (approx. one and one-third cwt. - one and two-thirds cwt.) per *baneh* is also deducted from the total harvest. Some 95 kharvar (approx. 555 cwt.) remains. This is divided between the landowner and the *gavband*. The latter then deducts from his share of 47½ kharvar (approx. 278 cwt.) the seed, leaving some 37½-40 kharvar (approx. 219 cwt. - 234 cwt.). He then deducts the dues for the blacksmith, carpenter and the bathkeeper, amounting to some 3 kharvar (approx. 17½ cwt.). The remainder is then divided in equal shares between him, on the one hand, and the four peasants. on the other. In Saoj Bulagh, however, the *gavband* usually get three-fifths instead of half the crop; the reason for his receiving a higher share is that the land in this area has to be ploughed three times.'[32]

The specific form of property relations and also labour-process pertinent to the form of the *boneh* (share-cropping) system, lead us to consider it as a transitional mode of production with the CMP in dominance. The reasons for which the CMP is considered as dominant in this articulation are as follows: almost all objective conditions of production are owned/possessed by the *gavband* who conducts the labour-process; production, and summer crops in particular, are to a considerable extent market-oriented; some of the direct-producers, *nasaq*-holders, are almost

entirely separated from the conditions of production, while some others, i.e. casual labourers, are completely separated from the objective conditions of production. However, one should notice the feudal characteristics of the property relation and labour-process in this system. That is, some of the direct-producers, i.e. *nasaq*-holders, possessed land, and therefore their labour power cannot be considered as a commodity; production is not entirely market oriented; *nasaq*-holders and *gavband* are subordinated to the owner of land, the feudal landlord. By and large, this form of *boneh* system is closer to capitalist production than the previous cases.

There is one further point to be made about this form of *boneh* in relation to the lending/borrowing of draught animals. As already stated, almost all studies and official documents on the borrowing of draught animals in relation to the labour-process of different forms of share-cropping, are unclear. One cannot, therefore, discover whether the *nasaq*-holders in the above mentioned form of *boneh* were considered as the borrowers of draught animals.

d) Oxen Supplied by the Landlord

Finally, in some cases, the landlords not only supplied land and water, but also furnished, partially or wholly, the other means of production mainly seeds and draught animals. From the property relation point of view, this conjuncture is more or less similar to the CMP, i.e. the direct-producer was almost separated from the objective conditions of production. But his specific relation to the land, i.e. *nasaq*, distinguishes him from an agricultural wage-labourer. However, from the point of view of the labour-process, the direct-producers conducted the whole process, and in effect, the landlord had nothing to do with this process. Considering this argument and also the fact that the landlords furnished oxen in lieu of a portion of produce, it follows that this category of nasaq-holders can be considered in the list of borrowers of

draught animals in rural Iran.

e) Boneh in Relation to the Tractorization of Agriculture

We have analyzed the labour-process in the different forms of share-cropping system in rural Iran in terms of property relations and the forms of extraction of surplus. However, in the late fifties with the introduction of tractors, the labour-process and also property relations in these social formations (at the village level) changed to a considerable extent, despite the fact that share-cropping remained as it was. The following case supports this.

The Ford Foundation, in 1954, reported from Shokat Abad, a village in the neighbourhood of Birjan in the province of Khorasan, that there were 24 *nasaq*-holders working in 12 work-teams (here called *gavband*) i.e. each team was comprised of two *nasaq*-holders. They supplied labour and draught animals, while the landlord furnished land, water, and seeds in lieu of half of the produce. The other half was divided equally between the members of the work-teams.[33] However, in later years some changes took place. The land in this village was ploughed by a tractor which belonged to the landlord, and the oxen were used very rarely. Although share-cropping remained as the form of distribution relation in the agricultural sphere, the share of the landlord increased due to the provision of means of ploughing. That is, 'the nasaq-holders give two-thirds of their produce to the landowner in return for the provision of water, land, seeds and the means of ploughing.'[34] Furthermore, by introducing tractors, the *boneh* system, i.e. working in the work teams, disappeared.[35]

However, employing tractors did not have the same effects on all areas. For example, in villages of southern Tehran, the *gavbands* were among the first persons who started employing tractors for ploughing. This was mainly due to the fact that, they realized that the cost of hiring tractors was cheaper than keeping draught animals.[36] However, it

appears that the *boneh* system remained as it was, and also no changes in property relations took place following on the *gavbands'* taking of the initiative by using tractors. Furthermore, the share of the direct-producers did not change, because their contribution of means of production to the labour process did not change.

Labour-Process in Fixed Rent System

In the first section of this part, we discussed the relationship between the direct-producer and non-producer in this mode of production. Here the exactraction ofsurplus took the form of the payment of a fixed amount of produce (or its value) as rent. However, as regards the labour-process, there was a great difference between this system and the share-cropping system. That is, in the region in which this form of payment of rent was dominant the direct-producers worked individually on the lands to which they were assigned. It follows, therefore, that the relationships between the agents of production were not so complicated as they were in the case of work-teams. We shall briefly explain this point with specific reference to the province of Gilan.

According to the 1960 Census, out of 165498 households, 137298 owned/possessed land, 17400 did not have any land and the rest were engaged in animal breeding and the like. The land was extremely fragmented into small plots: i.e. slightly less than 50% of the total area was owned/possessed by 83% of the direct-producers who held plots of less than 3 has. Holding from three to less than four hectares covered 11% of the total cultivated areas, and the rest was covered by holdings of over 4 hectares.

The means of production in Gilan, as in almost all other areas, were very primitive. For example, in 1960 around 88% of the owner/possessors used animal power exclusively in cultivation, while only 0.5% of them employed machinery, 2% mixed mechanical and animal power and the remaining 9% used manpower only. The data on the use of draught animals as a

source of power, in fact shows two different points: the primitive method of production, and also the crucial role which the ownership of these animals could play in the relationships between the direct-producers. We have already explained the first point at the national level, therefore, we shall discuss only the latter point.

The distribution of draught animals was, like that of the land, uneven in Gilan. Hence, on the average, the owner/possessors of smaller plots owned fewer animals than the holders of larger plots. That is, owner/possessors of plots under three hectares, i.e. 83% of total holdings, owned 72% of the total draught animals. However, the number of draught animals owned by these owner/possessors was far less than they needed. That is why 87% of the borrowers of draught animals comprised holders with less than 3 hectares. In other words, 42.5% of the holders with less than one hectare, 40% of holders holding between 1 and 2 hectares and also 38.5% of those holding between 2 and 3 hectares, hired draught animals.[37]

With regard to the fact that the small land owner/possessors were the main borrowers, the borrowing/lending of draught animals in this province, can be considered as a specific form of exploitation which took place outside the labour-process. It was an exploitative relationship, because it involved a transfer of surplus from the direct-producer to other agents of production. And it took place outside the labour-process, due to the fact that, the direct-producer was in the position of ownership/possession of other conditions of production and also conducted the labour-process.

The other main characteristic of the relations of production in the province of Gilan, was the widespread employment of wage-labourers by the owner/possessors. According to the 1960 Census, around 12% of the households did not own/possess any land. However, one should notice that this group of households was not the main source of the labour force.

In effect, there were two main sources of labour force in this province, that is, women and children on the one hand and the owner/possessors of small plots on the other. According to the R.G. a plot of land up to 3 hectares was hardly enough to supply a family's income.[38] It follows, therefore, that the owner/possessors holding less than 3 hectares (i.e. 83% of the total holdings) were connected, to a considerable extent, to the labour market. In addition, contrary to the other regions of the country, women in Gilan (and also the other two regions in Caspian sea littoral) were widely engaged in agricultural work, especially in paddy fields and tea plantations. According to the 1960 Census, out of 282110 women (10 years and over) only 72110, i.e. 25%, were economically inactive; and 205500, i.e. over 72%, were mainly engaged in the agricultural work. However, one should notice that, not all of these women worked as wage labourers, but a percentage of them worked on their own plots.

Thus, in Gilan province, as one of the regions in which the fixed rent system was dominant, the direct-producers were assigned to plots of land. They worked on these plots individually and therefore, they were directly related to the landlords and/or their bailiffs. They had to hand over a fixed portion of the produce, or its equivalent value, to the landlords. In addition, a high percentage of the direct-producers had to borrow draught animals from others, while hired labour was widely used.

Labour-Process in the Owner/Operator Plots

The third and last form of the labour-process, was that pertinent to the plots operated by their owners. From a technical point of view, the majority of these holdings, small ones, were operated in the same way as other plots. From the point of view of social relations a tiny percentage of them resorted to the employment of wage labourers.

However, in order to discuss this point, one must distinguish two

different categories of owner/operator holdings: small holdings, up to 10 hectares, where animals were the main source of power, and large holdings which were highly mechanized and were based on the wage-labour system (see Tables XIII and XIV).

The small owner/operator holdings constituted around 70% of the total of holdings in this category (see Table XIII). As with other categories of smallholdings, the owner/operators of holdings under 5 hectares used draught animals as the source of power. The exception is the case of holdings under 0.5 hectare where human labour was the main source of power. With regard to the employment of primitive means of production and to the fact that in the majority of cases owners of the small holdings conducted the production, one may consider the process of labour of this category similar to that of the fixed rent system, and/or the share-cropping system in the case in which the possessor worked individually. In addition, there is no doubt that, some of these owner/operators in the peak seasons resorted to the employment of wage labourers.

The second group of owner/operator holdings comprised mechanized (fully or partially) large farms. In these farms, the production was for the market, and the direct-producers had already been separated from the objective conditions of production. The mechanized large-scale farms, before L-R, were mainly to be found in Gorgan region. Okazaki states 'Although the scale of the farms ranges from 50 to 6000 hectares they are operated on the basis of mechanization and hired labour for profit. Each farm has a central office located on the farm itself; houses for the farm operator or custodian, technical and clerical employees and supervisors of the agricultural labourers, a service station for farm machinery, a generation plant, pump station and garages around the office.'[39]

The study of mechanized farming is beyond the scope of this part of our study. However, we should note that this form of farming, which is based on the employment of wage-labour, the use of machinery and the production of cash crops, started as early as the late 1940s. Mechanized

farming started in Gorgan region, and became the dominant form of operation in the 1950s. As far as the other regions were concerned, large scale, mechanized capitalist farming was negligible in comparison with other forms of operation as late as 1960.

In conclusion, we may summarize our argument on the labour-process with respect to relationships among the peasantry as follows. First, the labour-process was reviewed from a technical point of view in order to show how backward the means of production were. Then we discussed the labour-process of the share-cropping system: a minority of the share-croppers worked individually on their possessed lands, whereas the majority worked in work-teams. We explained that these work-teams had different forms in different areas: in some of them the capitalist relations of production were, to some extent, established among the *nasaq*-holders, while in others the relationship was based on collaboration. Moreover, most of the *bonehs* resorted to the employment of wage labourers in the peak seasons. In relation to the lending/borrowing of draught animals, we explained that, in some cases it was a form of exploitation that took place within the labour-process, while in some other cases it was an exploitation outside this process. Then we discussed the labour-process in the fixed rent system. In this system, *nasaq*-holders worked individually on their possessed lands, they were therefore directly connected to the landlords. With regard to the lending/borrowing of draught animals, it was asserted that this relationship could be considered as an exploitative relationship outside the labour-process. Also, we considered that many of the *nasaq*-holders resorted to the employment of wage labourers at least for a period of the year.

Our analysis in this chapter revealed the relationships established among the peasants prior to L-R. This now enables us to describe the social class structure in rural Iran before the implementation of L-R, which we shall do in the next chapter.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. Atai, 1965, p.135
2. Lambton, 1953, pp.359-60
3. English, 1966, p.129
4. 312 out of 316 of these holdings were owned/possessed by the operators; see Table XII.
5. English 1966, p.128
6. Lambton, 1953, p.376
7. Atai, 1965, p.135
8. Lambton, 1953, pp.359-60
9. Ibid, p.260
10. Wulff, 1966, pp.269-70
11. Becket, 1957, p.23
12. Wulff, 1966, p.276
13. Ibid, p.277
14. Lambton, 1953, p.368
15. Gharachedaghi, 1967, p.91
16. Keddie, 1960, p.16
17. Hayden, 1949, p.143, italics added
18. Gharachedaghi, 1967, p.95
19. Lambton, 1953, pp.369-70, italics added
20. T.E., nos. 15&16, Nov. 1969, p.196
21. Lambton, 1953, pp.372-73
22. Marx, 1976, p.724
23. T.E., nos. 15&16, Nov.1969, p.203
24. Safinejad, 1974, pp.237-46
25. T.E., nos. 19&20, pp.151-52
26. Safinejad, 1974, p.250
27. See ibid, pp.256-57.
28. T.E., nos. 19&20, p.144
29. Gharachedaghi, 1967, p.82
30. Ibid, p.94; see also Lambton, 1953, p.374, and Safinejad, 1974.
31. Gharachedaghi, 1967, p.95
32. Lambton, 1953, pp.374-75
33. T.E., nos.15&16, pp.208-10
34. Ibid, p.187
35. For a further similar case, see T.E., nos.13&14, Jan. 1968.
36. Safinejad, 1974, pp.138-39
37. See 1960 Census, vol.II, Table 117
38. T.E., nos. 11&12, p.140
39. Okazaki, 1969, p.12

CHAPTER VIII

Social Classes in Rural Iran

We have examined the relations of production in rural Iran at two different levels: between the owner/possessors and landlords on the one hand, and among the owner/possessors on the other. We can now move on to examine social classes in rural Iran.

In order to define social classes in any social formation, first of all, one should note that they are not sums of individuals. There are four economic factors to be taken as the main criteria for identifying social classes. They include: the position in the process of production, property relations (ownership/non-ownership of the means of production), the role in the social organization of labour, and the mode of acquisition of part of the social wealth (expropriation of surplus).[1] However, social classes are defined principally, but not exclusively, by economic criteria: 'The economic place of the social agents has a principal role in determining social classes. But from that we must conclude that this economic place is sufficient to determine social classes. Marxism states that the economy does indeed have the determinant role in a mode of production or a social formation, but the political and the ideological (the superstructure) also have a very important role.'[2]

Considering that the political and ideological levels are out of the scope of this study, we start our inquiry on the social-classes in rural Iran at the level of relations of production. Thus an attempt is to be made, here, to classify different agents of production by taking into consideration three aspects of the relations of production, property relations, labour-relations and distribution relations.

For rural Iran between 1940 and 1960 we can do more or less the following classification of the agents of production: well-to-do peasants middle peasants, poor peasants, and landless peasants and *khoshneshins*.

Given that there were two different modes of production in rural Iran, we shall consider each one of the above-mentioned classes in relation to these different modes of production. Thus in the first group of owner/possessors, i.e. well-to-do, we have three different categories: capitalist farmers, rich farmers who paid fixed-rent and rich *nasaq*-holders.

The category of capitalist farmers includes those owner/lessees who resorted to the employment of wage-labourers and machinery. They produced cash crops, such as cotton, for the market. They accumulated sufficiently to invest in production through the purchase of superior means of production and labour power. They maintained an extended reproduction based on accumulation. In this case, one can see three distinct social classes: the landowner, who through his monopoly power over the land, obtained a portion of surplus-value as capitalist (absolute/differential) ground-rent; the capitalist farmer, who purchased advanced means of production and labour-power, rented land and conducted the labour-process; and finally wage-labourers. In many cases, the capitalist-farmers had the ownership of plants under their control. Obviously the latter form does not refute the above statement of the social classes in this type of social-formation. In fact, in this form the position of the landowner (the collector of capitalist ground-rent), and that of the capitalist-farmer (the collector of profit) were vested in the latter agent; hence the capitalist farmer collected profit as well as ground-rent.

Capitalist-farmers of this type were mainly to be found in the Gorgan plain. The capitalist farmers in this area in addition to their main agricultural business, also resorted to renting out agricultural machinery.

If one considers 20 ha. as the minimum size of this form of operation, the share of capitalist farmers (leaseholders and owners) can be seen in Table XIII. That is, 1.9% of leaseholders and 3.2% of owner/operators had occupied 34.8% and 40.7% of the total areas of these categories respectively.

The above mentioned capitalist farmers should not be considered as a

part of the rural population. This is because these farmers were different from the peasantry at an economic as well as at the other levels. For example, in the late 1940s to mid 1950s, politicians, agricultural engineers, landowners, retired army officers, high and middle ranking government officials, merchants, university professors and others like them starting operating farms in the Gorgan plain.[3] A further case is that of the irrigation companies, which were established by some local *khans* and *sheikhs* and Sugar Cane Project (a State owned company in Haft Tapeh) in Khuzistan province. These companies were, to some extent, mechanized and employed daily wage-labourers. They also produced only for the market.[4]

However, as far as the differentiation of the peasantry is concerned, one cannot classify the peasantry according to size of allotment. This classification conceals the differentiation of the peasants. As a matter of fact, there are some other factors which contribute to the differentiation of the peasantry. They include the ownership of means of production (other than land/water), type of crops, labour conditions (fertility of land and availability of water). Thus we shall try to classify the peasantry by considering the above factors in addition to the ownership/possession of land/water.

The owner/possessors can be classified into three different groups: well-to-do (rich) peasants, middle-peasants and poor peasants.

I Rich Peasants

a) Rich peasants who worked individually

This category included those who owned/possessed land/water, seeds, draught animals and other necessary tools more than the average quantity of their needs. With regard to those owner/possessors who worked individually , Seidov states that they cultivated 10 or more hectares of land and owned more than they needed of draught animals, seeds, tools.

They therefore lent them to the others in return for a portion of produce. They operated their plots directly, however their income mainly sprang from the exploitation of the hired agricultural labourers, and was supplemented by lending money to the other peasants.[5] In the Caspian sea littoral: 'There is one peasant who owns 15 cows, six oxen, and 12 beehives. His income is £150 a year. Also he earns from the other peasants by lending them his oxen to till their fields and seed to plant their land, and he takes a part of the produce in payment.'[6] A second case is of a farmer in Hamidieh, a village in Khuzistan, who owned 10 acres of land. He produced lettuce, water-melon, cucumber, tomato, egg-plant for the market. In addition he devoted one acre of his land to the cultivation of wheat to meet the food requirement of his family. He employed two permanent and five seasonal wage-labourers.[7] A third case is of a village headman in Ghaleh-garden, in Mazandaran, who had around 2 ha. of land. He produced rice, tea and citrus fruits. He was not engaged in livestock breeding, but had some income from poultry-raising. He also employed a wage-labourer and paid him in cash. But considering the point that an agent of production must be regarded not only from the point of view of the ownership of the means of production and the expropriation of labour, but also from the point of view of *the social function he performs within the process of production*,[8] we should look at other functions which were performed by this farmer: *He was engaged in forage selling, and purchase and sale of oranges as well as administration works of the village.*[9] In effect, the performance of these functions distinguished this headman from ordinary owner/possessors and placed him in the category of the village bourgeoisie.

However, one should note that, there were some cases, in which labour-relations were disguised in the family relationship, for example in the case of a farmer who had two sons. The household owned 15 ha. of land, 4 ha. of which were left fallow every year. The family produced wheat, barley lentiles, oilseeds, millet, pears and summer crops. The work was

mainly performed by the father, while the sons worked nine months of the year as wage-labourers in Tehran. They worked the rest of the year for their father. The family owned 15 head of sheep, 2 head of cattle and one head of buffalo. The income from the livestock constituted around one sixth of the total income of the family.[10]

In some other cases, the work was performed entirely by the family members, while the production was, to a considerable extent, for the market. Thus a *nasaq*-holder who had a family of 5 in Mamedel, in East Azarbaijan, possessed 30 ha. of land and produced wheat, barley, summer crops, sugar-beet and grapes mainly for the market. The head of the family stated that he had no labour cost, because the family members supplied the field with labour-power. In addition, the family owned 70 sheep, 6 buffaloes, 7 head of cattle and 30 poultry, which brought in a fair amount.[11]

b) Well-to-do nasaq-holders who worked in work teams

These peasants (i.e. *gavbands*) were distinguished from the ordinary *nasaq*-holders by property relations, functions performed by them in the process of production, and *to a lesser extent by labour-relations*. With regard to the property relations, they not only possessed land/water, but they also usually owned seeds and draught animals. They either undertook light productive work or performed managerial functions. They lent money and seeds to the others. Also in some cases marketing of the produce was performed by leaders of the *bonehs*. The *gavbands* established two different sets of labour-relations: a) as leaders of the *bonehs* they employed seasonal workers; b) they had some sort of 'exploitative relationship' with the ordinary members of the *bonehs*. The latter was the main distinguishing difference between *gavbands* on the one hand, and ordinary members on the other.

There is one further point to be made in relation to the well-to-do *nasaq*-holders (leaders of *bonehs* as well as those who worked individually).

That is, although they had, to some extent, a prosperous economy, they were subject to feudal subordination. They had a stake in the *status quo* because they constituted a privileged stratum of the rural population and had some support from landlords vis-a-vis the others. On the other hand, they were faced with some attempt by the feudal landlords, to limit the expansion of their economy and become independent producers.

II Middle Peasants

Generally speaking, this category of the peasantry is characterized as those who live exclusively on the returns of the land they own/possess. They own means of production and do not resort to hiring wage-labourers for cultivation. Neither do they sell their labour-power.

On the basis of the above definition, Seidov described an Iranian middle peasant as follows: His plot of land was around 3 ha. He always owned agricultural tools and the necessary amount of draught animals for the cultivation of his land. The peasants of this category did not exploit agricultural labour. Some exceptions existed in the top stratum, where they resorted to auxiliary labour and paid them a portion of the produce. Moreover, a middle peasant who had an often unsteady economy resorted to loans and was caught by over-borrowing at high interest rates. The peasants of this category did not sell their labour-power.[12]

The above explanation suffers from some inadequacies. Firstly, considering 3 ha. of land as the average amount of land required by a middle peasant household seems to be arbitrary. This is because, *ceteris paribus*, not only does the fertility of land differ from area to area in Iran, but also the type of crops can play an important role in the amount of income earned by a peasant family. Secondly, Seidov has disregarded the question of ownership/possession of this category of the peasantry. Finally, in relation to the *nasaq*-holders, the above explanation does not consider the position of the middle peasants who worked in the *bonehs*.

However, on the basis of Seidov's explanation, we shall try to characterize this category of the peasantry.

Generally speaking, there were two different groups of middle peasants: those who *owned* plots of land, and those who *possessed* allotments. The latter category comprised those who worked individually and those who worked in *bonehs*. However, to simplify, we classify the middle peasants into two groups: owner/possessors who worked individually, and possessors who worked in *bonehs*.

a) Owner/possessors who worked individually.

These agents of production owned/possessed a sufficient amount of land to satisfy their needs. They also owned tools, draught animals, cattle, sheep and the like. They did not usually employ wage-labour, their income deriving mainly from their own labour. The cases below show the point.

The first case was of a peasant in Dohesaran in Khorasan province, who owned 1.2 ha. of land. He did not own any oxen, instead he shared in the village *qanat* and the pail-operated well. He had to pay for ploughing, but he obtained some money from his shares in the well and *qanat*. He produced wheat, barley, millet and summer crops. The small size of his holding and also the cultivation of products such as wheat, barley and millet, lead us to say that production was, to a considerable extent, not market oriented. The second is of a farmer who operated 20 ha. of which 5 ha. was rented. He owned a pair of oxen and produced wheat, barley and grapes. He did not employ any wage-labourer, because six members of his family helped him in the field. This peasant family was engaged in livestock raising activities as well.[13]

The second group of middle peasants comprised *nasaq*-holders who worked in *bonehs*. Here, we are faced with a more complicated case. This is because, labour-relations cannot be considered as the main criterion to characterize this group of middle peasants. That is, since the *boneh* as a production organization, employed seasonal labourers, all members,

including the middle peasants, at one time could be considered as the expropriator of the labour-power of the labourers. On the other hand, his labour, to a limited extent, was expropriated by the leader of the *boneh*. However, it is possible to characterize this group of middle peasants by criteria other than those of labour-relations.

Thus a middle peasant who worked in a *boneh* can be characterized by the following criteria: as a member of the *boneh* he possessed land/water; he contributed, labour power, seeds, oxen or some combination of these, to the labour-process; he did not take any off-farm jobs but his family members might have some other non-agricultural jobs, and he owned some head of sheep or cattle to supplement his income.

In addition to the above characteristics of the middle peasants of both groups, it can be said that: first, the *nasaq*-holders of this class were subject to feudal exploitation i.e. they had to pay rent for land/water, and also many of them were in debt, and therefore had to pay high interest rates to the landlord/usurer/*gavband*. Secondly, the owner/operator in this class could be considered as a simple commodity producer: i.e. family members were the sole source of their labour-force; a portion of produce was sent to the market; the family used simple tools, therefore it was not connected to the market through capital goods. Furthermore, with regard to both owners and possessors of this class, one should notice that, generally speaking, the minimum amount of land owned/possessed by each family should have been more than 2 ha., the reason for which will be explained below.

III Poor Peasants

Contrary to the previous case, it is not impossible to classify the poor peasants by size of allotment.[14] That is, one may consider, in the Iranian content, owner/possessors of plots under 2 ha. as poor peasants. This is for the following reasons: a) two hectares of land, in the most

fertile area of the country (i.e. the Caspian sea littoral), is the minimum amount of land which can feed a family of six;[15] b) the majority of owner/possessors holding allotments under 2 ha. owned an insufficient amount of draught animals (see Table XVI). Considering these two points, we shall try to discuss the owner/possessors of allotments under 2 ha.

Households owning/possessing less than two hectares, constituted 22.9% of the total rural households. And in terms of the population aged 10 years and over, 22.5% of the rural population belonged to this category.[16] However, in order to understand the class position of these owner/possessors, one should study their labour-relations. This is our concern in this section.

Tables XVIIIa and XVIIIb show the working status of the owner/possessor by size of holding. With regard to the male population holding less than two ha., Table XVIIIa verifies that a high percentage of them, i.e. on average 73.2%, were engaged mainly in agriculture. However, in comparison with owner/possessors holding between 2 and 20 ha. they were less involved in agriculture. On the other hand, the agents of this category were more involved in non-agricultural jobs than the next categories. That is to say, on average, 9.4% of them were mainly engaged in non-agricultural jobs, while the pertinent average percentage for the owner/possessors holding between 2 and 20 ha., is only 1.8%. Despite the small size of the allotments, the male population of this stratum was mainly engaged in working their own allotments, i.e. on average 54.4% and 3.2% worked on their own account in agriculture and non-agriculture, this is much lower than for the owner/possessors of larger allotments. That is, 16.4% of the agents worked as family workers in agriculture, whereas the average for the next stratum is 26.6%. It follows, therefore, that family labour did not play a very important role in the economy of this group.[17] On average 9.4% of the work-force of the male population was engaged in jobs other than agricultural work. This percentage is much higher than the percentage of the work-force engaged in the off-farm jobs

TABLE XVIIIa

Occupation of Male Population (10 years and over) (percentage)

Size of Holdings	Mainly Engaged in Agriculture				Mainly Engaged in Non-Agriculture				Inactive Population	Total
	Total	Own Account	Hired Worker	Unpaid Family	Total	Own Account	Hired Worker	Unpaid Family		
Non-holders	13.0	-	13.0	-	57.8	22.9	32.6	2.3	29.2	1,136,100
Under 0.5 ha.	63.7	48.3	4.3	11.1	17.3	7.1	8.5	1.7	19.0	469,712
0.5 to 1 ha.	77.3	58.4	1.4	17.5	6.5	1.7	3.6	1.2	16.2	288,246
1 to 2 ha.	78.7	56.7	1.2	20.8	4.4	0.8	2.8	0.8	16.9	435,953
2 to 3 ha.	81.1	57.1	1.0	23.0	2.0	0.4	1.2	0.4	16.9	365,167
3 to 4 ha.	82.6	56.6	1.2	24.8	1.5	0.1	1.1	0.3	15.9	258,842
4 to 5 ha.	83.4	55.8	1.6	26.0	1.9	0.2	1.2	0.5	14.7	223,174
5 to 10 ha.	82.7	54.6	1.7	26.4	1.8	-	1.1	0.7	15.5	640,412
10 to 20 ha.	83.2	50.0	2.1	31.1	2.0	0.1	1.0	0.9	14.8	481,268
20 to 50 ha.	78.2	45.7	3.1	29.2	2.7	-	1.1	1.6	19.1	210,454
50 to 100 ha.	76.4	46.1	3.4	26.9	2.6	-	0.3	2.3	9.0	32,438
100 and over	65.0	50.4	-	15.0	14.5	1.8	2.6	10.1	20.5	14,952

Source: The 1960 Census, Table 322.

TABLE XVIIIb

Occupation of Female Population (10 years & over) (percentage)

Size of Holdings	Mainly Engaged in Agriculture				Mainly Engaged in Non-Agriculture				Inactive Population	Total
	Total	Own Account	Hired Worker	Unpaid Family	Total	Own Account	Hired Worker	Unpaid Family		
Non-holders	1.8	-	1.7	-	8.1	1.1	3.2	3.8	90.1	1,077,150
Under 0.5 ha.	10.0	1.2	0.5	8.3	9.0	0.2	1.9	6.9	80.0	420,859
0.5 to 1 ha.	18.3	0.4	0.2	17.6	6.3	0.2	0.9	5.2	75.4	263,161
1 to 2 ha.	25.8	0.4	0.1	25.2	5.4	-	1.1	4.3	68.8	401,074
2 to 3 ha.	23.7	0.1	-	23.4	6.7	0.5	1.4	4.8	69.6	323,403
3 to 4 ha.	15.5	0.2	0.3	15.0	5.6	0.2	1.4	4.0	78.9	235,686
4 to 5 ha.	8.3	-	0.1	8.1	7.6	0.2	2.4	5.0	84.1	193,579
5 to 10 ha.	7.1	0.2	-	6.8	6.7	0.5	1.8	4.4	86.2	566,604
10 to 20 ha.	4.0	0.2	-	3.7	6.7	0.5	1.9	4.3	89.3	410,619
20 to 50 ha.	3.6	-	-	3.6	7.9	0.5	1.6	5.8	88.5	170,684
50 to 100 ha.	1.4	-	-	1.3	10.1	-	3.0	7.1	88.5	28,471
100 and over	1.0	-	-	0.3	15.2	-	9.6	5.8	83.8	13,243

Source: The 1960 Census, Table 323.

in the larger allotments. Furthermore, both tables clearly show that a tiny percentage of the work-force (male and female) worked as hired workers in agricultural as well as non-agricultural fields. Table XVIIIb also shows that on average 79% of the female population had no economic activity.

The following cases may make the economic situation of these owner/possessors clearer. A *nasaq*-holder, in Koleh-jub, in Kermanshah, who possessed jointly with his father and his brother, 7.4 ha. of land under cultivation each year had a share of the total produce of the allotment of 180 kgs. of wheat and 60 kgs. of barley. However, he stated that he spent four months of the year working as a reaper for one of the *nasaq*-holders, for which he received 450 kgs. of wheat and 150 kgs. of barley. For another four months of the year, he worked as a grocer.

According to Okazaki, in a small village called Shirang-Sofla in Gorgan region, there were 8 out of 23 household families each of which held less than 2 ha. under cultivation each year. These households did not employ any wage-labourers. In effect, almost all of them provided other household families with labour-power. In other words, these families found it necessary to supplement their income from farming by selling a good portion of their family labour-power.[18]

Thus the owner/possessors in this stratum can be characterized mainly by *their occupation of more than one position in relation to the means of production.* The extra-position could be a productive as well as a non-productive job. However, the majority of those who had off-farm jobs, worked as wage-labourers in different fields. That is why Lenin, in his work on the development of capitalism in Russia, considered the class position of these agents of production somewhere between the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but closer to the latter.[19]

Landless peasants and the question of Khoshneshins

The Iranian peasants use a general concept, i.e. *Khoshneshin*[20], for

all *agents of production who have no position in the ownership/possession of land.* Obviously this term embraces different agents of production with different positions. As Hooglund states this situation poses some difficulties.[21] However, in order to eliminate this confusion, we shall categorize these agents of production according to their relationship with the means of production and also their positions in social relations.

A group of the *khoshneskin* population was related to the means of production without being in the position of ownership/possession of them. That is, they were entirely separated from all objective conditions of production and had nothing to sell but their labour-power. These wage-labourers constituted 26.2% of the Khoshneshin population, and only 5.7% of the total rural population of Iran in 1960 (see Table XIX). They worked in the farms as well as rural industries. The wage-labourers in Ali-Abad in the neighbourhood of Bojnurd in Khorasan, worked on the farms, mainly because no handicraft industry existed in this village.[22] Contrary to the above case, in Dohesaran, near Ferdows in the same province, the majority of *khoshmeshin* population were engaged in carpet weaving. The working day was as long as 14 hours and the labourers received 15 rials per working day.[23]

In the Caspian sea littoral women participated to a considerable extent in agricultural production. Thus Seidov states that tea plantations mainly employed women and children. In Gilan young women worked in tea plantations belonging to the landlords from 6 o'clock in the morning until 8 o'clock in the afternoon. They collected tea leaves during the working-day and obtained 8 to 10 rials per day.[24] However, in other parts of the country, women and children were mainly engaged in industries. For instance, in Mahan and Jupar in Kirman province, 'They weave carpets, rugs and loosely woven woollen mats (...). Carpet weavers earn a high wage (by local standards). Less talented women work at lesser crafts, spinning wool into yarn, cleaning hair from the down of Kashamir goats, and making woollen hats, stockings and fields.'[25] The use of child

TABLE XIX

Status of *Khoshneshin* Population (1960)

Job Status	*Khoshneshin* Population			*Khoshneshin* Population as % of Total Population
	Total	Male	Female	
Wage-workers	580,050	521,250	58,800	
%	26.2%	45.8%	5.8%	5.7
Owner/operators	330,300	283,200	47,100	
%	14.9%	24.9%	4.3%	3.2
Inactives	1,302,150	331,200	970,950	
%	58.8%	29.1%	90.1%	12.8

Source: The 1960 Census, Tables 321, 322 and 323.

labour was not uncommon, and in fact it played a very important role in the economies of peasant households. In Farak, a village in the neighbourhood of Kashmar in Khorasan province, the poverty of the villagers was such that they were forced to send their children to work on the carpet looms or in the fields. For example, in 1963, a school was founded in Farak, a village in Khorasan, but it soon closed down due to the lack of pupils, because all children had to work in the field or carpet looms.[26]

The second group of the *khoshneshin* population comprised the agents who were in the position of ownership of (non-agricultural) means of production "capital" and ran their own businesses. They constituted 14.9% of the total *khoshneshin* population and 3.2% of the total rural population. These owner/operators can be classified into two groups: those who were engaged in the services, and those who produced different products. The latter category included blacksmiths, carpenters and coppersmiths. These producers supplied the owner/possessors with different

"industrial" products in return for which they received portions of agricultural products each year. The former group included shopkeepers, bath caretakers and barbers. Apart from shopkeepers, the other agents performed their pertinent services in return for a fixed amount of agricultural produce per year. However, the shopkeepers had a different position in relation to the owner/possessors. They were engaged in selling and buying and also exchanging different products with the owner/possessors. In some cases, they provided credit to the latter and in this way as moneylenders they obtained a certain amount of interest.

To summarise, we may say that apart from the landlords and capitalist farmers, we had a differentiated peasantry in rural Iran: rich peasants who owned means of production, possessed/owned land/water, and also were leaders of the *bonehs*; middle peasants who owned means of production sufficient for their own economies, and owned/possessed land/water, but were members of the *bonehs*; and finally poor peasants who had no means of production, possessed/owned land, and had to get off-farm jobs. In addition to these owner/possessors of land/water, there was a group of peasants who had no positions in the ownership/possession of land, i.e. *khoshneshins*. A certain percentage of them worked as agricultural wage-labourers; while the others were involved in non-agricultural production.

The main purpose of chapters seven and eight was to argue that the Iranian peasantry was already differentiated before the implementation of L-R in 1962. Our main concern in the next chapter will be to examine the immediate impact of the land reform programme (hereafter L-R) on the relations of production and social classes in rural Iran.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1. Lublinskaya, 1973, p.369
2. Poulantzas, 1975, p.14
3. Okazaki, 1968, pp.11-12
4. See T.E., August 1965
5. Seidov, 1963, p.112
6. Price, 1950
7. T.E., August 1965, pp.188-89
8. Carchedi, 1975a, p.364
9. T.E., nos. 11&12, Jan. 1967
10. T.E., nos. 13&14, pp.200-02
11. Ibid, pp. 189-90
12. Seidov, 1963, pp.112-13
13. The examples from T.E., nos 15&16, pp.165-66 and 173-74 respectively.
14. Here, we ignore the exceptional cases such as the cultivation of luxury crops, market gardening, industrial crop cultivation, suburban farming etc.
15. See Okazaki, 1969, p.272, and T.E., nos. 11&12.
16. See Table 321 of the 1960 Census.
17. See also Table XVIIIb for the contribution of female population.
18. Okazaki, 1969, pp.275-81
19. Lenin, vol.4, p.137
20. Khoshneshin literally means happy sitter. However, different terms are used to designate these agents of production:' e.g. in central plateau khoshneshin; in Khorasan aftabneshin; in parts of Kurdistan karaneshin; in some Azarbaijan districts gharibeh.' Hooglund 1973, p.241
21. See ibid.
22. T.E., Nov. 1969, pp.179-80
23. Ibid, pp.162-63; for some other examples see Seidov, 1963, p.56.
24. Seidov, 1963, p.56
25. English, 1966, p.82
26. T.E., Nov. 1969, p.157

PART II

CHAPTER IX

Land Reform Implementation and Its Immediate Impact on the Relations of Production in Iran

In January 1962, the Iranian Government launched a form of L-R to *emancipate the peasant from feudal ties and prepare the ground for full-fledged development.*[1] In this chapter, an attempt will be made to examine the causes, implementation and laws of L-R. We shall argue that the L-R was precipitated by the economic and political crisis of the late 1950s. In our examination of the L-R itself, we shall be concerned in this chapter with the immediate socio-economic effects on rural Iran of its implementation and legal structure. Our objective will be to show in which ways the L-R removed the barriers to the development of rural capitalism. We shall begin, however, with a brief discussion of the various conceptions of L-R which have appeared in the literature on this subject. For example, according to Warriner, '... land reform means the redistribution of property or rights in land for the benefit of small farmers and agricultural labourers. This is a narrow definition; it reduces land reform to its simplest element, common to all land reform policies in whatever conditions they may be carried out.'[2] Dorner defines L-R as follows: 'Land reform has an essential core meaning which concerns significant and purposeful changes in land tenure, changes in ownership and control of land and water resources.'[3] Laporte, Petras and Rinehart argue that L-R implies a set of public policies designed to readjust land-tenure arrangements so as to limit landholdings through expropriation or consolidation of landholdings or both; and impose or maximise land utilization, facilitating the application of efficient farming methods to increase productivity.[4] According to these writers conceptions of L-R can be classified into three groups:

1. "mild" reforms involving limited government intervention through some public regulation and assistance;

2. "stronger" reforms short of expropriation, such as rent control or rent reduction etc.;

3. "strongest"reforms that include expropriation programmes either with or without compensation to land-holders and the redistribution of this land to the tillers.[5]

Shanin refers to Warriner's definition of L-R (as a redistribution of land for the benefit of small farmers and agricultural labourers) and states that the scope of L-R is much broader than that of egalitarian land redistribution: L-R '... is on the whole supplemented by corrective measures aimed at improving the efficiency of land allocation, e.g. consolidating some holdings etc. It is also often complemented by the settlement and colonisation of virgin lands.'[6]

Lipton presents his own definition: Land Reform comprises the compulsory take-over of land, usually by the State and from the biggest landowners, and with partial compensation; and the farming of that land in such a way as to spread the benefits of the man-land relationship more widely than before the take-over. He, furthermore, adds that the primary motivation of L-R is to reduce poverty by reducing inequality.[7]

Generally speaking, all the above cited definitions suffer from one common shortcoming: i.e. insufficient attention has been paid to the social relationship, established through land/water between direct-producers on the one hand and non-producers on the other. However, it would appear that this relationship is the crux of the matter in any rural soc ial formation.

There is no doubt that land[8] is the chief means of production in any rural social formation. Further, the agents of production (direct-producers as well as non-producers) dependent upon the dominant mode of production, enter into a specific set of relations of production. It follows that the set of relations of production established through the

land (i.e. landed property) can be considered more important than other types of relations of production established through other means of production. Thus we would define L-R as follows: *Any act at the political level, on the part of the State, which can bring about changes in the relationship (established through land) between direct-producers on the one hand and non-producers on the other.*

Any changes in the relations of production (established through land) necessarily involve the manipulation of the ownership/possession of land such as redistribution and consolidation. Thus, our definition excludes sets of relations to other means of production such as ploughs and seeds. The relationship between direct-producer and non-producer is the core point in our definition of L-R, thus not all changes in the ownership and control of land/water resources are considered as a form of L-R, as in Dorner's definition above. Contrary to Warriner, the manipulation of the ownership/possession of land does not necessarily take place for the benefit of poor farmers and agricultural labourers. However, since distribution relations are produced by the relations of production[9], any changes in the landed property (as a relation of production) will bring about changes in the distribution relation. It follows that, only if poor farmers and agricultural labourers acquire any land, will they be benefited by the L-R. Our analysis of the first and second stages of the Iranian L-R below will show that while some *nasaq*-holders (including poor ones) obtained land in the first stage, the agricultural labourers and some other *nasaq*-holders were denied land in both stages of L-R.

It is always the direct relationship of the owners of means of production to the direct-producers which reveals the basis of any social formation.[10] Thus in relation to a given rural social formation, the question at issue is the impact of L-R on the relations among the agents of production, and not that on the man-land relation as Lipton argues.

In some cases, the implementation of L-R can be considered as an act, on the part of the state, to remove a set of relations of production

(pertinent to a mode of production, e.g. the FMP). In such a case, the state tries, at all levels, to stop the reproduction of the previous set of relations of production and provide the ground for development and reproduction of the new set of relations of production. As will be shown below, L-R in Iran is a remarkable example of this type of reform.

Unlike Lipton, we have dropped the process of implementation of L-R from our definition. This is for the following reasons. First, the technical practices of the implementation of L-R cannot be considered in its core meaning. Secondly, to consider these technical aspects in the definition makes the latter confusing, due to the fact that there have been different practices in different countries.

Unlike some of the above cited studies, we have excluded the supplementary measures (such as provision of credit, fertilizers, improved seeds, market facilities, etc.) from our definition. These measures have usually been taken by governments, after L-R, to reinforce the new set of relations of production. It is within the scope of economic development however, to study the impact of these measures on the relations of production in any given social formation. We shall deal with this point, therefore, when we are examining different aspects of development in the Iranian rural social formation.

Land Reforms: Partial Attempts During the 1940s and 1950s

It would appear that after the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, the Tudeh party was the first organization to advocate the reform of the landowning system. In the autumn 1943, the party in its programme recommended the following reform in landed property:

- buying the lands of large landlords and distribution of these lands and Crown and State lands among the poor and landless peasants, the peasants in return paying the price of lands to the government;

- increasing the shares of those peasants who did not own any land;
- abolishing all forms of labour service and other obligations other than rent.[11]

During the period 1949-53, the party gradually became more radicalized and changed its programmes and slogans. Zabih states that: 'the Party's attitude toward private ownership was also fully revised. The old slogans of land distribution through state compensation to large landlords were dropped in favour of outright confiscation of land and means of agricultural production owned by the royal family, feudal lords, and owners of large properties.'[12]

However, with the exception of some regionsin the northern part of the country, the Tudeh party did not have any influence in the rural areas during the 1940s and 1950s. In addition, the party did not pay sufficient attention to a full-fledged L-R programme. Thus Gharachedaghi rightly states that 'the agrarian reform, although regarded by the Tudeh Party as the most important economic and social project, was unlike its oil policies hardly propagated in public during the oil dispute.'[13]

Democratic Government of Azarbaijan

After the second W.W. an autonomous government led by the Democratic Party came to power in Azarbaijan region for a short period of time, i.e. 1945-46. The government of Democrats was strongly supported by the peasants. According to Ivanov, thousands of Azarbaijani peasants participated in this democratic movement.[14] According to another scholar, '... the peasants - armed, with Soviet help, in Nov. 1945 - by turning against the gendarmerie and by fighting for the banishment of these landlords who were opposed to the autonomists, confirmed the seizure of power by an urban group that had not yet promised - for tactical reasons - to support a land reform.'[15]

During the one-year term of the autonomous rule, the Democrat regime launched a form of L-R which changed the rent system in favour of the

peasantry. With regard to landed property, the autonomous government expropriated state and crown lands and the estates of those landlords who opposed the government. These lands were distributed among the peasants without any compensation. It seems that the distribution was carried out without being passed through the bureaucratic channels of the state apparatus, that is, these estates '... were given to the peasants without surveying or distributing the land and without notarizing the transfer of title deeds.'[16] However, the majority of landlords of this region, on the presupposition of their loyalty to the autonomous government, remained in their positions as landlords. The land distribution covered only 687 out of the total 7050 villages in the region under the control of Democrats.[17] The latter landlords, i.e. those who opposed the regime, were affected by the L-R policy of the Democrats. Labour service and all other obligations were abolished and also the share-cropping system for irrigated as well as unirrigated cultivation was modified in favour of the peasants. However, in many areas of this region, the peasants, contrary to the wishes of the Democrat government, declined to hand over the landlords' shares, while in some other areas they proceeded to divide the land among themselves.[18]

The Democrat regime remained in power no more than a year. Nevertheless, its land reform policy had some consequences. Gharachdaghi states that L-R measures were not sufficiently effective to change at a basic level the legal position of landless peasants in this region.[19] Nevertheless, if this movement did not change the position of landless peasants it weakened the position of the landowning class in Azarbaijan. Thus Lambton writes, '... the position of the landowners vis-a-vis the peasants had been severely weakened by the events which had taken place during the Democrat regime of Pishevari. For some years the payment by the peasants of the landowners' share of the crop had been irregular. A high proportion of landowners were absentee, living outside the region. Many of them were rich and enjoyed considerable incomes from their

estates, but *their influence was of an economic rather than a political nature.*'[20]

L-R measures of Qavam

As already described (see Chapter 5), during 1945-1946, peasants of many areas revolted against their landlords. The riots throughout the country drove the Qavam Cabinet to make some social concessions and issue a government communique on L-R. The Prime Minister ordered the governor of each province to set up committees comprised of representatives of landlords, peasants and the state. The committees were to rearrange share tenancy. In the summer of 1946, the Cabinet announced that the Shah's estates and public domains would be distributed among the peasants. Furthermore in August of the same year a bill was approved, according to which the share of peasants increased by 15%.[21]

The bill was enforced only in some areas. However, it was strongly opposed by the landlords who held a conference in Tehran in the next year. However, the landlords expressed their political power mainly through the *Majli*, where two-thirds of the seats were occupied by their representatives. On the other hand, according to Ivanov, the government sent soldiers and gendarmes to the rural areas to suppress the peasants.[22] Generally speaking, this bill did not bring about any changes in landed property in rural Iran.

Mossadeq's Bill

As already examined, in 1952, once again the Iranian rural social formation witnessed peasants' revolts and the latter drove Dr. Mossadeq's Cabinet to take some measures on behalf of the peasantry.[23] In this part we examine these measures and the effects on rural Iran.

The "L-R" policy of the Mossadeq Cabinet was started by the government communique of May 12, 1952 on distribution of the public domains.

Just a few months later, on August 3, 1952, 'the *Majlis* (...) passed Prime Minister Mossadeq's bill granting him full dictatorial power

for six months.'[24] This bill empowered the Prime Minister to issue two decrees on sixth and eleventh of October of the same year. According to the first decree the landlords had to turn over 20% of the return from their cultivated properties, grasslands, pastures, forests and also from the rent of flour mills, rice mills, shops, ice-house etc. (Article I). Article XVI of the decree provided that Councils at village, District, County and Province levels be set up to enforce collection of the 20% levy. The peasants were to obtain half of the 20% levy imposed on the landlords' shares, while the other half was to go to the development and co-operative funds which were supposed to be set up under the decree (Article I, No. 1).[25]

The second decree, dated October 11, 1952, abolished all feudal obligations including dues in the form of sheep, goats, lambs, clarified butter, fuel and the like. In addition, the decree abolished labour service: 'Article 2 forbade the landlords to force the cultivators to work on his private affairs or to use the peasants' agricultural implements or possessions except with the consent of the peasant or in return for the payment of a just price and wage.'[26]

In theory, the above decrees cannot be considered as full-fledged anti-feudal measures, in spite of the fact that they tried to abolish labour service and other obligations. This is because they (the decrees) did not give any security of tenure to the peasants, and therefore, kept the latter in the subordinated position of having to hand over a portion of produce to the landlords. In addition, no attempt was made to raise the peasants to the position of ownership of land. However, in practice the government did not even launch the above decrees; and in many areas where it had to face peasants' riots, resorted to force to maintain law and order (see Chapter 5).

Generally speaking, the above decrees did not make any change in the relations of production in rural Iran, but brought about the following consequences for Mossadeq's Cabinet: Firstly, it did not manage to get

any support from the peasants. Secondly, the landowning class, frightened by decrees, tightened its alliance with the comprador bourgeoisie. Later on, in August 1953, a *Coup*, which was strongly supported by these two classes, toppled the nationalist government of Dr. Mossadeq. And as we will explain below, the *Coup* government provided the ground for the feudal landlords to reimpose obligations, labour service and feudal rents.

Distribution of Crown Lands

As already stated, Reza Shah during his reign (1925-41) acquired some 2152 villages in different ways. A few days before he abdicated, he transferred them to the new Shah. However, the ownership of these villages was under dispute during the years 1941-53. Thus in June 1942, the new Shah transferred these lands to the State. A few years later in 1949, in accordance with the Shah's desire, the *Majlis* passed a bill to return the Crown lands to the Shah.

However the distribution (i.e. sale) of Crown lands was proclaimed in January, 1951, i.e. a year after the Shah's return from the United States.[27] In order to carry out the distribution and sale of Crown lands a special body was set up called the "Council for the Distribution and Sale of the Pahlavi Crown Lands". This organization had a more or less free hand in the devolution policy and the technical methods to be employed in this process.[28] The distribution actually started on March 16, 1951 in the Crown estates in Varamin in the south of Tehran.

According to the law of distribution of these lands, the available land was to be divided according to the number of eligible peasants in that village. All peasants who cultivated the land in a given village were eligible to obtain land. However, the peasants of neighbouring villages who were prepared to undertake any cultivation, could obtain plots of land. Nevertheless the former group had priority over all other groups. The acquirers of land had to pay off the price of the land in 25 annual interest-free instalments.

The process of distribution of Crown lands took almost eleven years (1951-62), and during these years around 517 villages were distributed among 42,000 peasants.[29] With regard to the relations of production, there is no doubt that the position of these farmers changed, i.e. they were raised to the position of the ownership of land. Apparently, one of the main purposes of undertaking such a limited reform was to create a stratum of peasantry which would support the Court. That is, 'the land distribution programme meant more to the Shah than a mere manifestation of progressiveness. It was a social measure designed to secure his popularity among the rural population, but especially with the politically active urban middle-class that was gathered around the nationalist Mossadeq, the clerical Kashani, and the Tudeh-Party.'[30] However, this attempt embraced only a limited number of Crown estates. 'All had been done except for the distribution of the royal estates in Jiroft, ..., certain forest and pasture tracts without habitation on cultivation were also excluded. Other lands which had not been distributed were those registered in the name of the King and held jointly by the royal land and the public in Mazandaran, Gorgan and Bojnurd.'[31] To sum up, one may state that the distribution of some of the Crown lands had a negligible impact on rural Iran, due to the fact that it embraced only 0.01% of the villages in the country.

Distribution of Public Domain

As already stated, around 2,000 villages throughout the country, belonged to the State. In the late 1940s, an attempt was made to distribute some of these villages, with the aim of fostering peasant proprietorship. This attempt failed, mainly due to the fact that a part of the distributed lands was acquired by merchants and landowners.[32] However, the distribution of Public Domain really started in 1959. In the previous year a bill was passed by the *Majlis* (the lower house) and Senate without being opposed by the landlords' representatives. It

envisaged the distribution of these estates among the peasants cultivating them.

The distribution of the Public Domain, when it was finally finished in 1971, took almost 14 years to complete. In the earlier years, the distribution took place under a special law stated in the bill of 1958. However, when the nation-wide L-R was started in 1962, the law gave the Ministry of Agriculture authority to sell the Public Domain land to villagers not under the special law for the State lands but under the sanction of the later law governing the private lands.[33] We shall examine these laws and regulations below. However, it is worth noting that, by 1971, around 536 wholly and 263 partially-owned villages had been distributed among 90,413 peasant families.[34]

The Nation-Wide Land Reform of 1962: Iran in the Second Half of the 1950s

The above cited attempts at L-R were never nation-wide. Nevertheless, they provided the basis for the nation-wide L-R in 1962. As we shall show below, the latter L-R brought about considerable changes in the relations of production in rural Iran. As the L-R was in part a response to economic and political crises in Iran during the second half of the 1950s, we shall first attempt to explain the nature of the latter crises.

The Economic Situation in Iran after the Coup of 1953

In the late 1950s, Iran still had an economic system in which agriculture was the major sector. Non-oil exports were almost exclusively composed of agricultural products. Of the total population of 18,954,704, in 1956, 54.8% were involved in the agricultural sector, while 19.6% and 23.0% were engaged in industrial and services sectors respectively.[35] This period witnessed a rapid expansion of the industrial sector: the number of factories and repair shops increased more than threefold from 2305 in 1955 to 8234 in 1960. But the number of employees employed by these factories was less than doubled from 82409 in 1955 to 133874 in 1960.[36] There did not exist any form of heavy industry. Apart from

the construction industry, the other factories were solely engaged in producing simple consumer goods such as sugar, vegetable oil, glass, soap, textiles, matches and cigarettes. Textiles, food processing and construction were the main industries in terms of production as well as employment. Although there are no data available to illustrate the share of industrial sector (other than oil) in the GNP, it has been reported that by the end of the Second plan, September 1962, industrial production accounted for 13-14 per cent of domestic production.[37]

The agricultural sector, as the main sector of the economy, embraced around 10.1 million people aged 10 years and over. However, around four million of them were engaged in agricultural production, while five million were economically inactive, and the rest were engaged in non-agricultural production in the rural areas.[38] The main products were wheat, barley, rice, different spices and different varieties of beans. Cash crops such as cotton, tobacco, sugar beet and oil seeds were produced for domestic consumption as well as for exports. Generally speaking, bearing in mind the relations/forces of production in rural Iran and also the types of products one may state that the supply of these products was to a considerable extent inelastic in relation to the quantitative changes in demand. This inelasticity brought about some problems for the country during these years.

The Coup government had two immediate tasks to perform: at the political level the suppression of all opposition groups, and at the economic level restoration of the economy to benefit its supporters, the landlords, comprador bourgeoisie (mainly merchants) and also the new "middle class". The new government totally ignored all anti-feudal decrees issued by Dr. Mossadeq for almost two years. In the summer 1955, a new law was promulgated which favoured the landlords; practically nullifying a 10% increase in the peasants' share of the total produce. In addition, according to Mossadeq's decrees, landlords had to hand over 10% of their income (from agriculture) to the rural councils for development purposes; but the new law reduced this share to 5%. Moreover,

the new law reaffirmed the two main aspects of the feudal relations of production in rural Iran, labour service and insecurity of tenancy. That is to say, the law of 1955, not only ignored the abolition of labour service but also provided the peasantry with no security of tenure.

One year later, in August 1956, the "Law of Social Welfare and Development of Villages" was ratified by the *Majlis*. Like the preceding law, that of 1956 did not make any change in the relations of production. Furthermore, Gharachedaghi, states that, 'no attempt was made here to change the peasant's or the landlords share of the harvest as stipulated in Article 3 of the law of July 1955. It provided for a small change in Mossadeq's planned communal administration.'[39] Apart from the above cited laws, the government did not take any measures to change landed property until 1959. In this year a L-R bill was presented to the *Majlis* and Senate. As will be explained below, the bill was eventually passed by the houses although it was ill-conceived and badly drafted.

In spite of the backwardness of the agricultural and industrial sectors, the government's activities were mainly oriented towards the expansion of foreign trade, of the services sector and the infrastructure network of the country. The rapid expansion of the services sector and the infrastructure was possible only after 1954, that is, since the time the government received oil revenues and substantial amounts of domestic and foreign borrowing on a growing scale.

During 1954-60 the government had a form of "open door" import policy. Apparently, consumer goods constituted the main item in the import bill.[40] Due to the inelasticity of the supply of consumer goods, the country had to import all varieties of foodstuffs as well as luxury goods to satisfy domestic demands. Capital and intermediate goods were imported but on a considerably smaller scale than were consumer goods.

Agricultural exports consisted of raisins, dried apricot, dried prunes, dates, walnuts, almonds, pistachios, cotton and carpets. However, the main export item was oil. On the question of the limited potential

of the Iranian non-oil exports Baldwin writes: 'the quality of Iran's citrus is too low to find a place in international markets... High internal transport costs combined with high production costs (reflecting low yields) make it unrealistic to look for any significant widening of fresh fruits exports for many years... For dried fruits the main problem is not production but proper processing, grinding, packaging and market-promotion.'[41]

Despite the fact that oil production and therefore its export were growing rapidly during the second half of the 1950s, imports expanded much faster than the total exports. Obviously the gap had to be filled in one way or another. Baldwin distinguished three ways of covering the deficits in the balance of payments (due to trade deficits and repayments of foreign loans). They include: a) drawing on reserves of foreign exchange or gold which were accumulated in earlier years, b) obtaining gifts of foreign exchange, and c) going into debt. He adds that, 'since Iran began the post-Mossadeq period with no reserves of exchange or gold, it has had to rely heavily on foreign aid and foreign loans.'[42] In short, liberal trade policy and also needs for funds for development projects drove the country into debt. The Table XX below clearly supports this.

During the second seven-year Plan (1955-62) the government mainly concentrated on the construction of roads, dams, airports and railways. Obviously these projects significantly increased the purchasing power of the economy without simultaneously resulting in a proportionate increase in domestic production. The expansion of the banking system was also strongly encouraged by the government. Thus between 1956 and 1960, fifteen new banks were established. In addition to the above developmental projects and current expenditures, defence expenditures were a heavy burden on the shoulder of the government. On average, defence and police expenditures constituted around 40% of the budget. These expenditures appeared to be main cause of deficit in the budget,

TABLE XX

Iran's Balance of Payments for Eight Years, Beginning in 1954 (million $)

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
A. Imports	138.2	206.7	229.6	280.2	370.7	440.5	473.7	484.1
B. Exports (non-oil)	108.3	82.1	89.6	98.4	86.3	96.8	95.7	106.0
Trade deficit	29.9	124.6	140.0	181.8	284.4	343.7	378.0	378.1
C. Other foreign exchange payments	7.5	43.3	70.1	84.4	88.1	89.9	79.5	70.6
D. Trade deficit plus other nondebt payments	37.4	167.9	210.o	266.2	372.5	433.6	457.5	448.7
E. Oil earnings	30.4	126.5	180.7	256.0	340.0	319.1	335.5	355.7
F. Foreign exchange deficit from earnings (D-E)	7.0	41.4	29.4	10.2	32.5	114.5	122.0	93.0
G. Debt repayments (Govt. loans only)	-	8.8	3.2	-	77.2	39.8	53.3	29.6
H. "Earned" exchange deficit plus debt repayments (F+G)	7.0	50.2	32.6	10.2	109.7	154.3	175.3	132.6
I. Foreign aid and loans	50.0	71.8	86.8	116.5	57.2	80.0	91.8	76.2
J. Increase (-decrease) in reserves	43.0	21.6	54.2	106.3	-52.5	-74.3	-83.5	-66.4

Source: Balwin, 1967.

especially after the Coup in Iraq in 1958, which caused the government to feel more insecure internally than before. Thus, according to the Economist, '... after the Iraq revolution in 1958, it was decided to spend a lot more money on the army and the security forces, ... The army and internal security, have been costing about £65 million a year - excluding the military hardware given by the Americans - and the Plan has been costing about £50 million a year.'[43] It is noteworthy that American military aid to Iran did not help to cover the budget deficits: 'the greatly expanded Army is costly and so a serious drain on the budget, but American aid is not designed to bridge the budget deficit. American advisors are numerous and highly paid, ...'[44]

There were three sources to cover the budget deficits. They included: diverting certain amounts of oil revenues from the Plan Organization budget to the government's ordinary budget; borrowing from the banks within the country; and finally, borrowing from other countries, international banks etc. Monetization of earned foreign exchange and oil revenues, liberal credit policy and also spending on non-productive projects caused an increase of 88% in the money supply. The real annual rate of growth of GNP was around 6% during 1956-1960.[45]

The economic policy of the Iranian government brought about a form of "*prosperity*" for over two years, i.e. 1957-1959. Thus, thanks to the massive imports of foodstuffs and luxury goods, the general index of wholesale prices rose by only 9%; however, the wholesale price index of home-produced and also services increased at a much higher rate than the general index.[46] In addition, the state's policy did not induce the private sector to invest in productive activities, rather it diverted private investors into land and real estate speculation, trade and banking.

However, the "prosperous economy" turned into an "inflationary economy" after 1959. The cost of living index rose by 26.5% during 1959-60.[47] For the salaried and wage-earner groups in the urban centres (especially in Tehran), skyrocketing land values and exorbitant rents

constituted the largest burden.[48] Shortage of foodstuffs became severe during these years due to abnormally sparse rainfall. This crisis in the rural areas caused a mass migration of peasants to the urban centres. According to a report '... substantial numbers of peasants leave their villages for the main towns where there are more jobs and higher wages. But the young industries cannot absorb so much unskilled labour.'[49]

The young industries were affected by the government's trade and credit policies in two different ways: On the one hand, these policies did not create any motivation for investing in industries (other than the construction industry), while on the other hand, many domestic producers could not compete with the imported goods. In effect, the latter factor brought about stagnation and in some cases bankruptcy for the young industries. For example in January 1960, owners of the Iranian textile industries, in a letter to the Prime Minister, wrote how "the Iranian textile factories were in a bad condition and situated in the border of bankruptcy". They demanded some measures to be taken to protect home industries, to ban the exports of cotton and imports of cloths.[50]

Finally the government was faced with another serious problem: shortage of foreign exchange. On the one hand, in the previous years, different ministries and government agencies borrowed directly without any co-ordination at the national level. It created, therefore, repayment problems, when 'it became clear that much of the uncontrolled borrowing consisted of medium-term suppliers' credits that would require heavily bunched debt repayments over the next few years.'[51] On the other hand, the IMF and World Bank supported by the United States, refused to provide further loans. More loans would be provided if the Iranian government adopted a program of economic stabilization.

Being faced with these problems, Dr. Eqbal, the Prime Minister, attempt to make some reforms and at the same time stabilize his own government. In connection with the anti-corruption Bill, in late 1959, the government sent a L-R bill to the *Majlis*. The L-R bill was ill-

conceived and badly drafted, and remained a dead letter. Meanwhile, riots began to appear in Tehran and some other cities.

In the summer of 1960 the general elections to the *Majlis* were held which could have saved Eqbal's cabinet. All members of different groups and parties affiliated to the National Front were banned from standing as candidates. Nevertheless, the elections were to be fought on a party basis. There were a few independent candidates but the contestants belonged in the main to either the *Milliyun* Party[52] or to the *Mardum* Party.[53] The elections were so flagrantly dishonest, that at his monthly press conference, the Shah'admitted that he was disappointed with conduct of the recent elections to the *Majlis*, ... They had not, he affirmed, been truly free or democratic, ...'[54] The Prime Minister, Dr. Eqbal, had to resign on August 28, 1960, due to the Shah's charges as well as the continuing demonstrations and protests of the opposition groups. The day after, Dr. Sharif-Emami was appointed Prime Minister.

The new Prime Minister more or less continued the policy of Dr. Eqbal, hence he did not manage to sort out the economic and political crisis. In February, 1961, the elections to the *Majlis* were reheld. Comparing the new elections to the previous attempts, the correspondent of "The Economist" reported: 'The first elections, in August (1960), were so fragrantly dishonest and so loudly criticised that a second attempt was made early this year (i.e. 1961); this time there was less criticism but, apparently, not much less cheating.'[55] The Prime Minister tried to enforce a mild austerity programme, but he failed. Finally, after nine months in office, he had to resign on May 5, 1961, because 'in its (Sharif-Emami's government) last weeks it was harassed by strikes, first of university students and then of teachers. When a teacher was killed during a clash with the police on May 2nd, the rumbling against the government became dangerous, and the Shah, ... has acted with the cool initiative that he has shown in previous crises.'[56] On the same day, the Shah, despite his reluctance, appointed Dr. Ali Amini as Prime Minister.

The economic and monetary crisis absorbed much of the new Prime Minister's effort in the first two months. Three days after his appointment in a broadcast to the nation, he disclosed that 'the treasury is facing a shortage of money, mainly because of "past excess and large scale corruption in Government expenditures". He spoke of measures to fight corruption and the need for austerity as the answer.'[57] On May 11, he announced a 15-point Government programme, including land reform, cuts in state spending, a lowering of the cost of living and anti-corruption measures. 'Under the new programme, prices will be lowered and imports and exports balanced. Unnecessary and luxury imports will be stopped. The Government will be decentralized, and provinces will be given greater autonomy. Land ownership will be limited and big estates split among the peasants. Farming methods and the tax collecting system will be improved.'[58]

The *Majlis* and Senate were dominated by the representatives of the feudal landlords, who blocked any form of L-R. The remarkable example is the nullification of the L-R bill of 1960. The bill was presented to both houses on December 5, 1959 by the Eqbal Cabinet. After six months' struggle in the *Majlis* and Senate between representatives of the Government and the proper committees, the bill was eventually passed although it was ill-conceived and badly drafted.[59] Having been aware of this obstacle Dr. Amini made the dissolution of both houses a pre-condition to any reform.[60] Thus, on May 9, 1961, the Shah dissolved both the *Majlis* and Senate by special decree on the grounds that 'no obstacle should hinder the strong Government appointed to institute fundamental reforms and ... without amendment of the electoral law a properly elected *Majlis* is impossible.'[61] During the absence of the houses, the country was to be ruled by decree. This move gave Amini's Cabinet a free hand, among other things, to make amendments to the laws of L-R of 1960. In the meantime, the Cabinet started preparing the technical foundations for launching L-R. Hence on October 5, 1961, a small and carefully chosen team of officials were sent to the Maragheh area to carry out a land

survey.[62]

However, the dissolution of both houses did not mean that the opposition groups gave in. In fact the opposition was composed of different groups, each with a different social status. Generally speaking, one can distinguish the following three opposition groups: the Tudeh Party, the National Front, and the most important of all, the landowning class. Here we shall explain the disputes each of them had with the Government.

With regard to the Tudeh Party, the land programme of 1952 (see above) was reaffirmed in October 1960 by the first plenum of the Central Committee.[63] However, the government's general orientation, after the *Coup*, was to ensure internal security for the regime. In order to do this, all organizations, affiliated to this party, were suppressed and many of its leaders and militant cadres imprisoned or executed.[64] The execution or imprisonment of many Tudeh Party members and the flight of some others resulted in the almost total annihilation of the party within the country. The party's slogans and propaganda, therefore, could not have been effective in mobilizing the peasantry against the regime. Yet the party feared that the success of L-R program would strengthen the regime and make the peasantry less receptive to its propaganda. According to the party, the L-R program was '... a trick of the Shah, backed by the Western imperialists to fool the Iranian public and to postpone the day of reckoning.'[65]

The National Front was a loose composition of various "nationalist parties". The latter were supported mainly by merchants, the petty bourgeoisie (producers and non-producers), the intelligentsia, students and also state employees. After the *Coup* in 1953, all National Front parties were suppressed and banned from having any form of political activities. However, by 1959-60, the National Front restarted its political activities, mainly due to the economic and political instability of the regime.[66]

The National Front's protests during 1959-62, appeared mainly in the form of demonstrations on the part of teachers and university students. During this whole period, the front insisted on the holding of general elections. The Economist's correspondent, in February, 1962, reported that, 'a policy of economic austerity and the dragging of government feet in bringing the corrupt to justice (...) sharpen the quarrel, *but the real issue is over elections.*'[67] The front hoped to gain power by winning *Majlis* seats. The Amini government was considered by the front to be unconstitutional. The leaders of the front declared that 'although the Shah's decree dissolving the chamber waiver this clause in the constitution, ... (they) do not recognise the validity of the waiver, and that from June 19th they will regard Dr. Amini's government as being a breach of the law.'[68] Furthermore, the front in one statement strongly protested against running the country's affairs by decree: 'Warning is given that the instructions issued from His Imperial Majesty's Bureau concerning the enactment and modification of laws without Parliamentary approval cannot be considered in the best interests of the Throne and must be deemed contrary to the clear purport of the Fundamental Law...'[69]

Generally speaking, the National Front kept demanding general elections, without proposing any program for social reforms. This made the front not only vulnerable to the manoeuvre of Dr. Amini in the political scene, but also resulted in their losing some of their supporters. The Prime Minister first promised to hold general elections in six months time. He also promised the front leaders that they would be allowed to participate in the next elections. Thus on May 18, 1961, Dr. Amini allowed the opposition National Front Party to assemble to register their demands for immediate elections.[70] In his meeting with the front leaders in June 1961, the Prime Minister managed to convince the leaders that if his government was brought down by their agitations, it would inevitably lead to a military dictatorship with the Shah at the head of the Army, helped by a strong body of military advisors.[71] On the other hand, the

Government, while fighting on the other fronts, managed to lessen the pressure from the National Front. However, later on, i.e. when the Government was more or less stabilized, the Prime Minister attacked the front leaders and ordered the suppression of demonstrations and arrested front members. He declined to hold elections and justified this by saying that elections held at the wrong time and in the wrong circumstances were a source of trouble. It was essential first to create the right atmosphere. This might take another six months or even longer. By the right atmosphere, Dr. Amini explained, he meant a situation wherein corruption had been further discouraged, the country's economy had further improved, and a fresh start had been made in L-R.[72] It is worth saying that the Amini Cabinet, by announcing some other social reforms, such as a campaign against illiteracy, managed to obtain some support from the intelligentsia (especially teachers and students). This obviously made the position of the front *vis-a-vis* the Prime Minister weaker.

Broadly speaking, the opposition of the National Front could not pose a serious problem for the reform Cabinet due to the following reasons. The front was not a solid and organized party; being threatened by a right-wing *coup*, they had to some extent to support Dr. Amini; and finally the front did not have any program for social reforms and therefore it not only lost some of its supporters, but also failed to get the support of the peasants and workers.

The opposition mainly came from the landowning class which had influence in the Parliament, Army and the Clergy. The landowning class opposed the L-R programme simply because it would undermine its politico-economic position as one of the dominant classes. The landlords tried to block the programme in one way or another during the whole of the period from 1959 (in the *Majlis*) up to 1963 (the second stage of L-R). As the *Majlis* and Senate were dominated by the representatives of the landowning class, any attempt at any form of L-R would not have been ratified by both houses. Bearing in mind this obstacle, the Cabinets

of Dr. Eqbal and Sharif-Emami, by holding two general elections, tried to have selected representatives of their own in both houses. However, both of these attempts, as we saw, failed. Having been aware of these attempts, Dr. Amini accepted the premiership, provided the *Majlis* and Senate be dissolved. As a matter of fact, the dissolution of the houses was the first attempt to block the power of the landowning class.

The second major step was to dismiss the anti-government elements within the Army. Although the Shah was in control of the Army by that time, there were some top rank generals who, explicitly or tacitly, disagreed with the reforms of the Government. Dr. Amini's anti corruption decree was, in effect, used mainly to remove these generals from their posts. The correspondent of the Economist reported that 'there was considerable effervescence in the Army because five generals were arrested without similar action being taken against civilian or equivalent rank.'[73] During 1961-62, as many as 33 generals and 270 colonels were retired.[74] However, a few of these generals were arrested on a charge of corruption. The dismissal of generals, naturally, created some restlessness within the Army, and increased rumours of a possible *coup* against the Government. Hence when the Shah returned home on May 31, 1961 from his European tour, the Prime Minister had a three-hour talk with him '... during which, it is understood, he gave a full account of recent rumours alleging a plot against the Government or a possible *Coup d'etat*.'[75] It is worth stating that the rumours of a *coup* were mainly against Amini's government rather than against the Shah. However, they died out 'after Dr. Amini said that there was no need for a military *coup* in order to oust him from the office. "I shall go any time His Imperial Majesty relieves me," he said.'[76]

The dismissal of the opposition element was carried out during Amini's premiership. However, the Shah-Amini clique took full control of the army, only when General Bakhtiar, the former chief of SAVAK who had close

links with the landlords and Bakhtiari tribes, was sacked and sent out of the country in January, 1962.

With dissolution of the houses of Parliament and also dismissal of generals, the opposition of the landowning class, was reduced practically to a few isolated cases of individual attempts. But they were shortlived. Some major landlords proposed different forms of resistance to the work of the L-R officials. When the land distribution started, for the first time in Maragheh, 'a landlord expelled peasants from their houses in his village and destroyed the houses ... In another village, four squatters who had received many favours from the landlords, started an anti-land reform demonstration on his behest... In a third village, the son of the landlord threw peasants out of the village and sexually attacked their wives and daughters.'[77] In some other cases, some landlords tried to bribe the L-R officials/or threatened them not to come in their villages. Generally speaking, the landlords as a class never rebelled against the Government, and their attempts at the political level failed. That is to say, 'an attempt to re-establish the landlords' Association, which had so effectively blocked the reforms of 1946 and 1960, was countered by a warning to its leadership that prompt action would be taken against it if there were any attempt to interfere in the operation of the land reform.'[78] Dr. Arsanjani, Minister of Agriculture, threatened that he would persuade the peasants to rebel against their landlords, if the latter tried to block the activities of land distribution. Later on, i.e. in Summer 1963, the Minister of Agriculture arranged the "*Farmers' Congress*" in Tehran to demonstrate the solidarity of the peasants behind his programme. Having failed to block the progress of the L-R implementation, the landlords mainly resorted to evade the L-R laws in different ways. As will be explained below, each landlord could hold one *village*. Hence, a common method of evading the laws, was to hold up the choice of the "chosen" village in the hope of obtaining revenue from two villages for a short period of time. The second method was to antedate the transfer of

estates to family members. Finally, since the mechanized lands were exempted from the distribution, some other landlords forced the peasants to sell their right of use of land, i.e. *nasaq*, and declared that their estates were mechanized and worked by agricultural wage-labourers.[79]

If the feudal landlords did not undertake any form of armed resistance, some tribal leaders in the province of Fars, unsuccessfully, tried to block the land distribution by armed resistance. The Qashqai, Mamasani, Sorkhi, and the Boyer Ahmadi tribes were involved in the clashes. Their opposition began to appear in the late 1962, when a land reform official was killed allegedly in the course of his work for the L-R Organization. The incident provided the Government with an opportunity to take some stronger measures against these rebellion leaders. Martial law was declared and a hard line general was appointed as Governor-General of the province. In early 1963, the Gendarmerie was reinforced by the Army. The rebellious tribes were encircled by the armed forces and attacked from the air. On the other hand, the L-R law was made applicable to the whole of the Fars province and the Government announced that the estates of the rebellious tribal leaders would be distributed among the peasants without any compensation.

During 1963, some clashes occurred between the Army and armed tribes, and some '... casualties occurred on both sides but most tribal leaders were finally brought to terms and agreed to go along with the government's programme.'[80] However, the backbone of the armed resistance by the above tribes was broken when in June 1963, the leader of the Mamasani tribe was killed.[81]

The other group which strongly opposed to the L-R programme (and also other reform programmes of the Government) was the clergy. As already shown, there were around 6,000 villages endowed to the holy shrines and mosques. The organization in charge of running these estates (and some other properties), the *Vaqf* Organization, was under the control of the religious leaders. Obviously, any programme for L-R and secularization

of the populace meant to them the loss of their economic as well as political influence. That is why, during 1959-63, they strongly opposed any reform by the government. The religious leaders, backed by the landlords and merchants and the petty bourgeoisie (in the bazaar), neutralized the L-R bill of 1960.

Having been aware of the anti-reform tendencies of the religious leaders, the Government decided, for time being, to exclude the *Vaqf* lands from the distribution in the first stage of L-R of 1962. This policy silenced the religious leaders, more or less, during the implementation of the first stage and the announcement of the second stage.

On December 11, 1962, in the holy city of Mashhad, the Shah for the first time disclosed that the *Vaqf* lands were due to be let to the peasants. On January 22, 1963, the Prime Minister, Mr. Alam, informed one of the influential religious leaders, the Government's intention to rent out on long term leases *Vaqf* lands to the peasants working on them. 'On the same day, after a number of the religious classes had gone to Ayatyllah Bihbahani's house, apparently to protest against the inclusion of *vaqf* land in the land reform law, the Tehran bazaar was closed...'[82] In the same month, Ayatyllah Bihbahani replied to the Prime Minister that he could not remain silent over the question of *vaqf* lands.[83]

The religious leaders protested about the L-R, on the ground that L-R was contrary to Islam, which guaranteed the santity of private property. On the other hand, the officials referred to Article 90 of Civil code under which "endowed lands can always be changed for the better", i.e. sold for cash. By resorting to the article, the Minister of Agriculture appointed teams for collecting information and working on an experimental basis in one or two religious endowed villages.

Following the Government's announcement on distributing *vaqf* lands riots broke out in the first months of 1963 in some of the cities, including Qum, Shiraz, Mashhad, Tabriz and Tehran. The main incident were three-day riots in Tehran, Qum and Shiraz. The followers of

ayatullahs took to the streets and protested against the L-R and the right for the women to vote. These riots were ruthlessly suppressed by the security forces.

The Government, determined to carry on with its programmes, showed its strength not only by the security forces, but also by its supporters (peasants in particular). Thus the Economist correspondent reported that 'peasants and workers were solidly behind the referendum ... *peasants, bent on becoming owners of their own land, were unimpressed by Koran quotations dug up to prove that land reform violated the tenets of Islam.* The Mullahs made no headway, and the Shah drove the point home by appearing in the religious city of Qum two days before the referendum to distribute land to peasants in the area.'[84] In spite of this sort of manoeuvre and the Government's announcement on distributing *vaqf*-lands, the Government was too cautious to touch these lands. Thus nine months after the beginning of the second stage of L-R, the Correspondent of the *Times* reported from the holy city of Mashhad that '... a state of watchfulness has set in between Government and Clergy. The properties and revenues of the Church (i.e. *Vaqf* Organization) have not been touched yet by land reform, and the decision whether or when they will be is being tacitly put off by both sides. Lieutenant-General Amir Azizi, the Governor-General of Khorasan, ..., says Church property will in the end be affected, Ayatullah Kafai Khorasani, who at present leads the mullahs there, says it will not.'[85]

Finally, on the power struggle between the Government (supported by some urban groups) and the opposition (including all groups mentioned above) we should draw the reader's attention to the enthusiasm of the peasants for land which heartened the officials during the first years of the implementation of L-R. In accordance with the massive propaganda done by the Government, the peasants of different regions started buying transistor radio sets. This helped the peasants to grow more restless.

Thus after the L-R began in some villages, the landlords, fearing getting killed, did not dare go to their villages. For example, the peasants of Koleh-Jub' Olya, at the first withheld payment of rent, but the owner managed to get his share by force. However, in the following year, i.e. 1964, the landlord, afraid to go himself, sent his brother to the village to collect the rent.[86] In many other villages (especially in Azarbaijan region), the peasants simply refused to hand over the landlords' share. When the land reform officials remonstrated with them, they merely answered "the Shah says that the land is ours and that we should not pay the landowners' share", and refused to listen to anything to the contrary.[87]

In spite of the fact that in some provinces, such as Kirman, Fars, in which peasants did not show their anti-landlord feelings (e.g. see Lambton 1969, pp. 147-49), the peasants generally showed their hatred of the landlords to such an extent that on one occasion the Minister of Agriculture, Dr. Arsanjani, said: 'When we started, landlords would not allow our officials in their villages, but *most of the landlords have to be protected by our officials when entering their own villages against possible peasnat attacks.*'[88] Having been heartened by such a mass support, Dr. Arsanjani replied to the opposition within the Cabinet (i.e. Ministers of War and the Interior), by stating that: 'I don't need the landlords. I don't need the Ministry of the Interior. I don't need the gendarmerie. It is the peasants that will make land-reform successful.'[89] However, as we shall discuss below, the peasants' enthusiasm for land caused a headache for the Government which wanted a limited L-R.

What were the causes of L-R in Iran? According to one study the main cause of the reform in Iran, was the contradiction between feudal landlords (as one of the dominant classes) and imperialism (and its internal ally the comprador bourgeoisie): 'the land reform can only be adequately analysed within the context of changes which were taking place in the system of world imperialism as a whole.'[90] In order to expand the interests of neo-colonialism in Iran and also to enable Iran to play its role in world imperialism, it was

necessary to get rid of feudalism in the country. The contradiction between world imperialism and feudalism (in Iran) arose mainly for the following reasons:

a) in a feudal social formation, the overwhelming majority of the labour force is engaged in agriculture, whereas imperialism requires more and more the labour force for work on assembly lines;

b) consumption in a feudal social formation is confined to localized production and also money transactions are limited, therefore imperialist products have no place in the markets of this system;

c) the feudal system is not market-oriented and produces mainly for local (village) consumption, hence the system is not able to provide imperialism with raw materials;

d) with the dominance of the FMP in the rural social formation, it is extremely difficult for imperialism to invest in agriculture.[91]

The above argument suffers from one major inadequacy, i.e. the economic reasons for L-R are *explained at a highly abstract level.* In addition, while in this "abstract model" imperialism, as an external factor plays the major role, the internal factors play no role at all.

However, with regard to Iran, the following comments should be made. First, the FMP was not the only mode of production in rural Iran (as implied in the above model); in effect we have argued that an articulated combination of different modes of production was dominant in rural Iran. The peasants were not tied to the land, and hence the industrial and service sectors could have been supplied with cheap labour. (As a matter of fact, rural-urban migrations took place during the second half of the 1950s.) Secondly, commodities (and not necessarily imperialists' products) had already penetrated into the rural markets. Hence, the fact that the market for consumer commodities was extremely limited, was something mainly due to the abject poverty of the masses of the peasantry and not to the feudal system as considered in the model. Furthermore, in the model it is implied that the implementation of L-R (and therefore

the removal of the feudal system) would automatically expand the market for consumer commodities (or using their own terms: imperialists' products). Bearing in mind however that the masses of the peasantry lived under/or at the subsistence level, one cannot expect that L-R would cause the demands of these masses for "Imperialist's products" to be increased. Finally, our argument, quite clearly, showed that the Iranian rural social formation was open to the "*Prussian way of capitalist development*". This means that not only indigeneous capitalists and feudal landlords, but also foreign investors could invest in the agricultural sector. In effect this process had already started, but L-R only accelerated it. In short, although the contradiction between the feudal landlords and comprador bourgeoisie ("imperialism") was one of the main causes of the implementation of L-R in Iran, the economic reasons for this contradiction given by the G.O.P.F. seem unrealistic.

For Ivanov the struggle between the peasants on the one hand and feudal landlords on the other, drove the Government to take some anti-feudal measures. A few years after the suppression of all democratic movements by the *Coup* government in 1953, peasants' revolts took place sporadically. However, by 1960, these "anti-feudal" revolts occurred to a larger extent (for the examples see Ivanov 1977, pp. 209-10). Ivanov refers to a statement of Dr. Amini, who addressed the landlords and said: "You should yourselves agree with the distribution of your estates, otherwise you would lose your lands as well as your lives", and states that the L-R of 1962 was mainly to block the expansion of these revolts.[92]

Although the peasants' revolts can be considered as the main reason for undertaking a L-R, Ivanov's argument suffers from the following inadequacies. First, in spite of the fact that Ivanov provides us with some examples of revolts in different parts of the country, these examples do not mirror the scale of these revolts. In addition, Ivanov does not explain whether or not these movements were organized. It

appears that these revolts were far from being a *national peasant uprising*, that is, they took place at the village or local level. Moreover, these movements were spontaneous and inspired by no (left-wing) political organization. We believe that the above cited statements by the officials cannot be considered as firm evidence for showing the scale and nature of these movements.

In order to find reasons for the nation-wide L-R of 1962, it appears that one should look for a combination of different contradictions existing between different social classes and strata in the Iranian social formation. The economic crisis of 1959-61 affected all subsectors of the economy: trade, industry agriculture as well as the state budget. The economic crisis brought about a political instability in the country. Thus demonstrations, riots, strikes and peasants revolts occurred now and again throughout the country. In addition there were signs of restlessness within the Army, upon which the ruling clique (the Court - the Cabinet) was dependent.[93] At the same time, the Kennedy Administration urged the Iranian government to carry out necessary reforms in order to stave off popular unrest.[94] This conjuncture weakened the position of the ruling clique. It made an attempt to take some measures (e.g. L-R of 1960), but failed due to the opposition of landowning class within the *Majlis* and Senate. While the economic and political crisis continued to become worse, the Court-Government tried to remove the opposition within the houses of Parliament (general elections of 1960) but once again it failed. At this conjuncture, we witnessed a split in the clique: thus the Shah, for the time being, dismissed the Cabinet, and despite his reluctance asked Dr. Amini and Dr. Arsanjani to undertake some social reforms. This shortlived alliance between the Court and Amini/Arsanjani made the position of both cliques stronger *vis-a-vis* the heterogeneous opposition groups. The alliance of Court-Amini/Arsanjani prepared the ground for reforms: at the political level by the dissolution of the *Majlis* and Senate and the removal of powerful generals in the Army, and at the

economic level by controlling imports and state expenditures, borrowing loans from abroad and preparing the ground for the Third Development Plan.

But why did they undertake (anti-feudal) L-R measures? The combination of the following factors may be considered as the reasons for the implementation of L-R in Iran: discouragement of rural-urban mass migration; the staving off of peasant's unrest (although it was as yet limited); removal of obstacles to the development of CMP in the agricultural sector; hence encouragement of investment in this sector; reinforcing the social base of the ruling clique by obtaining the support of the peasantry and petty bourgeouisie.

In such an economic and political crisis and after preparing the necessary regulations for the execution of L-R, the council of L-R was formed, under the chairmanship of the ministry of agriculture, to supervise the implementation of L-R. It was put into operation in Maragheh, an area in Azarbaijan, allegedly on the ground that '... it is the worst area in the country, because its landlords are of the type who flogged their peasants... If we can prove that land reform will work in Maragheh, then we have proved that it will work anywhere else...'[95]

Land Reform Laws : An Interpretation

In the previous part, we briefly examined the economic and political situation in Iran before the implementation of L-R of 1962. Then we discussed the opposition of different groups to the nation-wide L-R. In this part we shall examine the L-R laws in order to discover the nature of this L-R.

In Iran the nation-wide L-R was carried out in three main stages, each of which had different content and aims. In this part an attempt is to be made to analyse the main items of the L-R laws of the first and second stages. The purpose of this form of analysis is to discover the effect of L-R on the social formation and in particular whether or not it had transitional purposes.

Generally speaking, it appears that the laws of L-R can be classified into two different sets. While one set is pertinent to the technical aspects of the implementation of the laws, such as compensation or the expropriation of land, the assessment of the lands, and the financing of the L-R programme, the other set is related to landed property, such as laws concerning the redistribution of land and water. The former aspects of the L-R have already been examined by many scholars in detail (see for example Lampton 1969, Shams-Zanjani 1973, T.E. Vol. II, Nos. 7 and 8, U.N. 1966, and Denman 1973);here we are concerned with the social aspects of the L-R.

Land Reform : The first stage

The first stage was, generally speaking, an anti-feudal landlord L-R. It reduced the maximum land ownership thus:

> The maximum landownership allowed to a person in any part of the country is an entire (six-*dang*)[96] village. Landlords with more than one village may choose one of their villages to keep themselves. The remainder will be distributed in accordance with the provisions of this act. (Article 2)

Obviously, the option to choose a six-*dang* village (or its equivalent of six *dangs*) gave the opportunity to the landlords to choose the best and most fertile villages/or parts for themselves.[97] Furthermore, the political pressure from the landlords forced the government to give another concession to them (see below).

Under Article 6 of the 1962 Laws, the following lands were subject to distribution:

a) Village lands which become surplus as a result of enforcement of Articles 2 and 3 of this Act, whether or not such lands have been the subject of application for registration by the landlord.
b) Barren lands.
c) Uncultivated lands.

Thus, the enforcement of Articles 2, 3 and 6, caused the landlords, owning

more than six-*dangs* of the above lands, to lose their positions of ownership.

The above lands were to be transferred to the qualified direct-producers. That is to say:

> The lands of a village will be divided according to the agricultural order and farming pattern of the village: and will be jointly transferred to the farmers. Should the Land Reform Organization deem it necessary, the land of the village will be surveyed and will be allocated to the farmers in accordance with the agricultural pattern and farming order that already exist. (Article 17)

This article, in fact, sanctioned and reinforced the agricultural pattern and farming order in any village social formation subject to distribution. Therefore not all direct-producers were eligible to obtain land. The following priority was given in the distribution of lands:

a) The peasants of the village who worked on the same land and who live in the same village.[98]
b) The heirs of peasants who have worked on the same land, but who died within twelve months prior to the distribution of the land.
c) Share-croppers who farm in the same village.[99]
d) Agricultural workers living in the area.
e) Persons volunteering for agricultural work.

Through the above article the differentiation of the peasantry was sanctioned and reinforced. That is to say, the *nasaq*-holders with means of production (i.e. rich peasants) had the top priority to obtain land, while the *nasaq*-holders without means of production (poor peasants) came next, and the agricultural-workers retained their position.[100] Thus, while the peasants of different strata retained the "old relationship" among themselves, they managed to get rid of the feudal subordination.

Lambton states that there were practical reasons for transferring the land to the *nasaq*-holders. First, 'to have included agricultural labourers in the distribution would have involved a change in the field lay-out of the village lands, and some degree of survey and measurement.

This would have involved delay and imposed an additional burden on the officials of the land reform organization;... A second reason militating against transfer to the agricultural labourers was that they did not have the means to cultivate the land; and to have required the co-operative societies at the outset of the reform to provide them with draught oxen, agricultural implements, and seeds would have placed an additional burden upon these societies.'[101] It appears however that the above practical reasons are not as important as the economic and political reasons. The L-R law of 1962, included, in fact, a set of anti-feudal measures, while at the same time it tried to sanction and reinforce the bourgeois relations of production already developed among the peasantry. It was an act, at the political level, to develop the peasant bourgeoisie. That is why the law not only excluded the agricultural labourers, but also gave small plots to the masses of the poor peasants (i.e. *nasaq*-holders with no means of production) to tie them to the land as the main source of labour-power for the rich peasants. Neither was the law an attempt to equalize the landownership among the peasantry; hence the rich peasants obtained more land than the poor peasants, while the agricultural labourers acquired no land at all.

The Act, furthermore, took some strong measures to protect peasants against the landlords. Thus at the economic level, according to Article 17, Note 1, irrigated land was to be transferred to the *nasaq*-holders together with the water right from *qanat* and river belonging to it according to local custom. According to Article 20, also the landlords were responsible for the supply of water; hence it was their duty to pay for the maintenance, repair cleaning, and all such work necessary to ensure the continued and uninterrupted flow of water in the *qanats* or water well. In addition, in places where water-pumps existed, they had the duty to pay the cost of the irrigation motor-pumps. However, it was not uncommon to see landlords/or leaseholders declining to perform their duties: for example, in Ahvaz-i Qadim (near Ahvaz in Khuzistan), where a

pump unit had been installed, 'the peasants alleged that water was scarce, because after land reform, the pump owner ceased to clean the channels.'[102]

At the political level, the law prohibited the landlords to dismiss the *nasaq*-holders from the position of possession of land:

> All farmers who have been farming on their own land on the date of approval of this law, shall be considered as inhabitants of the village where the land is situated. No landlord, under any circumstances or excuse, can expel a peasant from his village or land or prevent him from farming on the said land.
> (Article 22)

However, in a note to this article, the law permitted the landlords to purchase peasant's possession of land, provided they obtain written official consent of the peasant. In spite of the fact that this article brought about some sort of security for the *nasaq*-holders, the landlords were able to evade it. In effect the note to this article can be considered a loophole for the landlords, because in practice it was not difficult for them to 'persuade' peasants to give their consent to sale of land. In some cases, the landlords ignored the law and expelled their subjects from their villages.[103]

The law, furthermore, strenghtened the rights of the *nasaq*-holders by giving them the permission to register their ownership of *a'yani* properties:

> Everything that is built or grown on the land by the peasant, shall belong to him. The peasant is entitled to register them in his own name and obtain title deed for them. But the construction of new buildings shall henceforth be subject to the written consent of the landlord.
> Note: In villages which are not subject to land distribution, if the peasants wish to build houses for themselves, the landlord is required to give each of them 500 square meters to build his dwelling place, storeroom, and shed as well as to house his cattle.
> (Article 25)

At the juridicial level, the law made an attempt to protect the *nasaq*-holders *vis-a-vis* the landlords. Thus:

> Disputes arising between landlord and peasant in connection with agricultural work will be settled by a Dispute Settlement Board which will be composed in every district of the commissioner, judge of the district court (...), the representative of the Ministry of Agriculture (...). The decision of the said board will be final and will be enforced by courts of justice. (Article 33)

With regard to this article (and also some of the above cited ones) we should draw the reader's attention to the following point. The issue of this article did not necessarily bring about its full-scale enforcement. Bearing in mind the widespread corruption in the Iranian state departments and landlords' ties with these departments and also the political dominance of the landlords over the *nasaq*-holders, one cannot expect this article to be fully enforced. The enforcement of this article, in effect, depended to a large extent upon landlord-peasant relationships at the political level. Thus, according to Lambton (1969), during the implementation of L-R in Azarbaijan, where the peasants were to a lesser extent subordinated to their landlords, many disputes had to be settled by the officials, because the peasants did not tolerate any evasion of their rights; whereas in some other provinces, such as Fars, where the peasants were highly subordinated to their landlords and tribal chiefs, peasants did not dare complain to the officials.

In our first chapter (on the landlord-peasant relationship) we explained how landlords, by periodical redistribution of land, kept their subjects in an insecure position. However, the law of January, 1962, abolished any form of annual or periodical allotments:

> Effective the date of approval of this Law, it is prohibited to change the farming procedures of a land. Peasants will be recognized as farmers on the same land whether under cultivation or fallow as they used to be on the date of approval of this Law. (The note to Article 20)

In spite of this prohibition, in some cases, the peasants continued to redistribute the land among themselves after the land distribution.[104]

With regard to the relations of production the L-R brought about two side effects: i.e. the abolition of labour-service and dues, and the discouragement of *boneh* organization. Although in the law of 1962, there is no reference to the abolition of labour service and dues, it is reasonable to suppose that by removing landlords from the social formations of the distributed villages (wholly or partially), labour-service and dues ceased to exist there, because there was no longer any agent, at the non-economic level, to impose these "pre-CMP" obligations. The other side-effect of the L-R was the disappearance of "*boneh*" as a form of production organization in rural Iran. Generally speaking, in many villages, *boneh* ceased to exist after the distribution of land.[105] This was mainly because the new landowners preferred to work individually. However, in some cases, they decided to work under the old production organization.[106]

So far we have considered the impact of L-R on the Landlord-peasant relationship in villages (wholly or partially) subject to distribution. Nevertheless, the first stage of L-R did not cover four groups of villages. They included: *vaqf* villages; villages belonging to landlords who held less than six-*dangs* of a village each; villages belonging to landlords and their family members (each owning one village); and finally mechanized farms. The first two categories became subject to reform in the second stage of L-R and shall consider them later in this chapter.

With regard to the villages remaining in the hands of big landlords, this was a concession which the reform government had to give to the feudal landlords. Later on, under the pressure on the part of the landlords, the L-R Council gave some more concessions. Thus on August 25, 1963, it 'decided that children under the care of the head of the family could also hold up to the maximum permitted by Article 2 of the law of 9 January 1962. A further modification was made on Feburary 7, 1967, when the Land Reform council decided that a woman, without regard

to her family's position, might hold as an independent person up to the maximum permitted.'[107] In the villages subject to partial or no redistribution, the position of landlords became weaker at the economic and political level. In Deylam Ulya (a village in Khuzistan which in February, 1964 was partially redistributed) for example, the L-R has had no noticeable effect. The peasants do not yet consider themselves to be the landowners and constantly talk of the government having become the landowner. They are, on the other hand, a little apprehensive of the possible action of the landlord; (who was one of the influential landlords of this province). Yet they all agreed that the landlords influence has been greatly reduced and that he or the government official cannot be as oppressive as they used to be.[108] It may, however, be considered as a side-effect of L-R on the semi-feudal social formation of these villages.

The last group of villages/farms exempted from distribution were *those which were mechanized and run on the basis of the wage-labour system.* The law of 1962 not only tried to induce the reproduction of capitalist relations of production in distributed villages, but also exempted capitalist farms from distribution. Thus under Article 3, the exemptions are mentioned as follows:

a) Orchards, tea plantations and woodlots whose land and crop, as well as all buildings, instalments and water rights on the land belong to one landlord, will remain the property of the landlord.

b) All lands which, at the date of approval of this Law, are farmed by mechanized methods, but with the employment of agricultural workers and without the use of peasants (i.e. *nasaq*-holders), will remain such as long as the above mentioned arrangement is operating.

Article 3 not only maintained the capitalist order in the agricultural units cited above, but also induced some other landowners to shift quickly to this mode of production. No attempt was made, in the

law, to define "mechanization". Nevertheless in practice the L-R officials used a quantification formula to distinguish whether or not a certain farm was mechanized: 'The formula was essentially a code of marks: a tractor was 10; discs 10; land-levelling machinery 5; combine 15; drill 15; use of chemical fertilizers scored 5; pesticides 10; making of ditches 5 and irrigation works 15 - and there was a make-weight of 5 marks to be used with discretion.'[109] A landlord who scored 51 points or more was declared exempt from distribution.

This method obviously enabled some landlords to evade the law. That is to say, by purchasing some machinery and or bribing the L-R officials, in many cases, landlords managed to declare that their lands were mechanized, when in fact they had not been so worked when the law came into operation. Furthermore, in some cases, this way of "quick mechanization" caused no real change in the landlord-peasant relationship. E.g. some village women expressed their image of "mechanization" by stating: 'motorization means that they (landlords) give you 8 pounds of wheat and one tooman (10 rials) a day; and mechanization means that you should sign the wage-slip at the end of the month.'[110]

Generally speaking, the article induced the development of the CMP in two different categories of farms. First, the capitalist farmers, who owned true mechanized farms based on the wage-labour system, were persuaded to expand their farms and secondly, the "*late comer*" landlords who quickly shifted to this form of "mechanization" and the "wage-labour" system for farming. The obvious consequence of both cases (the latter in particular), was the separation of the direct-producers (including *nasaq*-holders) from the objective conditions of production.

The implementation of the first stage of L-R took almost ten years to be completed. This stage affected as many as 14,000 villages. Table XXI illustrates the numbers of distributed villages and that of acquirers of land by provinces. As the table shows, the first stage of L-R covered 709,000 of the rural households, only 22% of the total

TABLE XXI

First Stage : Purchased by Province

Province	Six *dang*		Less than six dang		No. of Households receiving land	No. of Beneficiaries
	Village	Farm	Village	Farm		
Tehran	220	0	618	432	50,000	277,000
Khorasan	222	0	1,069	0	26,000	132,000
Isfahan	60	0	338	0	22,000	111,000
East Azarbaijan	510	0	1,307	0	123,000	615,000
Khuzistan	256	4	452	0	22,000	112,000
Mazandaran	175	70	546	297	75,000	386,000
Fars	247	0	1,405	38	63,000	317,000
Gilan	57	0	690	0	41,000	212,000
West Azarbaijan	422	0	435	0	35,000	173,000
Kirman	97	0	454	0	6,000	23,000
Kirmanshah	487	0	1,214	0	59,000	295,000
Saheli	3	0	13	0	+	1,000
Sistan & Buluchestan	1	0	3	0	+	+
Kurdistan	166	0	495	0	32,000	158,000
Hamadan	189	0	648	0	81,000	405,000
Luristan	99	0	447	0	17,000	83,000
Zanjan	169	3	429	0	20,000	101,000
Yazd	0	0	15	0	+	+
Bushire	49	0	132	0	6,000	30,000
Bakhtiari	6	0	102	0	6,000	30,000
Semnan	10	0	59	0	1,000	3,000
Ilam	210	0	89	0	10,000	48,000
Boir Ahmadi	335	26	43	0	12,000	62,000
Total	3,990	103	11,003	767	709,000	3,575,000

Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1976.

households living in rural Iran.

The Second Stage of L-R

Although the first stage of L-R affected a limited number of villages it broke the backbone of the "feudal type" of landholding in rural Iran. The first stage covered a limited number of villages because in the later years the Government gave some concessions to the landlords. In addition to these concessions (added to the laws of the first stage) in January, 1963, the Government announced the beginning of the second stage of the nation-wide L-R. The second stage had two characteristics. First,it affected *vaqf* lands, so it embraced some anti-feudal measures. Secondly, it opened the way for the development of capitalism from above (the 'Prussian' path) and therefore embraced some anti-peasant measures. Furthermore, the laws of the second stage, just like the previous ones, did not touch capitalist farming which had developed prior to L-R. Below we shall study these aspects.

The character of laws of the second stage, may be shown first of all, by the farms exempted from the distribution. Thus:

> Any mechanized land situated in the same village will not come within the provisions of this law, if it does not exceed 500 hectares. (Note to Article 1)

Mechanized land is defined as land which is worked by wage-labourers and the ploughing of which is done by mechanical means. The law excluded even mechanized farms operated by agents other than the landowners:

> In the case of the mechanized farms not directly farmed by the landlords, but which were farmed mechanically by a tenant or farmer according to official leases signed before the conclusion of the said Supplement, the official lease will continue in force until expiration ... (Article 15)

However, this provision was the occasion for much abuse. Likewise under the provisions of the first stage, many landlords made attempts to claim

that their lands were mechanized when in fact they were not or had only been mechanized after L-R began.[111] But not all landlords managed to use such an occasion. Thus, Lambton writes that, 'one complaint made against the land reform by some of the khans was that the exemption of mechanized land from its provisions was of no benefit to landowners in such areas as the Kuhqiluyeh, where mechanization had not been possible because there had been no roads along which to bring tractors.'[112]

The second type of farms exempted from the distribution, were farms whose direct-producers did not have *nasaq* in spite of the fact that they worked under the share-cropping system: i.e. share-croppers of summer crops.[113] Thus under Article 28:

> Vegetable growers and summer-croppers who are not domiciled in the village and who engage in summer-cropping every year under special agreement

were excluded, hence they did not obtain any land.

In the previous chapters, we explained the *vaqf* lands were operated according to the local customs, i.e. share-cropping and fixed rent. Despite this fact, the first stage did not cover these lands, because of the political considerations. However, *vaqf* lands became subject to the second stage. Under Article 2 of the law, the *nasaq*-holders occupying the private *vaqf* lands were to be raised to the position of ownership, whereas those occupying public *vaqf* lands were to be raised to the position of leaseholders of the capitalist type.[114] Thus:

> villages endowed to the public will be leased with consideration for the best of the endowment - on a long term basis, i.e. 99 years to the peasants of the same village for a cash rental which can be revised every five years. If necessary, privately endowed villages will be purchased by the Government, according to the provisions of the Civil Code, for the purpose of exchanging them for the better, and distribute them among the peasants. (Article 2)

With regard to the villages and farms which did not qualify for

distribution and remained in private ownership under the first stage, the landlords were required to choose one of the following three options:

> a) Landlords will lease their village to the peasants of the same village for a cash rental and on the basis of its revenues obtained during the past three years, not continuing the levies and in accordance with legal customary practices.
> b) From this date (Jan. 17, 1963), landlords may sell their lands to the peasants by mutual agreement...
> c) Irrigated or dry land may be divided between the local peasants and the owner or owners according to the customary ratios of landlord-peasant shares... (Article 1)

However, later on two other ways of settlement were offered to the landlords. They were as follows: either to form a joint-stock agricultural unit, in which landlord and peasants would become partners, according to their respective shares of the produce; or to buy out peasants' *nasaq* with the latter's consent and farm the land by employing wage-labourers. All contracts and transactions would have to be approved by the officials. In the case of land transactions, water was to be transferred to the new owner. (Article 31 and 32).

Under Article 8 of the law, the landlords were required to cede the land (up to 500 meters) under farmers' houses to the farmers. Articles 9 and 10 of the law recognized and sanctioned the *a'yani* right of peasants:

> Landlords will assess the value of the lands of orchards whose fruit trees are totally owned by farmers, and the land of other buildings or trees, in a manner mutually satisfactory to both sides, taking into consideration the water-right to sell the same to the farmers on ten year instalments. (Article 9)

And in respect of orchards, palm-groves, tea fields and the like in which both the owners and farmers had shares,

> landlords may with the consent of farmers buy their shares

or separate their own (landowners') shares. (Article 10)

The laws of the second stage, like those of the first stage, affected the positions of some other *nasaq*-holders in relation to the landlords as well as the means of production. Some of them were raised to the position of ownership of land, some became leaseholders, while others were separated from the means of production (particularly land) and became wage-labourers. In short, the *nasaq*-holders ceased to be subject to the (semi) feudal subordination. Table XXII below illustrates the impact of the second stage of L-R on rural Iran by province.

As Table XXII verifies, over 80% of the landlords preferred to lease their lands to the *nasaq*-holders on the basis of new regulations, while the least favourite option was the sale of *nasaq*, only in 0.86% of the cases did the landlords buy the *nasaq* of the *nasaq*-holders. The *nasaq*-holders strongly opposed the purchase of their right, while the landlords tried and to a considerable extent managed to retain their ownership (only 3.67% of them sold their lands to the *nasaq*-holders). However, since they were engaged in jobs other than agricultural ones, they were unable to get involved in agricultural production directly. That is why only a minority chose the options of forming joint enterprises and dividing land on the basis of division of produce (see Table XXII). Thus the majority preferred to rent out their lands to the *nasaq*-holders.

To summarize the immediate consequences of the first and second stages of L-R: Table XXI and XXII verify that around 1.005 million households were raised to the position of ownership of land. It means that, of 3.2 million peasant households, only 31.4% acquired land. Around 39% of the peasant households (1.24 million) became leaseholders of the new type, and the rest, i.e. 29% were not affected by the implementation of L-R. Katouzian believes that peasants in the latter group still cultivate under the old system.[115] But, not all the agents of production in this group can be considered as agricultural producers. In effect, this group may have comprised different strata of *khoshneshins*. Our

TABLE XXII

Distribution of Transaction in Second Stage Options by Regions and Provinces, October 1972

Operations of second phase until 51/6/31	*Tenancy*			*Sale*			*Tenant right sale*			*Joint enterprise*			*Division*			*Horizontal total (H.T.)*
	No.	*as % of H.T.*	*as % of V.T.*	*No.*	*as % of H.T.*	*as % of V.T.*	*No.*	*as % of H.T.*	*as % of V.T.*	*No. of cultivators*	*as % of H.T.*	*as % of V.T.*	*No.*	*as % of H.T.*	*as % of V.T.*	
Tehrān	85,203	83·79	6·83	6,101	6·00	10·67	1,241	1·22	9·28	—	—	—	9,136	8·98	5·84	101,681
Gilān	188,536	96·48	15·12	6,313	3·23	11·04	564	0·29	4·22	—	—	—	—	—	—	195,413
Mazandarān	132,604	99·51	10·63	327	0·24	0·57	—	—	—	—	—	—	330	0·25	0·21	133,261
E. Āzarbāyjān	179,814	88·65	14·42	13,449	6·63	23·53	44	0·02	0·33	1,975	0·97	2·37	7,559	3·73	4·84	202,841
W. Āzarbāyjān	48,007	78·72	3·85	5,963	9·78	10·43	159	0·26	1·19	3,891	6·38	4·67	2,963	4·86	1·89	60,983
Kermānshāhān	48,692	81·15	3·90	392	0·65	0·68	185	0·31	1·38	53	0·09	0·06	10,679	17·80	6·83	60,001
Khuzestān	79,262	96·41	6·36	24	0·03	0·04	—	—	—	11	0·01	0·01	2,908	3·54	1·86	82,205
Fārs	77,825	44·33	6·24	3,422	1·95	6·69	1,188	0·68	8·88	15,988	9·11	19·20	77,121	43·93	49·35	175,544
Kermān	3,702	27·86	0·30	22	0·16	0·04	1,921	14·45	14·36	5,778	43·48	6·94	1,865	14·03	1·19	13,288
Khorāsān	17,428	23·11	1·40	1,238	1·64	2·16	6,779	9·00	50·69	46,974	62·30	56·41	2,983	3·96	1·91	75,402
Esfahān	51,343	68·27	4·12	4,252	5·65	7·44	464	0·62	3·47	613	0·81	0·74	18,532	24·64	11·86	75,204
Sistān and Baluchestān	254	16·37	0·02	213	14·23	0·37	525	35·07	3·92	22	1·47	0·02	483	32·26	0·31	1,497
Kordestān	56,691	92·89	4·55	2,113	3·46	3·70	97	0·16	0·72	—	—	—	2,126	3·48	1·36	61,027
Lorestān	49,660	87·08	3·98	1,050	1·84	1·84	104	0·18	0·78	3,850	6·75	4·62	2,363	4·14	1·51	57,027
Hamadān	52,197	72·53	4·19	2,300	3·20	4·02	4	negl.	0·03	1,668	2·32	2·00	15,795	21·95	10·11	71,964
Semnān	2,294	94·44	0·18	102	4·20	0·18	33	1·36	0·25	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,429
Gorgān and Dasht	43,135	90·06	3·46	4,761	9·94	8·33	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	47,986
Coastal and Islands of Oman Sea (Bandar 'Abbās)	299	55·06	6·02	—	—	—	44	8·10	0·33	—	—	—	200	36·83	0·13	543
Persian Gulf (Bushehr)	6,933	74·07	0·56	2,425	25·91	4·24	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9,358
Ilām	24,218	100·00	1·94	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	24,218
Chahār Mahal Bakhtiari	22,496	95·16	1·80	128	0·54	0·22	22	0·09	0·16	—	—	—	994	4·20	0·64	23,640
Yazd	18,614	100·00	1·49	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	18,614
Kohkilouyeh and Bouyer Ahmadi	32,497	99·60	2·61	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	127	0·40	0·08	32,624
Zandjān	24,948	82·97	2·00	2,569	8·54	4·49	—	—	—	2,444	8·13	2·93	115	0·38	0·07	30,076
Vertical total (V.T.)	1,246,652		100	57,164		100	13,374		100	83,267		100	156,279		100	1,556,736 Grand total (G.T.)
V.T. as % of G.T.	80·08			3·67			0·86			5·35			10·04			

Source: Denman, 1973.

discussion in the previous chapter (on social classes) showed that only 26.2% of *khoshneshins* were agricultural wage-labourers (they constituted 5.7% of the total rural population). The position of these agents of production was reaffirmed and sanctioned by the laws of L-R. Nor did L-R affect the position of *khoshneshins* who were involved in non-agricultural production. But this does not mean that they became rural proletarians as Keddie believes.[116]

The first and second stages of L-R were followed by another set of provisions which was inaugurated as the third stage of L-R. The bill which was passed through the *Majlis* in 1968, aimed at the distribution and sale of rented allotments and joint-stock units to the leaseholders and shareholders respectively. With regard to the allotments rented to the leaseholders, the landlords were provided two options:

a) to sell their land and water right to the leaseholders;

b) to share their allotments with the peasants on the basis of the division of produce. The public *vaqf* lands were exempted from the provisions of this law. Denman states that the law was specifically limited to village lands and fields which had been let to tenants on the thirty-year leases included among the options given to the landowners under the second stage.[117] The landlords also had the following options:

a) to sell the lands to the tenants;

b) to divide the lands with the tenants on the basis of the division of produce.

However, we shall not discuss the provisions of the "third stage" of L-R, mainly for the following reasons:

a) these provisions had no impact on the remnants of "semi-feudal" relations of production in rural Iran.

b) The provisions were to cover a limited number of peasant families.

c) Finally, the provisions in practice do not seem to have had any effect on rural Iran, 'because although the laws of this stage were ratified in March 1968, they have still not been put fully into effect

and only a few villages have been affected by these laws.'[118]

Social classes in the aftermath of land reform

We examined the provisions of different stages of L-R in Iran. We saw that the implementation of L-R provisions had major effects on the relations of production in rural Iran. Thus the provisions changed the positions of many direct-producers in relation to the means of production as well as to the landlords. Here, we shall briefly analyse the formal aspects of the social classes before and after L-R. Table XXIII below illustrates the stratification of rural households in 1960 and 1972.[119]

TABLE XXIII

Rural Households by Strata 1960 and 1972

Households	1960		1972		Rate of Growth of each group during 1960-72
	No.	%	No.	%	
Total Households*	2710	100	3323	100	22.0%
Landless Households†	777	28.5	790	23.8	0.1%
Households holding under 2 ha.	737	27.2	1143	34.5	55.0%
Households holding 2 to 5 ha.	484	17.8	545	16.4	12.6%
Households holding 5 to 10 ha.	352	13.0	434	13.1	23.3%
Households holding 10 to 50 ha.	339	12.5	394	11.9	16.2%
Households holding 50 and over	21	-	17	-	-

* Excluding cattle breeders and the like

† Including all strata of *khoshneshins*

Sources: 1) 1960 Census

2) Avesvik 1977, Table 6.1

Although the number of *khoshneshin* households increased from 777,000 to 790,000, its share as a percentage of the total rural population

dropped from 28.5 to 23.8%. Nevertheless, since data for the wage-labourers for the year 1972 are not available, one cannot say whether or not the number of them has increased during this period. But their numbers might have increased because of the following: almost none of the *khoshneshins* acquired any land during the process of land distribution; some of the *nasaq*-holders were dropped, by force or other means, from their positions of possession of land before L-R began; others sold their right to the landlords in the second stage of L-R; and finally, the rural population increased by 1.5% in this period. However, there is no doubt that L-R accelerated the process of complete separation of some *nasaq*-holders[120] from the objective conditions of production, particularly land.

It appears that the remarkable consequence of land re-distribution was a sharp increase in the number of semi-proletarians. As Table XXIII illustrates the number of households holding less than 2 ha. increased by 55%, that is, it increased from 737 thousands in 1960 to 1.143 million in 1972. Also the share of this stratum as a percentage of the total holdings increased from 27.2% in 1960 to 34.5% in 1972. This sharp increase in the number of semi-proletarians means a vast expansion in the (casual) labour market during these years. The demand for the labour-power of these casual labourers came mainly from the following sources: in the rural areas, rich peasants and capitalist farmers; and in the urban centres, the construction industry.[121] The obvious result of the expansion of the labour market by casual vendors of labour-power was that while some industries and farms were supplied with labour-power required by them, the rural-urban mass migration did not take place. However, it is reasonable to believe that this permanent wandering between country and town and search for casual jobs, caused some underemployment as well as hidden unemployment in various forms.

The partial separation of the small land holders has been recognised as a phenomenon characteristic of all capitalist countries.[122] One may

therefore consider the expansion of such a labour market as an indication of the development of capitalism in Iran during the 1960s. Nevertheless, bearing in mind that a complete separation of direct-producers from the objective conditions of production is the pre-condition for a full-fledged development of the CMP, one may consider this vast number of semi-proletarians, who were partially separated from the objective conditions of production, as an obstacle to the further development of capitalism in the agricultural as well as industrial sectors of Iran.

The impact of L-R on the other rural strata was moderate. As can be seen in Table XXIII, the percentage of each stratum in the total holdings remained almost the same during this period. However, in absolute terms, the number of these households increased, but their rates of growth were lower than the growth rate of total rural households.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined the partial and relatively unsuccessful attempts which were made on the part of the different government to reform land tenure during the 1940s and 1950s. We then attempted to discover the reasons for the nation-wide L-R of 1962 which became a turning-point in the history of Iran. Thus we examined the economic and political crisis of 1959-61 and concluded that because of this crisis and some revolts on the part of the peasantry the government was driven to undertake some economic and social reforms, including L-R. In order to find out the aims and nature of the nation-wide L-R, we analysed the laws of the first and second stages of L-R. We then came to the conclusion that it was a L-R which tried to remove semi-feudal relations of production, thus removing barriers to the development of rural capitalism. In order to demonstrate the impact of L-R on the structure of landholding, we compared this structure before and after L-R. The results were a sharp increase in the number of small landholders and a moderate increase in the number of members of other strata.

If, as is argued, pre-capitalist relations of production are the main obstacles to economic development, then the implementation of L-R should have supposedly opened the way for agricultural as well as industrial development. Thus we shall go on to examine the development of agriculture in Iran after the L-R.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1. Deman stresses the question of emancipation, see Deman 1973 pp,141-58
2. Warriner, 1969, p.XIV
3. Dorner, 1972, p.18
4. Laporte and et al, 1971, pp.474-75
5. Ibid, p.474
6. Shanin, 1973, p.161
7. Lipton, 1974, p.270
8. For the sake of simplicity, here we ignore water which in some cases is as important as land.
9. Marx, 1974, p.758
10. Marx, 1971, p.791
11. Historical Documents: The Workers', Social-Democratic and communist Movement in Iran (1903-1963), vol.I, pp.225-34
12. Zabih, 1966, pp.182-83
13. Gharachedaghi, 1967, p.41
14. Ivanov, 1948, pp.72-73
15. Gharachedaghi, 1967, p.38
16. Ibid, p.38
17. Ibid, p.39; Ivanov states that of the 687 distributed villages, 434 were public Domain and the rest belonged to the private landlords, on the other hand, a total of 209096 peasants obtained plots of land. See Ivanov, 1948, p.73
18. Ivanov, 1948, pp.73-75
19. Gharachedaghi, 1967, p.39
20. Lambton, 1969, p.88 , italics added
21. See Gharachedaghi, 1967, pp.39-40, and Ivanov, 1948, pp.76-77
22. Ivanov, 1948, p.77
23. See above chapter V
24. The Middle East Journal, vol.6, no.4, 1952
25. For the articles of this decree see the Middle East Journal vol.7, no.1, 1953, pp.81-87.
26. Lambton, 1969, pp.39-40
27. Gharachedaghi, 1967, p.43
28. Denman, 1973, p.55
29. Ibid, p.66
30. Gharachedaghi, 1967, p.43
31. Denman, 1973, p.71
32. Ibid, p.73
33. Ibid, pp.78-79
34. Ibid, Table 4, p.81
35. Statistical Yearbook 1968
36. Benedick, 1964, pp.239-40
37. Baldwin, 1967, p.103
38. 1960 Census, Table 315
39. Gharachedaghi, 1967, p.54
40. See Vaqar, 1967, p.112
41. Baldwin, 1967, p.60
42. Ibid, p.57
43. The Economist, May 20, 1961, p.786
44. The Times, March 9, 1959, p.11
45. Data from Daftary, 1972, p.9
46. Daftary, 1972, p.14

47. Vaqar, 1964, p.109
48. Young, 1962, p.280
49. Iran Almanac, 1962, p.308 .
50. Ivanov, 1961, p.118
51. Baldwin, 1967, p.42
52. See note no.53.
53. In the second half of the 1950s, an attempt was made to form a two-party system from above. Thus the Shah sponsored the formation of two new political parties: the Melliyun (nationalist) party and the Mardom (people) party. The first was headed by Dr. Eqbal, the prime minister of the time; while the second one, Mardom party, was led by Alam, one of the Shah's most loyal supporters and a personal friend. However, after the initiation of the "White Revolution" in 1963, these two parties virtually ceased to exist.
54. The Economist, Sept. 3, 1960
55. Ibid, May 13, 1961, p.644
56. Ibid
57. The Times, May 9, 1961, p.11
58. The Times, May 12, 1961, p.14
59. For the activities within the Majlis and Senate see Lambton, 1969 pp.56-57, and for the laws see Gharachedaghi, 1967, pp.59-60.
60. Op't Land, 1965-66, p.97
61. The Times, May 11, 1961, p.11
62. Lambton, 1969, p.62
63. See Historical Documents :..., p.385 and p.390
64. For some examples see the Times, May 13, 1958, p.8, June 20, 1959, p.5, and Nov. 9, 1961, p.9.
65. Rudulph, 1971, p.136
66. Ivanov states that the reactionary domestic and foreign policies of the Government caused the intelligentsia, national petty bourgeoisie to protest against the regime; see Ivanov, 1977, p.217
67. The Economist, Feb. 10, 1962, italics added
68. Ibid, June 3, 1961, p.1007
69. The Middle East Journal, vol.16, no.1, Winter 1962, p.89
70. The Times, May 22, 1961, p.7
71. The Times, June 1, 1961, p.11; July 5, 1961, p.15; and also The Economist, July 22, 1961, p.346
72. The Times, Nov. 2, 1961, p.11
73. The Economist, June 3, 1961, p.1007
74. The Times, May 18, 1961, p.13
75. The Times, June 1, 1961, p.11
76. Iran Almanac 1962, p.96
77. Iran Almanac 1963, p.398
78. Mc Lachlan, 1968, p.709
79. See Lambton, 1971, pp.29-30; and for some examples of the latter case see T.E., Nov. 1969, pp.218-19.
80. Rudulph, 1971, pp.139-40
81. The Times, June 10, 1963
82. Lambton, 1969, p.108
83. Iran Almanac 1963, p.394
84. The Economist, Feb.2, 1963, pp.405-06, italics added
85. The Times, Sept. 23, 1963, p.8
86. T.E., Winter 1970, p.86
87. Lambton, 1969, pp.262-63
88. Iran Almanac 1962, p.311, italics added
89. Keyhan International, Jan.16, 1962, quoted in Op't Land, 1965-66

90. G.O.P.F., 1976, p.6
91. Ibid, pp.7-10; Mo'meni holds more or less the same idea,see Mo'meni, pp.12-18
92. See Ivanov, 1977, p.215; not only Dr. Amini, but also Dr Arsanjani kept making such statements now and again. For example, in a press conference on May23, 1961, he warned the landlords 'either to carry out the land reform programme or face a "bloody red revolution" that could easily take place if the programme failed.' The Times, May 24, 1961
93. After the Coup in Iraq in 1958, the Iranian ruling clique was threatened with a form of coup during 1958-62.
94. See Halliday, 1979, p.44
95. An interview with Dr. Arsanjani, in Keyhan International, Jan. 16, 1962, quoted in Op't Land, 1965-66, p.100.
96. Any real estate is divided into six parts (or dang). The dang, has no absolute areal value. For example with regard to the villages, it varies from village to village, depending on the amount of land under cultivation in each village.
97. Lambton, 1969., p.67
98. In Article 1, a peasant is defined as "a person who does not own the land but who tills it with the help of his family, or by himself, and who provides one or more farming elements (seeds, oxen etc,) and who pays part of his crop to the landlord". In the previous chapters, we defined such a direct-producer as a nasaq-holder who owned some means of production.
99. A share-cropper, in Article 1 of the law, is defined as "a person who does not own the land or any farming elemant, but who takes a share of the crop for work he performs in tilling the land". In other words, according to our own conceptions, a share-cropper is a nasaq-holder who owned no means of production.
100. According to Lambton, in very rare cases only did the agricultural workers managed to obtain any land. See Lambton, 1969, p.98
101. Lambton, 1969, pp.73-74
102. Ibid, p.157
103. In the previous chapters, we have given some examples for both of these cases; see also Lambton, 1969, p.157.
104. Lambton mentions two cases; see Lambton, 1969, p.132 and p.152.
105. See Katouzian, 1974; in 1972 Hooglund queried 200 peasants in nine different villages on the break up of bonehs : '77 per cent cited disputes as a reason; 19 per cent said bonehs were no longer necessary, it was just as easy to work alone as in teams; only 2 per cent said economic factors were involved.' Hooglund, 1975, p.169, footnote 11
106. For an example see Lambton, 1969, p.132.
107. Ibid, p.68
108. T.E., August 1965, p.220
109. Denman, 1973, p.104
110. G.O.P.F., 1976, p.49
111. Lambton gives some examples of such attempts in Isfahan, Darab Turbat-i Heydari; see Lambton, 1969, pp.29-30.
112. Lambton, 1969, p.126
113. For some cases see Ivanov, 1969, pp.70-71. However, in the second chapter, we examined this type of farming and came to the conclusion that the capitalist relations of production in this type of share-cropping system is dominant.

114. For the procedure of arranging this type of agreements see note to Article 5 of the law and also Lambton 1969, p.200.
115. See Katouzian, 1974, p.231.
116. Keddie, 1968, p.162
117. Denman, 1973, p.144
118. G.O.P.F., 1976, p.52
119. Here, we only consider agricultural producers as well as khoshneshins, therefore, some other strata including piggeries, hatcheries, poultry batteries, city dairies with livestock, tribes and the like are not included. We also ignore the differences between possession, ownership and leaseholding.
120. We are not here concerned with the other agents of production.
121. It was one of the main industries in Iran during this period.
122. See Lenin, vol.4, p.136.

PART III

CHAPTER X

The Iranian Rural Social Formation After Land Reform

A. The Economics of the Peasantry

In this chapter, we shall examine some aspects of capitalist development among the peasantry in rural Iran after L-R. These aspects include property and labour relations, marketing, processes of production, cooperatives and the credit system, and also the economics of capitalist farmers. In the third section, we shall examine the process of the pauperization of the peasantry. For the sake of simplicity, we shall consider holders of up to 50 hectares as peasants and holders of over 50 hectares as capitalist farmers. However, this is an arbitrary assumption, as it does not allow for differences in the productivity of land and in particular differences in the productivity of irrigated and unirrigated land. Secondly, as we shall explain below, the poor peasants as well as the agricultural labourers are involved at least in two different processes of production, one of which is agricultural. We shall consider the agricultural process of production first, and then examine the others. Thirdly, we shall assume that all villages were not affected by this programme for different reasons.[1]

Relations of production within the peasantry

In order to study the relations of production in rural Iran, we distinguished two sets of relations of production: the relationship between landlords on the one hand and the peasantry on the other; and relationships among the peasantry. We distinguished, therefore, two sets of property relation: ownership/possession of land/water, and ownership of other means of production. However, after the L-R, changes in property relations meant that the direct-producers occupied one or two of the following positions in relation to the land: as owner/operators,

as leaseholder/operators, and finally as wage-labourers. Table XXV shows the structure of landholding in rural Iran during the post L-R period. As one can see, the ownership of land is dominant, i.e. over 90% of peasant holders operated plots which belonged to themselves. The leaseholder/operators constitute a tiny percentage in each category, while the combination of leaseholding and ownership occupies more or less the same position as the category of leaseholding. Any simple comparison between this table and Table XII[2] shows the impact of L-R on landed property in rural Iran: i.e. the majority of *nasaq*-holders became either landowners or leaseholders. However, as far as the ownership of land is concerned, the land reform programme maintained the differentiation of the peasantry.

TABLE XXV

Forms of Land Holdings (1974)

	% No. of Ownership	Lease-holders %	Ownership/ Lease-holding %	Others %	Total Holding (000)
Total of Holdings	92.0	2.2	2.5	3.2	2479
Less than 1 ha.	92.3	2.4	2.3	2.9	734
1 to 2 ha.	90.5	1.7	3.6	4.1	322
2 to 5 ha.	91.4	2.0	2.6	3.9	542
5 to 10 ha.	93.4	1.8	1.8	3.0	428
10 to 50 ha.	92.5	2.4	2.7	2.4	428
50 to 100 ha.	87.6	4.9	4.2	3.1	16.2
100 and over	80.3	7.8	5.2	6.5	9.5

Source: The Agricultural Census of Iran, 1974, Table 88.

The peasantry was differentiated not only by the size of ownership of land, but also by the ownership of other means of production. As is illustrated in Table XXVI, the average and percentage of ownership of cows, oxen, sheep and goats increased in accordance with the increase in

the size of land (up to 50 hectares). This uneven distribution of land and means of production obviously shows two different dimensions to the peasantry's economic life: an uneven distribution of income, and some relationships amongst the peasantry which have been established around the means of production and which existed before L-R. The main aspects of these relationships are lending/borrowing oxen and machinery, selling/buying labour-power, and also lending/borrowing money. We shall examine the first two aspects below, and the third aspect later in our consideration of the functions of cooperatives.

In order to study lending/borrowing of oxen and tractors and also labour relations, for the sake of simplicity, we should make a distinction between the varieties of labour process in rural Iran. Thus we distinguish two types of labour process: traditional and modern. By the traditional process of labour, we mean the process in which traditional means of production such as oxen, the old type of seeds, and also animal manure constitute the input; whereas by the modern process of production we understand the process in which, to some extent at least, tractors and other machines, chemical fertilizers and also new seeds are used as inputs. The reason why we make a distinction between these processes of labour, is mainly because of an ever increasing consumption of modern inputs in the agricultural sector of Iran. This process is clearly illustrated in Table XXVII below. However, with regard to relations of production, we should note one point: although an increase in demand for modern inputs is a consequence of changes in the relations of production, one may expect that the use of these inputs in turn affects the relations of production. The introduction of tractors and chemical fertilizers, for instance, reduces the function of oxen as the source of energy and supply of manure to nil. The reduction of these functions in turn suppresses the differentiation of the peasantry.

However, the traditional labour process is the dominant form of expropriation of nature in the holdings under 5 hectares (see Table XXVI,

TABLE XXVI

Percentage and Average Ownership of Cows, Oxen, Sheep and Goats and the Use of Tractor 1974

Size of Holdings	% of Total Owned Cows	Average Ownership of Cows	Average Ownership of Oxen	% of Total Owned Sheep	Average Ownership of Sheep	% of Total Owned Goats	Average Ownership of Goats	% Using Tractors
Less than 1 ha	33.8	0.6	0.07	29.3	3.2	31.2	2.4	14.9
1 to 2 has.	55.6	1.2	0.27	30.7	3.9	28.6	2.9	32.4
2 to 5 has.	58.4	1,3	0.42	42.0	6.0	39.1	4.0	47.0
5 to 10 has.	59.0	1.4	0.51	55.5	10.4	50.4	5.4	63.9
10 to 50 has.	58.7	1.7	0.64	63.4	18.6	55.9	6.3	71.9
50 to 100 has.	46.8	2.2	0.62	52.0	53.5	40.6	6.9	91.5
100 and over	34.9	6.4	0.53	40.0	234.8	32.9	12.9	96.2

Source: The Agricultural Census of Iran, 1974.

last column). With regard to this type, one may not expect the techniques of production to be changed drastically. As Connell noted in describing the situation in 1969 in Mamood-Abad, a village near Samnan, as follows: 'Mechanization is not well advanced. A tractor is occasionally hired by the cooperative for the whole village, is used for ploughing and threshing and occasional transport... Nevertheless the wooden roller thresher or sledge (*garjin*) is more often used as is the woodennail plough, pulled by donkeys, plus a number of hand tools, such as the long handled spade (...) and the sickle. Scythes have not yet appeared. The land is not deep ploughed but simply furrowed at planting time to loosen the soil. Fertilizer application is usually simply by the application of manure, which necessitates less water use, ...'[3] The process of threshing and winnowing has remained as it used to be before L-R. Thus , Miller wrote that, in Hossein-Abad a village in the region of Zanjan, each family piled up the harvested grains in heaps: the process of threshing being done by two methods. In the first method, oxen and donkeys are walked in endless circles on the cut grain. The action of the animals' hooves separates the wheat from the straw. The second method is done by a primitive threshing mechanism called a *chun* It is drawn by oxen or horses or donkeys which have wooden or metal spokes or discs that break up the grain. After this stage, men use wooden winnowing forks and throw the grain in the wind to separate the wheat from the chaff. Following winnowing the straw is gathered up and put in large bundles for use as fodder and in the making of mud brick. The grain is cleaned by sifting through a sieve (*gharbal*)'.[4]

With regard to the traditional labour process, the position of suppliers of oxen, analysed in Chapter VII, was maintained after the L-R.[5] However, with the modernization of the agricultural sector, the peasantry has gradually shifted to the employment of tractors, improved seeds and also chemical fertilizers. With regard to the employment of tractors as Table XXVI shows, a minority of holdings under 5 hectares use them as a

source of energy; whereas 63.9% of rich peasants (holders of 5 to 10 ha.) use a tractor for ploughing and the like. Although there are no systematic data available to illustrate the ownership of tractors according to the size of holding, the available evidence suggests that the peasantry is mainly the borrower rather than lender (or owner) of tractors.[6]

The reasons for shifting to the employment of tractors on the part of some peasants are to be found in the higher efficiency of machinery over draught animals. The amount of land a tractor can plough depends on several factors such as horsepower, depth of ploughing, cropping pattern, size of plots and the type of soil. Nevertheless all other conditions being equal, a tractor can plough the same amount of land in less than two hours as a pair of oxen can do in a full working day. Moreover, tractor ploughing is much deeper than oxen ploughing which usually only scratches the surface of the land. However, the higher efficiency of machinery does not necessarily mean that all peasants shift to the use of tractors, combines, etc. As a matter of fact, they are faced with social as well as technical problems. As examples of technical problems, we may mention the type of cultivation. That is to say, there are some crops which cannot only be cultivated by machinery. For example, the cultivation of summer crops which is a labour-intensive labour-process, demands almost no machinery. In some other cases, the type of soil may block the use of machinery. For example, the peasants of Manioun, a village near Jahrum in Fars province, allegedly stated that they could not employ tractors for ploughing, due to the fact that the land which they had obtained was uneven.[7] Of the social problems, we may mention the absolute poverty of some peasants and the backwardness of the villages. The lack of roads and communications with the urban centres have virtually blocked the introduction of machinery to many villages in rural Iran.[8] In some other cases, although the peasants want to hire tractors, only occasionally do they manage to obtain any. For example, according to Connell, peasants of Mahmood-Abad occasionally

TABLE XXVII

Consumption of Fertilizers and Seeds and Sale of Tractors

Year	Consumption of Fertilizers 000 Tons	Tractors Sold by the O.D.A.M.	Seeds (tons) Wheat	Cotton
1966	124	-	7625	1700
1967	215	2382	5600	2000
1968	184	2967	6500	2567
1969	208	3369	-	2505
1970	243	1894	12789	3398
1971	328	2458	32980	3121
1972	379	5787	34000	9327
1973	482	4781	35500	11178
1974	616	7561	64620	11000
1975	624	9038	-	-

Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1976.

manage to hire a tractor, through their cooperative, to plough their plots.[9] Or some peasants of Tang-e Karam, a village near Gasa in Fars province, stated that they could not hire any tractors, because it was not economical for the tractor owner to plough their small plots.[10]

The hiring of machinery takes place both within and across village boundaries. There are three sources from which peasants can hire machinery: tractor-owners, rich peasants and capitalist farmers (including ex-landlords).

In some rare cases, machinery was supplied by agents who had no

position in relation to the land. For example according to Okazaki, during the late 1950s and early 1960s the level of demand for tractors and combines induced some individuals to buy machinery and do custom work. Accordingly, in some cases even some peasants sold their plots and bought combines and tractors for renting out to the other peasants. However, this case is relatively rare, since we have come across it in none of the other studies.[11] In some other cases, rich peasants supplied their fellow villagers with machinery. For example, three peasants in Qasr-Abad, a village around Shiraz in Fars province, jointly bought a tractor to cultivate their own lands. However, they rented their tractor to the other peasants for cash.[12] In Hossein-Abad, in Khuzistan province, a rich peasant who was at the same time the village headman, had managed to accumulate some wealth even before L-R. During the post L-R period he owned the only tractor in the village and rented it to the other peasants.[13]

Finally, in the majority of cases, machinery was supplied by some capitalist farmers (including ex-landlords). We have already stated that the L-R programme induced many landlords to change their method of expropriation of surplus-labour; hence they bought farm machinery and employed wage-labourers. However, they rent out their machinery to the peasants within or outside their villages. As an example, we mention the capitalist-farmer (ex-landlord) of Kushk, a village near Shiraz in Fars province, who owns one tractor and a combine and undertakes the ploughing and threshing for the small landowners of the village in return for some cash.[14]

The custom fees for ploughing are usually paid in cash, and in this sense it is contrary to the traditional form of payment for the custom work of oxen. According to one study, the data on the rates for custom ploughing varies from less than 500 rials per ha. in 39% of the cases, and between 500 to 1000 rials in 58% of the cases and over 1000 rials for the remainder.[15] It appears that in some cases, the performance of custom work is a profitable job. For sometimes the contract work is

performed over distances of more than 1000 kms. for combines.[16]

The use of tractors increases productivity and the rate of accumulation and at the same time saves the peasant some time during which he may find an off-farm job. This process of mechanization further reinforces the peasantry's involvement in the market by for example necessitating increased production for the market in order to cover the cost of renting tractors and by the increased demand for machinery.

In addition to the use of machinery, the peasantry is linked to the market through investment in motor-pumps and also chemical fertilizers. The production and use of fertilizers in Iran began in 1945. However, up to 1963, the amount of consumption was very low. With the opening of a modern fertilizer factory at Shiraz, the country entered a new phase of fertilizer production and consumption.[17] The distribution of fertilizers in Iran is almost exclusively undertaken by a state agency known as Fertilizer Distribution Company. The agency's main concern is the marketing of domestically produced fertilizers within the country. The agency has also handled all fertilizer imports. In order to induce all groups of agricultural producers to use fertilizers, the agency has provided some facilities. Thus the agency 'distributes fertilizers through private dealers, farm cooperatives, sugar beet factories and direct sale to consumers. It also provides credit through a nine-month allowance on payment at approximately 10 percent interest. If necessary, this limit can be extended by six months.'[18]

With regard to the fertilizer consumption of the peasantry, Table XXVIII shows the percentage consumption of each category and also the share of each category in the total consumed chemical fertilizers in the year 1975. As the first column illustrates, a minority of holders in each category consume fertilizers. This may be as a result of the existence of a high percentage of dry farming in each category, as in this type of traditional cultivation (*daym kari*) the whole process of labour includes only ploughing, sowing and finally harvesting. Despite

this however, the peasantry consumed 49% of the total chemical fertilizer consumption in the agricultural sector of Iran in 1975, while it holds only one-third of the total area under cultivation. The owner/lease-holders, holding 1.6% of the area under cultivation, consumed 14.5% of the total fertilizers. This is an indication of a high degree of integration of these owner/leaseholders into the market economy. With regard to the owner/leaseholders, holding between 2 to 10 ha., around one-third of them consumed 26% of the total consumed fertilizers. Considering the fact that these holders occupied 28.5% of the area under cultivation, one may state that as far as the consumption of chemical fertilizers is concerned, these holders are less integrated into the market economy. This may be due to the fact that almost half of these holdings have been subject to dry-farming cultivation. Finally, with regard to the owner/leaseholders, holding between 1 and 2 ha., the table shows that the percentage of these holdings using chemical fertilizers is higher than all other categories. But the share of these fertilizer users in the total consumed is lower than the other categories.

In addition to the investment in chemical fertilizers and hiring machinery, attempts have been made to instal motor-pumps to use the water of rivers and wells. It appears from different studies that this form of investment is common in the southern part of Iran including Kirman, Fars, regions in the northern part of the Persian Gulf and also Khuzistan.[19] Generally speaking, the investment has been performed either by agents who play no production function in the labour-process or by the peasant-cultivators (owner/leaseholders). With regard to the former, there is the case of the pump-owners in Qara-Bolagh, a village near Darab in Fars province. 120 motor-pumps belong to some 600 persons, i.e. every group of 3 to 5 of these persons owns a motor-pump which can water up to 35 ha. of land. These pump-owners have rented the land from the landlord and his bailiff (according to the laws of the second stage of L-R). Their role in the labour-process is purely

TABLE XXVIII

Fertilizer Consumption According to the Size of Holding 1975

Size of Holdings	% of Holdings Using Chemical Fertilizers	Share of each Category %	% of Dry Farming in Each Category	Share of Area Under Control
Total	33.1	100	44.0	100
Less than 1 ha.	33.9	14.5	27.8	1.6
1 to 2 ha.	47.0	8.5	41.0	2.7
2 to 5 has.	34.1	13.5	48.7	10.5
5 to 10 has.	28.3	12.5	51.4	18.0
10 to 50 has.	23.3	27.8	53.7	45.7
50 to 100 has.	43.0	5.6	48.2	6.5
100 and over	56.2	17.6	41.3	14.9

Source: The Agricultural Census of Iran, 1975.

managerial. Every year they make contracts with the peasants to produce different grains and vegetables. The contracts are of the share-cropping type and therefore the peasants collect a portion of produce for performing all productive functions in the labour process.[20]

On the other hand, motor-pump owners, i.e. the peasant-cultivators, are distinguished by the role they play in the labour-process. After the L-R many peasant landowners made attempts to instal motor-pumps on the shallow wells; sunk in their holdings. In some cases every two or more peasants have jointly bought water-pumps. For example, in Qotb-Abad, a village near Jahrom in Fars province, after the L-R, every 3 to 5 peasant landowners jointly bought a water-pump to water their allotments. There are all together 16 water-pumps in this village which belong to a group of peasants who directly cultivate their allotments.[21] But in other cases, rich peasants have installed pumps for themselves individually.

In Sheshdangi, a village near Shiraz, rich peasants started installing motor pumps individually on shallow wells a few years before L-R. However, by 1966-67, there existed around 13 motor-pumps which watered 340 ha. of the village land. Accordingly, these motor-pump owners directly contributed to the labour-process of their holdings and cultivated mainly wheat and beetroot.[22]

Unfortunately, there are no data available to show the extent to which the peasants undertook such an investment. Yet, it appears that in some areas, especially in the southern part of Iran, many peasants have sunk wells and installed motor-pumps.

There is one further point pertinent to the borrowing/lending of means of production on the part of the peasantry. So far we have talked about *lending/borrowing of all means of production but land and water.* With regard to water, from a technical point of view, lending/borrowing is impossible; nonetheless it has not been uncommon to see some peasants selling their water-right to each other. *But renting-out land has always been uncommon among the peasantry before and after the L-R. However since the "boom" started in the urban centres in the early 1970s, some peasants unofficially have rented out their allotments to their fellow villagers and moved to the town and cities.*[23] It should be borne in mind that not all peasants have managed to rent out their allotments; as a matter of fact, in many cases, they preferred to leave the land fallow and go to the urban centres.[24]

We have already explored labour-relations within the agricultural process of production in rural Iran before L-R. We saw that many peasants, including those who worked in the *boneh* system, in the peak seasons employed wage-labourers and paid them in cash or a portion of the produce. However, after the implementation of L-R and the break down of the *boneh* system, labour-relations became capitalistic. Before L-R, within a *boneh*, while a poor peasant was exploited by the *gavband* (head of the team) he exploited labourers who were employed during the

peak season by the *boneh*. After the L-R and the break down of the *boneh* system, obviously only rich peasants were in a position to employ wage-labourers for a period of the year. We shall consider this point below when we discuss the auxiliary labour-process in which peasant owner/leaseholders are involved. However, we should note the following points: First, the labour, which is hired by the rich peasants (as well as capitalist farmers), is supplied by poor peasants holding small plots of land. Secondly, the labour also may be supplied by agricultural labourers. That is the *khoshneshins* who own/possess no means of production are one of the main sources of labour-power for the rich peasants as well as capitalist farmers. In some villages, these wage-labourers manage to get jobs in their home villages for the whole year. However, this is a rare case. In most villages, these wage-labourers work for only a short period of the year in their villages. For the rest of the year, they have either to go to some other places (rural areas as well as urban centres) or to stay in their home villages and remain unemployed. After the L-R, these wage-labourers have been faced with competition from the semi-proletariat, whose number increased by 55% after the L-R programme began (see Table XXIII).[25] Thirdly, labour-relations have not been paid sufficient attention by scholars. For example, Ajami, studying the economies of eight rich peasants (*tolombekaran*), emphasizes the role of family labour in these economies. He not only overlooks the role of the employed wage-labourers in the rich peasants' economies, but also does not examine the labour-relations pertinent to the economics of the other peasants.[26] With regard to this point, however, we believe that in social formations such as rural Iran attention should be paid to labour-relations, mainly because of their significant role in the peasantry's economy. Thus we shall examine this aspect of relations of production with regard to the different labour-processes in which peasants, land holders as well as agricultural wage-labourers, are involved. In doing so, we shall make a distinction between land holders on the one hand and

agricultural workers on the other.

Generally speaking, in agriculture, the labour-process has two main characteristics. First, a particular labour-process is not continuous over a period of one year. That is, owing to natural conditions, the production time of many grains covers a part of the year, and renewing the process involves some time until the natural conditions provide the basis for the process to be started once again. In places where double cropping is possible, this period between two processes is shorter than in those places where only single cropping is possible. Secondly, in each agricultural labour-process, the amount of labour required during production time varies from stage to stage. In some stages such as harvesting and threshing in the production of wheat, for instance, more work is required than at others.

These two characteristics cause the demand for labour to fluctuate over a period of one year. However, the fluctuations in the demand for labour are, at the same time, dependent upon the level of the development of relations and forces of production. Although in accordance with the process of mechanization, the demand for labour decreases, this decrease is accompanied by less fluctuation in the demand for labour within a production time and/or over one year.

These technical aspects of the agricultural labour-process have different effects on different classes of the peasantry. We shall therefore examine some of these effects in relation to classes in rural Iran.

Agricultural wage-labourers

The *khoshhneshin* population of rural Iran, by 1972 was around 790 thousands (see Table XXIII), of which a proportion should be considered as wage-labourers. However, it appears that the number of agricultural workers is underestimated. According to a World Bank estimate, there were, in the late 1960s, around 0.9 million agricultural labourers who

constituted 25% of the total agricultural labour force in rural Iran.[27] Hooglund states that over 80% of the *khoshneshins* are agricultural labourers, who with their families number around 6 million, i.e. one-third of the agricultural population.[28]

These agricultural labourers do not own land or any other means of production, and therefore must earn their living by selling their labour-power. As permanent vendors of labour-power, they do not have fixed jobs. In effect, this is one of the main characteristics of labour relations in rural Iran.

The permanent vendors of labour-power contribute, by their labour, to different agricultural as well as non-agricultural labour-processes. With regard to the agricultural labour-process, the demand for their labour comes from capitalist-farmers and rich peasants, who employ them during the peak seasons i.e. from about mid-May through mid-September in the most parts of the country. Obviously, by working for such a short period of time, they cannot maintain themselves and their families. The alternatives are either to find jobs in the rural areas or in the urban centres. Both cases involve temporary migration from their home villages to some other labour-markets in the rural or urban centres. For the period of the 1960s and the early 1970s, Hooglund writes that, 'migration of agricultural labourers from one village to another still seems to be more prevalent than their migration to urban areas. One possible reason is the familiarity of village life and agricultural work. However, a far more important reason must be the lack of employment opportunities in the urban centres.'[29] Migrations usually take place when the labourers have no opportunities in their home villages. Considering the above cited characteristics of the agricultural labour-process and also the low level of the development of relations and forces of production, it is reasonable to conceive that in every year, agricultural wage-labourers leave their home villages in the hope of finding jobs in some other place. The following are examples of this process.

In Qasr-Abad, a village in the neighbourhood of Shiraz, 85 out of 181 peasant families hold no land at all; and there are almost no opportunities for them to work in their village. They go to Shiraz for work.[30] Unlike Qasr-Abad, in Manioun, a village near Jahrum, all wage-labourers (24 out of 60 peasant families) work in the field or the nearby mine which belongs to the (ex) landlord.[31] These examples show two extreme, but not rare, cases. However, the most prevalent situation is that the agricultural wage-labourers work at least for a period of time in their own villages. For example, Jones writes, that there are in Hossein-Abad, a village near Haft-Tapeh in Khuzistan, some seasonal residents, who live in the village at the planting and harvesting seasons, and at other times of the year, migrate to other cities of the province, where they seek non-farm employment.[32]

In the above examples, the *khoshneshin* wage-labourers occupy only one particular position in relation to the means of production, i.e. as direct-producers who produce value and therefore surplus-value. However, in some cases, *khoshneshins* do not have a position in relation to the means of production. Thus according to Auroi, there are four grocers' shops which sell commodities such as tea, sugar, washing powder, stationary requirements, spices and the like in Shah-Abad, a village in the neighbourhood of Tehran. Their sales are small because some villagers do some shopping in Tehran. Three of these shops belong to three *khoshneshins* who work for other peasants as wage-labourers.[33]

The *khoshneshin* wage-labourers constitute the poorest class of the Iranian rural social formation. According to Hooglund, while they sustain themselves through casual jobs within and outside their home villages, they live below what would normally be considered subsistence level.[34] Yet, since the L-R programme began, the job opportunities for these labourers have been declining in the rural areas. This may be as a result of a combination of the following factors.

1. An increase in their number due to different factors such as a high

rate of birth in rural areas, dismissal of some *nasaq*-holders and the like.

2. The L-R programme, as we saw above, increased the number of small landholders. These small landholders, being capable of running their holdings by the help of family labour, only occasionally demand the labour of the *khoshneshin* wage-labourers.[35]

3. The small landholders, have not only reduced demand for wage-labourers, but also in many cases they compete with the latter in getting jobs in their home villages.[36]

4. The mechanization of agriculture (in the sense of using capital-intensive technology) by capitalist farmers, has sharply reduced the demand for labour.[37]

Small landholders or semi-proletariat

We examined the property relations and also the agricultural labour-process pertinent to the peasant landholders, regardless of their differentiation. Below we shall consider auxiliary labour-processes in which the various classes of the peasantry, particularly small landholders, are involved.

According to Table XXIII, there are over 1.1 million peasant land holders under 2 ha. Here we shall examine this class of landholders in relation to the labour-processes in which they are engaged, and try to explain why they are *semi-proletarians*.

Table XXIII shows only the number of holders in each category of land holding. However, the property relations pertinent to other means of production can be discovered by looking at Table XXVI which shows that not only do owner/leaseholders of land under 2 ha. control smaller sizes of allotments, but they also own fewer means of production than the other categories. On the other hand, our small landholders run their farms mainly by *family labour* rather than by the hired labour. Yet in some rare cases, they permanently employ wage-labourers; while in other

cases, they employ a very limited number of wage-labourers in the peak season. The peasant small holders thus have a low level of income in the overwhelming majority of cases, so low that it does not enable a peasant small holder to maintain himself and his family. Generally speaking, this situation may be considered as a result of a combination of the following three phenomena: a) the agricultural labour-process is not a continuous process (see above); b) the forces of production in rural Iran (particularly those pertinent to the peasantry) are undeveloped; and finally, c) the amount of means of production available to the small landholders are limited.

If these peasants cannot obtain a livelihood from their own agricultural means of production, they are bound to seek auxiliary employment, i.e. to sell their labour-power. This means participation in another labour-process. But this time their relationship to the means of production is very different from the previous one. They work as direct-producers entirely separated from all objective conditions of production, in addition to the fact that their labour-power has become a commodity at least for a period of the year. That is why we call them *casual vendors of labour-power.*

The technical aspects of the agricultural labour-process, backwardness of the productive forces in agriculture as well as the existence of various types of climate have enabled the poor peasants to participate in the labour-markets of rural as well as urban centres. Although there are no study or statistics to mirror the temporary migration of the poor peasants (and also wage-labourers), it is possible to conceive that this form of migration has taken place on a large scale throughout the country. Every year around 2 million poor peasants and agricultural wage-labourers, i.e. slightly less than 60% of the rural work force, seek auxiliary employment within or outside their home village. The following examples may give an idea of the various forms of auxiliary employment of the poor peasants. In Gol-Berenji, a village in the neighbourhood of

Jahrum, 80 households of the village received 40 ha. land after the L-R programme began. Thus now, each household owns half hectare of land. Accordingly, almost all of these households undertake off-farm jobs, because they are unable to obtain their livelihood from their allotments.[38] In Giga-Sar, a rice producing village in Gilan, there are two labour peaks: at transplanting and harvesting periods. For this excess demand for labour, 'the migration to the village of seasonal workers mainly from the Elburz mountains and the Zanjan area (particularly for the rice harvest in Gilan which follows the wheat harvest in the south) has been maintained and is supplemented by some return migration of villagers who have left for urban centres.'[39]

As for the rural labour market, there is the role of child labour. According to the National Census of Population and Housing, November, 1966, out of the total rural male active population, 10% were under 14 years old and another 11.4% were between 15 and 19. As for the female active population, around 61% of them were engaged in rural industries, out of which 21% were under 14 years old and another 19% were between 15 and 19.[40]

The Demand for Rural Labour

So far we have looked at the labour market from the supply side. There are around two million proletarians and semi-proletarians who sell their labour-power. However, on the other hand, there are social classes which demand this labour-power, since supply and demand presuppose the existence of different social classes.[41] The demand for the labour-power of these agents of production comes from urban and rural centres. As to the former, the demand comes from different industries but mainly from the construction industry. The demand in the rural labour market, mainly comes from two different classes: rich peasants and capitalist farmers. We shall attempt, therefore, to examine the demand of rich peasants; but with regard to the capitalist farmers, we shall examine

their demand for labour when we are studying their economies in the next section.

Rich peasants

Here once again we make an arbitrary assumption, i.e. we consider peasants holding 5 to 50 ha. of land as rich peasants. We make such an assumption on the basis of the ownership of other means of production. That is, as Table XXVI verifies, the peasants holding 5 to 50 ha. of land are distinguished from the previous category by the high percentages and averages of the ownership of animals as well as the higher percentage using tractors. On the other hand, these holders may be distinguished from the holders holding over 50 ha. of land mainly by a lower percentage of users of tractors. With regard to the ownership of animals (excluding oxen), the average ownership of these peasants is lower than the next categories, though not remarkably in some cases. But the average ownership of oxen (as draught animals) is more or less the same. However, in the rural labour market these rich peasants are mainly the buyers of labour power. They may employ wage labourers for a period and/or the whole of the year. The following cases may throw light on this aspect of the economics of rich peasants. In Sheshdangi eight rich peasants (*tolomba kars*) have rented around 232.3 ha. from a landlord; i.e. on average each peasant holds 29 ha., one-third of which is fallow in every year. Their farms are to a considerable extent mechanised. Although they use family labour, *during the peak seasons they employ wage-labourers. The labour cost*, in 1966-67, *constituted over 40% their costs per ha.*[42] In Qara-Bolagh, a village in the neighbourhood of Darab in Fars province, every few persons own a motor-pump by which they irrigate their 35 ha. farm. Accordingly, the pump owners make no contribution to the labour-process: *they have employed some poor peasants to undertake the labour-process for the production of various crops.*[43]

There are two phenomena which suggest that to consider the size of

land as the main criterion of classification of the peasantry may be occasionally misleading. These phenomena are the *fertility of land* and the *existence of dry-farming*. With regard to the former, we should note that the fertility of land varies from area to area. The more fertile lands, therefore, involve more labour. Thus in the Gorgan Plain, holders of more than four hectares employ wage-labourers at least for a period of the year.[44] The second phenomenon is the existence of dry-farming in Iran. This type involves less labour and its productivity is much lower than that of irrigated farming. These characteristics, therefore, may effect the demand for labour on these farms. Thus if over 50% of the members of this category (5-50 ha.) undertake dry-farming,[45] we should not expect them to have the same demand for labour as the holders in the above examples.

The Middle Peasantry

According to our classification, holders holding less than two hectares are considered as poor peasants; while holders holding between 5 to 50 ha. are taken as rich peasants. It follows therefore that those peasants who own/lease 2 to 5 ha. of land may be considered middle peasants. These peasants occupy around 22% of the total holdings.[46] As table XXVI verifies, the average percentage of ownership of animals in this category is situated somewhere between the other two categories. In addition, while the percentage of users of tractors in this category is substantially higher than the previous category, it is much lower than the percentage of rich peasant tractor users.

As regards the labour-relations of the middle peasantry, we may say that they rely heavily on their own family labour, as they used to do before the L-R. However, they resort to the employment of labourers in the peak seasons, particularly in the production of labour-intensive crops such as beetroot[47] and rice as well as cotton. These peasants, after the L-R, to some extent have started using new technology in their

cultivations. Since the L-R, they have increased fixed as well as fluid capital, including sinking wells, installing motor-pumps on them and using improved seeds and chemical fertilizers. Around 47% of them hired tractors for different stages of the labour-process. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the use of tractors has weakened the relationship between the middle peasants and the labour market.

The Peasantry and the Commodity Market

So far we have explained the relationship of the peasantry to the labour market as well as the market of means of production. However, there are two other markets with which different strata of the peasantry are connected, i.e. the commodity market and money market. In this section, we shall, therefore, examine these aspects of the peasant economy, first analysing the peasants' relationship to the commodity market and then going on to explain the role of the money market in the peasantry's daily life.

Any agent of production who, directly or indirectly, produces commodities, may establish a relationship with the market for consumer goods either as a buyer or seller and or both. As we shall show below all strata of the Iranian peasantry are sellers as well as purchasers of different commodities. We shall therefore, for the sake of simplicity, study these two aspects separately.

Table XXIX shows the sale of produce by the peasants according to the size of holdings, and the relatively weak integration of the peasants into the market. That is, an overwhelming majority of them sold either no produce or less than 50% of their produce in the market. However, as the table shows, different categories have different degrees of integration into the market. The weak integration into the market of these may be attributed to the following two phenomena. On the one hand, a majority of these holders cultivate staples, including wheat, barley and rice, which are consumed by peasant families; while on the other hand, a minority

of them mainly produce perishable products such as various types of vegetables, and also tea, tobacco, cotton and the like.

The second category of holders, holding between 1 and 2 ha., showed a very different orientation, although as we explained above, they have more or less the same attitude towards the labour market and the employment of new technology. As Table XXIX shows, less than 40% of them sold no produce on the market (probably the growers of staples); while the majority sold at least a portion of their produce on the market. Contrary to this category are the holdings of between 2 to 5 ha. Over 51% of the holders in this category did not supply their produce to the market. On the other hand, only 22.3% of them sold over 50% of their produce to the market. Thus this category of holders, generally speaking, has a tendency towards a "closed economy" not only in terms of supplying consumer goods to the market, but also in terms of demanding various commodities as inputs.

Formerly, we considered the two categories of holders 5 to 10 and 10 to 50 as rich peasants. This is because the peasants in these categories have similarities in property relations as well as labour relations. However, they have, as Table XXIX shows, very different positions in relation to the market for consumer goods. Thus holders of 5 to 10 ha. allotments, in general, are the least market integrated category; whereas the holders of 10 to 50 ha. allotments sell more of their produce in the market than all other categories except the holders of 1 to 2 ha.

Table XXIX shows the percentage of produce each category sold in the market, but does not show the share of each of them in market output. However, according to one estimate, holders, holding over 10 ha., supplied around 77% of the marketed output; whereas the share of holders of less than 10 ha. allotments was only 19%.[48] Comparing the latter's share with the area under their control, i.e. 32.8% of total area, one may also see the degree to which the small landholders produce staples for their own consumption.

TABLE XXIX

Sale of Produce According to Size of Holdings (%)

Size of Holding	No Sale	Less than 50% Sold	More than 50% Sold
Less than 1 ha.	55.5	25.9	18.6
1 to 2 has.	39.5	28.5	32.0
2 to 5 has.	51.1	26.6	22.3
5 to 10 has.	59.2	26.5	14.3
10 to 50 has.	48.4	28.2	23.4
50 to 100 has.	1.0	1.9	97.1
100 and over has.	3.0	0.2	96.8

Source: The Agricultural Census of Iran, 1975, Table 9.

Generally speaking, Table XXIX shows the relatively weak integration of the peasantry into the market according to the size of holdings. However, the table does not show how the peasantry is related to the market for consumer goods and how this relationship may affect its economy. We shall, therefore, examine the nature of this relationship and try to explore the effects of it on the peasant economy.

The Marketing and Distribution of Peasant Produce

Broadly speaking, there have been poor marketing and weak food distribution systems in Iran. The infrastructures are very poor and therefore many of the 50,000 villages, which are scattered throughout the country, are isolated from the market centres (in urban centres). This situation plus the specific form of class structure of the peasantry have resulted in the almost complete separation of the peasant-producers from the marketing centres: i.e. *the peasants have no influence on the mechanisms of markets in the urban centres.* Thus, 'it is in urban terminal markets where almost all marketing functions are performed and where major market infrastructures are established... The existing

marketing and distribution are ineffective mechanisms for transmitting to agricultural producers either quantitative or qualitative changes in consumer demand.'[49] However, this separation does not mean that the peasantry is disconnected to the markets for consumer goods. As we showed above, the peasantry sends a portion of its produce to the market. But, in order for this portion of produce to reach the market for consumer goods, it must pass through a chain of middlemen. There are two points, therefore, to be explained: first, the relationship between the peasantry and these middlemen and secondly, the difference between the price at the farm-gate and that in the consumer market.

With regard to the relationship between the peasantry and the middlemen, we may say that the latter buy the produce at two different times: either when the produce is harvested, or during the production cycle. In some cases, the peasant-producers sell their produce when it is harvested to the middlemen. This may be attributed to two main factors: a) in a majority of cases they cannot afford the cost of transport and distribution; b) the distribution and marketing system are, to a considerable extent, monopolized by the traders in the urban centres. Hence, even if a peasant could afford the cost of transport, he would find it hard to sell his produce in the market. The case of a peasant in Hamidieh, in Khuzistan, who tried by-pass the middlemen but failed illustrates this: '... he acted courageously and loaded his lettuces on his own truck without any assistance from Ahwaz intermediaries, and sent it directly to the Tehran market. But the protectioners of Tehran food market raked off most of the proceeds. He told us that if he had not suffered losses in this way he would have again sent his produce directly to Tehran and tried to find an opening in one of the market-places thereby increasing his profit.'[50]

The second type of deal between the intermediaries (as buyers) and the peasants (as producer/sellers) is the preharvest sale (*salaf-khari*). It has never been made clear by writers on this subject whether or not the

preharvest sale is the dominant form of the realization of the value of produce on the part of the peasantry. However, it appears that a substantial quantity of agricultural produce, every year, is sold before harvest. Preharvest sales may take place in one of the following forms. First, the trader (*salaf khar*) may make an offer, for fresh fruits, on the basis of the past performance of the orchard, prices in the previous season, quantity of fruit expected, and also the time lag between the advance of loan and the harvest. Secondly, for the grains and dry fruits, an advance is usually given on a set quantity and quality of produce; at harvest time, the buyer collects the produce. The balance between the loan and the price of produce, is recovered immediately or later depending upon the type of agreement. Thirdly, in some cases, the price of produce is not fixed in advance. The trader advances a loan on the condition that the peasant will sell the produce to him at so many rials per kilogram less than the prevailing market price. Fourthly, in some other cases, loans are granted provided sales will be made to the lenders at current prices. However, the absolute separation of the peasant-producer from the market and also the non-existence of competition among the traders, enable the latter to manipulate the prices to his own advantage. Finally, in some other cases, the local shop-keepers accept the provision of loans in the form of such goods as tea, sugar, cloth. At harvest time, the peasant-producers, in return, have to supply the lenders with their products at reduced prices.[51] The negotiation between the shop-keeper and the peasant usually takes place in late winter when the latter has run out of all his food supplies.

Lodi, whose study was carried out only few years after the L-R programme began, states that 20 to 70 percent of the total agricultural production of many crops was sold before harvest. It appears that this form of sale has continued to prevail in the rural markets in spite of the establishment of cooperatives which were supposed to help the peasants sell their produce in the market.

The establishment of multi-purpose co-operatives to by pass the middlemen has not been successful. According to the L-R laws, membership of a co-operative was a necessary condition of receiving land. Thus, all peasant landholders are supposedly members of co-operatives. On the other hand, one of the main functions of these co-operatives is concerned with the production, exchange, storage, transport, and sale of the produce of its members.[52] The co-operatives were supposed to cut out the intermediaries who imposed low prices on the peasantry. However, so far the co-operatives have failed to perform such operations in rural Iran: 'according to the statistics of the Central Organization for Rural Co-operation, during the eleven months of the year 1348 (March 1969 - February 1970) the following quantities of major products were marketed through the co-operatives: rice 13,000 tons; "grains" 5,300 tons; wheat 3,800 tons. These quantities are infinitesimal relative to the national gross production, i.e. even in the case of rice, the marketed quantity does not account for 1 percent of the nation's rice output.'[53]

Thus, owing to the poverty of the majority of peasants, a virtual separation between the peasantry and the markets for consumer goods and also the weakness of the co-operative network, the peasant landholders have had to hand over their produce to intermediaries at post-harvest or preharvest time. The category of intermediaries includes the village shopkeepers, merchants of the nearby towns, landlowners, rich peasants (in some cases), private firms, flour mill owners. These agents have invested large sums in buying and selling agricultural products, due to the fact that (as we shall discuss below) it is a profitable business. However, dealings between the peasant-producer and a middleman may take one of the following three forms. First, the peasant is provided with some commodities in return for cash or agricultural produce at harvest time (usually from the village shopkeeper); secondly, the peasant is given some cash in return for produce, i.e. pre-harvest sale; or thirdly, he may borrow some cash in return for cash and not produce. These types of

dealings involve an outflow of some value in different forms: for example, overpricing the commodities and underpricing the agricultural produce (in the first type); underpricing the agricultural produce (in the second type); and interest on loans (in the third type). We shall, therefore, examine all these cases, taking into account the question of the outflow of value from the hands of the peasant landholders.

The first case is one of the most widespread forms of provision of credit to the peasantry. For example in Kushk Hezar Qal'eh, a village in the neighbourhood of Shiraz in Fars province, many peasants are provided credit by eight shopkeepers of the village. They obtain various commodities in return for which they will pay at harvest time.[54] The peasants usually buy simple commodities such as tea, sugar and cloth. At harvest time, the customers, not only have to pay the price of goods, but also pay some money as interest. Both parts are combined in higher prices for the goods. For example in the above-cited village, the peasants pay 17% and 66% more than the people in the nearby town pay for sugar and tea respectively.[55]

In some other cases, the village shopkeeper provides the peasant with credit (to buy goods from him), in return for some produce at harvest time. The exchange, in this case, seems to be a barter type of exchange. However, the exchange is accompanied at the same time by lending/borrowing money. As in the previous case, he charges his customers an arbitrary mark up over and above the price of goods (which they buy) as profit and interest; while on the other hand, he buys agricultural products below their prices.

It appears that in the villages in the remote areas or those which are not connected to the urban centres, the shopkeepers manage to perform the functions of traders as well as money-lenders at the same time.

In the villages near towns, the shopkeepers are faced with competition from moneylenders in addition to the fact that the peasants have access to consumer markets in nearby towns.[56]

The second method, where the peasant is provided with some cash in return for produce, works as follows. The negotiation between the peasant and trader (*salaf khar*) usually takes place in late winter when the farmer has consumed all his food supplies. Already in debt, he is offered by the trader immediate cash in return for the promise of receiving a fixed measure of the crop at harvest time.[57]

Preharvest sales prices are generally much lower than the post harvest prices. Preharvest prices of wheat are 30 to 35 percent and of cotton 40 to 50 percent below post harvest prices.[58] In Tasooj, a village in the neighbourhood of Shiraz, the trader provides the peasant-vegetable growers with credit, provided they sell him their products at harvest time. Accordingly, not only are the prices manipulated by the trader, but he also takes one tenth of the total produce as interest on the credit.[59]

Money Market in Rural Iran.

In the third case, where peasants borrow money in return for money and not produce, a clearcut line between the money market and commodity market can be observed. Credit is available to the peasants from the following five sources: the village moneylenders, the middlemen, the banking system (mainly the Agricultural Credit and Rural Development Bank), the Agricultural Development Fund, and finally the rural co-operatives.[60]

The money market in the UDCs is classified into two different submarkets: organized and unorganized markets.[61] Following this classification, we may consider the first two sources, i.e. moneylenders and middlemen as being within the category of unorganized money market; while the latter three sources, which are state owned financial bodies, constitute the organized money market in rural Iran. We shall, therefore, base our argument on this classification.

First, there is almost no direct connection between the organized and unorganized money markets:there is no transfer of loanable funds from

one market to another. On the other hand, there is virtually no competition between these two markets to enable the borrowers to have bargaining power *vis-a-vis* moneylenders and traders. It is one of the reasons for which we have two different ranges of interest rates. The interest rates in the organized money market range from 6% (by co-operatives) to 14% (by commercial banks); whereas this range is between 15 and over 100% in the unorganized money market.[62] Secondly, according to a study, in 1963, 17.6% of the credit, acquired by the peasants, was obtained from co-operatives, and 26.6 from the Agricultural Bank, while the rest was obtained from the private sources.[63] Table XXX illustrates the share of these two markets during 1963-72. Thirdly, borrowing from

TABLE XXX

Share of Credit Sources in the Rural Money Market of Iran 1963-72

Source	Amount (billion Rs)	%
Agricultural Co-operative Bank	9.0	13.6
Rural Co-operatives	6.0	9.0
Agricultural Development Fund	0.4	0.6
Tea Board & Other Institutions	5.1	7.8
Commercial Banks	13.2	20.0
Subtotal: Organized Money Market	33.7	51.0
Non-Institutional Credit	32.3	49.0
TOTAL	66.0	100.0

Source: FAO, 1975.

one source, in one of the markets, does not prevent the peasant from borrowing from other sources. In fact, the majority of peasants have taken out more than one loan. They often borrow from moneylenders or traders (preharvest sales) every year in order to repay official loans

from co-operatives.

The Unorganized Money Market

Our main criterion for distinguishing the unorganized money market from the organized one, is the source of credit. That is, while institutionalized organizations act within the organized money market, within the unorganized one private persons, such as moneylenders, traders, shopkeepers and rich peasants,are the sources of credit.

As in many other UDCs, the unorganized money market plays an important role in rural Iran. Thus according to Table XXX, around 50% of the amount of credit during 1963-72 was provided by the unorganized money market. It appears that in the Iranian unorganized rural money market, moneylenders and traders-cum-moneylenders, play the main role; while to a lesser extent the peasant borrowers can borrow from rich peasant relatives and the like.

All studies agree that all peasants (especially the poor one) are in debt to at least more than one institution or person. In almost all the villages of Fars and Kirman, visited by the G.O.P.F. groups, the peasants were heavily in debt to their co-operatives on the one hand and to moneylenders and/or traders on the other.[64] Obviously the demand for loans, by the peasants, is governed by the necessity to keep their farms in operation and their families alive. Hooglund attributes the need for borrowing mainly to the latter factor and points out that 'some 70% of all peasants farm less than five has. of land annually. Except in the Caspian sea area, five has. is not sufficient to provide a peasant family with more than the barest subsistence livelihood in Iran.'[65] The other factor, which pushes the peasants towards moneylenders in rural Iran, is the limited amount of credit available to them in the organized money market. E.g. in rural Fars, many peasants, while appreciating the easy conditions of loans from co-operatives, alleged that these loans were insufficient for their cash needs.[66]

In order to take advantage of such a situation, moneylenders offer immediate cash to the peasants. They make advances usually from sowing to harvest time, or for some period in between the two. Yet, in some cases, peasants may borrow money even before sowing. The moneylender may live in the village or run his business in the nearby town. Yet he knows, perhaps better than anyone else, what is going on in the village. In addition, he knows the peasant borrowers personally, that is as Wai points out, 'the relationship between borrower and lender is not only that of debtor and creditor but also an integral part of a much wider socio-economic pattern of village life.'[67] Thus, more often than not, conventional forms of collateral are not required.

The above situation has enabled particular moneylenders to monopolize particular villages or areas. However, in cases in which commercial and usury capitals are combined, we may see more than a single trader in any single village.[68] Furthermore, there are two factors which reinforce the monopoly position of the moneylenders. First, according to Bottomley, the borrower's personal knowledge of any particular moneylender plays an important role in borrowing from that particular moneylender due to the illiteracy of the majority of the peasant borrowers. The second factor is pertinent to the specific characteristic of the unorganized money markets in the UDCs, that is these markets in the UDCs are scattered over the rural sector and there is very little contact between the lenders and borrowers in different localities.[69] Thus a typical moneylender or trader is either an imperfect or an outright monopolist.

Generally speaking, the monopoly positions of the moneylender, the lack of communication between the different rural money markets, the dire needs of the peasantry for credit as well as their illiteracy have enabled the moneylenders to demand high rates of interest within a wide range. Thus the rates of interest in the Iranian unorganized money market range from 15 to over 100%. With regard to the trader-cum-money-lenders, the situation is more or less the same. They buy agricultural

products, on the basis of preharvest contracts, 30 to 70% below their prices at harvest time; while on the other hand, they sell their commodities to the peasant consumers up to 66% over the market prices in the nearby towns.

The Organized Money Market

We have briefly examined the credit situation in the Iranian unorganized rural money market. According to the rough estimates in Table XXX, non-institutional bodies provided around 49% of credit during 1963-72, and the rest was granted by the private as well as state owned banks and co-operatives. We shall therefore make an attempt to examine the provision of credits by those organized bodies in relation to the peasantry.

As Table XXX shows, around 51% of loans were provided by the organized money market. Yet the table does not illustrate the share of the peasantry out of the total of 33.7 billion rials credit. However, not all of these bodies provide the peasantry with loans. That is, out of the five categories of organizations within the organized money market, it is only the rural co-operative whose main function is to supply the peasantry with loans. Some other bodies, such as the Tea Board and sugar processing factories, usually make contracts with peasants under which they provide the peasant-producers with some cash before harvest time. In addition, commercial banks play a limited financial role in connection with the peasantry in the organized money market. Table XXX does not therefore illustrate the real amount of credit available to the peasantry. The other misleading point in the table is that a major portion of loans granted by the Agricultural Co-operative Bank of Iran, goes usually to rural co-operatives.[70] It means that a high portion of 9.0 billion rials, which has been granted to the rural co-operatives, is counted twice in the table: once under the category of the Agricultural Co-operative Bank and next time under the Rural Co-operatives category.

We should therefore bear in mind that there are rural co-operatives, among all other bodies, which are solely concerned with the provision of credit to the peasantry, while others such as the Agricultural Development Fund and Agricultural Co-operative Bank, have nothing to do with the peasantry. It follows also that the non-institutional bodies play a more important role in the peasants' economies than the organized bodies to which we now turn.

Rural Co-operatives as the Main Source of Credit

We have already noted that L-R programmes are usually accompanied by some supplementary measures to reinforce the "newly established" relations of production. One of the most common of these measures is the establishment of multi-purpose co-operatives. Thus a note to Article 16 of the Iranian L-R law specifies that 'only persons who are members of the co-operative will be eligible for land under the land distribution law.' In theory therefore a co-operative was to be set up wherever land was transferred. Table XXXI, below, illustrates the establishment of co-operative societies during 1966-75. Up to 1972, 8,361 co-operative societies were set up which comprised over two million peasants. However, by that year the State officials decided to merge the small co-operatives; hence we see a sharp decrease in the number of co-operatives, while the number of members, the societies' capital and the total amount of loans have increased. Before examining the advance of loans by co-operatives, we should draw attention to the following four points:

First, in theory, the co-operatives are supposed to perform various functions including the following: operations concerned with the production, exchange, storage, transport, and sale of the produce of the members; the provision of agricultural implements and machinery, pesticides, and fertilizers; the provision of primary necessities such as foodstuffs, fuel, clothing, etc.; the purchase of the agricultural produce of the members, or its storage and sale; the giving of loans to members to tide them over

TABLE XXXI

Number of Co-operatives, their Capital, Number and Amount of Loans 1967-76

		1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1)	No. of Societies	8236	8388	8102	8298	8450	8361	2717	2847	2858	
2)	No. of Members*	1087	1260	1400	1606	1754	2065	2263	2488	2685	
3)	Capital**	1270	1939	1984	2379	2769	3329	3857	4677	5690	
4)	No. of Loans*	559	673	739	844	903	876	1174	1251	1646	1771
5)	Total Amount of Loans**	5024	4077	5041	5753	6314	6812	10072	12372	19744	24723
6)	% of Members Obtained Loans	51	53	52	52	48	42	52	50	61	
7)	Average Amount of Each Loan	8987	6057	6821	6816	6992	7776	8579	9889	11995	

* Thousand

** Million rials

Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1976

the period until they sell their crops and to provide what they need for the cultivation of their crops, and where necessary, sums for the improvement of the means of production; to accept deposits from the members; and finally, to obtain credit. In other words, the Iranian peasants were supposed to have multi-purpose co-operatives. But in practice, they have become single-purpose co-operatives: they are mainly involved in supplying their members with loans.

Secondly, it appears that the data on the numbers of co-operatives may be exaggerated, i.e. some of these societies never really came into existence. Thus according to a UN report, 'by December 1963, nearly 2200 co-operative associations had been formed, but it is certain that many of these were co-operatives in name only, their sole function being to enable the tenant recipients of redistributed land formally to conform with the requirements of the law.'[71]

Thirdly, at the administrative level, the co-operatives are under the control of a central body called the Central Organization for Rural Co-operatives (CORC). The main functions of CORC are the promotion of co-operatives, guidance, auditing, training of staff, members' education and the provision of finance, supplies and marketing. This organization has thirteen offices at provincial level and ninety-five offices at district level. Each district office has four to six area supervisory teams whose main function is auditing the accounts of co-operatives. Generally a team supervises 10 to 15 co-operatives.

Fourthly, loans are advanced usually for a period of ten months, however the maximum period is one year, and rate of interest 6% per annum. CORC has laid down that new loans should not be advanced to members by a society until all members had repaid their existing loans. Lambton considers this regulation as 'an essential principle if thrift and responsibility are to be encouraged.'[72] However, in practice this regulation has directed the members of co-operatives to borrow from other sources (mainly moneylenders/traders) to repay their debts to co-operatives.

It means that the majority of the peasants are in debt, round the year, either to their co-operatives or to the moneylenders; and borrow from one source to pay back their debts to the other one.[73]

The number of co-operatives increased sharply during the 1960s and the early 1970s: by 1962 there existed slightly over two thousand co-operatives[74], while as Table XXXI shows, their number increased to 8361 in 1972. In accordance with the expansion of the co-operatives, the number of members also increased: they increased by less than 2.5 times during the period 1966-74. The rate of increase in the total amount of loans was more or less the same during this period, i.e. it increased from over 5 to over 12.3 million rials. This resulted in an almost fixed percentage of the receivers of loans in these years. That is, in three years only around 50% of members managed to obtain loans from their co-operatives. It appears that many peasants are unhappy with this situation. Many peasants of Fars and Kirman, for example, have complained that although the conditions of co-operatives' loans are very good, only a limited number of members manage to obtain loans every year.[75]

In addition to the limited numbers of loans, the amount of each loan is limited. In the last row of Table XXXI, the average amount for each year is computed: there is a decrease in this amount from 1967 to 1968, due to an increase in the number of members and a decrease in the total amount of loans. However, from 1968 up to 1971, the amount is more or less stable; but after this year, we can see a regular increase in the average amount of loans every year. We should note that in 1975, not only did the average amount of loans increase, but also a higher percentage of the members (61%) obtained loans. These changes after 1972-73 may be attributed to the changes in the agricultural economic policy of the State. With the increasing rate of migration of the peasants from the rural areas, due to the "prosperity" in the urban centres, the State undertook measures, including increasing the availability of credit, to encourage the peasants to stay in their home villages and cultivate. Table XXXI shows the average

amount of each loan for various years. Yet, these loans are not granted among the peasant-members equally. According to CORC's regulations, members can receive loans up to ten times their investment shares in the society, with an upper limit of 10000 which later on increased to 20000 rials. In addition, rich peasants are usually elected as members of the board of directors. This board has the power of allocating funds to the co-operative members. Consequently, not only are the rich peasants allowed, legally, to obtain larger loans, but they also give priority to themselves rather than poor peasants in allocating loans among the members. This is the reason why many peasants in Fars and Kirman provinces have complained about the distribution of loanable funds.[76] The co-operative system in Iran, therefore, has been reinforcing the differentiation of the peasantry rather than strengthening co-operation among them.

The Agricultural Co-operative Bank of Iran

The other source of credits for the peasantry, is the Agricultural Co-operative Bank of Iran. Table XXXII indicates the bank's activities between 1966-75. As can be seen, from 1967 onward current account expenditures, and livestock breeding and animal husbandry have constituted the main categories of the total loans advanced by the bank. The latter category is mainly concerned with agents of production other than the peasants. We therefore concentrate on the former.

It appears that the Agricultural Co-operative Bank of Iran extends credits in two different ways: indirectly through the CORC, and directly through its own branches. However, the bank acts mainly through the co-operatives, thus for example in 1971, 67% of the amount of the extended loans was advanced through the co-operatives.[77] The Bank's direct credit activities may be seen mainly in those areas where the co-operatives either are very weak or do not exist at all.

The interest rate of the Agricultural Co-operative Bank is 6%, and the bank advances short, medium as well as long term credits. However, as can

TABLE XXXII

Distribution of Credit Extended by the Agricultural Co-operative Bank of Iran (%)

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Current Agricultural Expenditures*	33.9	46.5	49.2	44.1	78.0	80.6	63.7	62.3	51.1	54.1
Credit in Current Account	35.1	8.5	7.5	3.4	7.6	1.4	2.3	-	2.5	0.7
Irrigation	12.4	10.4	7.7	4.1	1.0	0.9	2.7	2.3	4.5	4.3
Garden & Nurseries	7.0	8.4	7.1	6.4	1.4	1.6	3.5	5.0	5.1	6.5
Rural Construction	4.2	6.4	6.9	6.8	1.4	3.0	2.9	4.0	4.0	2.6
Livestock breeding and Animal Husbandry	2.7	16.0	17.9	28.2	9.8	6.0	20.5	22.0	27.2	18.8
Others	4.7	3.8	3.7	7.0	0.8	6.5	4.4	4.4	5.6	13.0
Total (million rials)	5168	5188	5290	5415	8909	9582	14381	19993	31116	35295

* Including loans granted to the C.O.R.C. every year.

Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1976, p. 239.

be seen in Table XXXII, short term loans during 1966-75 have constituted a high proportion of the total loans extended by the bank. In order to extend these short-term (seasonal) loans directly the bank has maintained some mobile units, each of which is composed of an agricultural credit specialist, an accountant and a cashier. These seasonal loans are advanced against a surety of two persons with good credit.[78] However, since 1970, according to Rudulph, this bank has tended to give short-term loans only to the co-operatives.

As to the commercial banks, their activities have been very limited in the rural areas. In addition, they advance medium and long term loans mainly to big agriculturalists, processors, merchants as well as the exporters of agricultural goods. However, three banks, Bank Melli, Bank Saderat and Bank Omran, are the most active in extending loans to the peasants.[79]

As Table XXX shows, in addition to the financial institutions, some other non-financial institutions advance loans to the agricultural-producers. Of the more important of these institutions we mention the Tea Board and Sugar Processing Factories. These bodies usually provide the small peasant cultivators with some credit before harvest time, provided the latter sell their products to them. However, as Table XXX shows, their activities are very limited in comparison to the total loans advanced in the organized and unorganized money market.

So far we have examined the various sources from which the peasantry may obtain credits. However we have no data to show the exact nature of their use. Table XXXII illustrates the distribution of credits (of the Agricultural Co-operative Bank of Iran) according to their use. Yet, the main category, i.e. current agricultural expenditures, is unclear in the sense that the data do not show the shares of personal and productive consumption in this category.

Considering that almost all of the peasants (poor and middle in particular) borrow short-term loans from the organized as well as unorganized

money market, we may not consider these credits as an attempt, on the part of the recipients, at investment in the land. This is because, on the one hand a high proportion of the loans received are used for non-productive consumption. Thus according to an estimate, 'only 48% of the borrowed money was used for agricultural purposes - the rest helped to finance the acquisition of domestic consumption goods. In the south, namely in Bandar Abbas, similar investigations in (1967) revealed that 30% of credit obtained by farmers in the sample helped finance their ordinary consumption; ...'[80] The permanent indebtedness of these peasants to the co-operatives as well as trader/moneylenders, indicates that they are short of cash for their current expenditures. Their agricultural economy seems to be a type of simple reproduction economy. With regard to the part of the year during which they work on their own allotments, they work only to pay their debts and provide necessities for their families (for part of the year only). This situation, generally speaking, does not leave them any surplus to be used for accumulation purposes. However, in some cases, some peasants have obtained medium-term loans from banks or co-operatives for investment purposes. For example, there are cases in Fars province, in which peasants have obtained short or medium loans for sinking wells and installing motor-pumps.[81]

To summarise this discussion, we can say that, after the L-R programme began, the State took some measures to reinforce capitalist relations of production among the peasantry. One of the main measures was the establishment of multi-purpose co-operatives. These co-operatives have, to a *limited extent*, succeeded in taking the place of landlords and moneylenders in the provision of credits and that of the traders in purchasing the products. The co-operatives' activities have been limited, because most of them 'have been too poorly funded, their credit terms too restrictive, and the prices paid to farmers too low to encourage expanded production or to relieve the farmer of a traditional dependence on non-institutional moneylenders. With only limited marketing facilities and

frequently severe shortage of storage and transport, only a small fraction of Iran's agricultural product is presently moved through rural co-operatives.'[82] The direct consequence of the failure in the co-operative movements may be seen in Table XXXIII, which illustrates the shares of various sources of credits in different parts of Iran. Furthermore, with regard to marketing, the co-operatives have still been less successful than in the provision of credits. Thus when in the summer 1977, I visited Kallaj, Siahpush and Qasem-Abad, three villages near Manjil, I was told that almost all peasant landholders had to sell their products to some intermediaties before harvest time at one-third of the prices in the urban markets. According to an official report from Azarbaijan, almost all peasants had to resort to preharvest sales, due to the shortage of money which was not covered by the co-operatives.[83]

TABLE XXXIII

Sources of Credit to the Peasantry in the Late 1960s (%)

	Co-ops.	Agri. Bank	Others	Land-Owner	Money-Lenders
Qasr-e Shirin	43	13	0.5	-	43.5
Sanandaj	39	18	-	0.6	42.4
Golpayegan	19	29	9.0	0.4	42.6
Garmsar	37	3	1.5	-	58.5
Sari	31	6	11.0	0.9	51.1
Hamadan	45	4	7.0	0.1	43.9
Birjand	41	20	-	0.4	38.6

Source: Denman 1973, p. 201.

With the failure of the co-operatives and other State bodies in the provision of sufficient credit for the peasantry, we have a situation in which a large number of producers, as the owner/possessors of the objective conditions of production, confront usury/merchant capital. Usury/merchant

capital is penned in the sphere of circulation and therefore sets limits on industrial capital. In our case, usury/merchant capital has tried to maintain its position in the sphere of circulation without altering the labour-process. In other words, it has made no attempt to take over the labour-process, separate the direct-producers from their conditions of production, and therefore subordinate them to capital. Instead, usury/merchant capital, as a general rule, has impoverished the peasantry, paralysed the productive forces and consequently has perpetuated the miserable conditions in which the social productivity of labour remains undeveloped.[84] By doing so, in effect, usury/merchant capital has inhibited the development of capitalism along the "American" path.

B. The Economics of Capitalist Farmers

We have so far, examined some aspects of peasant economies in rural Iran. However, as has already been explained, the L-R programme induced some landlords to shift to capitalist farming. In effect, these two processes of development have gone on side by side. According to our classification criteria landlords of 50 has. and over are considered as capitalist farmers. In terms of numbers, these holdings constitute only 1% of the total holdings, but this tiny percentage of holders, have occupied over 21% of the area under cultivation (see Table XXV).

In the majority of cases, these landowners operate their farms directly, i.e. they are landlords as well as capitalist farmers. They therefore collect profit and rent simultaneously. According to *The Agricultural Census of Iran, 1975*, around 16% of these landowners have rented out their farms to other persons. These two categories of landholders, not only own much more land than the other categories, but they are also distinguished from other categories in terms of the ownership of some of the other means of production and subsistence. As can be seen

in Table XXVI, the average ownership of cows and sheep by these two categories is much higher than those of other categories. But they do not own more oxen, on average, than other smaller landholders. This is because oxen in rural Iran are employed as a source of energy for ploughing, winnowing, threshing and the like; while these capitalist farmers mainly use machinery as a source of energy. Over 90% of these holdings employed machinery for cultivation (see Table XXVI). As a matter of fact, after the L-R programme began, many capitalist farmers shifted to mechanized farming; hence during 1967-75 as many as 40237 tractors were sold by the Organization for Development of Agricultural Machinery.[85]

We have no data available to show the share of these capitalist farmers out of the total 40237 tractors sold by the above mentioned organization. Yet, it appears that, leaving aside corporations and agribusiness units, a large percentage of the tractors sold belong to capitalist farmers. They not only use their machinery for themselves, but also, as we have already explained, rent it out to small landholders.[86] For example in Qasem-Abad, a village in the neighbourhood of Manjil, in the summer 1977 a capitalist farmer, who cultivated over 200 ha. of irrigated land, stated that he used to borrow tractors for ploughing and harvesting from an outsider. But in 1974, he bought a tractor and all other supplementary implements necessary for cultivation. He did not say whether or not he rented out his tractor to the local peasants.[87]

However, the process of mechanization has affected labour-relations in rural Iran. We have already shown that the demand for labour power in the rural labour market stems from the capitalist farmers. The farmers who run mechanized farms, employ the local peasants and *khoshneshin* wage-labourers only for a period of the year. The reason for such fluctuation in demand has been earlier attributed to the nature of the production cycle in agriculture. For example, the ex-landlord of Shah-Abad, a village near Tehran, who has become engaged directly in agricultural activities, employs the local peasants (his ex-subjects) as

well as non-local wage-labourers during the peak seasons.[88] In many villages of Fars the peasants stated that they manage to work for a period of the year on the (ex)landlords farms, and for the rest of the year had to go to other areas to seek jobs.[89] It appears that these capitalist farmers employ only a few permanent wage-labourers:the capitalist farmer of Qasem-Abad, a village near Manjil, for instance, told me that he has employed only one permanent wage-labourer. He performs a variety of jobs including driving the tractor, irrigating the farm, taking care of plants, etc. However, the capitalist farmer employs workers seasonally (local and non-local). For example, in August 20, 1977, he stated that he would employ some workers within the month to collect potatoes and onions which he had in his farm. Yet, he stated that, since the time that he had bought his tractors and all relevant implements, he employed fewer labourers than he used to do. Finally, the two capitalist farmers of Madavan, a village near Darab in Fars province, own a tractor, a combine and seven motor-pumps; they cultivate an 82 ha. farm. Despite the large size of their farm, they employ only a few permanent wage-labourers particularly for watering the farm. At harvest time these two capitalist farmers employ more wage-labourers (including some women).[90]

In the previous chapters, we have stated that one of the main characteristics of the agricultural sector in a capitalist social formation, is the existence of a large number of small landowners who are semi-proletarians. In analysing such a situation in Iran, we examined the fluctuations on the supply (of labour-power) side: i.e. the semi-proletarian, *ceteris paribus*, comes to the labour market when he has finished with his cultivation. On the demand (of labour-power) side we may see some fluctuations, during a year, which coincide with the changes in the supply of labour. Thus the capitalist farmer of Qasem-Abad stated that there was a shortage of labour, because this was the harvest time of the area. Accordingly, in September, namely,when the local as well as non-local peasants finish with their cultivation, he employs some of them to do harvesting and related activities.

In the villages, where the ex-landlords have managed to maintain their positions as the main landowners after the L-R, they are the main buyers of labour-power. Thus at the village level, any given capitalist farmer has a monopsony position in the labour market of the village. It is reasonable therefore to say that, *ceteris paribus*, they use their bargaining power to keep down the level of wages and at the same time to prolong the working-day. Thus Hooglund points out that 'working hours are usually long, lasting from dawn to sunset with a two-hour lunch and rest at noontime. For such a day an experienced man earns between 60 to 90 rials, women and children receive from ½ to two-thirds this amount.'[91] There is a factor which has reinforced the monopsony of these capitalist farmers. That is, the competition on the one hand between the local *khoshneshin* wage-labourers and local semi-proletariat, and on the other hand between local and temporary migrants. We have already examined the competition between the *khoshneshin* wage-labourers and semi-proletariat. However, with regard to the latter groups, the following two cases may shed light on this question.

In the first case, local wage-labourers of Shah-Abad compete with the Azarbaijani migrants who go to that village in March and stay the whole working season there. They are preferred by the capitalist farmer because they work harder and are ready to accept lower wages.[92] In the second case, the local peasants alleged that the capitalist farmer (ex-landlord) of Mozafarry (a village in the neighbourhood of Shiraz) who owns 1000 ha. of village's land, usually employs non-local wage-labourers, while their local counterparts are unemployed.[93]

However, the potential monopsony position of the capitalist farmers in the local labour market is weakened by other employment opportunities which are available to the labourers in the rural as well as urban labour markets. After 1973, the gap between the wage-levels in the rural and urban labour markets widened. In prosperous rural areas a farm labourer could earn around 300 rials a day as compared with a semi-skilled

labourer who obtained as much as 1000 rials per day in one of the urban industrial projects.[94] During the summer of 1977, I saw a similar difference between the two wage levels: while a labourer was paid 500 rials in Qasem-Abad, his fellow villagers could obtain between 1000-1200 rials in Qazvin or Tehran. This wide gap between wage levels obviously induced a large number of proletarians and semi-proletarians to seek jobs in the urban centres. The immediate consequence of this flight was a shortage of labourers in almost all rural labour markets. For example, I was told by the local people of Siahpush and Kallaj that almost two-thirds of the population of these villages had gone to the urban centres. The migrant population was mainly comprised of men aged between 15 and 55. These villages as well as Qasem-Abad were therefore at that time short of labour-power: the capitalist farmer in Qasem-Abad, who was digging a deep well (in summer 1977) stated that he had to leave the operation unfinished, due to the shortage of labourers.[95]

The flight of the vendors of labour-power strongly affected the monopsony bargaining power of the capitalist farmers in the rural labour market. Nonetheless, it is not economic for the latter to pay as high wages as the employers do in the urban centres. Having been faced with such a problem, it appears that some capitalist farmers shifted to more capital-intensive farming methods and the cultivation of crops which need less labour. In my visit in 1977 to the three villages mentioned in the neighbourhood of Manjil, I came across two such cases. Thus in the same way that the low level of wages could block the process of mechanization, the high level of wages accompanied by the shortage of labour may speed up this process.

The dominant form of payment of wages is in cash. This holds good especially with the non-local vendors of labour-power. However, it appears that in some cases, payment in kind takes place in the same way as it used to be paid before L-R.[96] Even in the Gorgan plane, which has been the leading region in mechanization, such cases persist. For

example, the employers (peasants as well as capitalist farmers) employed labourers on the basis of a wage-labour system. In some cases, in order to reduce the number of labourers, they assigned a certain plot of land after sowing, to individual labourers, who were responsible for all work up to harvesting and in return were promised a share of the crop as their wages. The labourers received usually one-third or one-fifth of the produce. In this way the employers increased the productivity of labour.[97] Finally, with regard to the Varamin area, in the south of Tehran, Gharachedaghi points out that in spite of the fact that the share-cropping system is prohibited by the L-R law of January 1963, 'this form is still applied among owner-operator farmers and landlords on the one hand and on the other hand by their share-croppers in the villages distributed, as well as in neighbouring villages still owned by landlords.'[98]

In addition to the investment in agricultural machinery and the employment of wage-labourers, capitalist farmers have been investing in other fields pertinent to the agricultural labour-process. For example, in order to provide sufficient water for their farms, they have sunk deep wells and/or installed motor-pumps on the nearby rivers and it appears that many of them have been concerned with the provision of water by means of new technology.[99] In the case of the above mentioned Qasem-Abad capitalist farmer, he used to use the water behind the Sefidrood dam. He owned three motor-pumps, and had to pay 5000 rials per motor-pump per year to the State for using the water. However, in the summer of 1977, since the lake behind the Sefidrood dam had shifted far away from his farm, it was no longer possible for him to use that source for irrigation. He was therefore digging a semi-deep well and hoped to have it ready for the next year.[100] Generally speaking, in accordance with the employment of machinery and new methods of farming, all the agricultural producers in general and capitalist farmers in particular have tended to shift from the traditional irrigation system, *qanat*, to the modern system including wells as well as dams.

Furthermore, the landholders holding over 50 ha. use chemical fertilizers which in 1975 constituted almost 50% of the total fertilizers used by the two categories of landlords. While they occupied over 21% of the cultivated area under their control in 1975, they used around 23.2% of the total consumed fertilizers; whereas landholders of less than one hectare with 1.6% of the total cultivated area under their control, used 14.5% of the total consumed chemical fertilizers.[101]

Finally, with regard to the market for consumer goods, these two categories of holders, have the most market oriented economies. Thus as Table XXIX shows, only a tiny percentage of these landholders sold no produce at all; while over 96% of them sold more than 50% of products, nor do many of them resort to preharvest sales, but sell their crops through traders or middlemen.[102]

To sum up, we may say that capitalist farmers have occupied over 21% of the total cultivated area (see Table XXVIII). They operate their farms by machinery and the employment of wage-labourers. They produce mainly for the market and to a lesser extent resort to borrowing from the local moneylenders. They invest their capital in machinery, digging wells and the like and in the recent years have shifted to more capital intensive techniques, due to the shortage and high cost of labour.

C. Pauperization of the Peasantry

Above, we examined two trends of development of capitalism in the Iranian rural social formation. First we examined the development of peasant capitalism and then that of capitalist farmers. Our discussion showed that these two trends are not exclusive alternative ways of development of the CMP. On the contrary, our explanation of property as well as labour relations clearly showed that these two trends are

articulated. One of the main aspects of this articulation is the existence of a large number of dwarf holdings whose owners for a certain period of the year sell their labour-power to the large landowners. In other words, development through the "American" and "Prussian" ways has been going on side by side since the implementation of L-R programme began.

However, the development of these two trends side by side has been accompanied by a form of struggle by each to dominate the other. This struggle which stems from the struggle between the peasantry on the one hand and the capitalist farmers on the other has taken place in different forms since the L-R programme reinforced the process of capitalist development in the rural Iran. In this section we shall therefore examine the different forms of the struggle between these two trends.

The Separation of the peasantry from the land

This form of pauperization of the peasantry had been taking place during the whole period of 1961-78 in various parts of the country.

We may classify them into two categories. The first embraces the evictions of peasants which took place during the implementation of the L-R programme; while the second concerns such evictions after the completion of land distribution.

We have already considered some of the ways in which landlords evicted their subjects from their positions in possession of land. However, generally speaking, the peasants' separation from the land took one of the following forms during the process of the implementation of the L-R programme. First, in some cases, the landlords used a "legal loophole" and claimed that the land was mechanized and was run by wage-labourers. For example, in Tassooj, a village near Shiraz in Fars province, the landlord claimed 200 ha. of his land as a mechanized farm and the peasants, due to their ignorance of their rights, affirmed this point when the L-R officials went to the village to distribute the land between the landlord and peasants.[103] Secondly, in other cases, the

landlords took advantage of the ignorance of their subjects. For example, in Darzin, a village in the neighbourhood of Bam in Kirman province, the landlord asked some 15 peasants to sign a document according to which they had no right of *nasaq* in that village. Consequently, none of these peasants received any land at all.[104] Thirdly, it appears that the ignorance accompanied by poverty of the peasantry played an important role in this respect. Thus, for example,:'in Turbat-e Haydari in 1965 large numbers of peasants were selling their rights, some under pressure, but many simply out of poverty... because their holdings were too small and too poor to afford a living. In some districts, notably Darab, many of the landowners persuaded the peasants to sell their rights, making promises to them that they would continue to employ them on the land as before.'[105]

The expropriation of land from the peasants after L-R, took place in two different ways. First, expropriation in order to establish agribusiness units and corporations; we shall consider this form in the next chapter, and secondly, the expropriation for private persons or public institutions. With regard to the latter type, as the following examples show, the expropriators, backed by the Army, bureaucracy as well as the royal family, managed to remove the peasants from their home villages by force.

In the neighbourhood of Gonbad-e Kavoos, in Turkaman Sahra, the peasants used to use a pasture for grazing their animals. However, later on, the Ministry of War decided to establish a "stable" for the royal family. In doing so, the officials not only occupied the pasture, but also took over small plots which belonged to the peasants of "Haji Larghola" and "Pooly Haji". In this way, after a short time the officials managed to prepare 500 ha. of land for the establishment of a "stable". But surprisingly, this "stable" turned into one of the Shah's 'large and fully mechanized' farms! In other cases, in the same area, influential people, including army generals, politicians and also merchants, rented lands from the local peasant-producers, but never returned them. In 1970,

the building of the Voshmgir Dam was finished. However, not only were the local peasants living around the dam deprived of using the water, but they also lost their dwarf allotments. The special force (of the Army) occupied the area, removed the peasants from the land and established a large farm for itself.[106] In another case in east Azerbaijan, a large area was considered as the royal family's hunting area. The people of "Golkharj", "Meikard", "Shah Mar", "Kolieh Dagha", "Margan", "Siabaz" and "Shoja 'baz" in this area were forced to move out of their villages. According to this report, these people totalled around ten thousand.[107] Finally, in another case, one of the members of the royal family bought a small plot in "Aresoo", a village near Sirjan in Kirman province. Later on, he banned the local peasants from irrigating their farms from the sole water source in the village. In this way the local peasants were urged to sell their allotments and leave their home village. Accordingly, the landed property of this member of the royal family has been extended to "Boloord" a village nearby to the first one.[108]

In these two cases, the direct-producers were separated from the land by force and were thrown onto the labour market. In the former case, the landlords freed their subjects in a double sense: from the old relations of bondage and servitude; while in the latter case, direct-producers were separated from the land after they had been freed from feudal subordination.

The opportunity for choosing the best lands

As already been indicated, according to the second article of the L-R laws, the landlords were given the opportunity to choose their land. It is reasonable to conceive therefore that almost all those landlords who retained their ownership over part of their estates, chose the best and the most fertile lands. In effect, the law gave the landlords an opportunity to remove some of their peasants to the "poor lands". The following cases support this argument.

According to the provisions of the second stage of L-R, Zigard, a village in the neighbourhood of Shiraz in Fars province, was divided between the landlord on the one hand and some 27 peasant *nasaq*-holders on the other. Out of the total 180 ha. of land, the landlord received 111 ha., while the peasants altogether obtained some 69 ha. of land. Still more, the landlord chose the best and most fertile parts of the village.[109]

In Qasem-Abad, the village's capitalist farmer told me more or less the same story about the distribution of his land. It was two years after the distribution of his lands that he realized that he could have chosen other parts of his village. In order to obtain these parts, he stated that, he had to act in two different ways. Firstly, he had to change the property deeds of land in the village. According to him, by bribing some L-R official, he managed to change these documents according to his own wishes. Secondly, he had to deal with the peasants. Obviously, some factors such as the ignorance of the peasant *nasaq*-holders of their rights, a long period of domination of the landlord over them, as well as some sort of "mutual understanding" between the landlord and the village headman, helped him. Thus his former peasant *nasaq*-holders had to occupy the poorer parts of the village land.[110]

Thus we see that on the one hand the L-R programme gave land to the *nasaq*-holders and created a large number of small landowners and therefore released the forces for the development of peasant capitalism. But on the other hand, it took the above cited measure for the capitalist farmers to impoverish these peasant landowners.

The nationalization of the forest

Iran's forests during the past centuries have been devastated through population pressure by pasture, charcoal-burning and other forms of over-utilization. However, one of the 12 points of the Shah's "White Revolution" was the nationalization of the country's forests. It was

supposedly aimed at preventing the further destruction of the forests. In doing so, the State took over the ownership of 18 million hectares of forest lands and 10 million hectares of rangelands; and a state owned body, the forest organization, became fully responsible for these lands. Furthermore, later on attempts were made to arrest soil erosion and its adverse effects especially in the watersheds behind large dams.[111]

This developmental programme has had some side effects on the economies of the peasantry. Thus, many peasants, who used to enjoy collecting free wood for heating and cooking, were banned from using the forests. Instead, for heating and cooking consumptions, they have either to buy paraffin from one of the branches of the N.I.O.C. (or their cooperatives), or to use more manure. However, it is safe to assume the implementation of this programme caused many disputes between the special forest guards on the one hand and the different strata of the peasantry on the other. It is worth noting that in the late 1960s, some parts of the "nationalized forests" were granted to some army generals, members of the royal family, top politicians and the like to be used for economic purposes.

On the other hand, the protection and conservation of rangelands and pastures, has affected the peasants' economies in a different way. Banning the peasants from using these lands has made them unable to feed their animals. Consequently, many of them lost their sheep and goats. Below we shall illustrate this point with some statistics. The following case may shed light on the impact of this measure on the peasantry.

In Siahpush, near Manjil, the Ministry of Forest and Natural Resources had recently banned the use of all pastures around the Sefidrood dam. Many peasants, who used to use these pastures to graze their sheep and goats, were *de facto* provided with two options: either to leave the animals to die from starvation, or sell them. The latter option was more reasonable; hence the majority of them sold their sheep and goats. The

rush to sell sheep and goats on the part of the peasants gave an opportunity to the buyers to offer lower prices. Consequently, they purchased many sheep and goats at a half to a third of the former market prices.[112]

However, the State has not taken over all pastures around the country. Yet the peasantry has been faced with the same problem in these pastures as well. According to Lambton during the period before L-R, one of the rights attaching to a *boneh* was that of using the village pastures and of collecting scrub for fuel from them.[113] But after the L-R, some "landlords" forbade the peasants to use pastures; and in some cases, they turned these lands into their own farms.[114] The following case is an example of such a change in the peasantry's economy.

In Sheikh-Abood, a village in the neighbourhood of Shiraz in Fars province, the landowner (ex-landlord) and his rentier (a capitalist farmer) cultivate around 800 ha. lands of the village. They own all machinery and equipment and their farms are mechanized. However, in order to expand their farms, they have recently occupied the village pasture and ploughed it, and therefore turned it into their own private farm. Since then the peasants have had either to buy fodder for their cows and sheep, or lose them.[115]

Water not divided in accordance to the division of land

In all above cases, the peasantry has been affected through the manipulation of the ownership of *land*. Nonetheless, considering the significant role of water in Iranian agriculture, in some other cases, our peasantry has been impoverished by losing this element of production. Below we examine two main cases.

We have already shown that, according to Article 17 of the L-R laws, irrigated land was to be transferred to the eligible peasants together with its customary water rights from *qanat*, river, etc. (see above).

However, this right became the subject of some evasion by the landlords, as the following examples show.

There are four *qanats* and two springs in operation in Dosari, a village seventy kilometers away from Jiroft in Kirman province. The village was affected by the second stage of L-R. However, before the distribution began, some landlords changed the custom for the distribution of water. Thus they devoted more water to their orchards which were exempted from the distribution, and left insufficient water for those farms which were to be transferred to the peasants.[116]

The land of Mozaffari, a village in the neighbourhood of Shiraz in Fars province, is irrigated by the nearby river. The 168 eligible peasants were supposed to obtain two-fifths of the total land in the village in the second stage of L-R. But in practice, they received only one-fourth of the village land. Still more, they obtained insufficient water for their dwarf plots (less than 2 ha. each). Thus they have borrowed money from the cooperative to dig shallow wells and install motor-pumps on them. However, not all of them have succeeded in doing so.[117]

Qanat Drying because of deep wells

We have already pointed out that *qanats*, i.e. the traditional irrigation system, supplied the major part of the agricultural water needs of Iran during 1940-1960. According to an estimate, this traditional system is still the main source of the agricultural water requirement of the country.[118]

From a technical point of view, almost all *qanats* are constructed of alluvial material where *the water table is relatively close to the surface.* This has meant that the system is affected by the drilling of deep wells. That is, the *qanats* either cease to flow or reduce their yields. Beaumont, studying this situation in the Varamin plain, points out that in this plain, 'the number of *qanats* which were dry in 1957 is unknown, but surveys

carried out by the Ministry of Water and Power since this date, have revealed an ever-growing number of dry *qanats* owing to the falling water-table. In the period 1960 to 1963, there were 48 dry *qanats*. This number had risen to 74 in 1964, and to 96 in 1966. A sample survey carried out by the author in 1967 revealed that the number of dry *qanats* at the present time is of the order of 120,... A falling water-table, besides making *qanats* dry up, has also had the effect of considerably reducing the yields of individual qanats.' According to Beaumont's estimate, the water-supply from *qanats* in this plain has dropped by at least 35% during 1957-1964.[119]

Qanats have been strongly affected on a national scale by the methods of ground-water extraction during the post L-R period, considering that by 1973, there were 9351 deep and 1295 artisan wells in operation in the country.[120] However, the following examples show the situation at a village level. In some parts of Khurasan province, notably Nayshapour, some landlords, who have retained part of their land and also those who have had mechanized land, have turned to irrigation by power-operated well. They have not violated the laws of L-R. But their modern method has affected the economies of the neighbouring peasants, because the *qanats* have either ceased to flow or reduced their yields.[121]

In Ali-Abad Ghadiri, a village in the neighbourhood of Jiruft in Kirman province, while the implementation of land distribution was progressing throughout the country, the landlord sank one deep and two semi-deep wells. This caused the *qanat* of the village to cease to flow. The peasant *nasaq*-holders complained to the L-R Organization and eventually they managed to obtain a semi-deep well in addition to their share of land. Yet, they alleged that they had insufficient water to irrigate even their 30 ha. of land.[122]

The peasantry and the average ownership of oxen, sheep and goat

In accordance with the increase in the employment of machinery, including tractors, combines and the like, the Iranian peasantry has been increasingly losing its draught animals. This may be mainly attributed to the high efficiency of agricultural machinery in comparison with oxen, mules as well as donkeys. As Table XXXIV shows, the average ownership of oxen has declined in almost all categories. The most affected category is the first one, the holders of less than one ha. Next comes the top category: their average ownership has been reduced to one-third of 1960. The other categories are less affected, though their average ownership has also drastically declined.

TABLE XXXIV

Average Ownership of Oxen, Sheep and Goats 1960-1974

Size of	Oxen		Sheep		Goats		% Sheep Owning	
Holdings	1960	1974	1960	1974	1960	1974	1960	1974
Less than 1	0.30	0.07	3.2	3.3	4.0	2.4	51	29.5
1 to 2	0.67	0.27	4.8	3.9	3.7	2.9	48	30.7
2 to 5	1.03	0.42	4.9	6.0	4.9	4.0	60	42.0
5 to 10	1.31	0.51	9.6	10.4	7.7	5.4	72	55.5
10 to 50	2.05	0.64	16.5	18.6	8.2	6.3	78	63.4

Sources: Tables XVI, XXVI, and 1960 National Census.

One may see more or less the same trend in the ownership of goats. That is, holders of all categories lost some goats during the period of 1960-74. But with regard to the average ownership of sheep the situation is different. As Table XXXIV illustrates, the average ownership of one category has dropped, i.e. holders holding between 1 and 2 ha., while that of the first category has not changed. But the other categories have slightly increased their average ownership of sheep. This does not mean

that these categories of peasantry have not been impoverished. If we look at the other two columns which show sheep owners as a percentage of the total numbers of each category, we shall see that in each category quite a high percentage of the peasants have lost their sheep. The most affected category is the holders of less than one hectare; while the least affected category is the top category (see Table XXXIV).

Thus we may state that, the average ownership of goats and oxen dropped drastically. Furthermore, the average ownership of sheep in almost all categories increased, in spite of the fact that the proportion of those who own sheep has dropped in each category sharply. But generally speaking, the peasantry has lost over six million head of sheep; in 1960, it owned 14.2 head of sheep in comparison with 8.1 million in 1974. The number of oxen owned by our peasants dropped from 1.5 to 0.87 million during the same period. The number of goats owned by the peasantry, dropped slightly, from 10.4 in 1960 to 10.0 million in 1974.[123]

The peasantry and the price of land

We did not examine the technical aspects of the Iranian L-R programme. In addition, we have used the term "distribution" of land to designate any changes in landed property in Iran. However, we should note that the land was not distributed among the peasants free of charge. That is, the beneficiaries have had to pay for the allotments they have received.

According to the L-R laws, the beneficiaries have had to pay the price of the land which they have received in fifteen instalments.

The amount of the annual instalments in the majority of cases are less than the amount of rent which the peasants used to hand over to their landlords.[124]

However, whether or not the prices of land were fair is not our concern. The important point for us is the impact of these payments on capital accumulation by the peasantry.

Marx's comments on the price of land in relation to capital accumulation are helpful. For him, the price of land is nothing but capitalized and therefore anticipated rent.[125] On the other hand, in the case of small landed property, he considers rent as a deduction from the profit and/or wages, and not as an independent category opposed to wages and profit. This is because, these petty producers, to a large extent, produce for their own needs, and therefore their economies are run independent of the regulation of the average rate of profit. Thus Marx concludes that: 'the expenditure of money capital for the purchase of land, then, is not an investment of agricultural capital. It is a decrease *pro tanto* in the capital which small peasants can employ in their own sphere of production. It reduces *pro tanto* the size of their means of production and thereby narrows the economic basis of reproduction.'[126]

We have already explained that the peasantry to a large extent, produces for its own needs; while on the other hand, it has almost no influence on the prices of agricultural products. The peasants' economies therefore, to a considerable extent, work independently of the regulation of the average rate of profit. Thus if we accept Marx's logic, we may consider the instalments/rents paid by the Iranian peasants as burdens on their shoulders which have reduced the economic basis for reproduction as well as investments in the sphere of production. It was only few years after L-R began that some peasants showed their reluctance to pay the instalments, due to poverty and tried to abandon them. For example, Bill explains the situation in the Qazvin area in the following way: 'since that time (beginning of the L-R programme), expenses continued to increase as the reform continually expanded and payments to farmer landowners kept coming due. The situation was complicated by the fact that the peasants were unable to pay their instalments... In spring 1967, some 240 peasants in the Qazvin area were arrested and jailed because of their refusal to make the annual payments.'[127] However, by early 1970, it was already obvious that very many peasants throughout the country

were unable to keep up payment of their instalments. Thus, 'the Government in March 1970 announced a cabinet decision that farmers finding themselves in such a position should apply to the Ministry of Land Reform and Rural Cooperatives for assistance. Special committees were to be set up in all provinces to identify the farmers in need of such help and to decide on the merits of their applications to be lodged with local land reform offices.[128]

TABLE XXXV

Purchase Cost, Interest and Repayment in First Stage (million Rials)

	Cost of Property	Down Cash Payment	Payment Order Falling Due	Interest on Payment Order
1962-3	3,339	339	-	-
1963-4	1,716	223	333.33	19.99
1964-5	1,178	426	439.99	46.39
1965-6	1,795	1,305	493.36	76.00
1966-7	1,000	547	528.68	107.72
1967-8	231	73	561.03	141.39
1968-9	317	64	572.31	175.74
1969-70	292	60	590.38	211.11
1970-1	-	-	606.95	247.54
1971-2	-	-	606.95	283.95

Source: Denman 1973, p. 184.

The struggle between the Government on the one hand and the peasants on the other around the payment of instalments is illustrated in the table above. As Table XXXV shows, the Government did not eventually manage to collect the money; and the peasants, having been unable to pay, resisted on a large scale any form of pressure by the Government.

Peasant versus trader-cum-moneylender

We have explained that almost all peasants are in debt permanently. They borrow from cooperatives as well as trader-cum-moneylenders. However, loans from the former source are insufficient, and they therefore have to borrow from the latter with high rates of interest. On the other hand, the majority of peasants sell their products before harvest time below the market prices. As in the previous case, this situation has obviously reduced the peasantry's economic basis for investment in the sphere of production.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined the property relations of the peasantry, and shown that not only are peasants differentiated in terms of landownership, but also the owners of larger allotments own more animals than the small landowners. After L-R, some peasants invested in their lands, bought motor-pumps, used chemical fertilizers and also hired tractors and combines. However, in the labour-process, mainly rich peasants in the peak seasons employed wage-labourers, including *khoshneshin* wage-labourers as well as small landholders. It follows that, around two million bread winners of the peasant families in rural Iran contribute to more than one labour-process. Obviously, such a situation has caused unemployment/underemployment of labourers. We then considered the relationship between peasant-producers and the market, and found that all peasants sold a portion of their produce through intermediaries before harvest time. Furthermore, since they are always short of cash for their livelihood and current agricultural expenditures, they borrow money. However, since the loans from the cooperatives are insufficient, they have to borrow from moneylenders as well, in return for which they pay high rates of interest.

The above argument shows the development of peasant capitalism (the

"American" path), but this process has gone side by side with the development of landlord capitalism (the "Prussian" way). Thus we examined the landownership of the capitalist farmers, showing the extent of employment of wage-labourers, use of machinery and chemical fertilizers, and production for the market.

Finally, we examined eight important factors, during the post L-R period, which have strongly impoverished peasant capitalism. Some of these factors, such as separation from the land, the lack of opportunity to choose the best parts of any village as well as unequal division of the amount of water, have directly reinforced the process of capital accumulation of the capitalist farmers. At the same time, the peasantry's economy has been indirectly affected by the process of mechanization: hence tractors have forced oxen to leave the labour-process to some extent, and deep wells have caused *qanats* to dry up. Furthermore, the last cited factor has reinforced usury/merchant capitalism in rural Iran. On the other hand, the peasantry has been resisting these impoverishing factors in one way or another. As examples, we may mention the resistance of peasants to the Government's demand for the payment of instalments, disputes with the capitalist farmers on the question of the division of land/water, and also struggles against forest guards who have prevented them from using forest/pastures.

NOTES TO CHAPTER X

1. For some examples of the latter case see G.O.P.F., study no.4,. . p.42 and p.75; and also see Keyhan, Sept.3 and Sept. 7, 1978
2. See chapter VII.
3. Connell, 1969, p.97
4. Miller, 1964, pp.485-86
5. For some examples see Safinejad, 1974, p.257; and also G.O.P.F. study no.3, p.110, p.122, and p.183.
6. See Lambton 1969, G.O.P.F., studies nos. 3&4, and Safinejad 1976.
7. G.O.P.F., study no.3, p.122
8. As an example see Bainouj, a village near Darab in Fars province, ibid, pp.181-84.
9. See Connell, 1969, p.97
10. G.O.P.F., study no.3, p.148
11. See Okazaki, 1968.
12. See G.O.P.F., study no.3, p.107 and p.175.
13. Jones, 1967, p.70
14. See G.O.P.F., study no.3, p.49.
15. See Nowshiravani, 1976, p.9.
16. See Okazaki, 1968.
17. For fertilizers consumption during 1963-72, see FAO 1975 .
18. Aresvik, 1977, p.156
19. See for example, G.O.P.F., studies no.3 and 4; . Ajami, 1976; and T.E., August 1965.
20. See G.O.P.F., study no.3, pp.229-34.
21. Ibid, p.115; for another example see p.159.
22. See Ajami, 1976, pp.71-79.
23. Interview with an official in the Plan and Budget Organization, August 1977
24. Some daily papers reported that in different parts of the country land has just been left unused. See, for example, Rastakhiz, June 22, 1977, Keyhan, Sept. 26, 1977, and also Ayandegan, Jan.25, 1976.
25. See for an example Auroi, 1970, p.150
26. See Ajami, 1976, pp.73-85.
27. See Aresvik, 1977, pp.166-67.
28. Hooglund, 1973, p.236
29. Ibid, pp.238-39
30. G.O.P.F., study no.3, p.108
31. Ibid, p.122
32. Jones, 1967, pp.66-67
33. Auroi, 1970, p.140
34. Hooglund, 1973, p.237
35. See Connell, 1974, pp.312-13.
36. See Hooglund, 1973, p.238.
37. See G.O.P.F., study no.3, p.49; see also Okazaki, 1968, p.23.
38. See G.O.P.F., study no.3, pp.136-38.
39. Connell, 1974, p.313
40. See The National Census of Population and Housing, Nov. 1966, Table 21, p.61. For examples of the employment of children see Jones 1967, p.71; Connell, 1974, p.313; and also G.O.P.F., studies no. 3 and 4.
41. See Marx, 1971, pp.194-95.
42. See Ajami, 1976, p.76, Table 12.
43. G.O.P.F., study no.3, p.231
44. See Okazaki, 1969.

45. See Table XXVII.
46. See Table XXV..
47. See Ajami, 1976, Table 17, p.82.
48. Aresvik, 1977, p.101
49. FAO 1975
50. T.E., August 1975, p.190
51. See Lodi, 1965, p.2.
52. See Lambton, 1969, p.293.
53. Kaneda, 1973, p.26.
54. G.O.P.F., study no.3, p.50
55. Ibid, p.50
56. As an example we may mention Shah-Abad, a village in the south of Tehran, which has four groceries. The activity of these groceries is small, because the villagers prefer to do their shopping in Tehran. Auroi, 1970, p.146
57. Hooglund, 1973, p.232
58. See Lodi, 1965, pp.2-3; also see Okazaki, 1969, p.276, and G.O.P.F., study no.3, p.148.
59. G.O.P.F., study no.3, p.65
60. Rudulph, 1971, pp.186-87
61. We should note here that Wai considers cooperative within the sphere of the unorganized money market (see Wai in Meier, 1976, p.302), however, since cooperatives in rural Iran are State-sponsored bodies and supply credit with a low rate of interest, they are considered to be in the category of the organized money market.
62. See Klein, 1973
63. See Zandjani, 1973, p.119.
64. See G.O.P.F. studies nos. 3 and 4.
65. Hooglund, 1973, p.233
66. See G.O.P.F., study no.3
67. Wai in Meier, 1976, p.301
68. For some examples see Jones, 1967, p.8, and G.O.P.F., study no.3 p.65.
69. Wai in Meier, 1976, p.301
70. For example in 1969-70, 67% of the amount went to the rural cooperatives, see the C.B.I., annual report, 1971, p.46.
71. U.N., 1966, p.24
72. Lambton, 1969, p.152
73. For example, peasant-landholders of Tang-e Karam, near Fasa in Fars province, every year borrow from their cooperatives; but having been unable to pay back their debt, they either borrow from a moneylender or sell their product (cotton) before harvest time 30 to 40% cheaper than the prices at harvest time. G.O.P.F., study no.3, p.148
74. Denman, 1973, p.196
75. G.O.P.F., studies no.3 and 4
76. For some examples see G.O.P.F., study no.3 and Auroi, 1970.
77. See the C.B.I., annual report, 1971, p.46.
78. Singh, 1970, p.348
79. See below Table XXXIII.
80. A collection of speeches delivered at the C.B.I., 1968, quoted in Shams-Zanjani, 1973, pp.121-22
81. See G.O.P.F., study no.3.
82. Weinbaum, 1977, p.438
83. See Keyhan, Dec. 18, 1977; for some other examples see also

Rastakhiz, August 13, 1977, Sept. 1, 1977, April 1, 1978; and Ayandegan, Sept. 3, 1977.

84. Marx, 1971, pp.595-96
85. Statistical Yearbook 1976, Table 93, p.252/23
86. See G.O.P.F., study no.3, p.64, 68, 73, etc.
87. I visited three villages of Qasem-Abad, Kallaj and Siahpush in the Manjil area in August 1977.
88. See Auroi, 1970, p.150
89. See G.O.P.F., study no.3
90. Ibid, p.190
91. Hooglund, 1973, p.237
92. Auroi, 1970, p.150
93. G.O.P.F., study no.3, pp.73-74
94. See The Financial Times, July 25, 1977, p.19.
95. The daily papers during 1977-78 have reported many examples similar to the case of Qasem-Abad; however, in order to avoid repetition we decline to mention them.
96. See G.O.P.F., 1976, p.49.
97. See Okazaki, 1968, p.19 and 42.
98. Gharachedaghi, 1967, p.82
99. See Auroi, 1970; Safinejad, 1974; and G.O.P.F., study no.3 respectively.
100. Personal interview, August 1977
101. See Table XXVIII.
102. Personal interview, August 1977
103. See G.O.P.F., study no.3, pp.62-63.
104. Ibid, study no.4, p.68
105. Lambton, 1969b, p.148
106. All three cases from a report in the daily paper Ayandegan, April 10, 1979, p.5
107. Iranshahr, no.13, Jan.19, 1979
108. Toofan, Nov. 1972, quoted in Iranshahr, no.13, Jan.19, 1979.
109. G.O.P.F., study no.3, p.76; for another example see p.80
110. Personal interview, August 1977
111. See Aresvik, 1977, pp.90-91.
112. For another example see G.O.P.F., study no.3, p.60.
113. Lambton, 1969, p.8
114. For some examples see G.O.P.F., study no.3
115. G.O.P.F., study no.3, p.58; for another example see p.111
116. Ibid, study no.4, p.83
117. Ibid, study no.3, pp.72-73
118. Beaumont, 1974, p.421
119. Beaumont, 1968, pp.177-78
120. Data from The Agricultural Census of Iran, 1973
121. Lambton, 1969, pp.289-90
122. G.O.P.F., study no.4, pp.98-99; for another example see p.19
123. Data from 1960 Census and The Agricultural Census of Iran 1974
124. Lambton, 1969, p.192
125. Marx, 1971, p.808
126. Ibid, p.810
127. Bill, 1972, p.142
128. Keyhan International, March 2, 1970, quoted in Rudulph, 1971 p.186

CHAPTER XI

Corporations and Agribusiness Ventures

In the late 1960s, the State initiated two sets of projects for developing the agricultural sector, the *corporations* and the *'agribusiness' ventures*. In this chapter, therefore, we shall examine the impact of these on the development of capitalism in rural Iran, including an analysis of the formation of these units of production, of property, production and exchange and of the labour process.

A. Farming Joint-Stock Companies or Farm Corporations

The model for the farm corporation was the Israeli Kibbutz and the Soviet collective farms and consequently official visits were made to Israel, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during the preparatory period.[1] In 1967, the Ministry of Land Reform and Rural Cooperation 'received the *Majlis* rubber stamp on the legislation of a "five years' experiment" with farm corporations - professionally managed, collectively owned farming units.'[2] However, this was only initiated in 1968, when 14 corporations were founded. Initially, the programme was to establish a total of 143 corporations, operating on 420,000 hectares, by the end of the Fifth Plan in 1978. By 1974, 65 farm corporations with 123,882 shareholders had been established throughout the country. These corporations covered 525 villages and farms with 231,759 hectares of land[3], something less than 4% of the total harvest area.

Having undertaken the corporation project, the State aimed at the following six economic objectives: (1) to end the fragmentation of holdings, especially by the process of division at death; (2) to mechanize and expand the scale of operations; (3) to acquaint shareholders with modern methods of agriculture; (4) to extend the cultivated area to previously barren and unused lands; (5) to lower the man-land ratio and

compensate for the displacement of labour by regional planning of resources between agriculture and industry; and (6) to increase the *per capita* income of the shareholders. Below, we shall examine the achievement of these objectives.

In order for a farm corporation to be established, the initial step had to be taken by the Ministry of Land Reform and Rural Cooperation. Denman points out that, it was for the Ministry of Land Reform and Rural Cooperation to select the villages which would then be given the chance to accept or reject. The law permitted proposals to be made by local eligible opinion, although the final decision was left with the Ministry.[4] However, not all peasant-residents were eligible to vote for or against the formation of any given farm corporation. Only peasant landholders were eligible to vote and later on to become members of corporations. These peasant-landholders could be from one of the following four categories: a) peasants who had received land under the first and/or second stage of L-R; b) peasant-cultivators of plantations and orchards which had been exempted from distribution; c) small landowners living in the villages who had agreed under the second stage to divide their land; and d) farmers, who for one reason or another, had not been affected by the L-R programme. However, according to the law, once at least 51% of these eligible peasant-landholders in a given region voted for the formation of a corporation enterprise, the formation would take place irrespective of the wishes of the other 49%. But in practice things happened differently. An overall majority of the peasant members of Farah, Garmsar, Dargazin and Samaskandeh corporations stated that they did not have any idea about the formation and aims of their corporations before their establishment.[5]

The State not only initiated the formation of corporations, but also supervised and assisted them financially (see below). Thus any given corporation is run by a manager who is appointed and employed by the State. He is, however, recommended by the board of directors which is

"elected" by the members of the corporation. In addition, the State makes available to each corporation the services of at least two agricultural experts, two accountants, an assistant accountant and some technicians. However, the State appointed manager has full power over the corporation's affairs. Richards points out that, 'theoretically, decisions regarding the annual budget, basic investment, and so on are made jointly by the manager and the shareholder committee, but in practice the manager usually makes most of the decisions. He determines the most efficient plot sizes, assigns shareholders to specific jobs, sets production targets and makes the choices of planting and fertilizer techniques. The government-appointed manager holds a great deal of power, ...'[6]

The above is a brief explanation of the formation of corporations. These corporations have drastically changed relations/forces of production within the 525 villages and farms which are covered by this project. We shall therefore examine the main aspects of relations/forces of production in the corporations' social formations.[7]

One of the main economic aims of the corporation is to end the fragmentation of holdings by pooling them for the efficient use of agricultural inputs, including water, pesticides, machinery and land. The members therefore give the corporation complete and permanent use of their land, which is operated as a single unit. In return, the corporation gives the peasant landholders as many shares in the organization as are consistent with the previous rights of ownership. In practice, the valuation of the peasants' allotments was very difficult, and in some cases, the committees in charge of valuation have had to assess the value of lands more than once. This was because the first valuation was objected to by some peasants. Despite this technical problem, there existed no valuation formula in the law's text, 'but behind the local variants was the general principle that value is ten times income ... Local evidence of land values unfaded from the recent land reform transaction was available in most villages,... The directive required

no more than that the committee identify the lands of the village, preferably a map prepared for the purpose, realize that they are the primary factor of production in the village farming economy and value the right of user over them accordingly; that is to say, with due regard to their area and the position of the village, the local agricultural custom by which, with the change of the years and seasons, land passed from sown to fallow and back again, the extent to which the land right was associated with water rights over river, *qanats* and other sources of water.'[8]

The process of valuation of land and pooling small and fragmented allotments of land, however, changed the peasantry's landed property drastically. In any given rural social formation, a peasant-producer may be in the position of possession/ownership of land. That is, he may operate his own allotment, or rent it to another agent of production and/or he may rent someone else's land. However, the corporation changed these varieties of possession of land which existed in those villages, covered by the project. That is, by transferring the permanent right to use the land, these peasants have, in effect, lost their effective possession of their own land. They have become only nominal owners of land, i.e. shareholders. In order to explain this point, we should study the relationship between these shareholders on the one hand and the corporation apparatus on the other.

According to the law, the board of directors is "elected" by the peasant-shareholders. Yet, in the Samaskandeh corporation, 60% of the shareholders did not know how this board was elected; the percentages for Farah and Garmsar corporations are 50 and 36% respectively.[9] The peasants were asked whether or not they knew anything about the process of decision-making in their corporations. Over 80% of the shareholders of all three corporations answered that they had no idea about this process.[10] Neither did these shareholders know about the internal affairs of their respective corporations. Furthermore, around 88% of

the members of Samaskandeh corporation stated that they had never been consulted by the corporation experts on production affairs; the percentages for Farah and Garmsar corporations are 81.5 and 85% respectively.[11] In the Garmsar corporation the shareholders did not know which body decides the employment and wage policy of the corporation. Hence, over 72% of them stated that it is their village representative who decides the wage-levels and the number to be employed.[12] In Farah corporation, when the peasant-members were asked the same question, they answered that it is the State cadre (including the manager, experts and corps) which makes the decisions on the employment and wage policy of the corporation.[13] The peasant-shareholders are thus entirely alienated from the body which controls their lands; and since it is not possible for them to take back their lands, we may consider this situation as a specific form of "separation".

Such a change in landed property made the affected peasants, who had just a few years ago received land, feel that they had lost their lands to the State. Thus 85, 52 and 82% of the peasants in Garmsar, Farah and Samaskandeh corporations respectively preferred land deeds rather than shares (in the corporations).[14] This situation may be considered as a form of "separation" in which, while the peasants nominally own some land, they have no control over it. It appears that the State has imposed this form of "separation/collectivization". For example, the peasant members of Garmsar, Farah and Samaskandeh corporations were asked whether or not they preferred to cultivate individually. 64, 80 and 82% of the members of these corporations respectively answered that they preferred to work on their own private allotments.[15]

In addition to the amount of land according to which the peasants obtained shares, they might have been given some shares for their ownership of other means of production. Thus Denman states: 'where a farmer handed over with rights (of land) oxen and farm machinery, a transaction he was not obliged to make, these items of live and dead stock were valued, and

the value added to the value of the land rights for the purpose of assessing the farmer's claim to share allocation.'[16] Although in the law, it is stressed that the peasants were not obliged to hand over their means of production other than land/water, it is safe to estimate that in almost all cases, the peasants handed over their means of production to the corporations or sold them to other peasants outside the area of the corporation. This is because these means of production were no use without owning/possessing land/water. However, although the peasant members cannot own any means of production, they are allowed to own animals such as sheep, goats and cows. For example, in Farah corporation, each one of the shareholders on average owned 17.3 sheep and goats, 2.3 cows, 1.8 calves and 7 chickens. For these shareholders, animals constituted a major source of income, i.e. they obtained 25.8% of their total income from selling their animals and/or their products.[17]

The second economic aim of the project for the formation of corporations is the mechanisation of the farming methods in these areas. This was to acquaint the peasant members with modern methods of farming (in fact the third economic aim). So far the corporations have been under strong State initiative and direction, with heavy initial State investment. Compared with the co-operatives, a member of a corporation obtained on average 400 times the amount of loans to a member of a co-operative. In this way, in 1976, 85 corporations obtained some 2883 million rials from the State.[18] For example, loans have been provided by the Ministry of Cooperation and Rural Affairs for the purchase of livestock and of farm machinery and implements, establishment or improvement of cottage industries for member families and also for purchase of chemical fertilizers. The conditions of loans are much easier than those for the co-operatives. That is, loans are given for a period of five years with an interest of 4% per annum.[19]

The heavy initial investment in the corporations in addition to the provision of loans on easy terms, have enabled them to speed up the

process of mechanization. Thus, Farah corporation two years after its foundation with 4733 hectares of land, managed to be almost fully mechanized. By 1975 it owned 11 tractors, 2 combines, discs, trailors, sprayers, seeders, grass mowers, plough regulators, as well as fertilizer spreaders.[20]

Having such modern farm implements and machines, the corporations needed experts to use them. As noted above, one of the aims of the formation of corporations is to acquaint the farmers with modern methods of agriculture. However, from the surveys, it appears that the peasant-shareholders have not been trained to use these modern methods. On the contrary, the corporations usually employ experts from outside. These experts are paid by the State. The peasant-shareholders are usually employed by the corporation as a form of unskilled labour. (We shall examine this point below.)

The fourth aim of the formation of corporations was to extend the cultivated area to previously barren and unused land. Although, the authors of the monographs of Samaskandeh, Farah, Garmsar and Dargazin corporations have not given any data on the extension of lands, the explanations quite clearly show that these corporations have succeeded in increasing the amount of land under cultivation. Accordingly, these corporations have levelled and drained the land around their farms to some extent. However, they have been faced with two serious obstacles: the bad quality of soil and shortage of water. In effect, these two factors have blocked the corporations' further expansion of their lands under cultivation.

The fifth economic aim of the formation of corporation was to lower the man-land ratio. This measure might have been taken in order to sort out the question of underemployment in the Iranian rural social formation. We are not going to examine the rationality of this policy for the national economy of Iran as a capitalist social formation. But our main concern is to study the impact of this measure (accompanied by

the first and second aims listed above) on the labour relations within the corporation units. In doing so, we shall make no distinction between peasant-members on the one hand and non-members (*khoshneshins*) on the other. This is because, as we shall see below, within the labour-process the peasant-members occupy the same position as the *khoshneshin* wage-labourers do.

Generally speaking, the direct producers (members as well as non-members) are employed by the corporations in two different ways: either as share-croppers or as wage-labourers. However, the latter labour contract is much more important than the former one. We have already explained how the corporation project separated peasant landholders from the objective conditions of production. But as shareholders, the members receive some money from the profits of the corporations. This source of income, however, does not cover all expenditure of the majority of peasant shareholders. They are therefore forced to work as wage-labourers within or outside the corporation.

As to the corporation, it employs some peasants (members as well as non-members) to perform simple agricultural work. These direct-producers have no control over the labour-process and are paid in cash. In addition, since the demand for labour, on the part of the corporation, fluctuates throughout the year, the majority of these agents of production manage to get jobs in the corporation only for a period of few months in a year. In Farah corporation, for instance, only 40.2% of the shareholders managed to work in the corporation; however, over 90% of them worked for less than nine months.[21] Furthermore, owing to the mechanization, the demand for labour has declined, i.e. the man-land ratio is lowered (the fifth objective). Thus in the same corporation, 46.4% of shareholders did not work in the corporation at all; and another 13.4% of them worked for the corporation as well as for other outside the organization.[22]

The corporation organizations have not removed the differentiation

of the peasantry. In effect, it has maintained the differentiation through the distribution of shares according to the amount of means of production owned by the peasants. However, the corporations have drastically changed the labour process that existed among the peasantry. That is, with regard to the agricultural labour process, they have established no forms of labour relations among themselves, unlike the peasants outside the corporations, as we have seen in Chapter X. Thus, although there are poor and rich peasants within the corporation, we do not have any directly exploitative relationships among the peasantry. Instead, all peasant-members (rich as well as poor) and *khoshneshin* wage-labourers may work for the corporation as direct-producers who are alienated from the objective conditions of production. Neither are they in a position to conduct the labour process. In this respect, there is no difference between peasant-members on the one hand and *khoshneshin* wage-labourers on the other. In short, both of these categories on the one hand and the corporation on the other confront each other as vendors of commodities. This is the reason why one may consider all peasant members as proletarians. Thus, the corporation project has not only changed landed property, it has also altered the labour relations among the peasantry.

The shareholders as well as the *khoshneshin* wage-labourers have the possibility of working outside the corporation. They may work as wage-labourers or undertake other jobs. It appears that these activities constitute one of the main sources of the shareholders' income. In Samaskandeh corporation, for instance, the shareholders on average earn one-third of their income from their activities outside the corporation. They are usually engaged in activities such as cattle breeding, trading and working as share-croppers, barbers, tailors and bath caretakers. In addition, many of the peasants work as wage-labourers in the nearby villages and towns.[23]

In addition to the above sources of income, the shareholders and

khoshneshins may work for the corporation as share-croppers. Contracts are made with these peasants, according to which the latter are assigned to cultivate a certain crop. According to this type of share-cropping contract (*nesfeh kari*), the produce is divided equally between the share-cropper and the corporation. It seems that the decision makers of the corporation resort to this type of contract for the production of labour-intensive crops. For example the corporation of Samaskandeh usually makes share-cropping contracts with shareholders and *khoshneshins* for the production of rice. On average, the shareholders earn one third of their income (from the corporation) by undertaking share-cropping contracts with the corporation.[24]

The sixth aim of the formation of corporations was "to increase the per capita income of the shareholders". As already pointed out, the corporations have been heavily subsidized by the State. It is not therefore surprising to see them making a profit. This has directly increased the shareholders' earning from the corporations. For example, in the second year of the formation of Samaskandeh corporation (1970), 83% of the shareholders stated that their income from the corporation had increased. However, regardless of the absolute quantitative increase in income of shareholders, we may note the important impact of the formation of corporations on relations of production, i.e. the relationship between the peasant direct-producers and the produce.

In the previous chapter, we examined the relationships between the peasant landholders (direct-producers) and the produce. We explained that the produce belongs to the peasant direct-producers. However, our peasant shareholders do not establish the same relationship with their produce. That is, the produce belongs to the corporation and the shareholders cannot have any immediate claim on it. This is similar to the position which wage-labourers occupy in relation to produce in a capitalist social formation. However, the situation is different in the share-cropping contract. In this form of relationship, the direct-

producers who have made such a contract, have access to half of the produce.

Marketing and distribution

So far we have examined three changes within the relations of production which took place as a result of the implementation of the corporation project. However, these changes have caused some alterations in the marketing of agricultural products, produced by the peasants within the corporation organization. That is to say, since the direct-producers (wage-labourers) do not own the products, they do not have to make contact with the traders in the urban centres for marketing their products. Unlike the case of peasants, therefore, shareholders are not involved in pre-harvest sales/or borrowing money from moneylenders for current production expenditures.

Marketing is undertaken by the board of directors of each corporation. The board sells the products in the local as well as national markets. In some cases, the board deals with the intermediaries. The board of directors of Samaskandeh, for instance, markets a portion of the corporation's produce through middlemen, who are known to the board members. The board may deal with private organizations. For example, the same corporation, in 1970, sold some wheat to one of the mills.

In other cases, the board may deal with a State owned body: for example, in 1969, a major portion of wheat production of Farah corporation was sold to the Cereal Organization.[25] However, it seems that the board of directors and the managers of the corporations prefer to sell their products to private persons rather than the State organizations. Perhaps, this is because the former are much more flexible in adjusting market prices to the supply of and demand for agricultural products.

However, if the shareholders do not need to borrow from trade-cum-moneylenders for producing and marketing their products, it does not mean

that they never borrow. On the contrary, our peasant shareholders, like other peasant-producers, borrow money/goods from different sources. In the villages covered by Garmsar corporation, for instance, some 35 shops supply the peasants with various necessities during the year; while the latter pay for the goods only at harvest time or when they are paid their wages.[26] It appears that this form of provision of credit has been retained in the villages covered by the corporation project, despite the fact that the shareholders have reduced their credit supplying activities after the formation of corporations. In Samaskandeh corporation, for instance, 55% of shareholders stated that they are supplied with credit for goods from their villages' shops just as they used to be before the formation of their corporation. However, they alleged that the shopkeepers provide less credit, because they (shopkeepers) do not consider them as *landholders*.[27]

The second source of credit for the peasant-shareholders is trader-cum-moneylender. As we have already stated, corporations make share-cropping contracts with peasants. These share-croppers, who usually have insufficient money for consumption as well as production expenditures, turn to the shopkeepers or traders for credit. Thus in Garmsar corporation, for instance, some rich shopkeepers are involved in buying the share-croppers' share of produce before harvest time (*salaf khari*).[28] And in Samaskandeh corporation, the share-croppers resort to preharvest sales, though the corporation provides them with some credit. This is because, the share-croppers spend all the money they receive as credit for their current consumption expenditures.[29]

The corporation project is therefore a state sponsored programme to develop capitalism in the Iranian rural social formation from above (the "Prussian" way). Relations of production established between the agents of production are those of the CMP. It is not the rural bourgeoisie, but a body of experts (employed by the State) which controls the means of production and extracts surplus-value. Almost all peasants (rich and

poor) therefore confront this body of experts (or corporation organization) as vendors of labour-power. The State has taken the initiative to implement the project and it has heavily subsidized these organizations. One may consider the development of the corporation programme as the development of "state capitalism". However, whether or not it is "state capitalism", the project has removed the peasants from their lands and speeded the development of capitalist relations of production between the decision making body on the one hand and the peasantry on the other.

B. Agribusiness Joint Ventures

In the previous section, we examined the implementation of farm corporations and their impact on relations of production in the affected villages. However, in order to reinforce the development of the CMP in rural Iran, the State in the late 1960s, in addition to the corporation project, launched another project which involved the establishment of agribusiness units on lands downstream of dams. In this section we shall therefore briefly examine the formation of these enterprises.

But before examining the formation of agribusiness units in Iran, let us see what is meant by "agribusiness". According to Feder, "agribusiness" stands for modernization of agriculture capitalist-style by big business. By the latter 'is meant not only the multinational concern engaged directly or indirectly in agricultural activities or in agricultural-related industries and services, but also the private international bank, the international lending organization, the "philanthropic" foundation, and the national development agency - all engaged in assisting modernization directly or by providing the infra- or superstructure for the activities of multinational concerns.'[30] Accordingly, the activities of agribusiness include production, processing, transport, storage, financing, regulating and marketing of the world's food and fibre supplies: 'in effect, agribusiness is a seed-to-consumer system composed of a series of closely related activities that together

enable agricultural produce to flow from the farm to the market place.'[31]

The ground for the establishment of such agricultural ventures in Iran was prepared during the second Seven Year Plan (1955-62).[32] In this plan great emphasis was laid on agriculture in general, and construction of huge dams in particular. In 1959, the World Bank agreed to furnish loans for the completion of the Dez Dam in Khuzistan, provided a portion of the Dez Irrigation project was devoted to a pilot irrigation project to demonstrate the benefits of modern farming techniques to the local farmers.[33] In 1962, the first modern plantation, i.e. Haft Tapeh cane plantation in the north of Ahvaz, was already an operating unit. However, apart from this State owned plantation, no attempt was made to launch another similar project until 1968. It was only in this year that the formation of several agribusiness ventures took place.

According to Feder, agribusiness ventures are of two types in relation to the land: they may control the land directly, or they may be related to it through direct-producers. Under the latter form, the venture makes contracts with the small producers for the delivery of their products. Feder points out that, 'one characteristic element is for processing or assembly to extend credit and other inputs wherever possible to producers on the contractual understanding that the producers must deliver their output to the lender/suppliers under pre-arranged terms of sales, although firms may increase their supplies through direct purchases from other producers securing their own financing, or through their production operation.'[34] In the first type of agribusiness (direct control), the venture is involved in the labour-process, hence 'capital is sunk into farm land: buying up land or obtaining a concession over an agricultural area, be it for agricultural or other purposes.'[35] For the establishment of this type of agribusiness ventures, obtaining land is therefore the primary task.

With regard to the agribusiness ventures in Iran, we may say that the decision makers, for one reason or another, preferred to establish

the first type of agribusiness unit, one directly involved in the agricultural labour-process. Thus the first step for the establishment of these ventures was the provision of land for them. This task was undertaken by the State. Thus the "Law for the Establishment of Companies for Utilization of Lands Downstream from Dams" authorized the State in 1968 to free land for investors:

> For the purpose of the maximum utilization of the water resources, the land irrigable from the dams and the hydraulic power installations of the lands downstream of the dams, the Ministry of Water and Power is authorized, with due regard to the development programme of agriculture-animal husbandry and the overall development of the country, to establish agro-industry companies with Government capital, or with private - local or foreign - or by joint companies being subscribed for the Government or by private investment, either local or foreign.

By the enactment of this law, some 400,000 hectares of land were transferred to the Ministry of Water and Power. However, so far not all of this land has been used for agribusiness purposes.

In theory, at least, the agribusiness ventures were to be established on virgin land near dams or groundwater projects. However, in practice, the affected areas embraced many villages. In Khuzistan province, for example, some 100,000 hectares of land were carved up among six agribusiness ventures. This area embraced some 58 villages with a population of 40,000 (around 6,500 families).[36] It is safe to conceive that these peasants, who had a few years ago received land, were reluctant to give up their lands. The investors, however, had already employed the power of the State to remove these peasants from their lands. Thus the law has allowed the Ministry of Water and Power forcibly to purchase the land from the peasants and move them out of the area. The price of land was already fixed by the State at 4,000 rials per hectare and that of orchards at 250,000 rials per hectare. Rabbani points out that 'this money is

not really of very much use to a farmer who had one, two or even more hectares because, having sold his land to the government he has no further interests in the village and must move to urban centres with his family.'[37]

With regard to the formation of the "new landed property" we should draw attention to the following three points. First, as a result of the enactment of "The Downstream Land Use Law", some peasants were separated from land/water by force rather than by economic (market) mechanisms, although it may be argued that force represents economic power.[38] In addition to force, the existence of different ethnic groups of people helped the authorities in the removal of the peasants. Richards points out that, 'to obviate any serious resistence to the removal policy, the KWPA (Khuzistan Water and Power Authority) took advantage of the racial prejudices among the local peasantry and removed the Arab population first.' However, the Persians soon received the same treatment.[39]

Secondly, for the removal, force was employed by the State organs. Thus if the investors were not able to obtain the required land in the market, the State used its own power for the provision of land/water.[40] The intervention of the State in the economic sphere changed the conditions of supply of land in favour of the agribusiness ventures.

Thirdly, the removal of the peasants from their lands in the areas below the dams, meant stripping them of all their means of production and throwing them onto the labour market. The implementation of "The Downstream Land Use Law" actually separated some direct-producers from land who were already freed from feudal subordination.

The land expropriated from the peasantry in Khuzistan province has been leased to some five agribusiness joint ventures. They are as follows:

Hashem Naraghi Agro-Industries of Iran and America (20,000 hectares)

Shareholders (prior to autumn 1974):

Hashem Naraghi Development Co., Escalon, California	51%
First National City Bank, New York, N.Y.	30%
Iranians' Bank, Tehran	10%
Three individual stockholders	9%

The Iran-California Corporation (10,000 hectares)

Shareholders (prior to autumn 1974):

Agricultural Development Fund of Iran	15%
Khuzistan Water and Power Authority	5%
Mr. K. Taleghani and Partners	10%
Trans. World Agricultural Development Corp.	30%
Bank of America International Financial Corp.	20%
John Deere Corp.	10%
Dow Chemical Corp.	10%

Iran Shellcott Co. (15,000 hectares)

Shareholders:

Shell International Ltd.	70.5%
Agricultural Development Fund of Iran	15%
Bank Omran	10%
Mitchell Cotts	4.5%

International Agricultural Corp. of Iran (17,000 hectares)

Shareholders:

Chase Manhattan Bank	15%
Bank Melli	5%
Mitsui (Japan)	5%
Ahvaz Sugar Beet Factory	15%
Agricultural Development Fund of Iran	15%
Diamond A Cattle (Roswell, New Mexico)	15%

Hawaiian Agronomics 15%

Khuzistan Water and Power Authority 15%

Dezkar (5,000 hectares)

Shareholders:

Former peasant farmers and landowners in the area of the Dez Irrigation Project. Managed by the Government.[41]

The province of Khuzistan is the province most affected by "The Downstream Land Use Law". However, other provinces were affected by this law as well. For example, there are agribusiness ventures on 25,000 hectares in Jiroft (in Kirman province), and on 20,000 hectares in Mahabad (in Kurdistan province). By 1974, there were still some contracts being signed for new leases between the State and various companies.[42]

In addition to the provision of land, the State undertook to provide water and some other facilities. With regard to the provision of water, the State has implemented two projects in Khuzistan province. The first was the Dez Pilot Irrigation Project which irrigates 22 thousands hectares of the lands under the Dez dam. In 1959 the World Bank agreed to finance the completion of the Dez dam, provided a portion of the budget was devoted to a pilot irrigation project. In the mid 1961, the digging of canals and installation of equipment began and was almost completed by the summer of 1965. The second project was the Greater Irrigation Project which was supposed to irrigate further 90 thousand hectares of land below the Dez dam. It is, in fact, the second project which is directly related to the foundation of agribusiness ventures in Khuzistan province. However, these two projects have cost 15,310 million rials up to the end of the Fourth Plan (1966/67 - 1972/73). Yet, it is believed that in order to complete the Greater Irrigation Project in 1975/76, the State has had to spend even more money.[43]

Thus the State has undertaken all the cost of the dam and canalization; but secondary canals to the fields have been left to the companies. In return for the provision of water, the agribusiness companies pay 750 rials per hectare per year. Rabbani, studying the cost-benefit of the Dez Dam project, states that this sum is so tiny that it is impossible to consider it as being of any economic significance at all. If it were mainly villagers using the waters of the Dez dam then perhaps it would have been justifiable to disregard the question of a return on the capital invested in the irrigation equipment and channels, but since it is a number of commercial companies who are using the land, it seems ridiculous not to be concerned over the economics of the project.[44]

Moreover, the State has pursued a generous loan policy towards the agribusiness companies. According to the report of the Bureau of Management Services, by 1976 four of the agribusiness companies had borrowed over two billion rials from two State owned banks:

Company	Loans (in million rials) A.D.B.I.	Bank Melli
The Iran-California Corporation	500.00	-
Iran Shellcott Co.	460.00	-
Agro-Industries of Iran and America	633.00	-
International Agricultural Corp. of Iran	228.75	228.75

In order to understand the generosity of the State towards these companies, one may compare these loans with the total amount of loans granted to peasant families through cooperatives. Thus, while around 2.7 million peasant families all together received slightly over 2.4 billion rials in 1976,[45] only four of these agribusiness companies enjoyed loans of over 2.0 billion rials. The rate of interest on these loans is 9.5% which is lower than the average rates that the State owned banks charge ordinary borrowers. Yet, the companies did not seem to be happy with it. Thus

a Mitchell Cotts executive remarked that with that kind of money around their neck, it was difficult to make a profit . He believed the company deserved soft loans from the Agricultural Development Bank at 3.5% rather than at 9.5% commercial rates which Shellcott paid.[46]

The agribusiness ventures represent the most mechanized and modern agriculture in Iran. For this reason, the companies were offered facilities to import machinery. Shellcotts, for instance, imported a bulk purchase of equipment including tractors and combines, on the grounds that the locally manufactured Rumanian tractors were not suitable.[47] These massive imports of the most advanced agricultural equipment have enabled the companies to have a fully mechanized operation. Thus Zahedani points out that the entire operation from land preparation to post-harvest is done with the aid of mechanical power. Land levelling is typically the first stage and is a special characteristic of this category. The very heavy and expensive equipment for this purpose is absent in all other categories. Ploughing is done with the most advanced equipment and attachment. Seeding and fertilizing is done by mechanical means and using the best seeds available and recommended quantities of fertilizers. Cultivation is done by mechanical means and at the highest intensity. Chemicals are used heavily and specific chemicals not generally available in Iran are imported. Irrigation water is used at higher quantities than in most other categories. Harvesters are used for nearly all crops.[48]

So it seemed that all the objective conditions were prepared for successful business. This made the companies' share-holders optimistic about the future of their companies. Thus Naraghi stated that, 'with enough water for irrigation, enough power for processing plants, and enough insecticides and fertilizers from the petrochemical plants nearby, success is almost guaranteed here (i.e. Khuzistan)... Anyone who cannot make it on Khuzistan has no business being a farmer.'[49]

The above argument shows that some five agribusiness companies with

the support of the State brought together all means of production, i.e. land, water, capital as well as the advanced machinery. On the other hand, we stated that the creation of the "new" landed property for these companies was accompanied by the separation of some 6,500 peasant families with 40,000 population from the land. In this way, *the necessary condition of exchange between capital and labour was prepared.*[50] In fact, the labour of the local peasants seemed to be a good source of wealth. Thus, Naraghi pointed out in 1970 that, '*labour cost is a tenth of what it is in California,... and almost everything does well.* Asparagus grows faster than in California, and with a better root system. I can get ten cuts of alfalfa here a year, and the protein content of Khuzistan alfalfa is higher than any other in the world.'[51] But the incorporation of the objective conditions of production with labour (as the subjective condition of production) did not take place as easily as the capitalist-investors expected. By 1976, all agribusiness companies have run into human problems. That is, not only have the detached peasants 'been reluctant to move, *they have also been reluctant to work for others on land which historically they regarded as theirs*, especially as the majority of work offered has been casual labour.'[52] Having been faced with such labour problems, a senior Mitchell Cotts executive stated that, Khuzistan was not like Africa,'where manual labour is forthcoming at very low wages. Peasants didn't want to work for the agribusinesses,..., because they weren't faced with absolute economic necessity.'[53] But it appears that he had forgotten that *it takes time for capital to make labour.*[54]

Owing to the massive investment in the most modern agricultural machinery, one would expect the employment of labour per hectare in the agribusiness farms to be the lowest of all the types of farms which we have examined. This has resulted in a relatively low level of demand for labour. Thus Rabbani, referring to the employment problems of the local peasants, states that these fully mechanized farms cannot absorb all the former peasant-landholders. This is because they need only a

small labour force and usually gather this from the youngest and most active men.[55] Wage rates for these unskilled labourers were very low in Khuzistan, as they were in most of Iran. Thus according to Zahedani in 1973-74, wage-labourers were paid on average between 60 to 80 rials for a full working-day.[56] However, during the years after 1973, the wage rates, for one reason or another, increased. Thus in 1975 Richards reported that an unskilled man was paid 120 rials for a working-day by Shellcott company.[57] In addition to the male labourers, young women are employed as well.[58] And as a general rule they are paid less than men. Shellcott's women wage-labourers in 1973-74, for instance, were paid 20% less than men, i.e. wage rate of a woman wage-labourer was 95 rials.[59]

It appears that wages are the sole source of income for the wage-labourers on these large farms. It is almost impossible for these wage-labourers to keep any animals and poultry. The employed labourers are settled in the five "modern" villages built in the area by the Ministry of Water and Power. But as a KWPA engineer responsible for the design of rooms stated, 'the rooms were deliberately made small in order to prevent the villagers from living with their animals as they had done in their former homes.'[60] In this sense, these labourers are worse off than the *khoshneshin* wage-labourers, because the latter may raise chickens, cows, goats and sheep in order to supplement their meagre income from labouring in the fields. On the other hand, these labourers do not collect any portion of agribusiness's profit. This is because, unlike the peasant-shareholders in corporations they are not shareholders of the ventures which they work for.

As we have already pointed out, the peasants of some 58 villages within the project area had to sell their allotments to the State. But after the purchase, the peasants had almost no money in their hands. George Wilson, once the head of the California Farm Bureau, explained the peasants' situation in the following way: 'all the villagers got progress-

ively into debt as Khuzistan was modernized. So badly in debt that when KWPA come to buy their lands, the net gain of the villagers was almost nothing.'[61] The peasants either stayed in the area and started working for the companies, or left their home lands for urban centres. These latter, with almost no money in their hands, have had to search in the urban centres for casual jobs. Since a great many of them are old, it is difficult for them to be absorbed into the nascent industrial sector. However, the situation of the former group, i.e those who stayed to work for the companies, was not better. For those who were actually paid something soon found out that more or less the same sum of money was demanded of them to pay for their houses in the "modern villages". Richards describes the houses in one of these "modern villages": 'the new town (village) so far constructed are without piped water, modern plumbing, or waste treatment facilities. Communal taps serve as the source of drinking water, and for every two units (20 persons) there is an outdoor lavatory. Because KWPA thought the traditional mud houses uncivilized, the new ones are made of cinder blocks, which are far less suited to local conditions, being very hot in summer and very cold in winter.'[62]

Apparently, the agribusiness project was launched on the ground that the local farmers of Khuzistan are not capable of using modern methods of setting up producers' cooperatives.[63] The project, therefore, aimed at the maximum utilization of water resources and land irrigable from dams for increasing agricultural production. These ventures' activities were supposed to cover a very wide field, including poultry and fish farming, fruit and vegetable production and processing, oilseed production and processing, forage crop production and processing, production of cuttings, seeds and flowers, and food industries. The products of these ventures were supposed to be marketed within the country as well as in world markets. It was therefore planned to create a source of foreign exchange for the country. However, by 1974, it was already well known

that such large scale agricultural units were not economic.[64]

Thus in 1974, one year after the crisis began in Iran, the pioneer agribusiness venture (Hashem Naraghi Agro-Industries of Iran and America) went bankrupt and the American partner pulled out of the business. The present crisis of Iran has affected almost all agribusiness companies in Khuzistan.[65] By 1978, out of the seven joint ventures which were formed in Khuzistan, only the International Agribusiness Corporation of Iran was still afloat with its original owner. The other ventures have been bought by the State.

Different writers have mentioned different causes of the bankruptcy of the agribusiness ventures in Iran. However, none of them seems to be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate the failure of this project. The summary below supports this view:

Some agribusiness officials expressed dissatisfaction with the policies of the Government. One of the Mitchell Cotts executives, for instance, referred to 9½% interest rates on loans from the A.D.B.I., and stated: 'with that kind of money around your neck, it's bloody difficult to make a profit.' He said his company deserved soft loans from the bank at 3½%. In addition, the same company only a few years after its establishment 'found out it could not double-crop; the land was in much worse condition than expected, requiring heavy investments in fertilizers; more earth than anticipated had to be moved in order to level massive tracts of land for precise methods of irrigation; the KWPA fell behind the agreed upon timetable for construction of irrigation works.'[66]

The land levelling for precise methods of irrigation turned out to be far more costly than had been anticipated. In addition, not only were the companies repeatedly asked to increase their capital, but the Government also declined to give the promised assistance. Many cropping decisions were commercially unsound or unrealistic; while from the outset these companies 'lacked competent farm managers ...'[67]

The agribusiness companies have been faced with excessively high overhead costs (for land levelling and secondary canals) and a low level of production. They complained of management problems. But more important was an acute shortage of Government-promised water for lands under cultivation. That is, 'the big Dez dam, ..., has a theoretical irrigation capacity of 100,000 hectares, but today (1976) it is only covering 18,000 hectares.'[68]

In addition, there was misunderstanding over what the Government promised and the owners expected, delays in delivery of equipment and canal-building, and the salinity of the soil.[69] Good agricultural planning was missing: the farms were producing but returns were insufficient because of costs which rose astronomically after 1973.[70]

Conclusion

The specific form of relations of production (as examined in the previous chapter) plus a high rate of illiteracy have caused problems for the employment of "modern" technology in the labour-process. This phenomenon plus a fragmented type of landholding have caused a low rate of growth in the agricultural sector. That is, the growth rate during the 1970s has been no more than 2½% per annum. This has caused shortages of almost all farm commodities, which consequently directed the State to increase its food imports.[71] The agribusiness project was allegedly intended to solve these problems. However, after a few years in operation, we can see that these joint-ventures have not only taken no steps to these problems, but they have also created other problems such as peasant unemployment. In addition, as large bankrupted units, they are a burden on the shoulders of the State.

This chapter has tried to show that both State led experiments to increase agricultural production have resulted in an increasing burden on the State, while accelerating the development of capitalist relations in

the countryside. The corporation project created a body of State-employed experts and bureaucrats, which controls the peasants' lands; while, as we have seen, many of the agribusiness ventures have gone bankrupt or have been losing money heavily. Despite their lack of financial sources, *they have helped to suppress the development of peasant-bourgeoisie and introduce/reinforce the development of capitalism from above.*

NOTES TO CHAPTER XI

1. Denman, 1973, p.207
2. Richards, 1975, p.10
3. See Statistical Yearbook 1976, p.252/50
4. Denman, 1973, p.213
5. Ibid, pp.212-13
6. Richards, 1975, p.11
7. The argument that follows is based on four monographs, carried out by scholars in the Institute of Social Research and Studies, University of Tehran. They are as follows :
   Azkia, M., Dargazin Corporation (Hamadan), August/SEpt. 1971
   Babai-e Hemati, GH., Ferah Corporation (Sanandaj) August/Sept. 1971
   Kiani Manesh, D., Garmsar Corporation (Garmsar) August/Sept. 1971
   Neek Kholq, A. Samaskandeh Corporation (Sari) August/Sept. 1971
8. Denman, 1973, pp.218-19
9. See Neek Kholq, p.188, Babai-e Hemati, p.136, and Kiani Manesh p.101 respectively.
10. Ibid, p.187, p.137, p.103 respectively
11. Ibid, p.186, p.142, p. 103 respectively
12. Kiani Manesh, p.101
13. See Babai-e Hemati, Table 64, p.236
14. See Kiani Manesh, p.105, Babai-e Hemati, p.146, and Neek Kholq Table 78, p.267, respectively.
15. Ibid, p.105, p.148, and p.267 respectively
16. Denman, 1973, p. 218
17. See Babai-e Hemati, Tables 30 and 33.
18. See Katouzian, 1978, Tables 4 and 5, p.360.
19. Khatibi, 1975, p.25
20. See Babai-e Hemati, p.113.
21. Ibid, Tables 21 and 24
22. Ibid, Table 21
23. See Neek Kholq, pp.45-53
24. Ibid, p.42
25. Babai-e Hemati, pp.84-85
26. Kiani Manesh, p.82
27. Neek Kholq, p.154
28. Kiani Manesh, p.82
29. Neek Kholq, pp.54-55
30. Feder, 1976, pp.413-14
31. Ibid, p.414
32. See Lilienthal, 1959
33. Richards, 1975, p.13
34. Feder, 1976, p.416
35. Ibid, 421
36. See The Financial Times, Oct. 21, 1976
37. Rabbani, 1971, p.159; we shall discuss this point below
38. Marx, 1976, pp.915-16
39. Richards, 1975, p.14
40. In fact, in the earlier stages of the development of capitalism, one of the main functions of the state is to use its power in

favour of the bourgeoisie wherever the economic mechanisms cease to function. See Marx, 1976, p.382 and pp.899-900.

41. Richards, 1975, p.14
42. Zahedani, 1974, p.30
43. Rabbani, 1971, p.162
44. Ibid, p.162
45. See Table XXXI.
46. Richards, 1975, p.17
47. See Field, 1972, pp.70-71.
48. Zahedani, 1974, pp.66-67
49. Griggs, 1970, p.128
50. See Marx, 1974, pp.295-96.
51. Griggs, 1970, p.128, italics added
52. The Financial Times, Oct. 21, 1976, italics added
53. Richards, 1975, p.17
54. On the relationship between labour and capital Marx states that, 'it is not enough that the conditions of labour are concentrated at one pole of society in the shape of capital, while at the other pole are grouped masses of men who have nothing to sell but their labour-power. Nor is it enough that they are compelled to sell themselves voluntarily. The advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education, tradition and habit looks upon the requirement of that mode of production as self-evident natural laws.', Marx, 1976, p.899
55. Rabbani, 1971, p.159
56. Zahedani, 1974, p.92. It appears that this range of wage rates is not very different from other parts of the country. For example, Hooglund, who conducted field research in 1971-72, wrote that for a working day an experienced man earned between 60 to 90 rials. See Hooglund, 1973, p.237.
57. Richards, 1975, p.15
58. Griggs in his photographs quite clearly shows this point; see Griggs, 1970,
59. Richards, 1975, p.15
60. Ibid, p.14
61. Ibid
62. Ibid
63. Rabbani, 1971, p.158
64. This may be attributed to the following economic factors: high costs of land leveling and building the secondary channels, the poor quality of the soil, and high over-head costs.
65. There are no reports on other ventures in the other provinces.
66. Richards, 1975, pp.16-17
67. Weinbaum, 1977, pp.439-40
68. The Financial Times, June 21, 1976, p.16
69. See The Economist, August 28, 1976, p.40
70. The Financial Times, Sept. 12, 1978, p.22
71. See The Financial Times, June 21, 1976, p.16

CONCLUSION

The implementation of the L-R programme may be considered as a turning point in the history of rural Iran. We have, therefore, set out in this thesis to analyse the immediate impact of this programme on relations of production in rural Iran. In order to do so, we divided our study into three parts: in the first part we analysed relations of production in the period 1940-1960; in the second part, we presented an overview of the L-R movement and the implementation and laws of the reform itself; and finally in the third part, we analysed relations of production in rural Iran after the implementation of L-R.

In examining relations of production in rural Iran prior to L-R, we distinguished two sets of relations: those between landlord and peasant on the one hand and those among the peasants on the other. The relationship between landlord and peasant comprised property relations and different forms of rent. The landowning class owned around 83% of the total cultivable lands, while the rest belonged to the peasants. The former also owned almost all water sources of the country. However, in order to make their properties (land and water) effective, the owners (of land/water) raised the peasants to the position of possession of land, *nasaq*-holding. However, the landlord had the power to suspend his subjects from their positions. The ownership of land and water, accompanied by the political dominance of landlords over the peasants, enabled the former to extract surplus (*rent*) from the latter.

On the basis of the ownership and possession of land and water and the articulation of these two, we distinguished different forms of rent. The dominant form of rent payment was the share-cropping system. On the basis of the relationship between direct-producer and non-producer, we distinguished two types of share-cropping: share-cropping of the winter crops (*mozare'e*) and share-cropping of the summer crops (*nesfeh kari*).

Our analysis of the labour process of the former type showed that it was a feudal rent but moved away from its original form in the classical feudal mode of production. On the other hand, the share-cropping for the summer crops was based on the capitalist relations. There was therefore no question of the non-economic domination/subordination relationship between the non-producers and direct-producers in this system. The share-cropping for the summer crops was employed for the production of vegetables; hence it was produced on the lands surrounding the towns and cities.

The second form of rent was the fixed rent which was dominant only in the Caspian sea littoral, though it existed in other parts to some extent. Our analysis of the fixed rent showed that this system is very close to the capitalist (absolute/differential) ground rent. That is, in this system, the *nasaq*-holders had to hand over a certain amount of cash and/or produce to their landlords.

In some arid areas, where the direct-producers actually owned land, the rent was paid for the use of water. Each direct-producer had the right to use a certain amount of water for his cultivation; in return he had to hand over a certain amount of produce and/or cash. In addition to these different forms of rent, in some cases the peasants were subject to a combination of two or more types of rent.

Almost all these forms of rent were supplemented by labour service and dues. In many parts of Iran, peasants had to undertake jobs, such as the construction/repairing of *qanats*, road building, and transportation, without any reward. In addition to labour service, the peasants were bound to give some products, such as eggs, butter, meat, to their landlords.

Having reviewed all the forms of extraction of surplus, we tried to answer the question as to why the peasants undertook these forms of exploitation? Were they tied to the land? Thus we briefly analysed incentive and disincentive factors which induced the peasants to move away from their home villages. Our analysis of these factors showed

that some economic factors induced the peasants to remain in their home villages; whereas others encouraged them to migrate to the towns and cities and/or other villages. Generally speaking, the peasants remained in their own home villages, not because of their political subordination to their landlords, but because of the economic incentives which they had in their villages. This drove them, in effect, to a considerable extent, to become subordinate to their landlords.

The imposition of feudal and semi-feudal rents on the peasants drove the latter to stand against the exploiting class on different occasions, in 1945-46 and 1952. However, in the late 1950s, the peasants' revolts started again, particularly in the north and north-west, and we showed how this affected the relationship between landlords and peasants: in some cases, the share of peasants out of the total produce was increased, in others, labour-service and dues were reduced or cancelled, and finally in some areas, the dominance of the landowning class was reduced to the economic domain only.

The relationships among the peasants were more complicated than the relationship between the peasantry and landlords. This is because while they were working in *bonehs* and therefore had some form of cooperation with each other, they had already developed capitalist types of relationship among themselves.

Poor peasants not only were subject to feudal exploitation, but also were exploited by other agents of production. In a *boneh* poor peasants had nothing to contribute to the labour process but their labour; they had to undertake heavy work and had no control over the labour process. They worked with the means of production (other than land/water) which belonged to the head of the *boneh* (*gavband*). The latter collected a share for his means of production. However this extraction of surplus-value took place through economic mechanisms. The poor peasants also borrowed money and or seeds from the rich peasants which they paid back

with interest. In addition, the poor peasants had to sell their labour-power in the urban or rural labour market, because they were unable to reproduce themselves and their families with just their shares out of the total produce. One may ask whether or not these poor peasants could be considered as wage-labourers? In other words, had these agents of production been entirely freed from the objective conditions of production as well as from bondage and servitudes? One may not consider them as such if one compares their positions with those of wage-labourers in a capitalist social formation. As Marx put it, in order for an agent of production to become a wage-labourer, he has to be free in a "double sense": free from the old relations of servitudes and bondage, as well as free of any means of production of his own.[1] Thus, the poor peasants may not be considered as wage-labourers for the following reasons: they were in the position of possession of land; they were able to produce their subsistence from their possessed/owned lands for a part of the year, and therefore they were casual vendors of labour-power. On the other hand, although they were free to leave their home villages they had narrow opportunities outside their villages which made them become subject to the bondage and servitude of their feudal landlords: they were therefore subject to feudal exploitation not because of the dominance of the landlords at the political level, but because they had almost no other economic opportunity in other sectors of the economy to reproduce themselves.

Contrary to the poor peasants, rich peasants were only subject to feudal exploitation by their landlords. They controlled the labour-process and undertook lighter work in this process. They had managed to accumulate some wealth and means of production, through which they had established exploitative relationships with the poor and middle peasantry. They sold a portion of their share of produce in the market.[2]

Finally, the middle peasantry was exploited by feudal landlords as well as rich peasants. However, they owned/possessed more means of

production than the poor peasants, and therefore they collected a higher portion of the total produce. They occasionally resorted to selling their labour-power.

The CMP reinforced the process of the reproduction of the conditions of production of itself as well as of the FMP. As Foster-Carter points out: '... far from banishing pre-capitalist forms, it (capitalism) not only coexists with them but buttresses them, and even on occasions devilishly conjures them up *ex nihilo*.'[3] On the other hand, the FMP not only provided the conditions for the appearance of the CMP (the point which is out of the scope of this study), but also produced and reproduced the material conditions of bourgeois relations of production. Paradoxically it was only this development which permitted the non-capitalist relations of production to continue to dominate the Iranian rural social formation.

The following comments on this process of articulation are in order here. First, pre-capitalist relations and elements did not play a passive role, the rôle which is attributed to them in Luxemburg's model. In effect they were as active as those of the capitalist mode. That is why we characterized our social formation by analysing the dynamics of both feudal and capitalist modes of production.[4] As a remarkable example of the active role which feudalism played in this articulation we may quote Khamsi, who rightly states: '... the rich peasants were not a dynamic force in the countryside comparable to the kulaks in Russia at the turn of the century, because *the existing feudal relations and the narrowness of the market allowed them little economic rein.*' Secondly, the articulation of the two modes of production showed that the FMP did not allow capitalism to develop as a direct and inevitable process: i.e. to undermine the feudal relations of production and replace them with those of capitalism; that is, the process which is conceived in the *Manifesto*.[6] Instead, each one of these two modes reproduced conditions

of production of the whole system. The process of "*undermining but at the same time perpetuating*" was the form of relationship between the two modes of production.[7]

Thirdly, the extraction of surplus-value through economic mechanisms on the part of the *gavbands*, accompanied by partial separation of the poor peasants from the objective conditions of production indicate that the process of primitive capital accumulation had already begun, and therefore, *capital had taken root* from inside the Iranian rural social formation.[8] Here, by "capital", we do not mean a sum of material and produced means of production, 'but rather a definite social production relation, belonging to a definite historical formation of society, which is manifested in a thing and lends this thing a specific social character.'[9] It follows that "primitive capital accumulation" is nothing else than the historical process of separating direct-producers from the means of production as well as the old bondage and servitude.[10]

Fourthly, the anti-landlord revolts in our social formation were attempts on the part of the peasantry to remove feudal ties and therefore release the dynamic forces for the development of capitalism within the peasantry, *viz.* the American way of capitalist development. Thus there was no contradiction between these two modes in the sense which has been developed in some studies,[11] since the latter were articulated. In effect, as almost all examples of revolts have shown, the main contradiction was between the peasantry as a whole on the one hand and feudal landlords (and their agents) on the other. The suppression of these revolts obviously resulted in blocking the development of capitalism through the American path by blocking the primitive capital accumulation to become a capital accumulation on an extended scale.

Fifth, we tried to show that rural Iran prior to L-R was a semi-feudal-semi-capitalist social formation, not because of the dominance of the share-cropping system, as the main form of exaction of surplus,[12] but because the capitalist relations of production had already developed in

rural Iran and thus the relations of production of the two modes of production were articulated.

Sixth, capital accumulation, as the cornerstone of capitalist development, was blocked by the feudal landlords.[13] *It was therefore necessary to break these feudal relations of production in the economic sphere by a political act, i.e. L-R, and open the way for capital accumulation on an extended scale.* Here we can see a direct relationship between L-R, as defined in Chapter IX, and economic development in the sense of expansion/reinforcement of the capitalist relations/forces of production.

In the second part of this study, we set out to review the events and laws of L-R during the period 1940-1970. This was to show the attempts which were made to reinforce the development of capitalism in rural Iran. Thus we described the land policy of the Democrats of Azarbaijan, Qavam and Dr. Mossadeq. It was stated that owing to the pressure on the part of the peasantry, Qavam and Dr. Mossadeq had to take some measures in 1945-46 and 1952 respectively. But their policies hardly affected the peasantry. In 1953, when the *Coup* government (supported by comprador bourgeoisie and feudal landlords) came to power, the landlords managed to suppress peasant movements. However, during 1955 to 1960, attempts were made to improve the conditions of life of the peasants. But all these mild measures were blocked by the feudal landlords, until the crisis of 1959-61 broke the alliance of comprador bourgeoisie and the feudal landlords. Then the political leaders of the former class managed to obtain the support of some other groups and launch a reform programme. Although different political groups were opposed to the programme, the reform government managed to suppress them and carry out its reform.

We ended this section with an argument on the causes of L-R. We criticized two different ideas, developed by different studies on this point. We argued that the economic crisis of 1959-61 brought about deficits in the budget and balance-of-payments, rural-urban mass migration,

unemployment in the urban centres, and stagnation in the agricultural and industrial sectors. This caused unrest in the urban centres as well as in the rural areas. In order to overcome this political and economic crisis, the State initiated a full-fledged reform programme which included reform in the system of land tenure.

In order to discover the nature of the nation-wide L-R programme, we set out to interpret the laws of this reform. Our interpretation of the L-R laws showed the following. First, this programme made attempts to change landed property in rural Iran. Thus in the first stage of L-R, many peasants who possessed land (*nasaq*-holders) were raised to the position of ownership of land; and in the second stage, more *nasaq*-holders became owners and/or leaseholders. The programme also encouraged some landlords to participate in the labour-process and therefore the *nasaq*-holders lost possession of land.

Secondly, in the case of irrigated lands, the *nasaq*-holders received land together with the water right from the *qanat* or river belonging to it according to local custom.

Thirdly, the programme gave the permission to the *nasaq*-holders to register their ownership of *a'yani* properties. These changes in property relations resulted in the disappearance of the share-cropping system, labour-service and dues.

Attempts have been made to assess the results of the Iranian L-R programme according to the number of peasants who received land. For example, Hooglund states that the answer to the following questions are crucial for an interpretation and assessment of Iran's L-R programme: how much land was actually redistributed, and what per cent of all villagers received land?[14] He reduces L-R to land re-distribution. The effects of any land reform-programme are conditioned by the mechanics of the reform process. For example, an extensive redistribution will affect the position and influence of landlords far more fundamentally than a nominal reform of tenure practice. Likewise, the results of a

relatively equitable redistribution of land among peasants can be expected to differ from those of an unequal redistribution. Also of significance is whether or not the reform benefits all villagers. On the basis of this general statement, he evaluates the results of the Iranian L-R programme: 'Evaluating Iran's land reform programme according to the above consideration, we can conclude that the Iranian effort has been, on balance, a fairly moderate one. Although an overwhelming majority of farmers have acquired some land, absentee ownership has not been eliminated and large landlords have been permitted to retain substantial holdings in many areas.'[15] It is implied in this quotation that the main aim of any L-R programme is an equitable redistribution of land among the peasants and since the Iranian officials fulfilled this aim to some extent, this programme was a fairly moderate one. But our argument in this thesis has been that the main object of the Iranian L-R programme was to remove the remnants of feudal relations of production from the rural scene. In order to fulfil this aim, the programme redistributed some lands among a certain number of peasants, while at the same time it encouraged some of the landlords to run their estates on the basis of the wage-labour system. Furthermore, following its main aim, the programme affected neither mechanized farms not the share-cropping system of summer crops (*nesfeh kari*).[16]

Generally speaking, an assessment of the immediate impact of the Iranian L-R programme should be made according to the extent to which it managed to remove the remnants of the FMP and induce the development of capitalism through the "American" and "Prussian" ways, and in this, the programme has been successful.

We showed that the L-R programme, in effect, reinforced the differentiation of the peasantry. In addition, the supplementary measures, taken by the State, helped the rich peasants accumulate capital; while the poor peasants remained unaffected by these measures. The cooperatives were established to support the peasants in different ways,

including money lending, marketing the agricultural products, supplying peasants with cheap products, etc. However, the cooperatives' activities were virtually reduced to money lending. Yet, only half of the peasants were able to obtain loans from the cooperatives. Some peasants complained about the insufficient amount of each loan., while many poor peasants stated that only rich peasants could obtain loans from the cooperatives. This forced the peasants to borrow money from money-cum-merchants to a considerable extent.

One of the main immediate effects of the Iranian L-R programme was a sharp increase in the number of proletarians and semi-proletarians. Thus in the late 1960s, there were around two million permanent and casual vendors of labour power in the rural areas. Apart from the urban centres, the demand for their labour power came from the middle and rich peasants and also the capitalist farmers. The study of the economy of rich peasants showed that they usually employed wage labourers at peak seasons, though they used family labour to some extent. The middle peasants were found to rely mainly on the family labour; however, they occasionally employed wage labourers at peak seasons.

Capitalist farmers employed agricultural machinery and produced mainly for the market. Each farm employed a few wage labourers permanently, but at peak seasons, it employed a number of casual labourers. The capitalist farmers had a monopsony position in the rural markets of their villages, they could therefore keep wages low. However, the labourers (local and migrant) had the opportunity to find jobs in other villages and/or the urban centres. Owing to the "prosperity" in the urban centres during 1973-77, many peasants preferred to work in the towns and cities; hence there happened to be a shortage of labourers in the rural labour market.

The State supported the capitalist farmers in different ways. Thus the latter could obtain low interest loans, custom free imports of agricultural machinery and also facilities for the exports of cash crops.

However, the L-R programme induced many landlords to shift to the capitalist methods of farming. They, therefore, employed machinery and wage labourers and produced mainly for the market.

The State's policy towards the establishment of large capitalist farms in the 1960s has caused Sodagar to believe that the transition from feudalism to capitalism in rural Iran took place through the "Prussian" way.[17] In his analysis of the development of capitalism in rural Iran, he overlooks the peasant bourgeoisie and looks at the "Prussian" path as the absolute dominant way of development of capitalism. However, our argument in this thesis showed that the development of capitalism through the "Prussian" and "American" paths has gone on side by side. In fact, the articulation of these two is the main characteristic feature of capitalism in rural Iran.

In the late 1960s, the State initiated two major projects to "develop" the agricultural sector, corporations and agribusiness units. For the establishment of corporations, the peasants in every few villages had to pool their fragmented plots. This changed the whole relations of production in the affected villages. Thus, the peasant owner/leaseholders lost their effective possession of land and other means of production; and a body of bureaucrats, experts, and rich peasants, took the control of land, water as well as machinery. The peasants became share-holders and therefore collected a portion of the total profit according to their shares. However, since the share of each family out of the total profit was negligible, almost all peasants had to work for the corporations as wage labourers and/or as share-croppers. This state of affairs gave the impression to the peasant share-holders that the State has taken over their land and become the new landlord.

The agribusiness project affected the peasant owner/leaseholders in a different way. Under the 'Downstream Land Use Law' the peasant owner/leaseholders were forced to sell their allotments to the State. The lands were rented by international companies. Apart from the provision

of land and water, the State provided the companies with long term loans and allowed them to import modern machinery and fertilizers. Unlike those in the corporations, the peasants in these areas did not become share-holders; and moreover, owing to the employment of sophisticated agricultural machines, only a small percentage of them managed to find jobs (as wage labourers) in the agribusiness companies. However, even if not financially successful, both agribusiness units and corporations contributed to the further development of capitalist relations, carrying on the work began by the State in the 1960s land reform.

NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION

1. Marx, 1974, p.507
2. According to an estimation, the peasantry was able to market around 20 to 25 percent of its total produce. See Khamsi, 1968, p.80. On the basis of this estimation, one may say that a fairly high amount of this marketed produce was supplied by the rich peasants.
3. Foster-Carter, 1978, p.51
4. See Foster-Carter's comment on this point, ibid, p.107; and also see Bradby, 1975, p.128.
5. Khamsi, 1969, p.22, italics added
6. See Brenner, 1977, p.25
7. This is the term used by Meillasoux, 1972, p.103; Bettleheim talks about "conservation/dissolution", see Bettleheim , 1972, p.297.
8. With regard to these two points Bradby poses the following question: 'If we consider the growth of capitalism on a world scale, do we see one primitive accumulation, or many - in other words, does capitalism have to "take root" from inside a social formation, or is an assimilation from the outside possible ?' See Bradby, 1975, p.130.
9. Marx, 1971, p.814; see also Marx, 1976, pp.988-89
10. See Marx, 1974, pp.506-09; and also Marx, 1976, pp.874-75
11. See Mo'meni and G.O.P.F., 1976
12. Badi, 1959 and Seidov, 1963
13. There appear to be two different approaches to the agricultural development in the UDCs :the 'improvement' approach and the 'transformation' approach. The improvement approach aims at the development of the agricultural system within the existing mode of production and is mainly concerned with the improvement of methods of production and animal husbandry. The transformation approach is an attempt to establish a "new" set of relations of production and therefore increasing production. This classification is based on Long, 1977, pp.144-45 and pp.158-59.
14. Hooglund, 1975, pp.4-5
15. Ibid, p.117; for a more or less the same type of evaluation, see Warriner, 1969, chapter V, pp.109-35; ... Keddie, 1968; and also Khamsi, 1969.
16. Sodagar criticises the L-R programme by stating that the vegetable-growers(seifi-Karan)did not receive any land at all; see Sodagar, 1979, p.46. The reason is to sought in the fact that the relationship between the producers and non-producers in this type of share-cropping is of a capitalist type; see our argument in chapter II.
17. See Sodagar, 1979, p.8 and p.27.

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